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Part 1 Introduction
Chapter 1.1 Introduction
In 1994, the Netherlands judiciary set up its first platform for dis-
cussing information technology for its courts. The initiative for the
platform was taken by the Dutch Association of Magistrates NVVR.
The platform served as a discussion partner for the Ministry of Justice,
which was in charge of providing the courts with information techno-
logy (IT). It was the beginning of my involvement with IT for courts.
The involvement went from this simple talking platform through the
first IT policy for the Dutch judiciary into the international arena of ad-
visory work for World Bank-supported judicial reform projects. Under-
standing what IT can do for what judiciaries and courts do has, in all
those contexts, been the thorniest question around. This difficulty is
not something only judiciaries have. Understanding IT implications
for business has been identified as the most important problem all or-
ganizations and businesses face when dealing with IT. As we shall
see, this understanding is critical for judiciaries who want to use IT to
improve their performance. That is the starting point for this study.
Judicial reform
Changing, adapting and improving judiciaries, courts and their pro-
cesses are all included in the broad term judicial reform. In this study,
the term judicial reform includes all those activities. There are many
impulses for judicial reform.
Around the world, judiciaries are faced with new problems. In North
America, the demand for court decisions has increased considerably.
In Western Europe, demand for judicial decisions has grown as well,
and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has led
to reforms in procedures and governance structures. In Eastern Europe,
courts experience the same influences, but they also have to meet
new demands as their countries develop into free market economies
and aspire to join the European Union. In Latin America, the rise of
democratic government has also increased the demand for judicial de-
cisions. In Asia, the picture is mixed as some countries have quickly
developed into fast-growing market economies, while others stay be-
hind in terms of economic development. In all developing countries,
the influence of globalization is felt. A properly working judiciary is a
condition for joining the World Trade Organization. For some, there
is also the struggle with a legal system inherited from a colonial past.
Information technology is popular as a possible means to resolve
some of those problems. In practice, IT does not solve any of them
quite so easily. Judicial organizations and justice authorities struggle
with IT in the courts. Understanding how judiciaries can solve some
of their major problems with IT should be helpful.
Information technology
IT is the most striking factor in changing the world in our era. It has
profoundly changed the way large parts of humanity interact and com-
municate. IT has increased accuracy. It has made information infinitely
more available. It has facilitated communication across the globe. It is
attractive because it implies the promise of things becoming better and
easier. Moreover, IT is a constant source of change as computing power
increases, new applications are marketed and new usages develop. Ad-
ministering justice is an activity that is made up of having information
available, communicating about it, and producing new information. It
seems IT will affect the way the administration of justice works. Under-
standing such effects, and how they can be used to improve the admin-
istration of justice, should be useful.
Concept for a thesis
Improving the understanding of how information technology can sup-
port improving the administration of justice and resolving the major
problems judiciaries face is, therefore, a deserving undertaking. In
some judiciaries with which I am familiar, the feeling generally is that
the most pressing problem related to IT is that the technology is not
understood. However, to my mind, a better understanding of technol-
ogy is not the right starting point for researching this topic. The first
thing that needs to be understood is at the other end of the spectrum:
it is in understanding court processes and the role of information in
them. Second, improving the processes requires an understanding of
what the problems are. Therefore, my first question is to inquire about
the most pressing problems. The second question will be to examine
the role of information in the context of those problems.
In order to find out what the most pressing problems are, I have
chosen to draw on the experiences and opinions of users of the courts.
The reason for this is that judiciaries, with their decision making
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monopoly and their institutional independence, risk not being in touch
with those who use their services. Over the centuries and all over the
world, three major complaints have been heard that can still be heard
today: court processes take too long, courts are difficult to access, and
judges are corrupt.
In my view, delay, access and corruption are three crucial issues any
judicial organization or court faces. They are the three most common
complaints of court users around the world. The empirical foundation
for this statement can be found in the opening sections of this thesis
in Part 3 (delay), Part 4 (access) and Part 5 (integrity). The issues also
relate to three of the standards laid down in the international human
rights conventions’ provisions on courts, discussed in Chapter 1.2. And
in organizational terms, they are also the issues organizations face
when doing business: internal processes, interaction with clients and
the integrity of the organization. Finally, there are claims that each of
them can be resolved with information technology. Consequently, I will
examine the role of information in court processes using these three
complaints as starting points. This will serve to produce some under-
standing of the role of information in those processes, and how they
can be improved with IT. This understanding should uncover ways to
reduce the complaints from the users.
Problem and research question
The main research question, therefore, is how IT can support improv-
ing the problems of delay, access and integrity in courts and judiciaries.
For this main research question, it is difficult to find specific research.
There is almost no organized expertise regarding judicial reform and
information technology. Technology and the work of judicial organiza-
tions are, apparently, worlds apart. The most common sources of infor-
mation on the subject each have specific perspectives and specific pro-
blems. Consultancy, external expertise hired for help with solving spe-
cific problems, brings a corresponding problem-solving perspective.
For this reason, it tends to be technocratic in the sense that it treats its
subject from a perspective of technical process improvement, or from
the perspective of technology itself. Academic research can provide
some badly needed conceptual clarity. Its limitation is that it usually
lacks practical knowledge of how courts work in actual practice. An-
other problem is that there is, by now, a whole body of practical experi-
ence with information technology in the courts, but that it is not easily
accessible because it is so dispersed.
In isolation, all these sources can provide some interesting insights.
However, it is when they are judiciously combined and confronted that
we can really improve our understanding with new insights.
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This poses some interesting methodological challenges. The main
challenges are in the use of empirical material and in using, and draw-
ing conclusions from, sources of such wide diversity. The next section
will discuss methodology, including these challenges.
Methodology
This section provides a general discussion of the methodology used in
this study. More detailed methodological considerations are presented
in each of the relevant chapters.
General approach
The three issues— delay, access, and integrity – are each examined se-
parately using the following general approach.
First, in each case, existing literature and theoretical approaches of
the issue at hand are explored and analyzed to provide a conceptual
framework for the next step.
Then, using the conceptual framework, sources of empirical research
into the issue are examined. This approach draws on a great variety of
sources: primary sources, such as court case statistics and other quanti-
tative sources; and secondary sources, like socio-legal studies and re-
ports on judicial reform projects. The purpose is to gain an under-
standing of practical reality regarding the issue in question.
Next, the findings are analyzed to identify informational aspects of
the issue. This should result in potential remedies for the issue in-
volved.
Finally, conclusions are drawn on the role information technology
can play in resolving or at least reducing the problem in question. The
technology should be proven technology, which has demonstrated it
has the potential to help a judicial organization to realize values to a
larger extent than before it was introduced.
Within this general approach, each issue raises its own questions. To
answer those, each issue is given its own approach. This is done, be-
cause of the nature of the issue involved. Second, empirical sources dif-
fer, which sets limitations on the approach and on the scope of the ex-
amination of the issue. These differences are accounted for in the treat-
ment of each issue.
Studying judiciaries and courts in an international perspective poses
particular challenges. Legal systems have evolved over time, mostly in
their own national political context. They each have their own practices
and conceptual frameworks. Their processes and cultures are influ-
enced by their environment and by the issues they have confronted.
The specific conceptual clarity that is required to meet this challenge is
discussed later in this chapter, in a section that deals with the concepts
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of courts and related matters. At the same time, courts the world over
have some things in common: their role in the legal system and their
activity in deciding individual disputes.
The most important challenge, however, has to do with empirical
material. Practical experience of court processes is often lacking. I con-
sider this a key ingredient in the analysis of court processes. Without
an empirical foundation, a foundation grounded in practice, the value
of research on courts and judiciaries is limited at best. My first source
of practical experience is my own professional history as a judge since
1986. My next source is a collection of materials that has formed over
the years. I have collected many sources and empirical materials. Some
of them are from my research for the World Bank in 2003-2007. That
research is the subject of Chapter 1.3. The others are common sources
that judicial reform experts at the World Bank and elsewhere use for
their work in supporting judicial reform projects. There is a more de-
tailed discussion of those sources in Chapter 1.3 as well. Nearly all of
my sources are publicly available on the Internet. The URLs are in-
cluded in the list of references. The empirical material I use generally
serves to illustrate an argument and make it understandable for the
audience. It usually does not serve to test a hypothesis, or to prove that
IT supports judicial reform.
Another challenge is in the use of sources that are different in their
concepts and approaches. This variety poses the question of how con-
cepts can be translated from one approach to another. Part of the solu-
tion is to strive for conceptual clarity: this is addressed later in this
chapter with some general definitions. Apart from that, trying to an-
swer this question in general is not very useful. Therefore, my transla-
tions will, in each case, be accounted for in the context in which they
are made.
Limitations on the scope of the study
This study’s scope is IT support for courts and judiciaries in the light
of delay, access and integrity. I have limited the scope on some impor-
tant points that need clarification.
The first limitation is the decision not to examine court manage-
ment. Court management is also a highly relevant area that has under-
gone much change under the influence of IT. However, I am a judge
without any court management experience. My expertise is in judicial
processes, not in managing courts. My expertise does not justify
making statements about court management. Hence, I limit myself to
the judicial processes. All those highly competent court managers out
there are invited to take up their pens and write about court manage-
ment and IT.
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The second limitation is in the case studies. They deal with civil law
only. The first reason for this limitation is that the case studies, particu-
larly the ones on case delay, build on earlier work in the same field.
Another reason is again my lack of expertise, in this case in adminis-
trative law. Moreover, in my experience, discussing administrative law
in an international perspective is very difficult because the institutional
arrangements for it are so fundamentally different that they are diffi-
cult to compare and study apart from their context. As for criminal
law: Criminal justice operates in its own information chain with the
police, the prosecution, defense lawyers, probation services, victims’
support agencies and others. This information chain has its own dy-
namic. The field deserves more attention than I could have given it in
this study.
Finally, the study will not discuss matters relating to cost. Cost is a
highly relevant perspective for the issues of delay and access. IT was
claimed as a way to reduce costs. IT was going to make processing
cases cheaper. I have not found evidence supporting this claim.
Whether cost can be reduced, thereby increasing access to justice, is an
interesting and relevant research question. It emerged several times
during my research. Costs come in different categories: cost for justice
seekers, cost of courts, and cost of individual procedures. Studying
whether each of them is affected by the introduction of different forms
of IT would require comparing them individually over time. Operatio-
nalizing the different kinds of costs for the purpose of examining the
impact of IT support turned out to be not feasible, at least not within
an approach that necessarily encompasses so many other perspectives.
As it would also have detracted from the other topics, I decided to ex-
clude it.
Positioning this study
This study examines the complex phenomenon of information technol-
ogy in courts and judiciaries. Hence, it is of necessity interdisciplinary
in nature. In its approach, it uses a variety of methodologies and
sources. They methodologies and sources are drawn from information
science, political and organization sciences and socio-legal studies. The
sources also draw on empirical information from more generally avail-
able sources such as statistics and opinion polls. The study intends to
show how approaches from all those disciplines are required, and need
to be integrated, in order to understand the complex phenomenon of
IT in courts.
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Guidance for the reader
This study was written with several audiences in mind:
– Those in charge of policy and decision making in judiciaries all over
the world
– Those specifically charged with IT policy in and for courts
– Those involved in judicial reform in developing countries
– Those involved in researching IT and courts and the law in general.
Different parts of the study may be of interest to different groups of ex-
perts in the respective fields.
The study is organized into 6 parts and 22 chapters.
Part 1 provides the framework and the information needed to under-
stand the other parts. It begins with this chapter introducing the re-
search. Chapters 1.2 to 1.4 present materials needed to understand the
rest of the study.
Part 2 presents an overview of the information technology available
in courts, and an analysis of the most frequent problems with imple-
menting it.
Next come three parts dedicated to the three issues identified as the
starting point for the research:
– Case delay (Part 3)
– Access to justice (Part 4)
– Integrity and corruption (Part 5).
Each of these parts is generally organized the same way. First, there is
a discussion of basic theoretical knowledge about each issue, and how
it can be diagnosed. Then, the issue is examined from an empirical
point of view, followed by an analysis of the information aspects of the
issue. Finally, conclusions are drawn on how using information tech-
nology can help with the issue in question.
Part 3 focuses on case delay. Chapter 3.1 discusses case delay as a
problem. Chapter 3.2 examines case handling as a process of informa-
tion management. Chapter 3.3 analyzes judicial roles in detail.
Part 4 examines access to justice. Chapter 4.1 examines the concept
of access to justice and its impediments. Chapter 4.2 analyzes access to
justice as access to information. Chapter 4.3 looks at access to justice
from the perspective of access to courts.
Part 5 analyzes corruption. Chapter 5.1 develops a theoretical frame-
work for judicial impartiality, integrity and corruption. Chapter 5.2 ex-
amines empirical evidence of corruption in judiciaries and courts.
Chapter 5.3 analyzes corruption as a problem of information.
Part 6 concludes the study. Chapter 6.1 summarizes the findings of
this study with regard to the role of information and information tech-
nology in judicial reform. Chapter 6.2 explores what research can con-
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tribute to developing new knowledge for judiciaries and courts regard-
ing the implementation and use of IT.
Research for this study was concluded on July 1, 2009.
Chapter 1.2 Conceptual Framework and Terminology
This section will introduce the definitions and terms used as well as
the normative framework for courts, judiciaries and judicial reform.
Court
The word “court”, in the legal sense, can be used with very different
meanings. The Oxford Dictionary defines a court as a body of people
before whom judicial cases are heard, and also as the place where such
a body meets. Wikipedia, the online encyclopedia, defines a court as an
official, public forum established by lawful authority to adjudicate dis-
putes, and to dispense civil, labor, administrative and criminal justice
under the law. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a court as a governmental
body consisting of one or more judges who sit to adjudicate disputes
and administer justice, as well as the judge or judges who sit on such
a governmental body.
The term court, meaning a court of law, is used for a single judge or
a multi judge chamber, as in: the court finds the defendant not guilty.
Such a court may be adjudicating one specific dispute or certain cate-
gories of disputes. The word court is also used for the organization of
these judges and chambers and their staff in a building, as in: the New
York Midtown Court.
Unless indicated otherwise, the term “court” is used here primarily
as the organization encompassing individual judges, panels and juries, their
legal staff and their logistical support staff. This use of the term court in-
cludes all bodies producing decisions: courts, judges and juries. This
use of the term courts does not include other forms of dispute resolu-
tion, traditional conflict resolution or traditional justice.
Judiciary
Another concept in this context is that of the judiciary. There are sys-
tems where this term is reserved for making the distinction between
the state power exercising the judicial function, and the executive and
legislative branches of government. In some contexts, the term “judi-
ciary” is also used to identify the national organization of the courts.
As this study focuses on reform in the sense of changing the organiza-
tion as well as its processes, the term judiciary will be used to mean
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the judicial branch of government, including the national organization of
all the courts.
Normative framework
This section discusses the normative framework for courts as laid
down in the international human rights instruments. These instru-
ments serve other purposes besides offering a framework for courts.
However, because national institutions and legislation with regard to
the administration of justice vary, the international human rights in-
struments serve as a single standard that applies to all of them.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 19481 states that every-
one is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and
obligations and of any criminal charge against him.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), Article 14, affirms this statement by stating that every-
one is entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal established by law. So do the re-
gional human rights conventions. All these conventions award
everyone the right to impartial judges and courts. The ICCPR
states that in the case of criminal charges, cases must be dis-
posed by courts without undue delay.
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, Article 7, states
that every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard, com-
prising the right to be tried within a reasonable time.
The American Convention on Human Rights, Article 8, states that
every person has the right to a hearing with due guarantees and within
a reasonable time.
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 6, ac-
cords everyone in the member states of the Council of Europe the right
to a fair and public hearing by an independent, impartial tribunal,
within a reasonable time. The Court of Justice of the other European
organization of states, the European Union, has recognized the ECHR
as an important source of law and takes Article 6 into account when
considering issues that have to do with reasonable time. Article 6 is
also echoed in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, according everyone the right to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tri-
bunal previously established by law.2
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Within this framework, procedural rules or codes prescribe the way in
which a hearing (this includes all case processing that courts do)
should reasonably ensure compliance with the values in the Declara-
tion and in the Conventions. Since the vast majority of countries are
party to one or more of the instruments mentioned above, the norma-
tive framework as described binds the judiciaries and courts of those
countries directly or indirectly.
Two concepts deserve special attention: independence and impartiality.
It is common to regard independence as a first value of a judiciary.
However, that is not how this study approaches the concept. From the
perspective of a court user, impartiality is the primary value for judici-
aries. In order to safeguard impartiality, judiciaries need to be institu-
tionally independent. Independence, therefore, is an institutional ar-
rangement underpinning the value of impartiality. Thus, judiciaries
need independence in order to process cases impartially, on the basis
of facts and in accordance with the law. For the discussion of impartial-
ity in Part 5, the distinction between de facto and de jure independence
is relevant. De iure (legal, constitutional) judicial independence can be
derived from looking at the formal legal arrangement. De facto (actual,
practical) independence is the independence factually enjoyed by
judges as a result of, for instance, the degree to which their judgments
have an impact on government behavior (Feld p. 3).
Box 1 Human Rights Instruments
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
December 10, 1948, General Assembly Resolution no. 217A(III), U.
N. Doc. A/3
Article 10
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by
an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
December 16, 1966, General Assembly Resolution no. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316
Article 14
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights
and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be ex-
cluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public or-
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der (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or
when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or
to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in spe-
cial circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests
of justice; but any judgment rendered in a criminal case or in a
suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of juve-
nile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matri-
monial disputes or the guardianship of children.
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
June 27 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982)
Article 7
Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This
comprises:
· The right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts
of violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed
by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force;
· The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a com-
petent court or tribunal;
· The right to defence, including the right to be defended by coun-
sel of his choice;
· The right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial
court or tribunal.
American Convention on Human Rights
Adopted at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human
Rights, San Jose´, Costa Rica, November 22, 1969
Article 8
Right to a Fair Trial
1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and
within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and im-
partial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantia-
tion of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or
for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor,
fiscal, or any other nature.
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
Rome, 4.XI.1950
Article 6
Right to fair trial
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pro-
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nounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from
all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of ju-
veniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so re-
quire, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the
court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice
the interests of justice.
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights
2000/C 364/01
Article 47
Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial Everyone whose rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has
the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with
the conditions laid down in this Article.
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously estab-
lished by law.
Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and
represented.
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient re-
sources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access
to justice.
Judicial reform
Reform means to make changes in (something) in order to improve
(Oxford English Dictionary). Reform can consist of resolving problems,
improving performance and realizing values. Problems signify short-
comings in the realization of values. Improving performance consti-
tutes a fuller realization of values. The values judiciaries are expected
to create can be found in the human rights conventions: fairness, time-
liness, impartiality and independence. Case delay is a problem because
it contravenes the norm, and does not realize the value of timeliness.
Reducing case delay implies fuller realization of the value of timeli-
ness. Corruption is a problem because it is an infraction on the norms
of fairness and impartiality. The values of fairness and impartiality are
realized more fully when corruption is reduced. Access is only partly
covered in the conventions, making it a conceptually more complex is-
sue. In the conventions, access is awarded to courts. Access to justice
is a broader concept that involves more than just court access. This
brings some particular problems with it, which are discussed in the
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chapters on access in Part 4 of this study. All the activities described
here constitute some form of judicial reform.
Improvement and innovation
Within the area of reform, the term improvement is reserved for reme-
dying existing processes. Innovation is the term reserved for develo-
ping new processes and services not in existence before. Thus, introdu-
cing early hearings is an improvement, but online dispute resolution
will, for most judiciaries, be an innovation.
Efficiency
Sometimes, judicial reform is understood as increasing court efficien-
cy. Efficiency, to be precise, is the relation between input (resources,
such as judges, financing) and output (mostly decisions): how much
money, judges, etc. are needed to process and decide a given number
of cases. Processing more cases with the same number of judges or
the same amount of funding would then constitute increasing
efficiency. Because cost is not included in its scope, as explained above,
efficiency will not be a major focus of this study.
Western reform
The normative framework raises another problem that begs to be dis-
cussed.
This discussion starts with the question, whether reference to the in-
ternational human rights conventions constitutes a solely Western per-
spective on courts and judiciaries, followed by the question whether
this study promotes a uniquely Western concept of judicial reform.
These are questions that emerged more than once in my advisory work
for judiciaries in developing countries. The answer comes in two parts.
The first answer is that the international human rights conventions ap-
ply to all states that are signatories to them. Only very few countries
are not. The other half of the answer is that this study aims to provide
lines of reasoning that may be helpful in realizing the values embodied
in those conventions, for those legal systems, judiciaries and courts
who choose to orient themselves on the international human rights
conventions.
System and structure
Court systems have developed over centuries, each in its own political,
economic and social context. The resulting court systems vary consi-
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derably. This study uses a very general idea of a court system, recognizing
that the systems may, in practice, be very different. In the ideal type of
court used in this study, court systems have a three-tier structure. The
first tier or first instance courts decide cases on the facts and on the law.
The second-tier or appeal courts review cases decided by the first tier
courts on the law, and on the facts unless legislation prohibits it. Third-
tier, or final instance courts decide cases reviewed by the appeal courts on
the law. Their purpose is to guard legal unity.
Court systems are always the result of complex political and histori-
cal processes. Therefore, they never fully resemble the picture above.
Not all systems have a second tier. In some systems, the second tier
consists of only one appeal court. Some systems have a fourth tier in
the form of a constitutional court. Some third-tier courts hear specific
types of cases, such as violations of human rights or cases against
high-ranking public officials, as a first-tier court.
Role
The role of judiciaries and courts also needs to be defined at the outset
of this study. A role is a person’s or thing’s function in a particular si-
tuation, according to the Oxford Dictionary. There is not one single role
courts and judiciaries fulfill. Which role is prevalent depends on the si-
tuation or, in the case of a study, on the perspective of the discussion.
There are many different perspectives on the role of the judiciary.
Court users have different views depending on their particular per-
spective. Court users can be regarded as those for whom courts pro-
duce value. From the perspective of the court user, the judiciary’s role
can be seen as that of offering concrete legal protection to the indivi-
dual, ensuring that the individual will not be jeopardized beyond the
limits of the law. In the United Kingdom., 73 percent of respondents to
the Paths to Justice survey agreed or strongly agreed with the statement
that courts are an important way for ordinary people to enforce their
rights (Genn p. 227). In the Netherlands, 68.8 percent of respondents
in the Dispute Resolution Delta survey agreed or strongly agreed with
the same statement (Van Velthoven 2004, p. 173).
Judges differ in how they view their role. Here is an example to illus-
trate this point. Judges in the Netherlands were surveyed by the Neder-
lands Juristenblad (Netherlands Legal Weekly) in 2001 (NJB 2001, p.
1930). When asked to rank six tasks of the courts and judges in order
of importance, they largely replied that helping litigants comes first,
with deciding legal disputes and resolving conflicts closely following in
second and third place. Only members of the Supreme Court regarded
actively contributing to legal development their most important task.
First instance judges regard resolving disputes as their role. The role of
28 TECHNOLOGY FOR JUSTICE
safeguarding the unity of the legal system emerges in the perspective
of the final court. How judges view their role will also be related to
their culture.
From the legal point of view, under the rule of law, the role of the
court is what the law says it is. In some countries, courts perform roles
that would not be considered judicial tasks in other countries. In the
United States, courts not only end marriages, they can also conclude
them. In the United States, justices of the peace perform this role. In
some countries in Central Europe, courts maintain the registers of real,
immovable property, and/or those of enterprises. This role would not
be considered the core role of the judiciary in most systems’ thinking.
However, where it was by law determined to be part of the role of the
judiciary to maintain these registers, it is legally part of its role.
Legal sociologists have debated the nature of the role of the judiciary
in society throughout the existence of their profession. As in any disci-
pline, there are schools of thought with different approaches and con-
victions. At this point, those schools of thought are not very relevant
for this study. In the sociological perspective, most writers on courts
see dispute processing as the central focus of the judicial process (Cot-
terrell p. 212). Court judgments are, in most sociologists’ perspective,
both a resolution to a dispute as well an assertion of normative order.
When deciding individual disputes, courts also contribute to confirma-
tion of the normative order in a more general sense. For example:
criminal courts process cases punishing transgressions, but their more
general role is to assert the norms in order to prevent transgressions
from happening. I would add that transgressions can be twofold: in-
fractions of the substantive criminal law, but also attempts to punish
those infractions by others than the justice system. This is a form of
concrete legal protection for those who are alleged to have broken the
law. In a sociological perspective, concrete legal protection is effected
as well through the manner in which parties are afforded fair hearing.
If one of the parties has to accept negative consequences from a judi-
cial decision, it is important that they have had ‘their day in court”: an
opportunity to influence the decision. Fair hearing in its turn legiti-
mizes the enforceability of the decisions.
From the point of view of society, the general effects of the courts’
role in asserting the norms on conflict-free interaction and on resolving
disputes by individuals themselves are much more important than the
specific effects in cases of disputes resolved by the courts (Galanter
1983a, p. 125; Griffiths p. 129). Therefore, these general effects are also
a product of the courts. This general role is what distinguishes courts
from bicycle factories, according to Griffiths. A more general term to
describe this role is abstract legal protection. It is produced by the mere
fact that the judiciary exists, and by the fact that it can be accessed in
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case of need. Effective and efficient concrete legal protection streng-
thens abstract legal protection. Abstract legal protection is also referred
to as “the shadow function of the law” (Galanter 1983a, p. 122).
The courts’ primary business process is processing filed cases. It in-
volves everything a court does to process cases through the court sys-
tem, from the filing of a case to archiving decisions and ensuring their
enforcement. Case management ensures that in filed cases, justice is
done promptly. It deals with individual cases and also with groups of
cases. Case management implies attention to timeliness.
This study includes all the roles discussed above.
Chapter 1.3 Sources
Empirical study of social phenomena builds on the empirical material
that is available. The sources of empirical material specific to each of
the issues here will be introduced in the respective chapters. This chap-
ter discusses indicators and indexes used throughout the study for
comparing countries. It also presents my own empirical material: the
studies I conducted examining judicial systems in developing coun-
tries.
Indicators and databases
This section introduces the concept of indicators and the main indexes
this study uses for comparing countries and their systems.
Indicators
Various organizations use different definitions of indicators depending
on their activities and purposes. The Vera Institute of Justice has pro-
duced a guide for constructing performance indicators. It lists a num-
ber of definitions (Vera 2003 p. 2):
An indicator is something that can be seen, experienced, or re-
corded. It is a sign that something exists, or has happened, or has
changed. This somewhat stark definition is used by the Performance
Assessment Resource Center (PARC), based in Birmingham, England.
An indicator is a direct and valid statistical measure that monitors le-
vels and changes over time in a fundamental social concern. This defi-
nition comes from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD 1976).
An indicator is a piece of information with significance for the objec-
tive to be achieved. This definition comes from the Handbook of De-
mocracy and Governance Program Indicators (Washington, DC: U.S.
Agency for International Development 1998).
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The World Bank does not have one single definition of indicators.
Below is the one from the World Bank’s Judicial Sector Indicators:
An indicator is information [that] can be used…to assess perfor-
mance and assist in planning for the future.
Indicators can be constructed to reflect a state or an event and to
measure change, for instance progress toward an objective. The objec-
tive can be intermediate, for example increasing the number of cases
processed, or an overarching purpose, such as assuring equal access to
justice. Indicators are also used in indexes listing or comparing specific
aspects of countries or systems.
Indexes
The main indexes I use as sources for quantitative comparisons be-
tween countries and their systems are listed in this section. It will list
the indexes, and for each of them it will discuss:
– What data they collect
– How they collect them
– What the data can tell us
– What the limitations for each of them are.
The indexes all serve to provide overviews and country comparisons.
They are used by experts for all of those purposes, and for research
purposes as well. They are not suitable, in themselves, to provide a di-
agnosis of a system that will serve as a basis for a reform program.
World Governance Indicators (WGI)
The WGI is the most comprehensive database on public governance in
the world. It was developed by the World Bank Institute and the World
Bank’s DEC group. The WGI is published annually. It aggregates data
from numerous other sources. The data are grouped into six categories,
all expressing an important aspect of a country’s political system: voice
and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, govern-
ment effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of cor-
ruption. The category that is most relevant for studying judges and
courts is the Rule of Law indicator. The Rule of Law data measure per-
ceived quality of contract enforcement, quality of police and courts,
and the likelihood of crime and violence. The indicator aggregates data
on contract enforcement, quality of police and courts and incidence of
crime and violence from 24 sources (World Bank 2007b). It produces a
percentile ranking for more than 200 countries. The rankings are not
actionable. That means that it is not evident from them what a country
can do to improve its performance and influence its ranking. The WGI
database is the most hotly debated collection of data in the world. Even
its critics qualify it as the most carefully constructed (set of) govern-
ance indicators (Arndt p. 49). The main criticism focuses on the meth-
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odology: lack of transparency resulting from the fact that the indicators
are based on data that are aggregated from other data sources, and
therefore the results are difficult to check for correctness (Arndt p. 66).
This difficulty, critics say, is compounded by the fact that some of the
sources are also aggregates, and one of the sources they aggregate is
the WGI indicators themselves. Thus, circular aggregation leads to un-
controllable results. The makers of the WGI recognize there are limita-
tions to what can be achieved with this kind of cross-country, highly-ag-
gregated data (Kaufmann 2007 p. 2). They maintain that WGI can
serve the purpose of providing individual countries with a set of moni-
torable indicators of governance they can use to benchmark themselves
against other countries and over time. But in view of the limitations,
this type of data cannot substitute for in-depth, country-specific govern-
ance diagnostics as a basis for policy advice to improve governance in a
particular country, but should rather be viewed as a complementary
tool.
In this study, WGI is used in the chapters on integrity and corrup-
tion to compare governance and levels of institutional development.
The Doing Business (DB) database
The DB database gathers information about the business climate in an
annually increasing number of countries around the world, from infor-
mants who report each year on a number of topics. It is a product of
the staff of the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation. The
Doing Business methodology (World Bank 2008a) is a tool for gathering
and comparing data and information on the business climate in most
countries in the world. Doing Business has a network of informants in
all its participating countries. In 2008, 180 countries participated in
the data gathering. The Doing Business process works as follows: Every
year, it asks its informants in all its participating countries to provide
information on the performance of a number of institutions relevant to
doing business, such as the tax office, customs, and also the justice sys-
tem. Its approach is criticized for not aiming to capture the benefits of
regulation, but merely measuring its burden (World Bank 2008b p. 6).
The other major criticism is lack of transparency about its informants
and their sources (World Bank 2008b, p. 54). My own main objection
regards its representativeness. DB looks at one specific way of enfor-
cing contracts: with an adversarial court procedure involving a witness
hearing. As we shall see in Part 3, this procedure is used in only a very
small fraction of contract enforcement situations. Therefore, it is not
necessarily relevant for businesses looking for an advantageous climate
for their business.
The topic most relevant for studying the courts is that of Enforcing
Contracts. It lists the number of steps needed, the time involved, and
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the cost of enforcing a contract. With regard to contract enforcement,
lawyers in all the participating countries are asked to provide their esti-
mates on the pursuit of a commercial contract enforcement case: the
disposition time, the cost and the number of steps that need to be ta-
ken. An objection to the methodology of using informants is that accu-
racy of the data is difficult to check where other data are unavailable.
For instance, the data on the Netherlands can be checked with actual
court statistics. Where such statistics do not exist or are not available,
this check is not feasible. Whether or not that is a problem depends
the purpose for which the data are used. Establishing whether a given
disposition time complies with a standard is one way of using DB re-
sults. If the average estimated disposition time from DB falls well with-
in a given standard, it is probably good enough for this purpose. For
other purposes, it may not be accurate enough.
As with the WGI, DB provides an approach for comparing perfor-
mance with other countries. In contrast to WGI, its results are highly
actionable because they focus on well defined aspects of performance
relevant to the business climate. It should be kept in mind that, be-
cause the data do not capture country nuances, it is not an adequate
tool for designing specific policy reforms. A reform program requires
more information from other sources.
In this study, DB is used extensively in Part 3, on case processing,
when discussing comparison as an approach to developing standards.
Chapter 3.1 has a more in-depth discussion of the methodology.
The Human Development Index (HDI)
The HDI, like the WGI, is a summary composite index. It was devel-
oped for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). It mea-
sures a country’s average achievements in three basic aspects of hu-
man development: health, knowledge, and a decent standard of living.
Health is measured by life expectancy at birth. Knowledge is measured
by a combination of the adult literacy rate and the combined primary,
secondary and tertiary gross enrollment ratio. The standard of living is
measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.
In this study, HDI is used in Part 5, on integrity and corruption, to
compare development levels.
The Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
The TI CPI is the most influential corruption perception survey in the
world. It ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is
perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. It is a compo-
site index, making use of surveys and scores provided by experts. The
index was first released in 1995. The 2008 index ranks 180 countries
by their perceived level of corruption. It draws on 13 sources origina-
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ting from 11 independent institutions, using data compiled in 2007
and 2008. It gives each country a score, an absolute figure between 0
and 10, where 10 is the maximum score. Moreover, it produces a rank-
ing, a list in which countries are arranged according to their score
(Transparency International 2008).
In this study, the TI CPI is used in Part 5 on integrity and corrup-
tion.
The Transparency Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)
The GCB is a public opinion survey that assesses the general public’s
perception and experience of corruption in more than 60 countries
around the world. Experience surveys ask about the actual occurrence of
a phenomenon in a given situation. Perception surveys ask what re-
spondents think about a certain phenomenon. Both experience and per-
ception are relevant for the purpose of gaining a better understanding
of the incidence of corruption and the levels of corruption in justice de-
livery, as well as the linkages between causes and possible remedies.
However, they both need to be treated with caution. Experience surveys
may over or under-report certain forms. Respondents may be reluctant
to admit having paid a bribe. Justice officials may be reluctant to report
corruption in their own profession or peer group due to a sense of loy-
alty to the group. That means that actual experience may not always be
truthfully reported. In some surveys discussed below, this problem has
been recognized by creating an opportunity to report anonymously.
The perception of corrupt practices in the justice system may be caused
by actual corrupt practices but also by delays or incompetence from
other causes. It can also be caused by a general feeling that all public
servants are corrupt. Perception of corruption may also go up when
governments actually begin to tackle corruption, and the subject gets
more attention in the press. A case in point is the Czech Republic; its
score in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index
went down from 3.9 to 3.7 between 2001 and 2002, as the Czech Re-
public prepared to join the European Union (TI CPI 2001 and 2002).
The Barometer includes questions of both types: perception and be-
liefs about court corruption, as well as experience with actual bribe pay-
ing in court. The outcomes consist of results that do not agree. More-
over, both types of survey carry their own risks with regard to the truth-
fulness of the reported replies. Hence, both experience and perception
surveys need to be treated with care, particularly in the context of diag-
nosing problems. However, they can serve to provide a sense of the in-
cidence of corruption. This helps to identify directions for further en-
quiry and examination.
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Commission Europe´enne pour l’efficacite´ de la Justice (CEPEJ)
The European Court of Human Rights was burdened with large num-
bers of complaints about undue delay in court procedures in the Coun-
cil of Europe (COE) member countries, a lot of them from Italy and
Russia. This was one of the reasons for setting up the Council of Eu-
rope’s program for the efficiency of justice. The program is run by the
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, called CEPEJ after
its French acronym. The terms of reference for CEPEJ are:
a. To examine the results achieved by the different judicial systems in
the light of the principles referred to in the preamble to this resolu-
tion by using, among other things, common statistical criteria and
means of evaluation
b. To define problems and areas for possible improvements and to ex-
change views on the functioning of the judicial systems
c. To identify concrete ways to improve the measuring and function-
ing of the judicial systems of the member States, having regard to
their specific needs
d. To provide assistance to one or more member States, at their re-
quest, including assistance in complying with the standards of the
Council of Europe
e. To suggest, if appropriate, areas in which the relevant steering com-
mittees of the Council of Europe, in particular the European Com-
mittee on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ), may, if they consider it neces-
sary, draft new international legal instruments or amendments to
existing ones, for adoption by the Committee of Ministers
f. To improve justice systems’ efficiency and functioning.3
The CEPEJ’s data collection is not an index. It serves the wider goal of
improving the functioning of justice systems of the member states of
the Council of Europe. In 2002, a pilot scheme on data collection was
set up. The first report was published in 2004. This study draws on
the most recent report, published in October 2008. The data collection
instrument collects data on courts’ inputs and outputs. It is not a
ranking. The instrument pays a lot of attention to the comparability of
its data. It collects data on member states of COE; it has 130 questions,
mostly institutional: general, justice system budget, legal aid, support
for users of courts and victims, functioning and efficiency of justice,
disciplinary procedures, use of IT in the court, fair trial, judicial career,
lawyers, mediators, enforcement, and notaries. Questions on the use of
IT in courts have been included since the 2006 report. The data are
provided by a network of national correspondents, usually in the mem-
ber states’ ministries of justice. Because of the differences in legal and
court systems, comparability of the data can be a problem. Since insti-
tutions are different across Europe, there can easily be doubts about
the empirical basis of some of the data. This data collection, with those
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limitations taken into account, is a useful repository of information on
justice systems in Europe.
Empirical material collected in World Bank work
This section introduces my own empirical material. While I was a se-
nior judicial reform expert for the World Bank from 2003 to 2007, I
worked on project advice, studies and assessments for the World Bank
on judicial systems in Benin, Gambia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Georgia, Ro-
mania, and Macedonia. The World Bank is a United Nations affiliated
organization. Its purpose is to provide financing for governments for
reconstruction and development of their country. The financing is pro-
vided in the form of loans or grants. The World Bank is a multilateral
donor, in contrast to national governments. Judicial reform can be a
component in government improvement programs, supported by
loans. It can also be done in project form, supported by grants from
trust funds the World Bank administers on behalf of other donors.
This section describes my briefs, the work I did, my reports and their
conclusions, and the most important and relevant information about
the country in question for this study. Each country has evolved since I
last visited it. Table 1 provides an overview of some country characteris-
tics that are relevant for this study.
Table 1 Country Indexes
1 Country 2 HDI
2005
3 WGI RoL 07 4 DB time
in days 2007
5 TI CPI
2008
Benin 0.437 36.2 720 3.1
Gambia 0.502 49.5 434 1.9
Georgia 0.754 42.9 285 3.9
Macedonia 0.801 41.4 385 3.6
Nepal 0.534 31.0 735 2.7
Netherlands 0.953 93.3 514 8.9
Romania 0.813 50.5 537 3.8
Sri Lanka 0.743 55.7 1318 3.2
Sources: 2 - Human Development Index, 3 - World Governance Indicators, 4 - Doing Busi-
ness, and 5 - Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.
The table presents an overview of index scores for the countries I stu-
died for the World Bank. The indexes were discussed in the previous
section. Column 1 displays the country names in alphabetical order.
Column 2 displays the HDI scores out of a possible 1.0, with a higher
score indicating a higher level of development. Column 3 presents the
WGI score, out of a possible 100, for Rule of Law. A higher score indi-
cates a higher level of rule of law. Column 4 lists the DB number of ca-
lendar days for processing and enforcing a money claim. Column 5
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lists the scores, out of a possible 10, on the TI CPI index. A higher
score indicates a lower level of perceived corruption. The scores dis-
played were the most recent ones available when the research for this
study ended.
Some observations present themselves. My work did not include
countries with a development level below 0.4 in the HDI. This may be
a coincidence, because the World Bank does support judicial reform in
countries with such low HDI levels. On the other hand, in countries
with a very low development level, institutional reform is not the first
priority because the institutions are usually too weak to sustain reform.
Another observation is that high or low scores for development level,
rule of law and low perceived corruption generally go together, but dis-
position times in DB present a very mixed picture. On a more detailed
level, the picture is not quite so simple. Nepal is the lowest scoring
country regarding rule of law. Gambia scores lowest on corruption and
human development, but higher on rule of law. In Part 5, there is a
more detailed discussion of the scores.
Benin
Present-day Benin was the site of Dahomey, a prominent West African
kingdom that rose in the 15th century. The territory became a French
Colony in 1872 and achieved independence on August 1, 1960, as the
Republic of Benin. A succession of military governments ended in
1972 with the rise to power of Mathieu Kerekou and the establishment
of a government based on Marxist-Leninist principles. A move to repre-
sentative government began in 1989. Two years later, free elections
ushered in former Prime Minister Nicephore Soglo as president,
marking the first successful transfer of power in Africa from a dictator-
ship to a democracy. Kerekou was returned to power by elections held
in 1996 and 2001, although some irregularities were alleged. Kerekou
stepped down at the end of his second term in 2006 and was suc-
ceeded by Thomas Yayi Boni, a political outsider and independent. Yayi
has begun a high profile fight against corruption and has strongly pro-
moted accelerating Benin’s economic growth (CIA World Factbook).
During the month of September 2004, I was in Benin as back-
ground support for the World Bank country lawyer in the team nego-
tiating the Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit for the next year. The
Credit is a budget support loan that is based on a program agreed be-
tween the government and the World Bank. The justice sector had
been added to the program as a new sector that year. Its programming,
the basis for a multi-year reform program for the sector, required more
than routine attention. I wrote the relevant sections in the program
and in the program budget.
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Gambia
The Gambia gained its independence from the United Kingdom in
1965. Geographically surrounded by Senegal, it formed a short-lived
federation of Senegambia between 1982 and 1989. In 1991 the two na-
tions signed a friendship and cooperation treaty, but tensions have
flared up intermittently since then. Yahya A. J. J. Jammeh led a mili-
tary coup in 1994 that overthrew the president and banned political ac-
tivity. A new constitution and presidential elections in 1996, followed
by parliamentary balloting in 1997, completed a nominal return to civi-
lian rule. Jammeh has been elected president in all subsequent elec-
tions, including most recently in late 2006 (CIA World Factbook).
I visited Gambia in March 2005. Justice system reform was part of
the World Bank Economic Management improvement program there.
The program included a component for strengthening justice institu-
tions. The Chief Justice of Gambia applied for funding for a court-an-
nex mediation program. My brief was to provide ad hoc informal ad-
vice to the World Bank country economist for Gambia who was in
charge of that program.
Georgia
The region of present-day Georgia contained the ancient kingdoms of
Colchis and Kartli-Iberia. The area came under Roman influence in
the first centuries A.D. and Christianity became the state religion in
the 330s. Domination by Persians, Arabs, and Turks was followed by a
Georgian golden age (11th-13th centuries) that was cut short by the
Mongol invasion of 1236. Subsequently, the Ottoman and Persian em-
pires competed for influence in the region. Georgia was absorbed into
the Russian Empire in the 19th century. Independent for three years
(1918-1921) following the Russian revolution, it was forcibly incorpo-
rated into the USSR until the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. An at-
tempt by the incumbent Georgian government to manipulate national
legislative elections in November 2003 touched off widespread protests
that led to the resignation of Eduard Shevardnadze, president since
1995. New elections in early 2004 swept Mikheil Saakashvili into
power along with his National Movement party. Progress on market re-
forms and democratization has been made in the years since indepen-
dence, but this progress has been complicated by Russian assistance
and support to the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
After a series of Russian and separatist provocations in summer 2008,
Georgian military action in South Ossetia in early August led to a Rus-
sian military response that not only occupied the breakaway areas, but
large portions of Georgia proper as well. Russian troops pulled back
from most of the occupied Georgian territory, but in late August 2008
Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of Abkhazia and
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South Ossetia. This action was strongly condemned by most of the
world’s nations and international organizations (CIA World Factbook).
Since the Rose revolution in 2003, Georgia has had a strong reform
agenda under the leadership of its president, Mikhail Saakasvili. It is
highly oriented toward the European Union. U.S. non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) like the American Bar Association (ABA), are
very active there in promoting what is called rule of law.
In May 2004, I visited Georgia at the invitation of a colleague at the
World Bank in charge of a justice reform project financed by a grant of
some few hundred thousand dollars. My brief was to interview a num-
ber of key players in the project and visit a couple of courts and report
whether I thought the project should change direction.
The highest priority for nearly everyone I spoke with was to combat
corruption in the judiciary. Some factors in the organization of the ju-
diciary were put forward as facilitating corruption:
– Judges not knowing what to do with the cases for lack of training
– Lack of (professional) court management
– Lack of consistent management of resources
– Low salaries
– Integrity not being a criteria for selection of judges
– Many rayon (small, subdistrict) courts consisting of only one judge.
Improving court management was regarded the second-highest prior-
ity.
Macedonia
Macedonia gained its independence peacefully from Yugoslavia in
1991, but Greece’s objection to the new state’s use of what it consi-
dered a Hellenic name and symbols delayed international recognition,
which occurred under the provisional designation of "the Former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia." In 1995, Greece lifted a 20-month trade
embargo and the two countries agreed to normalize relations. The Uni-
ted States began referring to Macedonia by its constitutional name, Re-
public of Macedonia, in 2004 and negotiations continue between
Greece and Macedonia to resolve the name issue. Some ethnic Alba-
nians, angered by perceived political and economic inequities,
launched an insurgency in 2001 that eventually won the support of the
majority of Macedonia’s Albanian population and led to the interna-
tionally-brokered Framework Agreement, which ended the fighting by
establishing a set of new laws enhancing the rights of minorities. Fully
implementing the Framework Agreement and stimulating economic
growth and development continue to be challenges for Macedonia,
although progress has been made on both fronts over the past several
years (CIA World Factbook).
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In January 2005, I visited Macedonia as part of a World Bank team
working on an assessment of the justice sector. Such an assessment
tends to serve as preparation and foundation for a World Bank loan.
My brief was to observe judges processing commercial cases in two
courts: Skopje I and Sˇtip. The judges felt they were doing too many ba-
sically administrative tasks, and my job was to find out what it was
they were doing and report. Of the 23 cases I observed, not a single
case was ready for a decision, mostly because documents were not
handed in. Judges do not actively manage cases for timely disposal, for
instance by enforcing the sanctions provided in the procedural codes.
One judge said she felt timely disposal served no purpose, since every-
one in the country was technically bankrupt anyway. In 2004, the dis-
posal time for civil cases was 547 days, 25 percent over the average of
the surrounding countries as reported by Doing Business. In 2008, the
disposal time was 385 days, 10 percent below the regional average.
Nepal
In 1951, the Nepalese monarch ended the century-old system of rule by
hereditary premiers and instituted a cabinet system of government. Re-
forms in 1990 established a multi-party democracy within the frame-
work of a constitutional monarchy. An insurgency led by Maoist extre-
mists broke out in 1996. The ensuing ten-year civil war between insur-
gents and government forces witnessed the dissolution of the cabinet
and parliament and assumption of absolute power by the king. Several
weeks of mass protests in April 2006 were followed by several months
of peace negotiations between the Maoists and government officials,
and culminated in a November 2006 peace accord and the promulga-
tion of an interim constitution. Following a nation-wide election in
April 2008, the newly formed Constituent Assembly declared Nepal a
federal democratic republic and abolished the monarchy at its first
meeting the following month. The Constituent Assembly elected the
country’s first president in July. The Maoists, who received a plurality
of votes in the Constituent Assembly election, formed a coalition gov-
ernment in August 2008 (CIA World Factbook).
Nepal is situated in the Himalaya mountain range between India
and China. Since a fatal incident in the royal family in 2001, the mon-
archy has been on a downward turn. It was abolished in June 2008.
Nepal is now ruled by a coalition government that includes the former
Maoist movement. Economically, Nepal depends heavily on India. In
June 2004, I spent a month in Nepal as part of a World Bank team in-
vestigating the legal framework for the financial sector. My brief was to
study those parts of the courts that serve the financial sector. I inter-
viewed judges and court management as well as arbiters in special tri-
bunals and representatives of other donors, for example the Asian De-
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velopment Bank. The team’s report was published as Nepal, the Legal
and Judicial Environment for Financial Sector Development, A Review
(World Bank 2005b). It discusses the legal framework for the banking
sector, insolvency and creditor rights, capital markets and corporations,
micro-finance institutions and the judiciary. A remarkable finding in
my report was the judiciary’s official immunity from investigation by
the anti-corruption agency.
Romania
The principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia - for centuries under the
suzerainty of the Turkish Ottoman Empire - secured their autonomy in
1856; they united in 1859 and a few years later adopted the new name
of Romania. The country gained recognition of its independence in
1878. It joined the Allied Powers in World War I and acquired new ter-
ritories - most notably Transylvania - following the conflict. In 1940,
Romania allied with the Axis powers and participated in the 1941 Ger-
man invasion of the USSR. Three years later, overrun by the Soviets,
Romania signed an armistice. The post-war Soviet occupation led to
the formation of a Communist "people’s republic" in 1947 and the ab-
dication of the king. The decades-long rule of dictator Nicolae Ceauses-
cu, who took power in 1965, and his Securitate police state became in-
creasingly oppressive and draconian through the 1980s. Ceausescu
was overthrown and executed in late 1989. Former Communists domi-
nated the government until 1996 when they were swept from power.
Romania joined NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007
(CIA World Factbook).
Romania is a former member of the Soviet Union’s satellite bloc in
Eastern Europe. It joined the European Union on May 1, 2004.
I visited Romania on two occasions in 2005. My brief was to support
the World Bank regional lawyer who was preparing a World Bank pro-
ject for judicial reform. On both occasions, I visited several courts and
had discussions with the judges and staff. When the project finally fo-
cused largely on reconstructing court buildings and a training pro-
gram, my help was no longer needed.
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka is an island off the coast of India. It was colonized first by
the Portuguese, then by the Dutch and finally by the British. It became
independent in 1948; its name was changed to Sri Lanka in 1972. Ten-
sions between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil separatists erupted
into war in 1983. Tens of thousands have died in the ethnic conflict
that continues to fester. After two decades of fighting, the government
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) formalized a cease-
fire in February 2002 with Norway brokering peace negotiations. Vio-
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lence between the LTTE and government forces intensified in 2006
and the government regained control of the Eastern Province in 2007.
In January 2008, the government officially withdrew from the cease-
fire, and by late January 2009, the LTTE remained in control of a small
and shrinking area of Mullaitivu district in the North (CIA World Fact-
book).
In 2004, 2005 and 2006 I visited Sri Lanka on altogether three oc-
casions. In the framework of supervision missions of the ongoing
World Bank justice reform project, my brief was to start discussions on
the content of a follow-up project. I visited a large number of courts
and spoke with some influential members of the program steering
committee. My observation was that their priority lay with building
and rebuilding courthouses and other building projects, not with study-
ing the judiciary’s performance or how to improve it.
Summing up
These activities produced the following material:
The project advisory work in Sri Lanka, Romania and Gambia did
not produce a report or document.
Nepal - an assessment of the judicial environment for the financial
sector
Macedonia - a report on observations of case processing in the com-
mercial court
Georgia - an evaluation report of the judicial reform project
Benin – draft of the reform program.
Evidently, this material does not constitute a deliberate, consistent
body of research work, but it informs the rest of this study, as will be-
come evident in the individual chapters.
Chapter 1.4 Information and Information Technology
This chapter introduces IT and the most relevant concepts concerning
IT for this study. This section presents some basic concepts as well as
a discussion on types of information technology, in a selection that is
relevant for the topic of this study.
Information and information technology
Information technology needs to be distinguished from information.
Without this distinction, the role of information does not get the atten-
tion it requires. Information technology is “the thing doing the mani-
pulating”, and information is “the thing being manipulated” (Davenport
p.71). If we attempt to discuss the vehicle, information technology,
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right away, we miss out on what is being conveyed: the information.
Processing court cases is primarily information handling. Therefore,
the role of information needs to be studied in order to understand what
the role of information technology can be. This study will examine in-
formational aspects of reducing delay, improving access to justice and
reducing corruption in order to identify how information technology
can support those activities. Thus, before addressing information tech-
nology, the study focuses on the roles of information in those areas.
Roles of information
Information plays many roles in an organization. We can distinguish
information as a focus of operational processes, production statistics
supporting management, indicators supporting improvement pro-
cesses, and many other roles (Davenport p. 72). This study discusses
information primarily as a focus of operational processes. That means
it looks at the judicial process itself as processing and managing of in-
formation. However, while doing so, the study extensively uses statis-
tics on processes and indicators supporting their improvement. This
so-called meta-information serves to provide a better understanding of
judicial processes.
Basic concepts in information science
When studying information processes, it is helpful to understand the
differences between data, information and knowledge: information is
data given meaning, and knowledge is information coupled with ex-
perience. This discussion of the basic concepts used in information
science is based on Gottschalk (p. 28):
Data are letters and numbers without meaning: independent, isolated
measurements, characters, numerical characters, and symbols. For ex-
ample, 2005, 3 is data. We can guess 2005 is a year, but otherwise, we
have no way of understanding what this can mean.
Information is data that are included in a context that makes sense out
of them. Information is data that make sense, because it can be under-
stood correctly. People turn data into information by organizing it into
some unit of analysis, for example, dollars, dates, or customers. Infor-
mation is data endowed with relevance and purpose: “in 2005, we com-
pleted 3 projects” is something we can understand because the data have
been given context and meaning. “This is the third case in 2005” is a dif-
ferent context that gives a different meaning to the data 2005, 3. The
context is needed for the data to become information.
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Knowledge is information combined with experience, context, interpre-
tation, and reflection. Knowledge is a renewable resource that can be
used over and over, and that accumulates in an organization through
use and combination with employees’ experience. Humans have
knowledge; knowledge cannot exist outside the heads of individuals.
Information becomes knowledge when it enters the human brain, pro-
vided the brain does the required processing. This knowledge trans-
forms into information again when it is articulated and communicated
to others. Information is an explicit representation of knowledge; it is
in itself not knowledge. Knowledge is subjective: it can be both truths
and lies, perspectives and concepts, judgments and expectations.
Knowledge is used to receive information by analyzing, understanding,
and evaluating; by combining, prioritizing, and decision making; and
by planning, implementing, and controlling. The observation that 3
projects is a lot to complete in a single year requires experience with pro-
jects to draw that conclusion. That makes it knowledge in the sense in
which information science uses the term.
Differentiating information technology functionalities
Information technology comes in many forms. IT, in this study, in-
cludes all technology capable of storing, exchanging or providing informa-
tion. This section presents a categorization of IT functionalities. This
categorization helps to understand what different IT functionalities do,
as well as what is involved in implementing them. It is based on the
discussion in McAfee (p. 144-145). The purpose of this presentation is,
in general terms, to outline:
– What the IT functionalities can do
– What their capabilities are
– The benefits they can deliver
– The organizational changes they trigger.
Understanding the functionalities, what they can do and what improve-
ments they can bring is required for translating information needs in
an organization into technological solutions. This is what Parts 3, 4
and 5 of this study will do for internal case processing, communicating
with users and safeguarding the integrity of courts. The organizational
changes that may be required are better-skilled workers, higher levels
of teamwork, redesigning processes, and new decision rights, accord-
ing to McAfee. Understanding, and subsequently making, the organi-
zational changes the IT functionalities trigger is necessary to make im-
plementing technologies a success. The changes triggered and required
are discussed in Parts 2 and 6. The categorization will first be used in
the overview of court IT in Chapter 2.1. This overview also provides il-
lustrations of what courts do with different IT functionalities.
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Function IT
This group includes technologies that assist with the execution of dis-
crete tasks and can make the execution of stand-alone tasks more effi-
cient. The most common examples are word processing and spread-
sheets. They increase precision and enhance experimentation capacity.
In text production, correction is much easier than before. Pieces of text
can be reused. Spreadsheets keep data, which increases the accuracy of
record keeping. Keeping electronic records facilitates not only preci-
sion, but also experimentation. These functionalities require almost no
organizational innovations or changes in the way companies get work
done. They do not require a network to function.
Network IT
The network group includes IT that provides a means by which people
can communicate with one another. It includes e-mail, instant messa-
ging, blogs, network technologies, wikis, and intranet web sites. These
facilitate collaboration, allow expressions of judgment and foster emer-
gence. They bring complements with them, but allow users to modify
them over time. Network technologies facilitate interactions between
users, but without specifying their parameters. They allow people to in-
teract, but do not define how they should interact. This means they al-
low users to implement and adapt them. And it means that people can
communicate and experiment with ways of communication that suit
them.
Enterprise IT
The technologies in this group include work flow management sys-
tems, customer relations management systems and electronic interac-
tion with customers. The ideal type for this group is an entirely electro-
nic management process: customers interact electronically, their input
is managed in electronic files by electronic work flow systems, both in-
dividually and according to load, outputs are sent to the customer elec-
tronically and filed in an electronic archive. In this ideal type, the
management process has gone completely paperless. These functional-
ities restructure interactions among groups of employees or with busi-
ness partners. They depend, from the outset, on new interdependen-
cies, processes and decision rights, because they cannot work without
them. This means their implementation is very much top-down. For
these functionalities, business processes need to be specified in ad-
vance. The capabilities of the technologies in this group are: rede-
signing business processes and standardizing work flows, monitoring
activities and events efficiently. This means that processes, after having
been standardized for electronic work flow management, can be rede-
signed and standardized much more easily. Reports on events and ac-
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tivities are, because the entire process is electronic, much more readily
available.
Concluding Part 1
This first part of the study has presented a variety of information in or-
der to facilitate understanding the study. The central question in the
study is how IT functionalities can support judicial reform: improving
and innovating processes in order to realize the values in the interna-
tional human rights conventions to a greater extent. The topic is very
complex. It involves studying information and information technology,
courts and court processes. It will draw on a large variety of source ma-
terials: comparative material, case studies, socio-legal analysis and legal
texts.
The study will first inventory the IT that is available in most courts in
Western Europe and the United States Next, it will explore the most
frequent problems encountered in implementing IT (Part 2). Then, it
will focus on three major problems courts and judiciaries face. Each
problem is examined in a separate part. Each part will explore a speci-
fic issue in order to identify, for each issue, the role of information and
how information technology can impact it. Part 3 examines internal
processes from the starting point of case delay. Part 4 studies external
interaction from the starting point of access to justice. Part 5 analyzes
safeguarding integrity from the starting point of corruption. Part 6 is
the final part of this study. It will sum up the findings of the study
with regard to how information technology can support improving the
delay, access and integrity of courts and judiciaries. The study closes
by indicating some topics for further research.
Notes
1 Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948.
2 2000/C 364/01, signed and proclaimed by the Presidents of the European Parlia-
ment, the Council and the Commission at the European Council meeting in Nice on
December 7, 2000.
3 Council of Europe Resolution Res(2002)12, Statute of the European Commission for
the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ).
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Part 2 Information Technology in Courts
This part of the study starts with a discussion of information techno-
logy in courts. Before exploring judicial reform, it is useful to have a
sense of what we know about IT in courts.
This discussion comes in two chapters. The first chapter will provide
an overview of the information technology courts actually use. It will
look at the different functionalities courts use. The question to answer
is: What IT functionalities have been implemented in the courts, and
for what purposes are they used? The purpose of Chapter 2.1 is largely
descriptive. It serves to identify the functionalities of court IT before
we can start to discuss how those functionalities can support reforming
judiciaries.
The second chapter examines a question that is, in my experience,
frequently discussed in judiciaries and courts themselves: why is im-
plementing IT so difficult? In order to find answers to that question,
Chapter 2.2 analyzes what is involved in developing and implementing
IT for courts and judiciaries. To that end, it will produce an overview of
the most prevalent difficulties organizations in general face with IT.
The risks those difficulties imply are then translated for judiciaries and
courts.
Chapter 2.1 Court IT
In an early example of the use of information technology in the court-
room, the war crimes tribunals after World War II made use of film
material and simultaneous translation (Radlmaier p. 67). In 1961, the
court trying WWII war criminal Adolf Eichmann used simultaneous
interpretation, photocopies and super8-films. Today, many different
kinds of IT are used by the United Nations International Criminal Tri-
bunals and the International Criminal Court: video and audio recor-
ding of the court sessions, simultaneous interpretation, electronic court
reporting, videoconferencing for witness hearings, and electronic files.
Moreover, the tribunals maintain web sites with their decisions, back-
ground information, and sounds and images from the courtroom.
What IT do the courts use?
This chapter is an inventory of information technology in courts.
It will list what IT has been implemented in the courts, and for what
purposes it is used. IT for courts can be distinguished into technology
for:
– The courtroom, supporting what happens in the courtroom itself
– The back office, supporting the processes that are related to case ad-
ministration, document production and court management
– External communication, supporting all communication with par-
ties and the general public outside the courts.
Finding out what technology is in use is not easy. It raises some quite
complex questions: what the functionality actually accomplishes and
how to establish that, what the various levels of implementation are,
and how to ensure accurate comparison. The answers to those ques-
tions are hard to find. One reason is in the sources: information on
computer use in courts - in Europe, the United States and some other
parts of the world - is not very accessible. The sources that are available
all have a different approach and they use different categorizations.
That makes comparison and consolidation of results difficult. More-
over, the functionality of the information technologies surveyed is not
always clear. This means, for instance, that we cannot be sure what the
case management systems in the different countries actually do. These
problems will be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
In this discussion, I mainly use three sources:
– CEPEJ 2008: In its collection of data about courts in the member
countries of the Council of Europe, CEPEJ has included questions
about information technology in the courts in its 2006 and 2008
surveys (CEPEJ 2006b, 2008). Reflecting court practice in most
European countries as a paper-document-based process, CEPEJ cov-
ers back office and some communication technology. It has not in-
cluded questions about the use of technology in the courtroom itself
in the survey. There is a special problem with the CEPEJ data. The
consolidated table on page 82 of the report and the full table on
page 266 of the report do not tally. CEPEJ confirmed there are pro-
blems with the data in the full table.1 Therefore, the data presented
in this chapter come from the consolidated table on page 82 of the
report. More detailed judgments on IT implementation than the
consolidated table allows can, therefore, be hazardous.
– FJC 2003: The U.S. Federal Judicial Center surveyed the level of im-
plementation of courtroom technologies. The survey did not cover
back office technology. This survey, done in 2003, covered the feder-
al district courts in the United States.
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– FJC 2007: The U.S. Federal Judicial Center produced another in-
teresting source of information on the level of implementation: a U.S.
federal judges’ round table on court technology in February 2007
(report, FJC 2007). The round table, convened by the federal judi-
cial conference’s IT committee, discussed a number of technology-
related issues that may give us some clues about the level of imple-
mentation in U.S. courts.2 The discussion was preceded by a survey
of technology users.
My assumption at the outset of this discussion is that U.S. courts are
ahead of the courts in Europe in their implementation of IT because
they started implementing IT earlier than other judiciaries. In the ana-
lysis, we will be looking for commonalities as well as differences.
Approaches and categorization
Categorizing IT should facilitate answering the questions outlined
above, regarding what the functionalities actually do and what the com-
parative levels of implementation are. The three sources each have
very different approaches.
The CEPEJ survey categorizes IT functionalities by the purpose of the
functionality:
– Direct support for judges and court staff
– Support for court management
– Support for interaction between courts and parties.
A similar categorization that looks to the purpose for which the func-
tionality is used, rather than the functionality itself, was used in the
first Netherlands judiciary policy plan (ARIZ 2000 p. 17, 19). Its cate-
gories are functionality for:
– Managing primary processes: individual cases, case load, and court
calendaring,
– Managing secondary processes such as the management of build-
ings, reporting and budgeting.
The FJC 2003 survey of courtroom technologies did not use any kind
of grouping related to purpose. The categories used in the FJC 2007
round table survey were calendaring, case management, courtroom
technologies, writing and tracking opinions, and working remotely.
This chapter discusses implementing IT in courts in chronological
order. Thus, it follows both the development of functionality and the
history of the introduction of IT functionalities in courts as they be-
came available.
First, it examines stand-alone functionality. This is technology that
works on a computer that is not connected to a network. Next, it looks
at network and communication enabling technology. Finally, it studies
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enterprise technology and technology enabling interaction with exter-
nal partners.
Stand-alone, function information technologies
The function information technologies came first. They assist with the
execution of discrete tasks and can make the execution of stand-alone
tasks more efficient (McAfee p. 144). They do not require a network to
function. The two major ones are word processing and database tech-
nology.
Word processing
Office automation is the most widespread form of information technol-
ogy generally. It is also the most prevalent functionality used in the
courts. It includes mostly word processing, but also some calendaring,
and simple spreadsheets bundled in an office automation package.
Word processing to produce paper documents is the most prevalent
form of IT in courts (Table 2). All courts in Council of Europe member
countries have word processing for most of their staff. FJC 2007 users
report they are very satisfied with their word processing technology for
its ease of use and suitability for the task.3
Databases
The functionality underlying automated registers is database technol-
ogy. It is used in courts for registration and management of cases. Case
registration systems replace the functionality of traditional court dock-
ets. On top of the case registration systems, court and case management
systems have additional functionality. They can provide non-judicial
and judicial case management support for case tracking, case planning
and document management. They can also generate information on
the performance of courts. The purpose of case management systems
is to ensure cases are disposed properly and promptly. Finally, there
are systems supporting the financial management of the courts (CEPEJ
2008 p. 82).
Table 2 Function Information Technology in Courts in Europe
Facility 100 %
of courts
< 50 %
of courts
< 50 %
of courts
< 10 %
of courts
Total no.
of responses
Word processing 42 4 0 0 46
Case registration 26 10 5 3 44
Court/case management 20 12 4 6 42
Financial management 26 8 2 6 42
Source: CEPEJ 2008 p. 86.
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Table 2 shows the results of the 2008 CEPEJ survey with regard to
functional IT. In the CEPEJ survey, the maximum possible number of
respondent member countries is 46. In almost all member countries,
all courts have word processing facilities. In a little over half of the
CEPEJ countries, all courts have court case registration systems. Case
registration systems have penetrated in fewer courts than word proces-
sing. Financial information systems have been implemented in about
as many courts as the registration systems. Court/case management
information systems have been implemented in less than half the
courts.
Courtroom technologies
In common law court systems, in both civil and criminal justice, cases
are ultimately decided by trial if they are not settled in an earlier phase.
Very few cases actually come to trial, and trial rates vary widely across
countries. Some of those trials are conducted in front of a jury.
In those trials, the principle of immediacy of evidence is very impor-
tant. This means the evidence itself needs to be presented in the court-
room: witnesses making a statement, exhibits like original documents
and objects. This has given rise to implementation of information tech-
nology to support conducting trials. The FJC 2003 survey results show
that in 2003, a large percentage of U.S. federal district courts have ac-
cess to such technology, either via a permanent installation in one or
more courtrooms or equipment that is shared among courtrooms (FJC
2003). The equipment includes sound amplification; an evidence cam-
era; monitors on the bench, the witness stands, the counsel table, out-
side the jury box or built into it; and monitors targeted at the audience.
It also includes an interpreting system, audio and video conferencing
equipment and equipment to support production of a transcript of the
proceedings. These functionalities are stand-alone technology; they do
not require a network to function.
Evidence cameras are used to present exhibits such as documents,
photographs or objects. Another way of presenting such exhibits is
through their image on a laptop computer connected to the display
equipment. Monitors and digital projectors and screens are used to dis-
play the exhibits. The kill switch is a tool for the judge to control what
jurors are allowed to see in accordance with evidence rules. Annotation
equipment facilitates marking up images in order to point out what is
significant in the display. A color video printer prints out such images
for the record. Most federal district courts have an orientation program
to familiarize court staff and attorneys with equipment and how it can
be used. About a third of the courts have one or more full-time emplo-
yees to deal with courtroom technology (FJC 2003). One user in the FJC
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2007 survey remarks: “Our equipment is old & unreliable. Monitors
are on their last legs in the jury box. They take up a lot of space & are
not that great for viewing written text in exhibits. The courtroom is a
total mess, with wires running everywhere.” The users in the FJC
2007 survey are, on the whole, satisfied with the ease of use and suit-
ability of the courtroom technologies, provided there is help from
technology staff.
Capabilities of stand-alone functional technologies
The general capabilities of these stand-alone, functional technologies
are to increase precision and enhance experimentation capacity (McA-
fee p. 144). This, it should be kept in mind, is what they can do. They
do not automatically produce these results without involvement and ef-
fort by the users.
Displaying actual evidence and exhibits increases precision in the
courtroom. Keeping data that record events supports experimentation.
For example: this study uses a lot of statistics to examine court pro-
cesses, particularly in Part 3 on case delay. Those statistics are available
because cases are registered using database technology. We now know
Table 3 Courtroom Technology in U.S. Federal District Courts (2003)
Functionality Equipment Percentage of
courts answering
survey that confirm
access to technologies
Sound amplification Sound reinforcement system 95
Evidence presentation Evidence camera 94
Wiring to connect laptop computers 93
Kill switch and control system 92
Monitors at the bench 89
Monitors at the witness stand 88
Monitors at counsel table or lectern 88
Integrated lectern 81
Monitors outside the jury box 77
Monitors built into the jury box 57
Monitors or screens targeted at the audience 77
Digital projector and projection screen 66
Annotation Annotation equipment 91
Color video printer 80
Interpretation Telephone or infrared interpreting
(translation) system
92
Transcript production Real-time software for use by court reporter 81
Real-time transcript annotation viewer 74
Recording Digital audio recording 66
Source: Federal Judicial Center Survey on Courtroom Technology 2003 (FJC 2003 p. 2).
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so much about our processes because databases keep the data for us
and make them available in ways we can use. We can study them and
see where bottlenecks in case processing are. We can evaluate whether
experiments to improve case processing are producing the desired re-
sults. Databases can produce correlations that we could never find
otherwise. Justice G.C. Bharuka, who headed the India judiciary’s IT
committee, told me how he first tracked case delay in Bangalore by
using a self-constructed database.4 For the policy research needed to
develop routines, databases to compare and analyze court decisions
and statistics are an indispensable tool. They can be used for senten-
cing support and automated decisions in very simple cases.
When word processing began to be introduced, it was implemented
primarily as a tool for support staff. Professionals like lawyers and
judges would at first dictate to a typist, just as they had done in the age
of the typewriter. Nowadays, professionals largely write their own docu-
ments. The databases for the case and court management systems, too,
mostly copied the paper based registration process. They are still
mostly used by support staff only.
For successful implementation, functional information technologies
do not require major changes toward better-skilled workers, higher le-
vels of teamwork, redesigned processes and new decision rights (McA-
fee p. 141). They do not need networks or electronic communication to
do their jobs. In summary, because they do not require much organiza-
tional change, they are easy to implement, at least compared with the
network and enterprise technologies discussed in the next two sec-
tions.
Network information technologies
Historically, network technology was introduced after stand-alone func-
tional technologies had been in use for some time. Network technolo-
gies facilitate interactions between users, but without specifying their
parameters. They allow people to interact, but do not define how they
should interact. This means users can modify how they use them they
allow users to implement and modify them over time. People can com-
municate and experiment with ways of communication that suit them.
Network technologies provide a means by which people can commu-
nicate with one another. In this group, I have included:
– Email
– Internet connections
– Jurisprudence databases
– Sharing documents
– Electronic files
PART 2 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN COURTS 53
– Groupware
– Audio and video conferencing.
Table 4 Network Information Technologies in Courts in Europe (2008)
Facility 100 %
of courts
< 50 %
of courts
< 50 %
of courts
< 10 %
of courts
Total no.
of responses
Email 33 9 2 1 45
Internet connections 33 6 6 1 45
Electronic files 18 12 4 7 41
Electronic database of jurisprudence 33 7 2 1 43
Source: CEPEJ 2008 p. 86.
Email
As almost everywhere else, the killer application of networking IT in
courts was email (Frissen p. 7). Email’s great advantage, over more tra-
ditional communication means like the telephone, is asynchronous
communication. The recipient and the sender do not need to commu-
nicate at the same moment in time, as is needed with the telephone.
Email is used on a large scale in justice networks for informal commu-
nication. However, email is not used on a large scale in official com-
munication with court users yet. According to Velicogna, this is due to
requirements for official communications. For instance, legislation in
Belgium, France, Greece and Italy would require both certified email
and digital signature for official communications. Velicogna maintains
that the absence of these technologies explains why email is not used
for official communication (Velicogna 2007 p. 136). Although I agree
that having those technologies in place is a condition, I do not think
that is the only reason. The technologies themselves are available.
However, implementing the technology also requires changes in the
business processes that have apparently simply not been developed yet.
I will come back to this point later in this chapter.
Jurisprudence databases
Electronic databases of jurisprudence are available in a large majority
of CEPEJ countries. However, we do not know which type CEPEJ actu-
ally measured. Jurisprudence databases deserve some special attention
because the functionality and capabilities behind them can be very di-
verse. Therefore, we need a conceptual clarification. Nowadays, juris-
prudence databases can be accessed online. But there were early ver-
sions in the stand-alone functionality group. Here is a list of the chron-
ology:
As stand-alone functionality, the first jurisprudence databases were
installed in court libraries. They could be consulted on media like dis-
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kettes or CDs, or over a telephone line. They most resembled a search-
able copy of the paper version of the jurisprudence collection.
As a repository of interesting or innovative decisions, they can be
put into the group of network technology, discussed below. People can
supply decisions on an ad hoc basis. Not every decision goes into the
repository. Some infrastructure is needed, for example a framework
on who decides what goes in. But that does not need to be any differ-
ent from the processes that went into producing the paper version.
As a collection of all decisions in an electronic archive, it is enter-
prise technology. All decisions need to go in. There is a process in
place that ensures they do. This type of decision database belongs in
the enterprise technology group discussed below.
These are actually ideal types. The second category is very much like
an electronic version of the first one.
Jurisprudence databases have had a major impact on the position of
courts in the public arena from the moment they became publicly
available on the Internet. For instance, reporting in the public press on
court decisions has become more accurate. The databases have also
enhanced the transparency of the decisions that have become available
since decisions that need to go public require greater clarity. Finally,
the public jurisprudence databases have strengthened the courts’ role
as the guardian of norms, its “shadow function.”5
Internet connections
Where court staff and judges have access to the Internet, they use the
connection mostly for email and to access information. The connection
facilitates access to sources of legal research such as laws, court deci-
sions or jurisprudence.
Electronic files
From the CEPEJ results, it looks as if electronic files have become a
regular feature in a majority of courts. However, it is unclear what is
meant by electronic files. If we understand an electronic file to be an
electronic case file for an individual case, there are several possibilities.
First, it can be a collection of documents, filed as paper and scanned in
court. In this case, no electronic filing is necessary. Then, the file can
be a collection of both paper documents that were scanned in court
after they came in and documents that were filed electronically. Sec-
ond, it can be a collection of electronically filed documents. This would
require electronic filing of documents, and thereby electronic two-way
external communication. The difference is such a major step in the de-
velopment of business processes that electronic files of this type are
not included in the networking technology group, but in the group for
enterprise technology discussed below.
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Other networking/communication technologies
CEPEJ 2008 has not measured the use of intranets, group sharing of
documents or distance participation technology - audio and video con-
ferencing. Strictly speaking, audio and video conferencing do not need
the use of a computer network. They can both be conducted over a tele-
phone line. But because they are so clearly communication technology,
I have included them in the networking group. FJC 2003 surveyed
them both. Both audio and video conferencing were common technolo-
gies in federal district courts in the United States in 2003. 93% of sur-
veyed courts replied they had audio conferencing equipment, and 85%
had video equipment. They are mostly of the moveable type. In the
2007 survey, quite a few users report technical difficulties with video-
conferencing equipment.
Networking to combine databases and word processing: Standard decisions
models
Although word processing and database technology do not require a
network to function, their combined use over the court network gave
rise to a major innovation. Office automation, merging data from the
case registration system with text in the word processor has become a
very common process for producing bulk decisions in small claims
and debt recovery cases. It is used in many courts where the technolo-
gies were implemented. The Dutch courts use a system called Just-
Word that supports use of standard texts and smart merges by using
Visual Basic programming. This system was developed first by users in
the courts at the end of the 1990s when networks with central data-
bases were starting to be implemented. It was re-developed when the
courts were given a different word processing system, and rolled out to
all the courts.
Capabilities of network technologies
The capabilities of network information technologies are:
– Facilitating collaboration
– Allowing expressions of judgment
– Fostering emergence (patterns).
Again, whether the capabilities are realized depends on the users.
There is an interesting emerging process in collaboration in Dutch
courts. Where judges work in panels, or where their support staff draft
decisions, review of those documents is beginning to be done increas-
ingly over the network, in the electronic document on the court net-
work drive. Presentations at the FJC round table reported on already
more developed forms of collaboration in case management and writ-
ing court decisions (FJC 2007, presentation handouts, my notes from
the meeting).
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With regard to implementation of network technology, some obser-
vations can be made on requirements. Users are free to experiment
with ways to use the technology, as can be seen in the examples of Just-
Word and the document sharing. Some standards, such as a code of
conduct for Internet and email use for the users and standardization of
email addresses, are needed. Some of the standardization is external,
but some, like the code of conduct, need to be developed inside the jus-
tice system. On the whole, network technologies do not restrict the
users’ freedom as much as the enterprise information technologies dis-
cussed in the next section. However, the network itself needs to be
managed and maintained with standards for email addresses and for
making information accessible.
Enterprise information technologies and external communication
The technologies in this group include work flow management sys-
tems, customer relations management systems and external electronic
interaction with customers. This group does not include any courtroom
technologies.
The ideal type for this group is an entirely electronic management
process: cases are filed electronically, they are managed as electronic
files by electronic work flow systems, both individually and according
to load, outputs are filed in an electronic archive. In this ideal type, it
is the management process that has gone completely paperless. The
process of adjudication can still consist of physical court hearings.
The capabilities of the technologies in this group are: redesigning
business processes and standardizing work flows, monitoring activities
and events efficiently. This means that processes can be redesigned
and standardized much more easily, and that reports on events and ac-
tivities are much more readily available.
In order for these functionalities to work, business processes need to
be specified in advance (McAfee p. 145). This means their implementa-
tion is very much top-down. They prescribe new interdependencies,
processes, and decision rights. They restructure interactions among
groups of employees or with business partners. In other words: from
the outset, they depend on those new interdependencies, processes and
decision rights, because they cannot work without them.
Workflow and case management systems
Case management includes management of single cases as well as
managing case flow and managing courts. It includes managing time
standards and case load, as well as analysis of court workload trends to
improve planning and monitoring strategic actions (Velicogna 2007
p. 134-135). The system supporting these activities uses case data from
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the case administration as well as information about work processes
for case processing. The more sophisticated the system, the more it re-
quires standardizing. For instance, for planning and monitoring pur-
poses, data need to be the same and to steer work processes, those pro-
cesses need to be standardized as well. The federal district courts in
the United States have a case management/electronic filing system
called CM/EFS. In FJC 2007, judges in federal district courts remark
how CM/EFS does not support the functionality they need. For in-
stance, calendaring is supported for the district judges, but the magis-
trate judges have different case flows that cannot be calendared using
CM/EFS.
The case management systems reported to CEPEJ and listed above
in the functional technology category may qualify for inclusion in this
group. There is not enough information in the report to determine
what level of sophistication the case management systems have
reached.
Interaction with external partners
Courts’ external communication occurs with very different counter-
parts:
– With non-users and users
– With lawyers and other regular professional court users
– With non-professional court users.
Another way of looking at external communication is to look at the le-
vel of the interaction. The approach below follows the four-stage model
for benchmarking e-government projects in the European Union (EU
Benchmarking p. 16):
Stage 1: Information online about public services
Stage 2: Communication/interaction: downloading of forms
Stage 3: Communication/two-way interaction: processing of forms
(including authentication)
Stage 4: Transaction: case handling, decision and delivery (payment).
Table 5 Enterprise Information Technology in Courts in Europe (2008)
Facility 100 %
of courts
< 50 %
of courts
< 50 %
of courts
< 10 %
of courts
Total no.
of responses
Electronic web forms 11 3 5 20 39
Special web site 14 7 9 11 41
Other electronic communication
facilities
15 3 6 11 34
Source: CEPEJ 2008 p. 86
Based on the CEPEJ data on electronic web forms, it appears that
quite a few European courts have reached the European Union’s stage
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2. It is difficult to ascertain from the CEPEJ data whether any court
systems have developed beyond stage 2. There is no information on
what the special web sites can do. And we do not know what the other
electronic communication facilities provide by way of functionality, or
how any of them rate in the European Union benchmarking stages.
Conclusions for chapter 2.1
This chapter provided an overview of IT implemented in courts. From
the above, some lines can be drawn regarding implementation levels
and factors influencing those levels.
Across Europe, information technology implementation levels vary
widely. It appears that so far, most courts have largely used IT to assist
their paper based processes. They have not used technology to radically
improve their processes.
With the CEPEJ results, we should be able to compare the member
countries to learn about IT implementation levels in courts. CEPEJ
2008 has graded countries on their IT implementation. It has categor-
ized them according to the implementation levels: very high, high,
moderate and low levels of implementation. It accorded 44 points to
systems having implemented all 11 types of functionality in 100 per-
cent of all courts. A system with those functionalities in less than 10
percent of its courts scores only 11 points. Taking into account the pro-
blem with the full table on p. 269 mentioned earlier, there are still
some observations to be made.6
Finland, Austria and the United Kingdom, but also Estonia, Slovakia
and Hungary, are in the very high implementation group because they
score more than 39 points (CEPEJ 2008 p. 87). High levels of imple-
mentation can be found in France, Germany, Sweden, Latvia, Bulgaria
and the Netherlands. Belgium, Ireland and Croatia are in the moderate
level group. In the low level group we find Cyprus, Ukraine and Rus-
sia. That is, if we assume this ranking was based on correct and accu-
rate data.
In the very high level group, direct support for judges and support
staff are fully functional, and countries in this group are ahead of the
other groups with digital access and communication. They use web
forms, special web sites and other forms of electronic communication
more than the others. This is a general conclusion that the table on
p. 269 allows. Austria has developed the Elektronischer Rechtsverkehr
(ERV) or Electronic Legal Communication, a system that is updated
periodically with new technical capabilities (Fabri 2003 p. 112-116). This
system was initially developed for communication between lawyers and
the courts, but it has gradually been opened up for other user groups.
In England and Wales, a special court was set up to process small
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money claims for large claimants such as energy companies and
banks. This procedure is now accessible to everyone living in England
and Wales. It is used frequently by small businesses and the self-em-
ployed (Fabri 2003 p. 176). The functionality of this court, Money
Claim On Line (MCOL), was extended to another simple procedure,
that of repossession: Possession Claim On Line (PCOL). There is a
more detailed discussion of MCOL in Part 3.
Implementation of functional technologies has been managed by most
courts. Networking technologies seem to have been implemented in a
fair number of courts systems. Different factors influence those levels.
One factor is early implementation. Early starters, such as the Uni-
ted Kingdom and the United States, have progressed further than later
starters, like some countries in Western Europe. This, however, should
be nuanced for the really late starters, for example in Central and East-
ern Europe. Velicogna observed how countries newly adapting to auto-
mation moved very quickly because of reform pressures from the Eur-
opean Union and available funding and assistance (Velicogna CEPEJ p.
48). Another factor seems to be the approach that is chosen. Velicogna
observes how in European courts, the more successful approaches to
electronic administration of justice have been to choose simple proce-
dures and to simplify more complex ones. Developing full online pro-
ceedings, where effort is centered on translating all the complexity of
the paper based procedures into the electronic ones, has been charac-
terized by never-ending piloting and mounting costs (Velicogna CEPEJ
p. 48). There is a world of IT development experience behind these ob-
servations. That world is examined in the next chapter.
Chapter 2.2 Lessons on Developing and Implementing IT
This chapter looks at court IT from a different perspective than the pre-
vious chapter. Chapter 2.1 served as an inventory, listing what IT courts
use for their business. The chapter you are reading now was inspired
by reactions from judicial colleagues on early drafts of this study. The
main concern they expressed was why getting the IT working in the
courts is so difficult. Therefore, this study on IT for courts would be in-
complete if it did not address that concern. Thus, this chapter exam-
ines what is needed to get IT into the courts. Conceivably, this is a
question to be asked not before, but after deciding that IT will be im-
plemented for specific areas of judicial reform. To a certain extent, that
is right. This chapter would also have been well placed after Parts 3, 4
and 5. However, whether this chapter should come before or after the
ones on judicial reform is something of a chicken-and-egg discussion.
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In Part 2, dedicated to court IT, it serves two purposes at once: concen-
trating on IT in Part 2 means it does not distract from the topics in the
parts on judicial reform. More importantly, studying implementation
problems provides a clear argument for the relevance of the discus-
sions in Parts 3, 4 and 5.
Before those major problems in judiciaries are addressed in the next
parts, this chapter examines what is required if judiciaries want to de-
velop and implement IT. In order to answer this question, it analyzes
experience with IT development in courts and other organizations. It
first studies two well documented IT projects for courts and justice in-
stitutions. It then analyzes experience with IT policy development in
other organizations. From the findings, it extrapolates requirements
for IT policy development in judiciaries.
IT development – learning from experience
IT projects are often unsatisfactory. In many organizations, and not
just in courts and judiciaries, IT projects do not produce the results en-
visaged, on time, and within budget. These examples illustrate the
point:
– More than 50 percent of all IT projects fail in some part, and be-
tween 4 and 15 percent fail completely, according to a report for the
Dutch Parliament by the General Accounting Chamber (Rekenka-
mer A p. 9).
– Court IT projects in France and Italy are mired in difficulty, reports
on IT developments in courts show (Velicogna CEPEJ 2007 p. 48).
– World Bank IT projects received a lower quality rating than World
Bank projects overall, reports a World Bank quality study (World
Bank 2006b p. 6).
Courts and judiciaries, in order to be successful in their adoption of IT
to improve the quality of justice, may benefit by learning from experi-
ence. The need to learn is evident: either IT development activities are
new to judiciaries, or the functionalities are new. It is in the nature of
the activity of developing new IT for courts that what needs to be done
has mostly not been done before.
They can learn from their own experience as well as that of others.
Learning from others’ experience can be done by observing successes
and by studying failures. Others’ successes may point the way, but their
environments may not be similar. Learning from failures helps to avoid
pitfalls, but it does not necessarily make clear how to do things right.
Thus, the findings in this chapter will not provide hard and fast recipes
for successful IT development and implementation.
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This chapter studies documented IT experience.
First, there are descriptions of two IT projects in the justice sector.
The projects are fairly representative of the approach to justice IT pro-
jects in the recent past. The descriptions highlight some of the pro-
blems the projects encountered. Next, there is an inventory of findings
on IT development failures in a variety of non-judicial organizations.
Both the inventory and the project experience are analyzed to draw
some conclusions on the requirements of judiciaries wanting to use IT.
Two projects
This section examines two justice IT projects: the HBS project in the
Netherlands and the Ontario Integrated Justice Project in Canada. Both
projects were stopped before completion. These projects are relevant
for four factors they have in common:
– They attracted a lot of attention.
– They illustrate a variety of learning points.
– They were audited by a third party, so there is an authoritative
source for what happened. The audit reports are an important
source of information for this section:
L The external audit report of the Hoger Beroep Systeem Stra-
frecht (Criminal Justice Appeal System)) project submitted by
the Netherlands Minister of Justice to the Second Chamber of
Parliament in 2001 (Brouwer).
L The audits, by the Ontario Auditor’s office, of the Ontario Inte-
grated Justice Project. These audits were conducted in 2001 and
2003 (Ontario 2001, 2003).
– They are no longer active projects, so their outcomes are known.
There are many very interesting judicial IT projects in progress
right now. Any of them would have been interesting for this study.
However, they are difficult to judge because they are still in mid-
course and their outcomes are not yet clear. Therefore, I chose to
look at these two projects, which both closed some years ago.
The HBS project in the Netherlands is interesting because its level of
technological ambition was high; it was the first court IT project in the
Netherlands intended to implement work flow management and it se-
verely tested the governance structure that was in place at the time. It
is also interesting because it was stopped after it failed to deliver.7 The
Ontario Integrated Justice project is interesting because it is – to my
knowledge – the single largest justice IT project ever attempted. It at-
tracted a lot of attention because of the level of its ambition and scale.
It subsequently attracted attention because it failed.
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Project 1: HBS (Criminal Justice Appeal System)
The Hoger Beroep Systeem Strafrecht project intended to create the
first electronic work flow management system for Dutch courts. Its
goal was to develop a case registration and management system for the
integrated case administrations of the appeal courts and the appeals
prosecutors. It intended to develop a system that combined work flow
management with the case registration database. It required designing
a single business process over both the prosecution and the courts. Pre-
viously, each of the five prosecution offices and the five court adminis-
trations had their own paper-based administration. The timeline in Box
2 shows how the project’s management was replaced several times.
The project’s governance structure was changed in mid-course. When
the system as delivered turned out to have irreparable flaws, the project
was stopped.
Box 2 HBS Project 8
HBS project
Start: December 1996
Aim: To create one common information system for the case admini-
strations of the offices of the appeals prosecutors and the appeal
courts in the Netherlands.
Principal and budget holder was the Ministry of Justice. In 1999, the
role of principal was instituted materially in a project steering com-
mittee, made up of three members from the prosecution, the appeal
courts and the ministry.
Time line:
1997 – Q1 1998: Feasibility study
April-October
1998: Functional design, freeze because of doubts
about the wide range of functional requirements
Projected delivery: End of 1998
April 1999: Second phase, with higher budget and new pro-
ject management
2000: Detailed design and actual building phase.
August 2000: Detailed design completed
December 2000: Technical delivery of the system
2001: Testing and preparation of implementation
started. Testing immediately uncovered pro-
blems, some of them extremely serious. The
project management was replaced again. The
problems turned out to be irreparable
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October 2001: Project was stopped
Total spending: E 12,7 mln or US$ 11.3 mln (estimated cost
ƒ 6 mln (E 2.72 mln, or US$ 2.42 mln)
Source: Brouwer, and letters of the Minister of Justice to Parliament,
October 2001, February 2002.
After it was stopped in 2001, the project was audited at the request of
the Ministry of Justice. The external audit of the project examined risk
management, project governance and control, responsibilities and lea-
dership, and the main causes of the project’s failure. It found (Brouwer
p. 6):
– Expectations and points of departure were too ambitious in relation
to the experience of the organizations involved.
– The feasibility study had already concluded the project was very ris-
ky. The risks had been identified adequately. Subsequently, the risks
were not reduced and managed sufficiently.
– For the full duration of the project, the importance of change in the
organizations and of integrating the user organization into the pro-
ject were underestimated. As a result, the project did not achieve
successful acceptance of the delivered system.
– Competences and responsibilities of those involved were not ar-
ranged properly for steering and controlling the project adequately.
– The chosen development methodology was not applied adequately
during 1999 and 2000.
The Ministry of Justice acted as the principal for the project. Involve-
ment of both the appeal courts and the prosecution made it politically
complex. This meant the project was, in effect, run by three separate
stakeholders, each with their own needs. The change in project govern-
ance in mid-course had to do with this political complexity because, as
the audit phrased it, the responsibilities of those involved were not ar-
ranged properly for steering and controlling the project adequately.
This phrase refers to the circumstance that the user committee, or at
least the court representatives, had no clear mandate or strategy. They
also could not refer back to an authority for guidance, since the appeal
courts presidents did not have a strategy with regard to their IT.
The combination of functionalities envisaged, the case registration
database with electronic work flow, had not been tried before. There-
fore, the project was technologically ambitious. I recall being called
upon to mediate when a problem arose after the national prosecution
service and the judiciary had each chosen different products for their
work flow functionality. It is an eloquent illustration of the kind of
complexity integrated systems can face. The prosecution had chosen a
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system that encoded fully developed work processes for maximum con-
trol on integrity of information management. The judiciary, on the
other hand, had chosen a system that would support developing diffe-
rent work flows and support experimentation. If we recall the typology
of functionalities from Chapter 2.1, the judiciary chose a system that
requires few complements and allows a large measure of freedom, and
the prosecution chose a top-down system requiring full complements
in terms of decision rights and centralized process control. This exam-
ple shows how organizations can have different, and even opposing,
needs. This circumstance added to the complexity.
The experience of the organizations involved with IT was extremely
limited. The appeal courts, at the time, had no automated case registra-
tion system, and therefore no experience with anything beyond a paper
docket. For the criminal divisions of the appeal courts and the appeal
prosecution offices, this was going to be their first case registration sys-
tem. They had no experience with IT, apart from word processing. The
appeal courts and prosecution offices did not have experience with IT
projects either, let alone projects of this complexity.
Project 2: The Ontario Integrated Justice Project
The Ontario Integrated Justice Project was regarded as a model project
when it started in 1996. It was regularly presented at international IT
conferences like the Court Technology Conferences of the National
Center for State Courts in the United States. It was presented at the
2002 Technology for Justice Conference in Sydney, Australia in Octo-
ber, the same week it was scrapped.9 Derek Freeman, chair of the On-
tario Bar Association Integrated Justice Committee, presented the pro-
ject. His presentation10 and the 2001 and 2003 external audits of the
project (Ontario 2001 and 2003) are my sources for this overview of
the project.
In Ontario, the project was regarded as ground-breaking: “This is
not fine-tuning or changing a process here; it is foundational and
huge,” said Deputy Solicitor General Virginia West, in February 2002
(Freeman 2002 slide 5). The project ended because its work term ex-
pired on October 8, 2002 when the ministries and the consortium of
vendors, after 20 months of negotiations, were unable to renew their
agreement to continue the project. The components were subsequently
assigned to each component’s most related ministries (Ontario 2003
p. 287).
When the project ended, the status of the work was as follows (On-
tario 2003 p. 285):
– Police: Computer-aided dispatch, electronic records management
system and offender tracking information system were implemen-
ted, but not with full functionality.
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– Crown (prosecution): Case management was not completed.
– Courts: E-filing, digital audio court recording, electronic case man-
agement and scheduling were not completed and were not expected
to be completed as originally envisioned.
– A common query system and common information services man-
agement were not achieved.
Box 3 The Ontario Integrated Justice Project
Ontario Integrated Justice Project
Start: 1996
Aim:
· Solve the problem of not sharing information on criminal justice
· Streamline the civil justice system
· Improve services.
The scope was to integrate all services and systems: courtrooms and
court offices, the private bar, the judiciary, police services, prosecu-
tion, corrections and parole, and ministries of justice.
Police: computer-aided dispatch, electronic records management sys-
tem
Crown (prosecution): electronic brief exchange, case management
Courts: e-filing, digital audio court recording, electronic case man-
agement and scheduling
Corrections (prisons): institutions case management probation and
parole case management
Common query system
Common information services management
Savings through disintermediation, new efficiencies and new fees
through increase and usage. E-filing for a fee was seen as a big cash
tap.
Principal: Office of the Solicitor-General of Ontario
Time line:
1996-1998: Plan project and define requirements
1999-2002: Development and design
2000- : Phased implementation, completion planned by
August 2002
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August 2002: New systems had to be completed by September
2002.
October 2002: Software had not been customized, there were
policy issues, testing and developing were still
going on, and the organization design was still
in progress.
October 2002: Project stopped. Parties will go their separate
ways.
Total spending: March 1998 cost estimate was CAN$ 180 mln
(E 127 mln), with expected benefits CAN$ 326 mln (E 230 mln).
By March 2001 the cost estimate had gone up to CAN$ 359 million
(E 253 mln). Expected benefits were down to CAN$ 238 million
(E 168mln).
Sources: Ontario 2001 and 2003 (audits), Freeman 2002.
The audits of the Ontario project have a strong financial focus, but
there are some observations about other aspects of the project as well.
The 2003 audit sums up some of the basic problems that were out-
lined in this chapter from other evaluations:
– The original business case had “an aggressive schedule that was
based on a best-case scenario [and] did not adequately take into ac-
count the magnitude of change introduced by the project, the com-
plexity of justice administration – particularly that of the courts – or
the ability of vendors to deliver the project’s computer systems in
the required time frames” (Ontario 2003 p. 283). That means that
risks were underestimated. The main risks were the scale of the
change involved and a lack of understanding of the complexity of
the organization. That is, there was no understanding of the need
for alignment with the business of the organizations involved, parti-
cularly that of the courts, and of implementation and what that in-
volved.
– The financial benefits were overstated. Originally, benefits were esti-
mated at CAN$ 326 million (E 230 million on January 1, 200211).
More than half of those benefits, CAN$ 172 million (E 121 million),
were foreseen in the court. The main benefit, apart from staff re-
ductions, was to be in e-filing of courts cases for a fee. Electronic
filing of cases was expected to attract more business. Fees charged
for this improved service were intended to make up a considerable
part of the benefits of the project. By 2002, estimated benefits had
been reduced to CAN$ 238 million (E 168 million). This was still
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overstated by CAN$ 57 million (E 40 million), according to the
2003 audit.
Whereas the benefits were overstated, the costs went up as underesti-
mated risks and unforeseen complexity materialized. Originally, the
cost was estimated at CAN$ 180 million (E 127 million); by October
2002, CAN$ 265 million (E 187 million) had been spent.
– The project was politically and organizationally complex because it
included applications for information exchange between the differ-
ent parts of the justice information chain. If we look at the specific
position of the judiciary, the Ontario Courts’ Annual Report for
1999 says: “The integrated justice project is intended to create pro-
grams to allow information and evidence to be received and trans-
mitted electronically at the counter and in the court room. A neces-
sary component of the program is a court scheduling and case man-
agement system for all civil, criminal and family matters.
Integrated justice has benefitted from the tremendous time and ef-
fort of the judicial committee in identifying the needs and expecta-
tions of the judiciary. The judicial committee has not stated how
these needs and expectations should be met, as this is a matter for
the attorney general to determine” (italics mine) (Ontario 199912). A
small piece of evidence of the organizational complexity is the cir-
cumstance that the attorney general, the minister of justice, deter-
mines how the needs and expectations of the judicial committee
shall be met. The judiciary does not have the means to prioritize.
However, that same judiciary was expected to deliver more than half
of the estimated benefits, in staff reductions and new fees for new
services.
Comparing the two projects
Both the scope and the scale of the HBS project were much smaller
than those of the Ontario project. Otherwise, some similarities emerge
from the audits:
– Both projects were overly optimistic about what the project results
would bring. They were too ambitious and the Ontario project
started out overstating the financial benefits.
– They both underestimated risks. Ontario had “an aggressive sche-
dule on a best-case scenario.” HBS “did not manage the risks identi-
fied.”
– They both also underestimated the amount of change needed in the
organization, and the need for integrating the users into the project
structure.
– Both were politically complex. In both cases, the minister of justice
was holding the purse strings. The judges and prosecutors ex-
pressed needs, but they had no means to prioritize. Competences
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and responsibilities were not arranged for steering and controlling
the project.
– The most striking commonality is the underestimation of the com-
plexity of the projects.
Did the respective organizations learn from their experience? The On-
tario project was taken apart and divided into smaller units. Each orga-
nization went on to develop its own systems. The HBS project pro-
duced some lessons. The governance structure of the Netherlands judi-
ciary was already in the process of being reformed. In 2002, the
Council for the Judiciary of the Netherlands took over the administra-
tion of the lower courts from the Ministry of Justice. As part of that re-
form process, IT policy making was positioned in the Council itself,
thus enabling policy and financial control for the judiciary. A firm poli-
cy agreement was made to set up projects in such a way that results
could be delivered within a calendar year. A comprehensive IT architec-
ture project was started and then aborted. A project to develop a new
case registration system was started. The pilot for this project was done
in the same instance as the development of HBS. The project still has
not delivered results after five years. Evidently, on the one hand, some
lessons were learned, but on the other, there are still other lessons to
be absorbed.
In order to find the most common lessons to be learned, the next sec-
tions will look at IT experience in other organizations. The most fre-
quent failure factors in developing and implementing IT will be identi-
fied. For each factor, there will be an analysis of its implications for ju-
diciaries.
Sources of experience
This section presents an analysis of lessons for courts and judiciaries
wanting to improve their performance with forms of IT. To that end, it
examines the experience of what went wrong in developing and imple-
menting IT in various non-judicial organizations. It translates that ex-
perience into messages about IT for courts and judiciaries.
By now, there is a large body of experience with IT projects. In order
to gain a broad understanding of that experience, this study will draw
on several sources presenting such experience in consolidated form.
This choice was motivated by several considerations, outlined below.
The most obvious and straightforward way to learn from projects is
to look at what actually happened in those projects first, and then draw
some conclusions from the information gained. This, however, may
well present some problems. Project documentation is needed to study
PART 2 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN COURTS 69
what happened. It is not always available, either publicly or on request.
Then, there is the question of the accuracy of the documentation. In
my experience, project documentation often does not provide the infor-
mation needed because it was written for other purposes. A second op-
tion for learning from projects is to study their evaluations. Not all pro-
jects are evaluated in order to draw lessons from them. There can be
any number of reasons for not evaluating projects: political sensitivity,
lack of evaluation budget, and poor planning. Both options, learning
from observing projects and studying project evaluations in order to ac-
quire a representative picture, are not very feasible when time is lim-
ited. Besides, the perspectives gained from either operation are bound
to be fairly limited because they will cover only a few projects. For all
these reasons, I have chosen sources that present consolidated experi-
ence from evaluations of large numbers of government and other IT
projects:
– The World Bank Quality of Information and Communication Tech-
nology Components in Bank Projects, Quality Assurance Group As-
sessment, July 2006 (World Bank 2006b). This study assessed IT
components in World Bank projects. Projects to be assessed were
selected as follows. Out of 215 operations, about half of which con-
tain some ICT components, projects were selected with ICT compo-
nents meeting the following three characteristics: enabling the crea-
tion of enhancement of an information system; enabling policy, ad-
ministrative or institutional reforms; and being a key success factor
for one or more project outcomes. Of the 31 projects selected, the
24 projects with the highest ICT expenditures were actually as-
sessed. This report is interesting because of its wide scope and
world wide overview.
– A report in two parts of the Dutch Algemene Rekenkamer (General
Accounting Chamber) on government IT projects (Rekenkamer A
and B). This report is of particular interest because it discusses the
specific problems government IT projects encounter. Report A ex-
amines the underlying causes of problems with IT projects in na-
tional government and reporting about them to parliament. Report
B analyzes the efficiency and effectiveness of expenditures on IT
projects, and avoidable costs and delays since 2000 by studying five
projects.
– A survey on lawyers’ experience with failed IT projects in the Neth-
erlands, summarized in a Top Ten of failure factors (Beenker). The
survey questioned 13 law offices with experience in settling and liti-
gating failed IT projects. The survey produced a long list of 90 fail-
ure factors. The report is fairly brief, but it is interesting because it
consolidates experience with failed IT projects.
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– Cap Gemini’s Global CIO Survey 2008 focuses on the role of the
IT function in business innovation (Capgemini). It explores the
views and experiences of 425 CIOs and companies world wide on
how access to new technologies and information is changing their
role, and the role of their IT function.
The next section summarizes the findings from those sources and ex-
amines their messages for judiciaries and courts.
The strategic perspective
At first glance, it might seem that the most important cause of difficul-
ties in IT projects is IT that does not work: inadequate performance of
an IT application or system. However, if we look at the combined wis-
dom of our sources, the most prevalent reason why IT projects fail is
strategic: it is in the relationship between businesses and organizations
on the one hand and their IT on the other. The strategic perspective re-
lates to the way organizations position themselves and plan with regard
to their overall role and purpose.
Defects in the strategic link between the organization and its tech-
nology affect IT development and governance at every level.
Organization and technology fit
Capgemini’s survey of the top innovative businesses in 2008 supports
these findings. It finds that organizations where the IT function has a
leading role in business innovation share a number of characteristics:
– The business leadership team thoroughly understands IT (77 per-
cent against the average, 38 percent)
– Effective relationships between IT and the business (94 percent
against the average, 67 percent)
– Strong delivery of fundamental IT services (83 percent as opposed
to the average, 56 percent)
– The Chief Information Officer (CIO) reports to the Chief Executive
Officer/Chief Operational Officer (CEO/COO) rather than to the
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) (75percent against 53percent)
– Overwhelmingly (88percent) the IT function plays the role of part-
ner to the business, as opposed to trusted supplier or utility player
(Capgemini).
– The other sources report a similar experience:
– The strategy of any organization needs to provide a vision of what
information is, and what its potential is for IT applications in the
business (Beenker p. 3).
– The organization strategy and the ICT strategy need to be in line.
– Business is leading, and thereby responsible for budgeting and
prioritizing (Rekenkamer A p. 31).
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– Investments in IT projects need to be part of the project portfolio of
the organization (Rekenkamer A p. 31).
Without this strategic alignment, business and ICT will be two differ-
ent worlds. If reporting is only financial, the effect will be that the only
reasons for prioritizing are economical ones. As a consequence, only
increased efficiency will count as a valid reason for investing in IT.
This does not do justice to the role of information and its potential to
improve performance and processes.
In summary: Every organization, in order to benefit from IT, needs a vi-
sion of the role of information in its organization, and of the potential
of IT applications. The business leadership team needs to thoroughly
understand IT. The strategy in business determines the IT strategy.
Hence, strategy also determines budgeting and prioritizing, in general
and in the organization’s project portfolio.
a What does this mean for judiciaries and courts?
In the case of the HBS project, the appeal courts, or the judiciary as a
whole, had no vision of the role of information or a strategy with re-
gard to information. This meant their representatives could not provide
adequate guidance to the project for lack of understanding the direc-
tion in which it needed to go. The end result of this deficiency was
that the project was unable to produce functionality according to user
requirements. In Ontario, the judiciary had enunciated its needs, but
the Attorney General decided about the means to meet the needs.
b Judiciaries and strategy
Courts are normally concerned with judging individual events that
have happened in the past. Strategic orientation, looking forward over
the longer term, does not come naturally to them. The skills needed
for deciding individual cases, such as patience and attention to detail,
do not prepare one for designing strategies for the future. The cases
courts need to decide are always concerned with events that happened
in the past. Moreover, the authorities used to decide the cases are the
law, jurisprudence and precedent. Both jurisprudence and precedent
derive their authority from the past. Consequently, thinking in general
terms and looking forward is not a common activity in courts and pol-
icy. Strategy formation skills are not the prime requirement for judges
and court staff. As an Australian report on IT in courts observed, the
legal profession is historically conservative (Victoria p. 30).
Therefore, judiciaries that choose to use IT to improve the way they
administer justice need to acknowledge this cultural background and
the entailing limitations. This means they may have to make a major
shift in thinking. A framework for policy formation and fit with IT
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needs becomes a necessity. For most judiciaries, this is a new situation.
It may require changes in governance structure to provide for a policy
formation function.
Moreover, the judiciary’s leadership and the IT function - this in-
cludes everything having to do with IT, from development to managing
systems and hardware - both need to understand how information
works in their courts and what the implications for IT can be. Courts’
business is to decide individual cases and to confirm norms. The inter-
national human rights instruments also set standards for the way
courts administer justice. The role of information in court processes is
very important: in internal processes, in communication with the en-
vironment. Understanding the role or roles of information is crucial
for understanding the way IT can support improving courts in their
performance. This requires training in what is already known, and
research to generate new knowledge.
The leadership also needs to be able to prioritize in terms of funding
and budget allocation. Reporting should focus on policies, not on
spending. This may require changes to the reporting and budgeting
systems.
Summing up, IT sets new requirements for judiciaries: (1) a policy
formation function able to set a strategy, with (2) a corresponding bud-
geting and reporting structure and (3) understanding of the role of in-
formation in the work of the courts.
The project perspective
Projects are temporary structures set up to produce results. New pro-
cesses and applications are actually produced at the project level. The
overall strategy should determine what the projects’ results should be.
Strategy failure, consequently, also affects whether results are produced
at the project level.
When there is no strategy setting a clear goal, it is difficult to deter-
mine what the system is intended to do. This means the project result
cannot be defined. As a consequence, the project’s management does
not know what it is expected to produce. We already observed in the
HBS project how the courts could not provide guidance to the project,
resulting in irreparably inadequate functionality.
The next problem caused by a lack of strategy is a failure to under-
stand how the products of the IT projects will effect change in business
processes. This leads to inadequate change management. The business
will jump to ICT solutions quickly, without considering the impact of
an organizational change on IT (Rekenkamer A p. 19). IT projects are
incorrectly assumed to be primarily technical challenges (World Bank
2006b p. 6). In the HBS project, the implications of electronic work
flow for the business processes of the courts were not foreseen.
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In Chapter 2.1, we have seen that implementation of enterprise tech-
nologies such as work flow requires a redesigned business process to
be in place. Failure to recognize this requirement can lead to a situa-
tion where redesigning business processes is left to the IT specialists.
They are trained to develop and implement technology, not for rede-
signing business processes. Their exclusively technical training means
they look at the project from a limited number of perspectives. The IT
lawyers observed that, because of their perspective, IT professionals do
not take resistance to organizational change seriously enough (Beenker
p. 3). This creates resistance to IT (Beenker p. 3). Leaving innovation
solely to the technicians can also lead to an inadequate skills mix: iso-
lated, unsupervised ICT operations working outside the established
units (World Bank 2006b p. 7). The HBS project ultimately delivered a
system that could not be used because essential functionality was miss-
ing. From the above, it is clear that this was due to a lack of strategic
orientation in the courts, causing the project to fail.
In summary: IT project goals need to be clear. This requires that (1) they
can draw on a strategic vision, and (2) their relation with business
change is understood and managed. If the fit between business and IT
is not understood and managed properly, process redesign risks being
done from an exclusively technical perspective. Then, the redesign will
be done by people who do not have sufficient business knowledge.
This will generate resistance to both business change and IT.
What does this mean for courts? Judiciaries need to have a strategic vi-
sion of their processes as their core business and of the role of infor-
mation and of IT in those processes. If processes need to be rede-
signed, that should be done in such a way that IT helps them instead
of hindering them. This requires people who combine knowledge of
court processes with IT to link IT development and court processes.
Courts also need knowledgeable IT personnel who understand how IT
supports those processes.
Learning through experimentation
Understanding how information works in courts and how IT can im-
prove court information processes requires not just training and re-
search. It also requires building experience through experimentation
with functionalities. In Chapter 2.1, we have seen how users learn to
understand and use functionalities that are introduced. They experi-
ment to learn what the new functionality can do for their process. With
stand-alone, functional technologies, it took years to develop and subse-
quently implement smart merge routines that could be used in the en-
tire court system in the Netherlands. To be honest, it benefited greatly
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from an internal network in order to access the databases. At the time
of writing this study, courts in the Netherlands are experimenting with
forms of collaboration by judges and court staff on the intranets, to
produce decisions by panels. No standards have emerged from this
process yet. This type of experimentation resembles what Valerie Fris-
sen calls bricolage (Frissen 2004 p. 15). Frissen contrasts bricolage, tin-
kering, with linear planning activity as done by engineers. User-brico-
leurs can “tinker” with materials to make surprising new combinations
and uses.
The need for experimentation will become more urgent as technolo-
gies affect work processes more profoundly. As we have seen in Chap-
ter 2.1, digital court access beyond the European Union’s stage 2 re-
quires a business process suited to managing incoming electronic in-
formation. In fact, what characterizes interactivity at level 3 and beyond
is the presence of an electronic business process that can receive and
manage electronic information. The new processes need to be in place
before the technology can be implemented. Because they need to be in
place, there is little room for experimentation once the technology is
implemented. Therefore, there needs to be room for experimentation
before the innovation of two-way online communication with courts can
be implemented. Consequently, fostering user experimentation can be
an important source of learning. For process innovation, it is a neces-
sity.
Government projects: Big solutions and perverse incentives
Judiciaries are constitutionally independent, but in practical terms they
operate in the framework of government. The two projects show how
IT for judiciaries is sometimes developed in a context involving other
government organizations. Ministries, judiciaries, prosecution services,
politicians and actors in other institutions have to work together in IT
projects to produce the results needed. This complicates the problems
already identified above. The Dutch General Accounting Chamber
examined large government IT projects in the Netherlands at the re-
quest of the Dutch Parliament. It found that a combination of political,
organizational and technical factors makes government IT projects too
ambitious and too complex (Rekenkamer A p. 15-22).
The report signals the following clusters of complexity:
– Political complexity, engendering additional requirements and poli-
tical deadlines
– Organizational complexity, related to the goals of the project
– Very complex cooperation between parts of the information chain,
insufficiency of the chain’s governance, broad and diverse variation
in use of data, and massiveness of the primary business process
– Technical complexity of development and implementation.
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In its examination of government IT projects, it found the following ty-
pical problems:
The parties (ministries, politicians, and IT vendors) all have an inter-
est in large, ambitious projects, and they are all naturally inclined to
think in terms of big solutions for big problems. They do not counter-
balance each other. On the contrary, they hold each other captive, and
this easily spirals inevitably into a complex project with the status of
political fact, from which no elegant exit is possible (Rekenkamer A p.
23).
The big ambitions engender difficulties. They can cause a lack of re-
straint in project ambitions. This leads to too much made-to-measure,
tailored work, where numerous exceptions from regulation are in-
cluded in the system, making for complexity that is difficult to deliver.
Lack of prioritizing as a consequence of big ambitions can lead to the
concurrence of large IT projects that compete for the same IT staff (Re-
kenkamer B p. 52). An excessive level of ambition may lead to attempt-
ing a combination of ITcomponents and solutions that have not been
tried within the organization before (Rekenkamer B p. 52). The Reken-
kamer’s advice is to reduce complexity whenever possible. Reducing
complexity means to start small, and to move forward in small steps.
Organizational complexity can be reduced by limiting the number of
organizations involved, or by choosing an approach with pilots. Choos-
ing standard software wherever possible will reduce technical complex-
ity.
In summary: In government projects, complexity is compounded. There
are few or no incentives to curb big ambitions. Too much complexity is
allowed to go unchecked, leading to technically and financially unma-
nageable projects. Reducing complexity wherever possible should in-
crease the success rate of government IT projects.
What does this mean for courts? The HBS and Ontario projects illus-
trate how insufficiently controlled complexity can make projects unma-
nageable and underproductive. Judiciaries, however independent, oper-
ate within the complex field of public government. Judiciaries usually
get their funding from the public treasury. They work with other parti-
cipants in information chains, like the prosecution, lawyers, probation
services and social security agencies. They are part of information
chains with complex mechanisms. Reducing political, organizational
and technical complexity needs to be a major concern.
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Reducing complexity: The example of Money Claim On Line
The Rekenkamer’s advice is to mitigate complexity by reducing it and
starting small and moving forward in small steps. This small excursion
explores implications for judiciaries. Velicogna observes how in Eur-
opean courts, the more successful approach to electronic administra-
tion of justice has simple procedures and to simplify more complex
ones (Velicogna CEPEJ p. 48).
I offer the development process for Money Claim On Line (MCOL)
in the United Kingdom, one of the more successful approaches in Eu-
rope, as an example of ways to reduce complexity. The three most sali-
ent ways in which MCOL has reduced complexity are the following:
A simple procedure: MCOL has chosen to automate money claims,
one single, simple procedure. Civil procedural regulation in England
and Wales is less formal than in some other countries, which helps to
reduce complexity. Filing a claim by sending it to a court institutes pro-
ceedings. A formal summons delivered by a bailiff, like in continental
European systems, is not required. An attempt to develop a similar on-
line small claims system for the Netherlands was unsuccessful. The
formal requirements of the summons may have been of influence. A
suggestion, put forward in the context of a general reconsideration of
civil procedural regulation, to deformalize formal summons altogether
and replace them with a request addressed to the court, was not
followed up (Asser 2006 p. 101).
A dedicated court: MCOL has simplified organizational complexity by
setting up a dedicated court, instead of creating a process that could be
handled by all the competent courts.
Moving forward in small steps: The development process has spanned
many years, and involved several distinct steps:
– Receiving claims, without completely automated processing in the
court
– Processing undefended claims without human intervention.
– Supporting defense
Starting with one procedure and with one court reduces complexity.
Doing what is known, by taking small steps, fostering experimentation
and using information produced in the experiments for development,
is an approach that limits the risks engendered by complexity. There is
a more extensive discussion of Money Claim On Line in Chapter 3.3.
Other requirements
The changes required in the work processes prior to implementation
of enterprise technology functionalities make implementation of func-
tionality at this level particularly difficult. Work processes tend to differ
from court to court. If they should be automated, they need prior sim-
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plification and standardization. This will require a centralized effort.
Users in the courts will experience those efforts and the resulting
changes as a loss of autonomy and discretion.
There also needs to be a clear vision of the degree of automation, as
well as standardization, the work flow really needs. Velicogna’s story
about IT projects mired in difficulty for wanting to automate too many
exceptions emphasizes this point (Velicogna CEPEJ p. 48). It has be-
come common wisdom in IT development that 80 percent of a process
can be automated with 20 percent of the cost and effort needed to
automate 100 percent of the process. Automating the other 20 percent
takes 80 percent of the cost and the effort. In this light, the extent to
which court processes should be automated or streamlined in a work
flow system is a matter of serious concern. What are the pros and cons
of leaving the possibility of handling exceptions on an ad hoc basis
open? The strategy needs to provide clear guidance on this point. Evi-
dently, that guidance needs to be based on an understanding of the
processes in question.
Conclusions for Part 2
Part 2 examined IT in courts. Chapter 2.1 inventoried IT functionality
in use in courts, mostly in Western Europe and the United States
Chapter 2.2 examined frequent problems in IT development and the
implementation of IT.
Chapter 2.1 inventoried the court IT that is in use in different countries
in the world, and uncovered how some court systems struggle with im-
plementing IT. The IT most widely implemented mostly supports
courts’ paper based processes, word processing for document produc-
tion and case registration to replace the paper docket. Networking tech-
nology, where it has been introduced, is mostly used internally and in-
formally. External electronic communication is the edge where develop-
ment by the forerunners is taking place. Work flow management and
other enterprise systems do not seem to get much attention. Work flow
technology was at the forefront of development ten years ago, and the
CEPEJ survey results show it still is. It has not become a domesticated
technology in courts. European court systems do not emphasize court-
room technology, contrary to U.S. systems.
The inventory also tells us something about development ap-
proaches. Attempts to translate the entire complexity of the court pro-
cess appear to have been expensive, cumbersome and ultimately un-
successful. Successful development has been incremental development
of one simple procedure, or after simplification of a more complex pro-
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cedure. The application is then opened up to other fields, or to new
user groups.
In the HBS project story, there is an eloquent illustration of the kind of
complexity integrated systems can run into. The prosecution had cho-
sen a system that encoded fully developed work processes for maxi-
mum control on integrity of information management. The judiciary,
by contrast, had chosen a system that would support developing differ-
ent work flows and experimentation. If we recall the typology of func-
tionalities from Chapter 2.1, the judiciary chose a system that requires
few complements and allows a large measure of freedom, and the pro-
secution chose a top-down system requiring full complements in terms
of decision rights and centralized process control. This example shows
how organizations can have different, and even opposing, needs. The
prosecution needs a system that supports accountability within its hier-
archy. The judiciary’s main need was a system that supports experi-
mentation. Understanding those needs based on the role of informa-
tion in the organization’s processes, developing a corresponding strat-
egy and managing the needs of the organization when implementing
IT are essential activities for successful implementation.
Chapter 2.2 examined frequent problems in IT development and im-
plementation. It concluded that some judiciaries may have to make a
major shift in thinking and in their organization.
Experimentation in translating the needs of administering justice
into IT applications needs to be institutionalized. The results of such
experimentation are important for innovation. In this way, the IT func-
tion should learn from the users. Court systems can also learn from
the experiences of other court systems and other organizations.
The judiciary’s leadership and the IT function both need to under-
stand how information works in the courts and the implications for IT.
This requires both training and research. Redesigning processes,
where needed, requires people who combine knowledge of court pro-
cesses with IT in order to link IT development and court processes. Ju-
diciaries also need knowledgeable IT personnel who understand those
processes.
Changes in the governance structure may be needed to support strat-
egy and policy formation and to support prioritizing funding and bud-
geting in accordance with the policies.
This chapter concluded that the most salient deficiency is that of
strategy: a strategic vision of processes administering justice, shaped
by knowledge and understanding of the role of information in courts.
The next three parts of this study aim to improve that understanding.
They examine the role of information in courts’ and judiciaries’ inter-
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nal processes (Part 3), in external communication (Part 4), and in safe-
guarding integrity (Part 5)
Notes
1 Apparently, data from the survey are inserted into the report by hand, thereby leaving
room for error. Email from Pim Albers of CEPEJ, October 3, 2008.
2 Special thanks to Elizabeth Wiggins of the FJC who arranged an invitation for me to
attend the round table.
3 They use WordPerfect.
4 Interview in New Delhi, July 2005.
5 This discussion is limited to publicly available jurisprudence collections. It does not
cover collections that are available only to subscribers.
6 I already pointed out there is a problem with the data in the report. According to the
report, p. 269, the Netherlands should have implemented word processing in less
than 100 percent of all the courts, less than in the 2006 report. Email ( to my know-
ledge functional in 100 percent of the courts) is implemented in less than 10 percent
of all the courts, according to page 269. The correct data for the Netherlands would
lead to a score of 38 points. Turkey was placed in a very high group, but its points on
p. 269 lead to a score of 32 points, which would put it at the bottom of the high level
group. Therefore, the data on p. 269 cannot be used to draw conclusions.
7 At the time the HBS project was stopped, I was active in the Dutch Judiciary’s IT
field. I was not directly involved in the decision making surrounding the project. In
order to avoid unverifiable judgments, my conclusions are based solely on the fin-
dings of the external audit report.
8 The exchange rates were calculated as of January 1, 2002 by Oanda, http://www.oanda.
com/convert/classic?free=1
9 It is not difficult to imagine this caused some uproar.
10 http://www.aija.org.au/tech3/program/presentations/Ontario2002-2.ppt
11 The exchange rate was calculated as of January 1, 2002 by Oanda, http://www.oanda.
com/convert/classic?free=1
12 The web version of the Annual Report has no page numbers.
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Part 3 Case Delay
This part examines how IT can support reducing case delay. Excessive
delay in processing cases is the most common complaint about justice
system performance. There is an almost universal opinion that courts
and judiciaries take too long to respond to users of their services.
The discussion of case delay comes in three chapters. From the star-
ting point of delay, they examine case handling to uncover ways in
which IT can support improvement in case handling processes in a
broad sense.
This part starts with a chapter on delay itself. In the two chapters
that follow, its scope extends to court processes in a wider sense and to
a more detailed examination of some individual processes. It ends with
some conclusions on how information technology can be leveraged to
reduce delay. Consequently, there is more to this part of the study than
delay.
This first chapter presents an overview of the traditional approaches
to case delay. It explores how to establish whether there is delay, what
its causes can be and where to find the most likely areas for remedies.
The second chapter moves beyond the traditional approaches. In order
to understand how information technology can support reducing delay,
it is necessary to learn more about how delay occurs through the way
courts handle cases. This chapter examines how case processing works
as a process of information handling. The vehicle used for this purpose
is a case study of civil justice in the Netherlands. This chapter presents
a conceptual framework to aid the study of information handling in
court processes. The third chapter, continuing the case study of civil
justice in the Netherlands, applies this framework to look at case hand-
ling in more detail. It analyzes four different categories of court cases.
It looks at the process in each category as an information process. For
each category, it draws conclusions about IT functionalities that can
help to implement improved case processing and innovative ways of
handling information, leading to more timely and adequate judicial de-
cisions.
Chapter 3.1 Case Delay
This chapter analyzes the dynamics of case delay. It examines current
theory regarding the problem of case delay: the normative framework,
diagnosing delay itself and candidate remedies for it. First, it will dis-
cuss current thinking on the impact of delay. Next, to facilitate a clear
discussion of the issues involved in delay, it presents the most com-
monly used terminology. An analysis of the normative framework is
next. After that, we look at ways to identify delay by measuring case
disposition times and using standards. Finally, we will also examine
the most common ways of combating delay and how effective they
have been.
Case delay as a problem: A brief tour around the world
Probably the most famous adage in the culture of the justice world is
British Prime Minister William Gladstone’s “Justice delayed is justice
denied” quote, with its French counterpart, the adage “justice re´tive,
justice fautive.”1
Case delay has been a topic of debate for centuries. Here are some
examples.
– In 1802, the City Council of Hamburg, now part of the Federal Re-
public of Germany, adopted a directive to shorten court procedures.2
– In the early 1970s, many U.S. states enacted legislation setting time
limits for trials.
– In 1983, the Supreme Court of India quoted the Chief Justice of the
Bombay High Court as saying that any “judicial system which de-
lays disposal of cases or resolution of disputes over decades can be
said to have outlived its utility” (Bharuka 2003).
– The European Court of Human Rights has difficulty dealing with
all the complaints about late, overdue court decisions. 28 percent of
its judgments found a violation on account of the length of the pro-
ceedings (ECHR 2009 p. 6).
– Today in Nigeria, court users, when comparing the issue of delays
with other problems affecting the justice system, considered delays
the most important obstacle to using the courts; the majority per-
ceived the length of the process as the most serious problem. Busi-
ness people also seemed generally unsatisfied with the time re-
quired for the dispensation of justice (UNODC 2006 p. 34).
– Only 44 percent of court users in the Netherlands, surveyed be-
tween 2005 and 2007, were satisfied with the duration of their pro-
cedure. They were also less satisfied than they were in a previous
survey (Prisma 2008 p. 4, 26).
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Nowadays, case delay is officially regarded as a very important problem
to be addressed in many judiciaries:
– In the United States, it has been the focus of targeted case manage-
ment reform as early as the 1970s (Steelman 2000 p. xi).
– Influenced by developments in the United States, court reform in
Latin America has also focused on case delay (Hammergren 2007
p. 58).
– CEPEJ was created by the Council of Europe with the express brief
to improve the efficiency of courts and judiciaries in the Council’s
more than 40 member countries.3 CEPEJ has commissioned a
number of studies that have produced very interesting results.
Some of the results will be discussed below. Court delay is now re-
cognized as the most important problem to be addressed in many
European judiciaries (CEPEJ 2005 p.2).
In the literature, the issue of court delay has been addressed fairly
widely in the United States, Canada and Australia, less in Europe and
even less elsewhere in the world. A few technically very complex stu-
dies have been done in the Netherlands, focusing on civil procedures.
The results of these studies will also be discussed below.
This small sample illustrates two things: case delay is believed to be
a problem, and it is also considered important.
Hammergren notes from extended experience working in countries in
Latin America, and in which delay was first identified as a major pro-
blem, that:
– The incidence of delay was exaggerated.
– Its causes were not as claimed.
– Its impacts were different than imagined (Hammergren 2007 p. 71-
78).
Hammergren’s point is that claims require verification, and verification
may turn up some surprising findings. We will first look at some of
the impacts of case delay that have an empirical foundation. In order
to verify that delay is a reality, and not just a belief, we then go on to
look at the incidence of delay with a discussion of how to measure it.
This chapter ends with an analysis of causes and remedies.
Some impacts of delay
Timely justice is not just an abstract right. There is always a risk that
justice will be denied when proceedings drag on. As time passes, cer-
tain legitimate interests may be adversely affected. Delay directly affects
the parties to a case. Moreover, delay affects the administration of jus-
tice itself, as well as society in a wider sense.
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Delay has many different impacts. First of all, there are impacts on
the parties to a case:
– The value of any awards that they eventually receive will be reduced
by delay.
– Further costs are incurred when delay occurs, which the parties
may sometimes be unable to bear.
– Long case duration may mean that a party to a money claim case
may not survive. This puts particularly small and medium enter-
prises at risk (Felso¨ p. 88).
– Delays in criminal cases can cause severe hardship on victims and
on those under suspicion or accused of crimes. Lengthy pretrial de-
tention is only one of those hardships.
– Access to justice is obstructed for those who cannot bear the cost of
delay.
– Delay can also be an incentive for parties to settle a dispute.
– Next, there are impacts on the administration of justice itself:
– Evidence disappears and sometimes new evidence has to be ad-
duced.
– Witnesses disperse.
– Witnesses lose credibility as time elapses.
– Defendants and suspects may disappear.
– Justice can be avoided when investigations and trials are extended
beyond the statute of limitations.
– Corruption is encouraged by delay because delay creates opportu-
nities to request bribes to speed up case processing or to hold off at-
tention to a case (Reiling 2007 p. 71).
– There is also the wider impact of case delay. Good performance of
the judicial infrastructure, of which timeliness in courts is an im-
portant aspect, boosts economic growth (Van Velthoven 2005 p. 31),
lowers transaction costs for business (Van Dijk 2003 p.1), and low-
ers the business cost of crime (Van Velthoven 2005 p. 20). Research
on the situation in the Netherlands has shown that particularly
lengthy procedures lead to problems in all areas of the law. Con-
flicts remain unresolved longer, which adversely affects social stabi-
lity and leads to inertia. The damage increases as dispute resolution
takes longer. Long procedures hamper effective crime reduction.
They lead to delay and sometimes abandonment of activities, long-
term uncertainty, damage through continued illegal activities and
cash flow problems. The direct social cost to Dutch society of unne-
cessarily long processing times was cautiously estimated at E 450
million annually (Van Dijk 2003 p. 2).
However, although delays can have negative impacts, a sufficient
amount of time is essential for proper inquiries to be conducted, all
the questions of law elucidated and relations between the parties
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settled, and for the court to arrive at a reasoned conclusion (CEPEJ
2006 p.16; World Bank 2006a p. 48-49).4
In summary, case delay negatively impacts the parties to a dispute as
well as the larger society.
The normative framework
Everyone is awarded the right to have their case disposed without un-
due delay or within a reasonable time by a number of international hu-
man rights conventions:
– The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
article 14, states that in the case of criminal charge, cases must be
disposed by courts without undue delay. Disposal includes com-
mencement, end and judgment in the case.5
– The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, article 7,
states that every individual shall have the right to have his cause
heard, comprising the right to be tried within a reasonable time.
– The American Convention on Human Rights states in article 8 that
every person has the right to a hearing with due guarantees and
within a reasonable time.
– The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), article 6, ac-
cords inhabitants of the member states of the Council of Europe the
right to a fair and public hearing by an independent, impartial tribu-
nal, within a reasonable time. The Court of Justice of the other Euro-
pean organization of states, the European Union, has recognized the
ECHR as an important source of law and takes article 6 into account
when considering issues that have to do with reasonable time.
The core business of the courts is to handle everyone’s case, and to do
so without undue delay and within a reasonable time. This is a stan-
dard that is authoritative for courts in countries that are signatory to
one or more of these conventions. Those courts need to comply with
this standard. In itself, the standard is not very practicable as a stan-
dard because it is not very concrete. We will come back to the topic of
standards after the discussion on diagnosing delay. Once we have dis-
cussed how to measure delay in courts, we come back to standards to
establish whether the disposition times found in the measurements
are excessive.
Diagnosing delay in two steps
Delay occurs when a given time exceeds a standard. If the law stipu-
lates a certain term for a court decision to be finalized, and the deci-
sion only comes after the expiration of the term, we can say that there
is delay. Therefore, measuring the time it actually takes a court to dis-
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pose a case is the first step in diagnosing delay. The next step is to de-
termine whether the actual time found exceeds a standard.
Terminology for case delay
The terms most frequently used in the context of case delay are timeli-
ness, delay, backlog and congestion.
Timely generally refers to an absence of delay.
Delay refers to a task being late or deferred. It is something that
should have been done, but has not been. There is a normative compo-
nent to the term delay. Delay is something that exceeds a standard.
Backlog is another term frequently used in the context of case hand-
ling. It means an accumulation of tasks to be handled. It is things piling
up without getting done. If delay is what court users experience when
their cases do not get handled in time, the courts experience backlog
when they do not process cases at the same rate as they are filed.
Congestion describes the situation where the number of tasks is so
great that it interferes with completion.
An important distinction is that between the time a case spends in
court from the time of filing to the final disposition, and the time
someone actually does something with the case. In the literature on
case delay and case management, the terminology found is not consis-
tent. In this study, the following terms are used consistently:
Disposition time is the time that goes by between the filing of a case
and the time it leaves the court, by a judgment or otherwise. Disposi-
tion time is usually measured in calendar days.
Processing time is the time during which someone actually does
something to a case. Processing time is usually measured in minutes
or hours.
A preliminary step in the diagnostic process is to determine what data
are available. Only a few justice systems have statistical records avail-
able that enable the easy calculation of these figures for specific stages
or for the entire trajectory of a case. In most countries, real statistics
for these cases are not readily available. Most judicial reform assistance
projects operate in countries where working statistics offices for courts
are scarce. In those cases, other mechanisms will have to be used. They
are discussed below.
It is common for justice assistance projects to introduce computers
in courts, and subsequently develop a case registration and manage-
ment system. Such a system, when implemented in an entire court
system, will make the types of measurement discussed below easier
and potentially more accurate. It can also enable comparisons across
courts within the system and maybe even across systems.
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The next section will first discuss ways of measuring disposition times
with or without automated case management systems. In step 2, we
will examine what standards there are in order to assess whether the
times measured are excessive and can therefore be qualified as delay.
Step 1: Measurement
The first step is to measure disposition times. For assessment pur-
poses, representative figures are needed. The mathematical average is
the measure that is most commonly used. It is generally used as an in-
dicator for an ordinary, run-of-the-mill case. As such, it is often an
effective indicator for that purpose. The average is the measure normally
used in annual reports. However, when most cases are processed rela-
tively quickly but a few cases take an extremely long time, the average
does not tell us much about ordinary cases. Here, case distribution is
skewed. In case of skewed distribution, the median is a better indicator.
The median is the central measurement in a series of measurements.
If we look at case disposition times in civil cases, one-half of the cases
take less time than the median, the other half takes longer (Eshuis
2005 p. 19, Eshuis 2007 p. 144). The measure of dispersion also is
informative. It makes an enormous difference if most scores are clus-
tered around the mean or median, or if the “average” hides a wide
range of scores. For example, there is a telling difference between 90
percent of cases being processed in 6 months versus a 6-month
average composed of times ranging from a few days to several years
(Reiling 2007 p. 63, Eshuis 2007 p. 144). In order to express this, the
90th percentile is usually the measure. It means the time within
which 90 percent of all cases are disposed. This is the measure used
in the U.S. Trial Court Performance Standards, discussed below.
Distinguishing types of cases is also necessary in order to compare
cases that are actually comparable. It is more informative to know the
average time for a bankruptcy case, a simple debt collection procee-
ding, or a dispute over unfair dismissal than just the average time for
processing civil cases in general. As we will see in the discussion of
ECHR jurisprudence, disposition is more urgent in some case types
than in others. Moreover, measures to reduce processing times can be
identified only for specific procedures. In criminal cases, the most
common distinctions are between simple misdemeanors, major felo-
nies, and complex investigations of suspected corruption or other white
collar crimes. Such a categorization is relevant for several reasons. For
instance, the parties involved in a certain type of case have a specific
interest in the timely resolution of their case. Moreover, proportionality
requires that case types are handled commensurately with their impor-
tance. Finally, if an eventual reform is meant to focus on reducing de-
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lay, this kind of analysis early in the process is a necessity because it
helps to draw attention to possible points for reform.
National Center for State Courts (NCSC) CourTools
The most common methodology for measuring case disposition is de-
scribed in CourTools, a methodology developed by the U.S. National
Center for State Courts.6 This methodology was developed to help U.S.
state courts wanting to measure their performance with setting up
their own measuring system. The methodology is described in very
clear, understandable terms. CourTools explains how courts can set up
their own measuring system to suit their own needs. It explains how
to measure court performance in ten aspects:
– Access and fairness
– Clearance rates
– Time to disposition
– Age of active pending case load
– Trial date certainty
– Reliability and integrity of case files
– Collection of monetary penalties
– Effective use of jurors
– Court employee satisfaction
– Cost per case.
The system presumes there is a categorization of types of cases. The
methodology is based on the American Bar Association’s Trial Court
Performance Standards (TCPS), to be discussed below in the next step.
CourTools measures 2, 3, 4 and 5 have to do with case delay. The dis-
cussion in this study is confined to those measures. They are discussed
in depth in Box 4. The time measurement methodology can provide a
framework to measure case processing times in other systems than the
U.S. system as well (Steelman and Fabri, p. 31). Time to disposition is
the most immediately relevant measure. It measures the time a case is
in court from the time of filing to the day judgment is entered, in ca-
lendar days. Clearance or disposition rates, measure number 2, measure
whether a court is keeping up with its case load. The age of the active
pending caseload of a court, measure 4, measures how long the existing
case load has been on the court docket since the cases were filed. Trial
date certainty, measure number 5, is a measure that is important for
systems that conduct trials. It measures the number of times a case
was set for trial. The congestion rate, not part of the CourTools measure-
ments, is a simple rate that expresses whether a court is building up a
backlog. Box 4 also explains how to calculate case load congestion.
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Box 4 Time Measurement Methodologies
Time to disposition is the time it takes a court to dispose a case (of a
certain type) from the day of filing to the day of disposition, measured
in calendar days.
The clearance or disposition rate measures whether a court is keeping up
with its case load. The clearance rate expresses the number of outgoing
cases as a percentage of the number of incoming cases. If the clearance
rate is less than 100%, the court is building up a backlog (Dakolias
1999 p. 10-17).
The CourTools methodology
Time to disposition expresses the percentage of cases disposed or other-
wise resolved within established time frames. Those time frames can be
the local, state or national guidelines for timely case processing, for in-
stance the ABA and the COSCA standards (Table 7).
Clearance rates measure outgoing cases as a percentage of incoming
cases. Outgoing cases can be cases that have been decided or cases that
leave the court in some other way. Incoming cases can be new cases or
cases that are reopened or reactivated, depending on the court system in
question. The clearance rate is calculated by dividing the sum of out-
going cases by the sum of incoming cases. If the result is 1, or 100 per-
cent, the court is keeping up with its caseload. If the result is less than
100 percent, the court is building up a backlog. The clearance rate meth-
odology itself does not take an existing backlog into account.
The age of the active pending caseload of a court, measure 4, measures
the age of the active cases that are pending before the courts, measured as
the number of days from filing until the time of measurement. This mea-
surement is again related to the ABA and COSCA standards in Table 7.
Trial date certainty, measure number 5, is a measure that is important for
systems that conduct trials. It measures the number of times cases dis-
posed by trial are scheduled for trial. A court’s ability to hold trials on the
first date they are scheduled to be heard is closely associated with timely
case disposition.
Source: NCSC CourTools.
The case delay measurement methodologies we have seen in this sec-
tion all measure disposition time. If few data are available, there are
some proxies that can be used for diagnostic purposes. Analysis of ran-
dom case files is an approach for situations in which no data are avail-
able at all. Where those data are available, time to disposition, disposi-
tion rates and age of case loads are useful information on how well a
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court is keeping up with its case load. Since there are many different
types of cases, categorizing them is very informative as to whether the
disposition is timely. This is particularly relevant when we look at the
standards because the standards mostly apply to specific categories of
cases. The next step is to look at standards to see whether the results
found in the measurements exceed them.
Step 2: Standards
The second step, after acquiring quantitative data on disposition times,
is to determine whether the acquired disposition times exceed any
standards.
Thus, standards are needed to determine whether there is delay. The
problem is that, in practice, there are very few standards for case hand-
ling. The standards that do exist are either unclear or volatile. Some
countries have set time limits for case processing in their laws, for in-
stance in their procedural codes. These standards have legal relevance
because they are in the law. Nonetheless, for diagnostic purposes, their
value is limited because (1) they are fairly general and abstract, and (2)
there may also be a gap between the law and actual practice. In sum-
mary, standards will need to be identified first.
A special problem sometimes raised is whether standards apply to judi-
ciaries, given that judiciaries are independent. Issues have been raised
about the concept of standards for judges and judiciaries. First, the in-
dependence of the judiciary is sometimes regarded as a bar to setting
or imposing standards. Second, there is the question if, and how, stan-
dards should be enforced.
The first problem is not as serious as it might look at first, because
solutions to the problem of authority have been found. If we look at
standards that have emerged in judiciaries, they can be classified ac-
cording to their source of authority.
One type of standard is that of self-imposed goals. An example is the
United States where the accepted standards are the Trial Court Perfor-
mance Standards developed, adopted and published by the Conference
of State Court Administrators, the Conference of Chief Justices and the
ABA. Judges are generally members of the ABA. The standards are
promulgated as illustrations. Each state court system is gently encour-
aged (cf. the text in Table 6) by the National Center for State Courts to
use or modify the standards. The Netherlands has recently adopted a
time standards system, based on the TCPS and on data about actual
case processing times. The Dutch system is displayed in Table 7.
Another type is the standards that emerge from jurisprudence on undue
delay, like the one from the European Court of Human Rights. This
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court hears complaints about undue delay in the member countries of
the Council of Europe. The Court has ruled that, for criminal cases,
two years is a reasonable disposition time, counting from the moment
the reasonable suspicion arose to the decision in the first instance. It
has by now developed an extensive jurisprudence on what is reasonable
and what is not when it comes to disposition times. This jurisprudence
is discussed below because it offers important pointers on what are the
relevant factors in the issue of case delay.
A third type of standard is that of emerging from actual practice. It is
closely related to the first type Research into disposition times can lead
to knowledge about average practice, and this knowledge can become a
basis for standard setting. An example of a comparative approach that
could become a potential source of such a standard is the World Bank’s
Doing Business database, discussed below as well.
Knowledge about actual practice can lead to turning actual practice
into the norm. It can also lead to setting more stringent standards, as
happened with the ABA norms. In conclusion, judicial independence
is not a barrier for courts and judges to adopting standards to measure
their own performance.
That leaves the question of enforcement. Courts in the United States
are “gently encouraged” by the National Center for State Courts to use
the standards. Courts in the Netherlands are encouraged to conform to
their own standards by the Council for the Judiciary, their governing
body. The European Court of Human Rights can order a member
country to pay punitive damages because of case delay.
Self-imposed goals as standards: The ABA
The ABA has set time disposition standards for cases of different types
in U.S. courts. For general civil cases, for instance, the standard is that
90 percent of all filed general civil cases should be disposed within 12
months after filing, 98 percent in 18 months, and 100 percent in 24
months. Table 6 also gives the more generally phrased standards
adopted by the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of
State Court Administrators. Both sets of standards can be applied in
measurements according to the CourTools methodology (Box 1).
Tables 6 and 7 show how different types of cases are considered as dif-
ferent levels of urgency. Those involving juveniles who may need to be
kept in detention are considered the most urgent.
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Table 6 Case Disposition Time Standards in the United States
Time Standards Adopted by the Conference of State Court Administrators (COSCA), the
Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ) and the ABA
CCJ and COSCA ABA
Case type
Criminal
Felony 180 days 90% in 120 days
98% in 180 days
100% in 12 months
Misdemeanor 90 days 90% in 30 days
100% in 90 days
Civil
Jury trials 18 months
Non-jury trials 12 months
General civil 90% in 12 months
98% in 18 months
100% in 24 months
Summary proceedings, small claims,
landlord/tenant
100% in 30 days
Domestic relations
Uncontested 3 months
Contested 6 months
All cases 90% in 3 months
98% in 6 months
100% in 12 months
Juvenile
Detention/shelter hearings 24 hours 24 hours
Adjudicatory/shelter hearings 15 days 15 days
1. In a detention facility 15 days 15 days
2. Not in a detention facility 30 days 30 days
Disposition hearings 15 days 15 days
COSCA adopted its standards in 1983, CCJ and ABA adopted theirs in 1984.
Criminal cases: time from arrest to trial or disposition.
Civil and domestic relations cases: time from filing to trial or disposition.
Juvenile detention and adjudication or transfer hearings: time from arrest to hearing; juve-
nile disposition hearings: time from adjudicatory hearing to disposition hearing.
Note from NCSC: These case disposition standards, which have been promulgated by pro-
fessional organizations in the field of judicial administration, are provided in the CourTools
methodology only for illustration purposes. Each court or state court system that has not al-
ready adopted case disposition time standards may wish to consider using or modifying
these standards as a means of regularly evaluating its case management performance.
Source: National Center for State Courts 2001.
The Netherlands courts have a time standards system that is derived
from the U.S. Trial Court Performance Standards, adapted on the basis
of Dutch case processing statistics over the years.
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Table 7 Case Disposition Time Standards in the Netherlands
Case type Case category Court Time standard Input at Output at
Commercial,
defended
102/103 district 70% within 1
year
80% within 2
years
First hearing Issue of
decision/
removal from
record
local 75% within 6
months
90% within 1
year
Commercial,
undefended
105 district 90% within 1
month
First hearing Issue of
decision/
removal from
record
local 90% within 15
days
Requests 106 90% within 3
months
Request
received
Decision sent/
withdrawal
after hearing
Summary
proceedings
and
provisional
decisions
301/302 district
+
local
90% within 3
months
Draft
summons
received
Final decision
Divorce 201 district 50% within 2
months
95% within 1
year
Request
received
Final decision
sent/
withdrawal
received
Alimony 1596/1597/
1600/1601
district 90% within 1
year
Request
received
Final decision
sent
Juvenile:
authority and
visiting rights
1595/1598/
1602
district 80% within 1
year
Final decision
sent
Juvenile:
supervision
and shelter
203 district 90% within 3
months
Request
received
Decision sent/
withdrawal
received
Dissolution of
labor contract,
settled
decided
107 local Request
received
Decision sent
2606 90% within 15
days
2607, 2608,
2709
90% within 3
months
Source: Netherlands Judicial Council Quality Standards project, final report, November 16,
2007.
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The standards laid down in this report have emerged from actual prac-
tice. They are self-imposed. In a number of categories, actual practice
is even timelier than the standards. We will come back to this point in
the next chapters.
The same picture, but with some differences, emerges from the Eur-
opean jurisprudence discussed in the next section.
Jurisprudence as a standard: The European Court of Human Rights’
jurisprudence on undue delay
Article 6.1 of the Convention deals with timely justice by stating the
right to justice without undue delay. Article 13 states that member
states must have a remedy in the national system for those who have
not been given the right to justice without undue delay. As a subsidiary
measure, the European Court of Human Rights hears complaints from
those who feel the national remedies were insufficient to address the
violation of their right to timely justice. They can apply for a ruling of
the Court on violations of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Court can order the member state in question to pay compensa-
tion to the applicant, if it finds there has been a delay that was undue,
and thus a violation of article 6.1. The Court’s decisions also have a
broader authority, because they are a source of authority on the proper
administration of justice guaranteed in the Convention. For example,
the case of Brogan7 against the United Kingdom led to a major reform
of the Dutch procedural rules for pretrial detention.
When judging claims of undue delay, the Court generally allows a
duration of two years for a case in a single instance. It then applies
four more individualized criteria to judge whether there has been a vio-
lation of article 6.1: 8
– The complexity of the case
– The applicant’s conduct
– The manner in which the matter was dealt with by the administra-
tive and judicial authorities
– What is at stake for the applicant – some cases need to be expe-
dited, such as labor disputes involving dismissals, compensation for
victims of accidents, cases in which the applicant is serving a prison
sentence, police violence cases, cases where an applicant’s health is
critical, cases of applicants of advanced age, cases related to family
life, and cases with applicants of limited physical state and capacity.
Such situations make up what are termed priority cases.
The starting point of the calculation the Court makes is different in ci-
vil, criminal and administrative cases. In administrative cases, it is the
date on which the applicant first refers the matter to the administrative
authorities. In civil cases, it is normally the date on which the case was
filed in court. In civil cases, the end date is when the decision becomes
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final, but the court also takes into consideration the length of enforce-
ment and other implementation procedures that are viewed as integral
parts of the proceedings. In criminal cases, the starting point may also
be the date on which the suspect was arrested or charged, or that on
which the preliminary investigation began. The Court regards the date
on which the final judgment is given on the substantive charge or the
decision by the prosecution or the court to terminate proceedings as
the final date of the proceedings.
Analysis and comparison of the large number of cases the court has
decided in this matter has led to some indications of the Court’s ap-
proach. The resulting indications are still fairly general (CEPEJ 2006a
p. 6).9 Table 8 provides the full list.
Table 8 ECHR Jurisprudence on Reasonable Time
Type of case Issues,
case type
Length Decision
Criminal Diverse More than 5 years Violation
Criminal Normal 3y6m (total in 3 instances)
4y3m (total in 3 levels + investigation)
No violation
Criminal Complex 8y5m ( investigation and 3 levels) No violation
Civil Complex More than 8 years Violation
Civil Simple 1y10m in first instance
1y8m on appeal
1y9m Court of Cassation
No violation
Civil Priority 1y7m in first instance (labor)
1y9m on appeal
1y9m Court of Cassation
No violation
Administrative Priority More than 2 years Violation
Administrative Complex More than 5 years Violation
Source: CEPEJ 2006a p. 6.
This is the general trend:
Generally, a total duration of up to two years in normal non-complex
cases was regarded reasonable.
In priority cases, the court may find violation even if the case lasted
less than two years.
In complex cases, the court may allow more time, but pays special at-
tention to periods of inactivity that are clearly excessive. The longer
time allowed is rarely more than five years and almost never more than
eight years of total duration.
The only cases in which the court did not find violation in spite of
manifestly excessive duration of proceedings were the cases in which
the applicant’s behavior had contributed to the delay.
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Standards emerging from comparison: Doing Business
If there are no standards against which the actually measured disposi-
tion times can be judged, comparing actual practices is a help in devel-
oping standards. This section will take the Doing Business data – even
though they are not actually measured disposition times - to illustrate
how this can work. The Doing Business (DB) methodology (World Bank
2006a, 2008) gathers and compares data and information on the busi-
ness climate in most countries in the world. Doing Business has a net-
work of informants in all its participating countries. In 2007, 178
countries participated in the data gathering. The Doing Business pro-
cess is explained in detail in Box 5.
There are two reasons for using this example. First, it is a widely
used tool for developing countries to compare their performance with
regard to the business climate, including that of the justice system.
Second, it does not depend on the presence of a statistical function of
any sort in the justice system in question. That makes it a useful tool
when assessing court performance in the context of developing coun-
tries. Chapter 1.3 discusses the DB methodology in general, as well as
its limitations.
It works as follows: Every year, it asks informants in all its participat-
ing countries to provide information on the performance of a number
of institutions relevant to doing business, such as the tax office, cus-
toms, and also the justice system. With regard to contract enforcement,
lawyers in all its participating countries are asked to provide their esti-
mates on the pursuit of a commercial contract enforcement case: the
disposition time, the cost and the number of steps that need to be ta-
ken. The time counted begins at filing and ends at completion of enfor-
cement. The lawyers who are DB’s informants in the country estimate
how long, in calendar days, a case would take in their courts. DB
averages the times estimated by the lawyers. The time is specified for
three specific activities: (1) filing and service, (2) trial and judgment
and (3) enforcement.
Here is a methodological illustration: In 2006, the time in days
needed to process a claim in the Netherlands, displayed in the DB in-
dex, changed from 48 to 408. This is not a typo, nor does it reflect that
90 percent of the Dutch judiciary has suddenly become incapacitated.
The Doing Business team confirmed that they have changed the case
in the questionnaire put before the correspondents. The new case (Box
5) was constructed to make the results more comparable across coun-
tries. Consequently, the procedure for the claim has changed. The new
number of days, including 50 days for enforcement, tallies with the
Dutch judiciary’s statistics. This change means we can no longer com-
pare the data over time if we want to go back beyond 2006. The other
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limitations are in the fact that the data provided are not primary source
data, but estimates.
Box 5 Doing Business Database – Methodology for Contract Enforce-
ment Scores
Indicators on enforcing contracts measure the efficiency of the judicial
system in resolving a commercial dispute. The data are built by follo-
wing the step-by-step evolution of a commercial sale dispute before local
courts. The data are collected through study of the codes of civil proce-
dure and other court regulations as well as surveys completed by local
litigation lawyers (and, in a quarter of the countries, by judges as well).
Assumptions about the case
· The value of the claim equals 200% of the country’s income per
capita.
· The dispute concerns a lawful transaction between 2 businesses
(Seller and Buyer), located in the country’s most populous city.
Seller sells goods worth 200% of the country’s income per capita
to Buyer. After Seller delivers the goods to Buyer, Buyer does not
pay for the goods on the grounds that the delivered goods were
not of adequate quality.
· Seller (the plaintiff) sues Buyer (the defendant) to recover the
amount under the sales agreement (that is, 200% of the country’s
income per capita). Buyer opposes Seller’s claim, saying that the
quality of the goods is not adequate. The claim is disputed on the
merits.
· A court in the country’s most populous city with jurisdiction over
commercial cases worth 200% of income per capita decides the
dispute.
· Seller attaches Buyer’s goods prior to obtaining a judgment be-
cause Seller fears that Buyer may become insolvent during the
lawsuit.
· Expert opinions are given on the quality of the delivered goods. If
it is standard practice in the country for parties to call witnesses
or expert witnesses to give an opinion on the quality of the goods,
the parties each call one witness or expert witness. If it is standard
practice for the judge to appoint an independent expert to give an
expert opinion on the quality of the goods, the judge does so. In
this case the judge does not allow opposing expert testimony.
· The judgment is 100% in favor of Seller: the judge decides that
the goods are of adequate quality and that Buyer must pay the
agreed price.
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· Buyer does not appeal the judgment. The judgment becomes fi-
nal.
· Seller takes all required steps for prompt enforcement of the judg-
ment. The money is successfully collected through a public sale of
Buyer’s movable assets (for example, office equipment).
Procedures
A procedure is defined as any interaction between the parties, or be-
tween them and the judge or court officer. This includes steps to file
the case, steps for trial and judgment and steps necessary to enforce
the judgment. This year, the survey allowed respondents to record
procedures that exist in civil law but not in common law jurisdic-
tions, and vice versa. For example, the judge can appoint an inde-
pendent expert in civil law countries whereas both parties in com-
mon law countries send a list of their expert witnesses to the court.
To indicate the overall efficiency of court procedures, 1 procedure is
now subtracted for countries that have specialized commercial
courts and 1 procedure for countries that allow electronic filing of
court cases.
Time
Time is recorded in calendar days, counted from the moment the
plaintiff files the lawsuit in court until payment. This includes both
the days when actions take place and the waiting periods between.
The respondents make separate estimates of the average duration of
different stages of dispute resolution: the completion of service of
process (time to file the case), the issuance of judgment (time for
the trial and obtaining the judgment) and the moment of payment
(time for enforcement).
Cost
Cost is recorded as a percentage of the claim, assumed to be equiva-
lent to 200 percent of income per capita. Only official costs required
by law are recorded, including court and enforcement costs and aver-
age attorney fees where the use of attorneys is mandatory or com-
mon.
Source:
http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/EnforcingContracts.aspx
The Doing Business approach of using estimates by local lawyers entails
a risk. Where there are no statistics from courts or other sources, there
is no way of checking their accuracy. How much accuracy is required
depends on what we need to do with the figures. If, for example, the
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average estimated time in days is 285, and we want to compare that to
the ECHR general standard of 2 years, the level of accuracy is suffi-
cient for the purpose. Actual court statistics, provided they are reasona-
bly accurate, would most probably not make the outcome of this com-
parison any different.
Table 9 Doing Business Database Contract Enforcement: Time in Days
Time in calendar
days including filing,
service and
enforcement
in 2007
Time in calendar
days for trial and
judgment
Overall ranking on
contract
enforcement
in 2007
Benin 720 375 166
Georgia 285 100 42
Macedonia 385 280 84
Nepal 735 365 123
Netherlands 514 442 36
Romania 537 365 37
Sri Lanka 1318 1000 133
United States 300 180 8
Singapore (lowest number
of days)
120 88 4
Hong Kong, China (best
overall ranking)
211 176 1
Timor-Leste (highest number
of days, lowest overall
ranking on contract
enforcement)
1800 1500 178
The lowest number of days for all three phases found by Doing Busi-
ness for 2007 is 120 for Singapore. The highest number is 1,800 days,
for contract enforcement in Timor-Leste.
The final column in Table 9 shows the ranking of each country in
the list of 178 participating countries. Thus, Hong Kong, China ranks
top performer on contract enforcement and Timor-Leste, in place 178,
is at the bottom of the list.
The reason for describing the DB database here is to show how com-
paring national figures can play a role in developing standards, in this
case for case processing in court. Doing Business has existed in its pre-
sent form for only a couple of years at the time of writing (2008). It
has become a widely used source of information on the business cli-
mate in most countries in the world. It contains a wealth of informa-
tion. This information cannot always be verified. Reality has been mo-
deled to a great extent to make the scores comparable. That may mean
it no longer reflects actual practice. For instance, in the Netherlands
the number of cases in which witnesses are heard is less than 2 per-
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cent of the total number of civil cases. A seller who wants to enforce a
contract will turn to summary proceedings rather than a full trial. This
does not provide the information needed to track problems in courts
because that would require information on disposition times at the
court level. Showing an average number does not reflect whether there
are extremes and their share in the average disposition time. A large
share of extremes may be a signal of problems.
DB’s greatest value is for those situations where no other informa-
tion is available. The point this section aimed to illustrate is the fact
that these estimates are available to serve as a basis to reflect on what
disposition times are acceptable, and which are manifestly unreason-
able. This way, it can serve as a basis for setting standards.
Comparing results to standards
In order to provide an illustration of the methodology developed in
these chapters, we can now compare the estimates from Doing Busi-
ness with the standards, trends and indications discussed earlier. The
case constructed for the DB purposes is a general civil case of no parti-
cular urgency. For this type of case, the ABA, CCJ and COSCA stan-
dard is 12 months or 365 calendar days for non-jury trials (see Table 6).
The ECHR’s general indication is 2 years, or approximately 730 days,
for a simple civil case.
The U.S. DB result of 180 days for trial and judgment is well within
the ABA, CCJ and COSCA standards of 12 months for non-jury trials.
The Netherlands result of 442 days for trial and judgment exceeds the
ABA standard of 365 calendar days but is within the ECHR jurispru-
dence’s framework. Romania’s result of 365 days for trial and judgment
is well within those limits. Courts in all countries in the list except Sri
Lanka and Timor-Leste have estimated disposition times that fall with-
in the most current standards.
It is also possible to make a world wide comparison for a general ci-
vil case: If the phases of service and filing and enforcement take on
average 135 calendar days, that is, 4½ months, courts in 72 of 178 coun-
tries are estimated to perform within the ABA standard. Courts in 135
of 178 countries are estimated to perform within the indicative stan-
dards that emerge from the ECHR jurisprudence. This raises the ques-
tion whether, if a majority of courts’ estimated performance falls within
a widely accepted standard, the belief that courts are slow is justified
for this particular case type.
How do these observations relate to Hammergren’s conclusion above
that case delay is exaggerated? If the DB estimates are approximately
correct, and if the ECHR standards are applied, that conclusion is more
or less justified. With the stricter time standards of the ABA, more dis-
position times would qualify as delays. This could serve as a starting
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point for a debate about case delay that is based on facts rather than be-
liefs.
Some preliminary conclusions
Case delay is recognized as a major problem in the administration of
justice. Delay negatively affects parties in a case, society in a wider
sense, and the administration of justice itself. Case delay means taking
so long to process a case that it is considered excessive. Delay needs to
be measured in order to establish whether it exists, whether it is as se-
rious as claimed, and to identify remedies. In order to answer these
questions, we do quantitative measurements. We do not measure delay
itself but proxies, such as time to disposition, age of case load and
clearance rates. In order to see whether there is an undue delay, the re-
sults of these measurements need to be gauged against standards.
Hard and fast standards for case disposition times are not generally
available. Existing standards have emerged from factual evidence about
actual practice. That evidence is used to establish self-imposed goals
for what the system wants to achieve. Jurisprudence deciding whether
there has been a violation of the reasonable time rule is a source of
standards too. Existing time standards differ for different case types:
some types of cases require more expedient disposition than others be-
cause the parties involved have a more urgent need for a judicial deci-
sion. Case disposition times differ widely across the world.
The next section looks for causes of delay that may explain some of
those differences.
Identifying causes
Courts may, if they have measured their disposition times and possibly
compared them with standards, find that the times indicate unrea-
sonable delays. This may bring them to the conclusion that delay is a
significant problem for them. In order to find ways of reducing the dis-
position times, the next challenge is to identify the causes of delay.
Identifying these causes has been approached in different ways. One is
to look at variations disposition times between courts and factors that
may explain those variations. There is research into factors explaining
variations in disposition time. The scope of this research is limited be-
cause it is almost entirely American. The approach the research usually
takes is that of comparing differences in case disposition times be-
tween courts on the basis of a theory regarding which factors are rele-
vant. The next step is to identify those factors that emerge as signifi-
cant in explaining these differences. The results of this research are dif-
fuse (Eshuis 2007 p. 28).
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Another approach is to look at interventions to reduce disposition
times and how effective they have been. Solid empirical research into
the workings and the results of concrete remedies against disposition
time problems is very scarce, but there is some information on inter-
ventions to reduce disposition times and how effective they have been.
Most of the examples below come from the 2002 World Development
Report (WDR 2002). They are an aggregate of experience from judicial
reform projects around the world. The value of these findings is also
limited, for two reasons: (1) the interventions did not take place under
well controlled circumstances, and (2) the results of the interventions
were – both beforehand and afterward - not very well defined. Drawing
conclusions about their effectiveness would be tentative at best. Draw-
ing general conclusions from practical experience in an international
context would also be problematic because of the important differences
in the setup and scope of procedures, resource levels and a host of
other factors.
With all those caveats, the discussion below looks at four groups of
factors and interventions: case load, procedural factors, organizational
factors, and cultural factors and other incentives. If the findings on
both factors and interventions point in the same direction, the assump-
tion will be that the factor in question effectively influences case dispo-
sition times.
Caseload
The most common explanation for delay is the size of a court’s case-
load: a court with more cases will take longer to process them. Case-
load size alone does not determine delay. Only in relation to the hu-
man and other resources available to dispose it does caseload have
meaning when it comes to disposition times. Case influx in the courts
is determined by different factors:
– Legislation regulating which disputes or matters (for example di-
vorce, property disputes, criminal sanctions) need to be brought be-
fore a court
– Incidence of these matters in society
– A large number of cultural and other factors influencing whether
cases or matters actually come before a court (Genn 1999 p. 252).
These factors can all change. Congestion, backlog, and delay are inher-
ent risks for organizations that face uncontrolled demand, while their
resources are limited and inflexible. This kind of disconnect is very
common for public service institutions, and the institutions in the jus-
tice sector are no exception. In principle, anyone can take a case to
court, and the factors influencing the decision to do so are largely out-
side the court’s control. For instance, the demand for commercial court
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cases will fluctuate inversely with the economy. If more people and
businesses are unable to pay their bills, more claims will be filed with
the first instance courts. The demand for criminal court cases may well
vary with the political climate and public sector priorities in a country.
The actual caseload is also influenced by the types of cases that have to
be dealt with. A rise in more complex cases, for example when a coun-
try decides to prosecute more fraud or corruption, may not be reflected
in the numbers, but it will constitute a greater demand on resources.
The caseload is sometimes regarded as the basis for differences in
work distribution and cultural differences. However, a study of courts
in the United States found that differences in the cases, in a court’s
case mix or in the percentage of jury trials did not explain variations in
disposition times (Church p. 79). At first glance, it may seem that case-
load is a factor that is not easily influenced. Timely and reliable
management information reports and the use of modern case flow
management techniques were found to be important factors in redu-
cing backlog (Mahoney p. 19).
Backlog reduction programs were reported as effective in the short
term. However, to reduce disposition times over the longer term, it is
necessary to tackle the more fundamental causes (Eshuis 2007 p. 282).
Framework regarding procedures and processes
There is strong evidence of a significant relation between higher levels
of procedural complexity and longer disposition times (Djankov c.s. p.
25, Botero c.s. p. 73). In countries with more complex procedures, case
processing generally takes longer. It is important to differentiate be-
tween the procedural complexity, which has to do with the steps that
need to be taken, and the substantive complexity of the case or dispute
at hand, like the number of issues that need to be resolved.
With regard to remedies, the primary area to look would be in proce-
dural simplification. The 2002 WDR lists different forms of simplifica-
tion that have improved court performance:
Simplifying procedural rules is reported as successful by the WDR
(WDR 2002 p. 127). Its beneficial effect is reported to increase with
the degree of complexity of the older rules. An example is to reduce
the possibility to appeal interim decisions and to limit appeal to the fi-
nal decision only.
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is, according to the WDR, an al-
ternative for badly functioning courts. It is important to distinguish
ADR as a means to resolve disputes, and ADR as a means to relieve
the courts of disputes that can be resolved alternatively in order to re-
duce the caseload and help courts to process the cases that need a court
decision more quickly. As a concentrated form of dispute resolution,
ADR can well be regarded as both a type of simplification, as well as a
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kind of procedural specialization. Genn reports that ADR has not had
much impact on the way members of the public seek to resolve their
justiciable problems10. Genn predicted in 1999 that this may change
as courts encourage parties to try mediation to resolve their disputes
(Genn 1999 p. 261).
The presence of summary proceedings was found to be significant in
explaining variations in disposition times (Eshuis 2007 p. 28). The in-
troduction of summary proceedings is reported as successful in redu-
cing disposition times by offering a simpler procedure to resolve some
disputes much faster (WDR 2002 p. 128). In the Netherlands, sum-
mary proceedings (kort geding) are a popular and effective means of ac-
quiring a judicial decision in a short time.
Small claims courts, with a simpler procedure proportional to the size
of the claim, were by far the most successful measure in reducing dis-
position times (WDR 2002 p. 126). However, it must be noted that
there is not an overwhelming amount of evidence for this observation.
The degree of specialization of judges in some U.S. courts was found
to be not significant in explaining the variation in processing times
(Eshuis 2007 p. 28). However, the WDR reports that specialized courts
were a successful measure for improving court disposition times and
other aspects of court performance. Specialization in the sense of dif-
ferentiating case streams is a popular remedy, although evidence for its
efficacy is rather slim (WDR 2002 p. 126).
Early interventions in individual cases, either in court or just before
the case comes to court, were mentioned as effective in reducing dispo-
sition time (Eshuis 2007 p. 299, Goerdt p.56). They generally serve to
reduce the complexity of a dispute at the start of the court case. There
are positive evaluations of this approach in Australia and the United
Kingdom.11 Court conferences, a form of early intervention where the
judge plans the way a dispute will be handled with the parties and/or
their representatives, have been found to reduce disposition times.
Practices and structures
This section is a mixed bag of various factors and remedies having to
do with court practice and court structures.
Lack of resources is frequently put forward as a cause for longer dispo-
sition times. Resources were found to affect the length of disposition
times in some studies in some U.S. courts, but in others they did not
turn out to be significant. One study found that long disposition times
are caused by lack of resources in the courts. A lack of resources may
mean a relatively low number of judges. A lack of judges entails a
higher caseload per judge, and that brings us back to the relative case-
load as a factor affecting disposition times. The numbers of judges and
staff were found to be related to disposition time in one study (Eshuis
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2007 p. 28). Raising budgets and funding as an isolated measure does
not lead to longterm improvements, according to experience reported
in the WDR (WDR 2002 p. 128-129).
Methods of planning and control, caseload planning and guarding and
enforcing time limits have all proven to be significant explaining in
variations in disposition times in U.S. courts.
A study of courts in Argentina and Venezuela by Buscaglia and Ulen
published in 1997 found that the use of computerized word processing is
strongly correlated with faster disposition, particularly in the senten-
cing stage in courts in Venezuela and Argentina (Buscaglia 1997 p.
290).
Differences in organization and the ways the courts work were found to
be relevant in explaining differences in case disposition times. Case
management, keeping track of each individual case in order to ensure
its expedient resolution, was found to be an important factor. Case
management systems and keeping track of disposition times are two of
the instruments used in case management. In a comparison of specific
methods of management, the results were diffuse. Another study
found a court’s management characteristics, planning methods or
goals not to be significant factors explaining its case disposition time
(Mahoney p. 6, Eshuis 2007 p. 28).
Correct production statistics and awareness of disposition times are both
proven factors leading to reduction in those times. This raises the ques-
tion about causality: how, and whether, correct statistics contribute to
delay reduction. We will come back to this question later. Research also
shows that U.S. courts have adopted the ABA standards only under ex-
ternal pressure. Moreover, standards are a useful instrument for courts
that seriously try to shorten disposition times (Eshuis 2007 p. 32).
The WDR reports that making individual judges responsible for
cases is an improvement compared with master calendars (WDR 2002
p. 125). This reflects similar findings by Church (Church p. 72). Master
calendars list cases that are in court, but have not been assigned to an
individual judge. There is evidence that assigning cases to a judge early
helps its prompt disposition. Lack of oversight at all stages of the pro-
ceedings is another contributor to delays.
More publicity in the form of information about judicial conduct and
court hearing observation makes administration of justice faster and
fairer, according to the WDR (WDR 2002 p.125). The presence of tele-
vision cameras in the court made case disposition 30 percent speedier,
and the quality of judgments went up. Observation by civil society or-
ganizations who evaluate judges is another example put forward by the
WDR.
PART 3 CASE DELAY 105
Insufficient implementation: where implementation of interventions to
speed up case processing was insufficient, it was unsuccessful. Short-
ening disposition times is a long term exercise requiring longer peri-
ods of implementation. In the change processes, leadership is consid-
ered a factor. External pressure is an important factor to move local
court systems (Eshuis 2007 p. 33).
Culture and other factors
Established expectations, practices and informal rules of behavior of
judges and attorneys do explain variations in disposition times in a
study of some U.S. courts (Church p. 50).12 Efficient work orientation
was also found to be significant in explaining variations in disposition
times in some U.S. courts (Ostrom p. 108-9). Local expectations as to
whether speedy procedures are generally considered important were
found to be relevant for disposition times. However, there is no solid
empirical evidence for the idea that they influence disposition times
significantly (Eshuis 2007 p. 28). Finally, explanations can be sought
in a series of perverse incentives. There are benefits to case delay too,
for instance for the party who wants to defer payment. Defendants
may have an interest in trying to hold off or prevent decisions against
them. Lawyers may want to string out cases as a means of increasing
their fees. A court itself may want to have a backlog as an argument
for more resources.
This section analyzed which factors and interventions have proven to
be effective in reducing case delay. The picture is not very clear. If we
start looking for areas with factors (1) that have turned out to signifi-
cantly influence disposition times, and (2) where interventions have
helped in reducing disposition times, the following areas present them-
selves:
Increased transparency, such as correct measurement and awareness
of actual disposition time, and of standards, can be regarded as positive
factors in reducing disposition time. They have the potential to change
the local legal culture posited by Church. As Church phrases it: “The
crucial element in accelerating the pace of litigation in a court is con-
cern on the part of judges with the problem of court delay and a firm
commitment to do something about it” (Church p. 81). This is con-
firmed by Goerdt: “Delay can be reduced where there is commitment
to expeditious case processing” (Goerdt p. 57). Information about ac-
tual practice can be a first step in fostering that awareness and change
culture.
This is a hypothesis than can actually be tested. Taking the data on IT
implementation from CEPEJ and the estimated disposition times for
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general civil cases from Doing Business, we can see whether the pre-
sence of case registration and case and court management systems
bear any relation to those disposition times. I divided the countries re-
porting to CEPEJ into two groups: those reporting that they had imple-
mented case registration systems, case management systems and court
management systems in all courts, and those that reported they had
not. In the first group, DB’s disposition time estimates varied from
210 days for Lithuania to 515 days for Spain. The median disposition
time for general civil cases for all countries in this group is 386 days,
and the average is 388 days. Estimates for the second group of coun-
tries ranged from 237 days for Azerbaijan to 1,210 days for Italy. For all
countries in this group, the median disposition time for general civil
cases is 561 days and the average is 577 days.
For general civil cases in the Netherlands courts, average disposition
time was 608 days in 1996, and 420 days in 2007. Simplification of
case processing in the form of early intervention, specialization of case
streams and simplification of procedures are also positive factors in re-
ducing disposition time.
The area of court resource management presents itself as well, but it
is outside the scope of this study on primary judicial processes. Courts
and judges have often, and often with good cause, been accused of not
paying attention to the issue of court resource management. Neverthe-
less, the issue is not part of this study because it focuses on the judicial
process in itself.13
Therefore, increasing transparency and simplifying case processing,
which both stand for a number of more specific activities, are areas
that should receive special attention when we move on to the next
chapters.
Conclusions for this chapter
This chapter took a first look at the question of how IT can support de-
lay reduction in courts. It examined a number of aspects of case delay.
Outcomes of the research on causes of delay and interventions are dif-
fuse. They do not provide hard and fast guidelines for reducing backlog
or delay. Local culture, awareness of actual practice and the need for ex-
pedient case processing present themselves as factors affecting delay.
Procedural complexity and simplification emerge from the research as
likely areas for reducing delay. Specialization is reported as an effective
remedy. It comes in many forms: summary proceedings, small claims
courts and simpler procedures. Early intervention is also reported as ef-
fective.
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IT as a factor affecting case delay in courts has not been studied em-
pirically, except in some isolated cases.
One IT factor arises from this study: database technology used in
case registration and management systems producing case processing
statistics. Having data on case disposition and processing available fa-
cilitates both measuring actual disposition times and developing stan-
dards. The first standards emerged in the early 1980s in the United
States, where technology was implemented in courts earlier than in
most other countries. Apparently, database technology has been a factor
in the development of standards. It has also been a tool in studies on
factors affecting case delay. As a foundation for a debate about stan-
dards, case handling statistics have the potential to affect court culture.
According to the DB estimates regarding ordinary civil contract enfor-
cement cases, courts in 58 of 178 countries dispose those cases within
the ABA standard, and courts in 135 of 178 countries stay within the
ECHR jurisprudence of what consists a reasonable delay in ordinary ci-
vil cases. Such a result provides a basis for discussion as to what a rea-
sonable delay actually is. Such standards help to determine whether de-
lay is a problem that needs to be tackled. They also help in reducing
delay by providing a target. Self-imposed standards do not conflict with
the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This is still true if the
standards were adopted under external pressure because the obligation
to provide timely justice is an obligation laid down in the Conventions.
Jurisprudence on compliance with those standards, like that of the Eur-
opean Court of Human Rights, is a source of standards as well. Stan-
dards like the ones from the ABA can emerge from the study of actual
practice, either in one country or in cross country comparisons like in
Doing Business.
Looking at most other sources, IT is usually discussed in a very generic
way: using IT will reduce processing times. Programs aiming to reduce
processing times frequently refer to IT as a means for doing so. How-
ever, there is very little empirical foundation for this claim. One excep-
tion is the finding that the presence of word processing systems
speeded up case disposition in Argentina. Apparently, experience-based
research has not identified the implementation of IT as a very success-
ful factor in reducing case disposition times. Various explanations for
this observation are possible. Maybe the issue has not been studied, or
maybe the results of studies that were done were inconclusive or nega-
tive. Possibly, it is hard to study because after implementation, no con-
trol group is available. Or maybe implementation of IT in courts has
not yet led to changes in work processes that result in more expedient
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disposition times. After all, most courts are still paper based, and their
interactions with the parties have, so far, not changed fundamentally.
In summary, the question of how IT can support reducing case delay
has not received a satisfactory answer yet. Therefore, this study will
need to take a different approach. In the next chapters, it will look at
court processes themselves in terms of information handling. We need
to know more about those processes in order to gain a deeper under-
standing of what IT can do. From the above, we have an indication of
which interventions may benefit from using IT: increasing transpar-
ency and simplification. We will look at those interventions in terms of
information processing. Writing about IT easily risks becoming specu-
lative. To avoid this risk, a concrete, practical example that can be
tested is necessary. Therefore, civil justice in the Netherlands will be
the object of study in the next chapters.
Chapter 3.2 Case Processing as Information Management
This chapter examines information handling in case handling pro-
cesses. It develops a conceptual framework for examining those pro-
cesses. The next chapter tests the framework in a case study of civil
justice in the Netherlands.
The following chapters will be mainly concerned with what courts do –
deciding cases, producing titles, providing legal protection, and con-
firming norms –in terms of processes (Susskind 1996 p. 83). Thinking
productively about those activities and processes in terms of informa-
tion requires a conceptual framework. That framework will be un-
folded in this chapter. It was first developed as a picture of first in-
stance civil justice for a reappraisal of civil justice in the Netherlands
in the first years of this century. That model, with a more extensive ex-
planation of the thinking behind it, is presented in this chapter. Subse-
quently, I used a much more detailed version of the model to explain
civil case processing to the information experts developing information
architecture for the Netherlands judiciary. Both can be found in two ar-
ticles I wrote. The first one appeared in the Netherlands Legal Weekly
(Nederlands Juristenblad) (Reiling 2003). I later wrote an English lan-
guage version of it for Information and Communications Technology Law
(Reiling 2006). That version, now updated, is presented in the next
chapter. I have found it to be a useful tool. Below, I will explain the
thinking behind the model as it developed over the years.
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We will take up the conclusions from the chapter on case delay again
here. One important conclusion from the previous chapter is that
knowledge about what goes on in a court helps us to understand what can
be improved. A case registration system using a database and producing
information about cases and how they are handled is a tool for courts
that want to improve their performance. The adage about measuring is
that what gets measured gets done.14 This chapter and the next one
will illustrate, in different ways, what can get done once the measuring
is done.
Another observation from the discussion of case delay in the last
chapter is that it is uncertain whether the introduction of forms of informa-
tion technology has reduced case delay in courts. Understanding how infor-
mation technology can contribute to reducing case delay may be more
effective with a different approach. If we want to learn how informa-
tion technology can support improvement in case processing, we will
do well to consider the roles of information in the judicial process.
This chapter examines court processes themselves in terms of informa-
tion management, and largely independent of the legal substance of
the cases in question. The analysis will draw on non-legal disciplines,
such as sociology, information science and organization science.
The plan for this chapter is as follows:
The first step will be to introduce the theory behind the model that
will be presented: Basic concepts about processes, products, roles and
information. The roles of the judiciary are confronted with the theories
about products and processes. This analysis leads to a conceptual fra-
mework in the form of a matrix
Next comes practice: A case study of civil justice in the Netherlands,
applying the matrix framework developed in the first step and using
statistics about civil case processing.
In the concluding part of this chapter, we will confront the findings
with some common approaches to civil justice reform in the recent
past.
Theory: Case processing as an information process
What does it mean to look at case processing as an information pro-
cess?
The parties take a case to court. What they take to court, in terms of
information, is information concerning their view of the issues in their
case. Some of the information can be qualified as legal, most of it re-
lates to the factual situation. Courts, judges, and juries process cases
on the basis of information. From here on in this chapter, I will use
the term “court” to include courts, judges and juries for the purpose of
110 TECHNOLOGY FOR JUSTICE
this discussion on processes. The information courts use to decide a
case is both legal and factual. It comes from different sources: the par-
ties, as well as sources of substantive and procedural law and other
sources. In court, the information is processed and transformed into
new information. The transformation is a process that involves all par-
ties to the case as well as the court. The court output is information
that the parties can subsequently use to pursue their goals.
This analysis of the use of information in court processes will use con-
cepts from different disciplines. Therefore, those concepts need to be
defined clearly and unequivocally, in order to make them understan-
dable to readers from different disciplines. These concepts will be
needed when we look at the court processes in more detail later in this
chapter and in the next ones.
Then, we will look at the roles of the judiciary. Judiciaries around
the world have been awarded similar roles, but there are some dif-
ferences depending on the national context. The roles will be analyzed
from various perspectives.
The next step will be to identify the products and outputs that corre-
spond to the roles we found earlier.
We then move to the processes that produce these outputs and pro-
ducts. The processes will be examined as ways of handling informa-
tion, not according to their legal substance.
Basic concepts
Here are the basic concepts used in the rest of this chapter and the
next ones:
Role: A role is a function performed especially in a particular opera-
tion or process.
Process: Organization science, more specifically business process
theory, provides the notion of process: a process is a collection of activi-
ties that takes one or more kinds of input, adds value and creates an
output that is of value to the customer (Hammer p. 38). A process is a
structured, measured set of activities designed to produce a specified
output for a particular customer or market (Davenport p. 5). This out-
put can be called the product of the process. In an information proces-
sing business, the process takes information as the input, processes
the information and adds new information. The resulting product is
new information the customer can put to use.
Product: The term product, also from organization science, will be
used here for “that which is produced” by the court process. It will
usually be a judicial decision. The product is distinct from the output.
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Outcome: In this chapter, the term outcome is reserved for the con-
tent of the court’s decision: the claim is awarded, the defendant is not
guilty, the government has wrongly taken a decision, the divorce is
granted.
Output: In the same framework, the term output is used for that
which is produced in a process, and that is of value to the customer.
Here, this term will be reserved for that which is the value of the court
product for the customer. Court decisions can have different values for
the customer: an end to a legal debate, a document to register a di-
vorce, an entitlement of some sort, a document to enforce a claim, or
the execution of a prison sentence.
Thus, the court process produces a decision (product) with content
(outcome) that has value for the user (output). Processes are deter-
mined first and foremost by what they produce. Both the process and
the product are related to the role of the producer. Hence, the outputs
and products of the judiciary are closely related to its roles. What are
those roles?
Court roles (1)
If a role is a function performed especially in a particular operation or
process, and the role affects the processes and products, we first need
to examine how the role of the judiciary can be described. Court users,
judges, the legal profession, socio-legal studies and society in general
all have their own perspective on the role of courts. These perspectives
are described in Chapter 1.2. Here is a brief summary.
Court users, the “customers” for whom courts produce value, perceive
the courts as an institution providing concrete legal protection to the
individual, ensuring that the individual will not be jeopardized beyond
the limits of the law. Judges differ in how they view their role. First in-
stance judges regard resolving disputes as their role. Final court judges
give priority to safeguarding the unity of the legal system.
From the legal point of view, under the rule of law, the role of the
court is determined by the law. Court tasks as attributed by the law
may differ from country to country.
Most legal sociologists consider dispute processing the central judicial
role (Cotterrell p. 220). Court decisions as judgments are, in most so-
ciologists’ perspective, both a resolution to a dispute or concrete legal
protection, as well as an assertion of normative order, or abstract legal
protection.
For the purpose of this discussion about the courts’ processes, the
product of those processes is defined as “decisions.” Those decisions
are not just any decision, but the decisions that are specific to the
court’s role in society. Courts are not the only instance in society pro-
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ducing decisions. Government agencies decide about policy, civil ser-
vants decide about entitlements, arbiters decide certain disputes. What
characterizes the court’s role is that it produces decisions that can be
enforced with public means: bailiffs, the police force. Judicial decisions
sanction the use of official force, whether it concerns enforcing sanc-
tions or auctioning off assets. In this perspective, the role of producing
enforceable decisions distinguishes judiciaries from all other organiza-
tions producing decisions and resolving disputes. Those decisions are
also affirmations of norms in the broader sense of abstract legal protec-
tion.
Court roles (2)
In this section, the roles perspective is narrowed down in order to fo-
cus on the court processes. The role of the court in general is to pro-
duce enforceable decisions, in other words: to provide title. The pro-
duct is consequently an enforceable decision. In this role, the question
can be asked: What is the output of the judicial process? Output, as we
have seen, is the value for the customer produced by the processes.
How are the enforceable decisions produced of value to the customer?
This is the next question we explore.
The framework used here to explore customer value related to court
roles was introduced by Blankenburg in a comparative study of Ger-
man and Dutch courts in the light of access to justice and alternatives
to courts (Blankenburg 1995). I have adapted it by reversing the hori-
zontal axis in order to model the relationships between the court pro-
cesses and their outcomes more adequately. However, the roles allo-
cated to the court remain the same (Blankenburg p. 188). For each role,
we can determine which products and outputs are brought forth. Next,
we can determine the characteristics of the processes that produce
them. The descriptions below are ideal types of each role. In reality,
cases will resemble one of the types to a certain degree, and they may
at the same time have some of the characteristics of another type. Here
are the ideal types of each role:
a Title provision
Overall, title provision is the role of the court as attributed by the law.
It is to provide parties with the output, the formal decision they need
to proceed with their business: with a judicial decision in hand, they
can go to a bailiff for contract enforcement, to impose criminal sanc-
tions like fines and prison sentences, or to have administrative deci-
sions revised. This role includes the affirmation of norms in a more
general sense. Apart from being the general role of a court, it is also
the role associated with undefended claims. This is how it will be dis-
cussed in the rest of this chapter.
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Three other specific roles can be identified that will help us under-
stand the information processes in courts and judiciaries.
b Notarial role
This role resembles that of a public notary. The parties submit an ar-
rangement to a court for approval: an agreement on how to conduct
their divorce, who will exercise parental authority, or how they intend
to terminate a labor contract. Judicial control ensures the arrangements
proposed by the parties are within the limits of the law. The judicial de-
cision formalizes the arrangement. In this role, there is only marginal
control of what the parties have arranged and now submit to the court.
The parties will generally need this decision for a next step in a bu-
reaucratic process, such as having their divorce registered with the civil
administration.
c Settlement
This is a role that is often stressed in socio-legal literature. The settle-
ment role is gradually becoming an accepted modality in courts. More
and more, courts are encouraged to help parties settle their differences,
rather than pursuing their differences to the full. Settlement occurs,
for instance, when the parties agree to settle their differences in an
agreement, instead of letting the judge decide.
d Judgment
This role is considered the judicial role par excellence. The full legally
relevant scope of a dispute is dealt with by the court, and the court case
ends with a judicial decision. The decision is reached with legal reason-
ing.
The roles cannot always be distinguished quite so sharply in actual
practice. Case processing may contain elements of more than one role,
but in most cases it is possible to identify an overriding role.
Now that the roles we will be examining have been identified, the
next step is to look at the products and outputs that come with each
role. The term “product” describes what the court actually produces.
The term “output” is reserved to describe what it is that is of value to
the customer. Finally, the term “outcome” describes the content of the
judicial decision.
Products, outputs and outcomes
Each of these roles brings with it a specific product and output. The
product will, in most cases, be a judicial decision of some sort. The
output, as we have seen, will be a title. In the notarial role, it is also a
confirmation that can be used for the next step in some bureaucratic
process: registering a divorce in the civil register, applying for a social
114 TECHNOLOGY FOR JUSTICE
security benefit. This is the output that is of value to the court users.
The settlement role is an exception because, at least in the Nether-
lands, the product here is not a judicial decision but a court report con-
taining the provisions of the settlement. The report is full proof of the
settlement.
What makes the roles and the products relevant for our discussion is
that they affect the way information is used in the primary judicial pro-
cess.
Two factors affect court processes in a major way:
A major factor affecting a process is the unpredictability of the out-
come. The outcome of a process can be completely predictable from the
outset. For example, in the case of a factory, the process is set up to
produce a predetermined object, for instance bicycles of a certain type.
Alternatively, the outcome can be more or less uncertain at the outset.
This can be the case in a design process, for example, of a new model
bicycle, with participants influencing the outcome during the process.
Events happening along the way can affect the outcome. In our case of
court processes, the outcome is the content of the decision: the divorce
arrangement is in keeping with regulations, the claim is unfounded.
In terms of information: the information available at the outset of
the process can be either sufficient to produce the outcome, or insuffi-
cient. In that case, other factors, including added information, may af-
fect the outcome while the process is going on.
Another important factor is the parties’ interest configuration: it can
be one party’s loss and the other party’s gain at the same time, or the
outcome can be a gain for both parties. In terms of game theory, the
result is either zero-sum or win-win. In game theory, zero-sum de-
scribes a situation in which a participant’s gain or loss is exactly ba-
lanced by the losses or gains of the other participant(s). In zero sum, it
is irrelevant whether the parties maintain a good relationship. A win-
win game is a game that is designed in such a way that all participants
can profit from it one way or the other. In conflict resolution, a win-
win strategy is a conflict resolution process that aims to accommodate
all the disputants. In win-win, cooperation by the parties is vital toward
producing the best result for each of them.
Figure 1 shows this concept in a matrix
In this matrix, the role of the court and the ensuing products are ar-
ranged along two axes: the relative uncertainty of the outcome from left
to right, and the relationship between the parties in terms of zero sum
and win-win from top to bottom. In showing court roles in this way, I
also want to make the point that, regarded from this perspective, indi-
vidual cases are on a continuum, both vertically and horizontally. A
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case or a decision can be mostly notarial with a little judgment, or
mostly judgment with a little settlement.
The next step will be to explore how court cases fit into the groups.
Introducing the groups and their characteristics
This next section works toward categorizing court cases according to
the use of information in each group. This is relevant for subsequently
determining what forms of information technology can support them.
The matrix above is the vehicle used for this purpose. Below, each
group is identified and its most relevant characteristics are discussed.
Providing title is the role in the first group. As we have already seen,
the product of the judicial process is always a title, in the sense that it
is an enforceable decision that can be used to take possession, to effect
imprisonment, or perform any other act of enforcement. But it is the
output of this group in particular. Here, we deal with a process that
does no more than producing that title. The case is “cut and dried” (Ga-
lanter 1983b15). The outcome is zero-sum because one party gains and
the other party loses. The process in this group is characterized by a
very low level of uncertainty. Undefended money claims come to mind
as an example.
The notarial role, group 2, produces an affirmation, a formal declara-
tion that the arrangement proposed by the parties is legal. It also en-
tails little uncertainty. The outcome is win-win. By cooperating, the par-
Figure 1 Matrix of Judicial Roles
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ties can achieve an optimum result. This process is also characterized
by low uncertainty. Ideally, parties propose an arrangement they have
worked out among themselves. The arrangement is examined by the
court only marginally. Family cases and plea bargaining are some of
the examples for this group.
The settlement role, group 3: here, the overriding objective is for the
parties to reach agreement. This agreement is the output. The outcome
is win-win. The process is characterized by uncertainty about the out-
come, and by communication and negotiation. Very complex informa-
tion, needed to help the parties to reach agreement, can be the object
in this process.
The judgment role, group 4, is widely regarded as the judiciary’s main
function. The outcome of the process is dependent on all sorts of
events that may occur during the process. The parties are in opposi-
tion. The court decides. This process may involve large amounts of
complex information. It should be noted here that the difference be-
tween groups 1 and 4 is relative, in the sense that the outcome is more
or less unpredictable. If no or almost no legal issues need to be
decided, the case is regarded as a title group case. As the number of le-
gal issues to be decided increases, the case moves in the direction of
the judgment group. The cutoff point between groups 1 and 4 is
whether the case is defended or not. However, there can still be legal
issues that need to be decided in group 1 cases.
In the next section, we will take the actual caseload of civil justice in
the Netherlands and sort the cases into the groups according to the
model developed above. We can determine the relative share of each
group in the total caseload, the average processing and disposition
time, some other statistics. The answer to these questions is primarily
important to determine where efforts at implementing IT can be most
effective.
Practice: A case study of civil justice in the Netherlands
The next step in our exploration is to apply the matrix to civil justice in
the Netherlands. The Netherlands has a legal culture in which settle-
ment plays a substantial role.16 Civil procedural law instructs judges to
attempt settlement before deciding a case on its merits. Each country
will most probably have its own legal culture in this regard. It will be
interesting to see whether other legal cultures have demonstrably dif-
ferent patterns, and whether those patterns show up in the matrix.
Such an exercise requires intimate knowledge of case types and court
roles in the context of the legal culture of the country involved. For in-
stance, it requires a solid database with case management data with
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sufficient differentiation of case types. Hence, it should not be underta-
ken lightly.
However, finding such patterns in other legal cultures is not the pur-
pose of this chapter. It is to learn how different processes use informa-
tion in order to understand what they need by way of specific IT func-
tionality.
Reasons for choosing civil justice
There are a number of reasons for choosing civil justice. First, in think-
ing about information technology in court processes, civil justice has,
in my experience, turned out to be the most accessible area of law. This
may have to do with the real or presumed equality of the parties. The
reason for choosing the Netherlands for this case study is that categor-
izing cases into the groups is an exercise that requires in-depth knowl-
edge of the local legal culture and its practices. Having been a practi-
cing civil judge in the Netherlands for many years, I am familiar en-
ough with civil justice to make the judgments needed to make the
conclusions robust, and this study useful.
The other reasons are more objective in nature.
Civil justice is statistically of relatively large importance in Dutch ad-
ministration of justice: 45 percent of all disposed cases are civil.
The second is its economic importance: 1 in 4 cases of insolvency is
due to late payments. 35 percent of these payment delays are deliberate
late payments; they are not due to financial problems of the debtor, or
of a dispute over performance, or even administrative inefficiency.17
This section starts with an overview of civil justice judicial institutions
in the Netherlands. Then, we look at the statistics of disposed cases.
Those cases are put into their groups in the matrix quadrants. In the
next chapter, we look at each group, and how information plays out, in
much more detail.
Some statistics about the Dutch court system
The Dutch court system has some of the characteristics of the classic
Napoleonic civil justice (as opposed to common law) system. It has
three tiers of jurisdiction. In the first instance, there are 19 district
courts working in sectors: a civil law sector, a criminal law sector, an
administrative law sector and a local courts (“kanton”) sector. The civil
law sectors deal with major money claims, family matters related to di-
vorce and civil juvenile matters. They generally have a specialized com-
mercial matters unit and a unit for summary proceedings. The for-
merly more than 60 local courts were administratively integrated into
the district courts in 2002. They deal mostly with money claims up to
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E 5,000, traffic violations, minor family matters, and employment and
rent contract matters. They also have summary proceedings in their ci-
vil law fields. For the purpose of this study, they will be called “local
courts” and “civil courts,” respectively. There are five appeal courts that
hear appeals of civil, criminal and some administrative cases. For civil
and criminal justice, the apex court is a court of cassation known as
the Supreme Council.
With 19 first instance courts for 16 million inhabitants, the rate of
courts per inhabitant is a little less than 1 court to a million inhabi-
tants. With 2,280 judges totaling a full-time equivalent of 2,072, the
rate of judges to inhabitants is 13 judges to 100,000 inhabitants. Look-
ing at the results of the CEPEJ study on court efficiency, both those
rates are very low compared with those in most other member states of
the Council of Europe (CEPEJ 2006b p. 61, 62). In 2002, the total
case influx was 1,330,500 with total production at 1,450,000. In 2007,
the case influx had gone up to 1.733,600 and production was at
1.726,000 (2007 Annual Report of the Dutch Judiciary, p. 79-80).
Table 10 Civil Justice: Disposed Cases in Three Instances
Year 1st instance local court 1st instance civil sector Appeal Cassation
2002 502.030 201.880 9000 488
2003 580.590 208.480 11940 490
2004 671.090 225.610 13000 466
2005 695.170 230.570 14370 452
2006 685.430 232.600 14310 463
2007 680.100 236.120 14710 475
Source: Netherlands Judicial Council Annual Reports, Supreme Court Annual reports
Table 10 shows the number of disposed civil and family cases for
2002-2007.18 More than 700,000 civil cases were disposed in the first
instance in 2002. Almost 500,000 of these were disposed in the local
court sectors of the district courts, the other 200,000 in the other civil
sector or sectors in the district courts. Approximately 9,000 cases got a
review in the appeal courts.19 Finally, the Supreme Council reviewed
488 civil cases.20
By 2007, the numbers for the first and appeal instances had gone
up to more than 900,000 and 14,000, respectively, but the cassation
numbers remained at around 500 annually. Evidently, from these
quantitative data, the appeal and cassation instances’ numbers are ex-
tremely low compared with the first instance. Statistically, they do not
influence the distribution in the groups we will be looking at below.
That is why, from here on, only the statistics for the first instance of ci-
vil justice in the Netherlands are taken as our object of study.
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Cases into groups
The first step is to find out how many cases are in each group.21
To that end, actually disposed cases are counted, based on the re-
ports of disposed case by the courts to the Council for the Judiciary.
The count follows the detailed case categories the Dutch courts use for
their production reports, as reflected in Table 11.
The counts were done as follows:
Group 1: Final dispositions and summary dispositions of undefended
money claims, both for the local court and the district court.
Group 2: Dispositions in parental authority, supervision and settled
employment termination cases in the local courts, and dispositions in
divorce related family cases in the district courts.
Group 3: Cases withdrawn at the parties’ request or struck off the
record.
Group 4: Final dispositions of contested civil claims, including those
going through a phase of fact-finding by hearing witnesses and
viewing locations, for both local and civil courts.
Table 11 Detailed Count of Groups, with Case Category Numbers
Group Local court Civil court
1 105 Final dispositions in
undefended claims
105 Final dispositions in
undefended claims
302 Final dispositions
in undefended
summary cases
302 Final dispositions in
undefended
summary cases
2 204 Decisions instituting
supervision
201 Divorce dispositions
299 Decisions instituting
guardianships and
parental authority
204 Other family cases
including
maintenance,
adoption, parental
authority after
divorce, visiting
rights, other
dispositions in
family cases,
reclaiming social
assistance
2606 Settled employment
terminations
3 301 399 Defended cases
Withdrawn or struck
off the record at
parties’ request,
both summary and
non-summary cases
1568, 1570-1573,
1635, 2560, 2565
399
Defended cases
withdrawn, struck
off the record at
parties’ request
4 1686, 1691, 1692 Final dispositions in
defended cases
1589-1593 Final dispositions in
defended cases
120 TECHNOLOGY FOR JUSTICE
Group Local court Civil court
2607 Non-settled
employment
terminations
1631 Final dispositions in
defended summary
cases
1727, 1728 Final dispositions in
defended summary
cases
The numbers are the case category numbers known as Lamicie categories after the com-
mission that first developed them; in italics: more detailed case category numbers, where
applicable.
Source: Netherlands Council for the Judiciary.
Figure 2 shows the matrix with the distribution of cases over groups,
as a percentage of total civil case dispositions in 2007.22 The numbers
vary slightly over the years, with group 3 showing a little growth from
2002 to 2007 and the other three groups small reductions. Civil case
production itself grew by 76 percent during those years, but the varia-
tion in distribution is not significant. The numbers are for 2007.
The distribution of caseloads over the groups presents a different
picture. Group 1 is the largest with 35 percent of the total case produc-
tion. Group 2 is only somewhat smaller at 30 percent. Groups 3 and 4
are much smaller. Group 3 is 9 percent of the total caseload and group
4 is the smallest, at 8 percent. Cotterrell observes that it is well known
that courts handle large numbers of routine matters as well as disputes
Figure 2 Matrix of Judicial Roles and Caseloads
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(Cotterrell p. 224-225). Group 4, in which defended cases are decided
by the court, is normally considered judicial work par excellence. Yet, it
is only 8 percent of the case production.
This diagram tells us a few things that are useful for automation
(electronic processing): the title group is the group that is easiest to
automate because it is zero-sum and the outcome is predictable. It is
also the largest group. That makes this a good candidate to start auto-
mation, developing routines for electronic processing. The notarial
group comes in a close second.
In the next chapter, each group will be discussed in more detail.
Conclusions for this chapter
This chapter took a first step in analyzing information handling in case
handling processes. It developed a conceptual framework for examin-
ing those processes.
The main topic in this chapter was the matrix showing the different
groups of civil cases that flow through the court. The groups reflect ju-
dicial roles as well as case characteristics and processes. The cases can
be sorted according to the level of predictability and the party config-
uration of zero-sum and win-win outcomes. That leads to a number of
conclusions:
The different roles of courts determine the processes and products
that can be identified for each of the groups. Offering legal protection,
providing a way to enforce rights and affording fair hearing, resolving
disputes and dispute processing are the roles most often found. In a
different perspective, courts fulfill four major roles.
In the majority of the cases processed in the Dutch civil jurisdiction
in the first instance, there is no dispute resolution because there are
few disputes to be found there. Titles are provided for undefended
claims (role 1), arrangements in family situations are marginally tested
(role 2), and settlements are encouraged wherever possible (role 3). In
those cases where there is no dispute, the information available at the
outset is sufficient to finalize the case and produce a decision.
Relatively few cases, less than 20 percent, need more information
during the court procedure in order to bring a resolution of the dispute
closer.
Half of those cases are most probably resolved with a settlement
(role 3).
What is left after that is a small fraction of the total caseload in
which disputes are decided by a judicial decision (role 4). The role of
dispute resolution, most often mentioned by the different stakeholders,
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is not the most prevalent one if we look at its share in the total case-
load.
These conclusions can be drawn because – as observed before - the
relevant statistics are available from the case registration systems.
We can put these findings into the context of some common ap-
proaches to civil justice reform in the recent past. Zuckerman’s study
on Civil Justice in Crisis in 1999 was an attempt at a comprehensive
approach to the reform of civil justice. In this approach, the three as-
pects of time, cost and truth are central. Zuckerman observed in 1999
that a reassessment of the balance between those three was going on
in many parts of the Western world, with the emergence of the ideas
of proportionality and a just distribution of procedural resources (Zuck-
erman p. 48). The study for a fundamental reconsideration of the
Dutch civil procedural system posited the basic principle that a dispute
can best be resolved where that can be done at the lowest possible so-
cial expense: it should be accessible, cost efficient, use modern means
of communication, be open to alternatives and have acceptable disposi-
tion times (Asser 2006 p. 19). By now, ten years later, we should be
able to see Zuckerman’s trends in action. Whether and how courts and
judicial systems have started to use forms of information technology to
support effective dispute resolution within a reasonable time should
also be discernible by now. These questions will provide guidance for
the next chapter.
Chapter 3.3 Judicial Roles in Detail
This chapter examines each group in the matrix in more detail, in or-
der to identify how IT can support reducing case delay in each of the
groups. It takes a closer look at civil justice in the Netherlands. For
each group in the matrix, we first collect some statistics. Then, we exa-
mine the role of information in the process in question. From those
findings, we look for the IT potential in each group. This potential will
be determined by the roles of information we discovered looking at the
process. We also examine some examples of the use of information
technology in other court systems. The chapter ends with conclusions
about possibilities for IT in each of the groups, framed in terms of the
wider debate on civil justice and case delay reduction.
Methodology
For each group, the first item is its main statistical characteristics.
These come from the courts’ own case administration systems. The
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courts report the numbers of their caseload and disposed cases with
the help of their information systems.23 The figures shown in each
group below are those reported by the courts to the Council for the Ju-
diciary:
– Percentage of the total caseload as an indicator of the importance of
the group. This figure is calculated from the counts of disposed
cases from the last chapter. The statistics are for 2007.
– Average disposition time in calendar days. Disposition time is the
length of time a case is in the court administration, from filing to
final disposition. The disposition time is the actual figure usually
shown in the statistics. This figure comes from the court statistics
for 2007. For some groups, the figure is an average of very diverse
case categories.
– Processing time. This is the time someone is actually performing
some action in a case file. Actual processing times are not avail-
able, but the case processing time standards are. They are updated
every three years to reflect actual practice. They are the best proxy
available. Processing times are expressed in minutes, for both the
judge and the support staff. The most recent update as shown here
is from 2005.
Starting from this information about Dutch court practice in each
group, each process is examined to understand the implications of its
characteristics. How do their characteristics affect handling the infor-
mation involved? What are the consequences for supporting and im-
proving the process with IT? Examples of proven technology and of
changes in business processes that enable new technological solutions
are analyzed. Each discussion of a group wraps up with conclusions
for information technology support for that group.
The chapter as a whole will close with a discussion of information
technology support for civil justice, and about the activities needed to
make that support work.
Group 1 – Title role
The outcome of the cases in this group is both zero-sum as well as
highly predictable.
Facts
The title group consists of the final dispositions and summary disposi-
tions of undefended money claims, handled by both local and civil
courts.
In the local courts, about 46 percent of all civil cases are unde-
fended. In the civil courts, the percentage is only 5. Therefore, this is
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an important group for the local courts, but not a priority category for
reform in the civil courts.
Table 12 Case Categories in the Title Group
Group 1 Local court Civil court
Percentage of total civil caseload 46% 5%
105 Final dispositions in
undefended claims
Time standard 90% within 15 days 90% within 1 month
Average disposition time
for 2007
1 week 5 weeks
Work load standard
processing time for 2001
Judge 1 minute
Staff 45 minutes
Judge 15 minutes
Staff 90 minutes
Work load standard
processing time for 2005
Judge 1 minute
Staff 19 minutes
Judge 9 minutes
Staff 98 minutes
302 Final dispositions in
undefended summary
cases
Time standard not
available
Time standard not
available
Average disposition time
for 2007
30 days 48 days
Work load standard
processing time for 2001
Judge 1 minute
Staff 45 minutes
Judge 15 minutes
Staff 90 minutes
Work load standard
processing time for 2005
Judge 1 minute
Staff 45 minutes
Judge 15 minutes
Staff 90 minutes
The numbers are the case category numbers.
2005 is the most recent year for which practice-based processing time standards are avail-
able at the time of writing in 2008.
Source: Netherlands Council for the Judiciary.
The local courts process default cases in a disposition time of 8 days on
average. The workload standard for processing time for 2001 was 1
minute of the judge’s, and 45 minutes of the support staff’s time. By
2005, processing time had dropped to 19 minutes of the support staff’s
time per case. The judge’s task is usually limited to signing the deci-
sion that has been prepared by the court staff following judicial instruc-
tions. Because self-representing parties can appear in person in the lo-
cal courts, they handle these cases in an orally conducted roll session.
In the civil courts, the disposition time of ordinary, non-summary un-
defended cases was on average 37 days in 2007. The workload standard
for processing time per case for the judge was 15 minutes in 2001, and
it came down to 9 minutes by 2005. The support staff’s time for 2001
was 90 minutes. That time went up to 98 minutes for 2005. Clearly,
in the civil courts, there is more judicial involvement with individual
cases than in the local courts. Processing those cases also takes the civil
court support staff longer.
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Process and information analysis
The outcome in this group is mostly or completely predictable from
the outset. The outcome does not depend on any cooperation between
the parties. This is what happens: A claim is filed, and the defending
party files no defense. There is a check whether it is complete and in
conformity with the law. This check of the lawfulness of the claim may
require the attention of a judge in some individual cases. Otherwise,
court staff members process these cases on the basis of instructions
from the judges. The claim, provided it is complete and lawful, is
granted because it is undefended. In the local court, the work the
judges do on individual cases is 1 minute on average, as opposed to 9
minutes in the civil courts. Local court staff time, 19 minutes, is also
much more limited than the 98 minutes for civil court staff.
Cases also involve decisions about other issues, such as costs. Costs,
as a general rule, are borne by the losing party. The part of the judicial
decision awarding those costs is mostly handled routinely because col-
lection costs, procedural expense, most legal representation fees, and
court fees have been standardized in a tariff structure. The tariffs are
the product of working groups or committees in the National Associa-
tion of Magistrates (Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtspraak, NVVR).
Some courts, by way of incentive, produce decisions more quickly for
parties who claim collection costs according to the tariff (NVVR
200224).
Because the outcome is predictable and zero-sum, generally spea-
king the information that is available at the outset is sufficient to
decide the case. It seems reasonable to assume that this process should
be the easiest one to automate. Automation means: creating a process
that can be handled by a machine without human intervention. In the
context of IT, this means the process runs electronically. This does not
mean that the entire process needs to be automated. It is also feasible
to automate parts of a process, for instance for fixing procedural cost
compensation as discussed below. Automation means translating poli-
cies and routines into programs for electronic processing. Those pro-
grams operate as follows: if x, then y. For example, if there is a tariff
for collection costs, the program does the following: if the claim
amount is a, or between a and b, or more than c, depending on the
tariff, then the collection cost according to the tariff is x, or y or z, and
an amount of x, y or z is awarded as the collection cost. Thus, the
claim amount needs to be entered into the program. This concept
needs to be standardized enough to serve the purposes of fixing cost
compensation amounts for all cases. We have to be certain that the
claim amount is (1) always composed of the same elements so that it
(2) produces the same sum of collection costs. So far, this is the same
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for automated and non-automated processes alike. But when the pro-
cess is automated, the computer needs to know, so to speak, what the
amount of the claim is. Hence, in the database that contains the case
data, there is a data field containing the amount of the claim. If data
are provided by an outside source, like the bailiffs, there needs to be a
recognizable data field with the claim amount using the same concept.
The data need to be structured in order for the computer to recognize
them. This is what is meant by structured data. Structured data do not
necessarily have to be in electronic form. A paper form with boxes or
numbered questions and dotted lines for the answers is also structured
data. Therefore, the availability of structured data is a necessity because
the programs transform the structured data that constitute the input
into a product.
The more the input into the court can be done as structured data,
the less human activity is needed for the product. Even less human ac-
tivity in the court is needed if those data can be supplied to the court
in electronic form, and online.
In summary, there are two opportunities in this group. The opportu-
nities are closely related. One is the interaction with the parties submit-
ting cases, the other is internal processes. If the parties file their cases
by submitting structured data electronically, and the internal court pro-
cess receives those data, manual data entry by court staff is avoided. If
court routines are translated into programs to handle those data, the ti-
tles that are the product of this process can be produced (almost) with-
out human intervention.
Examples
In this section, we look at some examples of applications for (nearly)
automated title provision in actual operation.
a Example 1: Online claims in the United Kingdom
An example that is relevant for group 1 cases comes from the United
Kingdom25. It consists of three online systems: the Claims Production
Centre (CPC), Money Claim On Line (MCOL) and Possession Claim
On Line (PCOL). These systems are the best known examples of
online title provision.
It took a long period of time for them to get to the present level of
functionality. What started out in the early 1990s as a simple proces-
sing center for processing large amounts of electronically filed claims
from frequent users (CPC) now accepts individual claims for money
(MCOL) or repossession (PCOL). First, here are the most significant
steps in that development:
A dedicated center (the CPC) was set up at Northampton County
Court as a service to large returning court users like energy companies
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and banks. It was set up in the early 1990sto handle large numbers of
routine civil cases. Freeing up the staff of the other local courts for
other tasks, the CPC is a central point for receiving monetary claims.
The CPC was set up long before the emergence of the Internet. It has
been in use for many years. Large returning customers, such as energy
companies and banks, use it to file large amounts of claims. They file
those claims, batched, electronically, with structured data. Originally,
they would send in only data tapes. Today, the transmission is also
done online. After receiving claims, a next step is to process unde-
fended claims.
The feature to actually process undefended claims was subsequently
added to the court. At that stage, if claims were defended, the claimant
could request referral to the court that is competent according to the
normal rules (Timms 2002).
In February/March 2002, Money Claim On-Line (MCOL) was added
as the Internet mailbox for the court.26 MCOL is governed by a practice
direction contained in the Civil Procedural Code.27
Entering a defense online has been possible via the MCOL system
for all claims issued via either MCOL or the CPC since December
2002. If claims are defended, they are automatically transferred to the
court that is competent according to the normal rules.
In October 2006, Possession Claim Online (PCOL) was launched
(HMCS Annual Report 2006-2007).28 As reported in the HMCS An-
nual Report for 2006-2007, it enables property owners to apply electro-
nically for repossession when rent or mortgages are not paid. Defen-
dants can also issue a defense online. This addition to HMCS’ online
service portfolio makes claiming far simpler and faster: fees are paid
electronically, claims issued straight away and hearing dates scheduled
automatically.
Box 6 Online Services in the United Kingdom
MCOL - Money Claim On Line
Internet based system - can be used for any specified money claims
provided that the particulars of the claim can be summarized within
1,050 characters.
Claimants can make individual claims over the internet.
Allows parties to make or defend a claim, and/or request a judg-
ment and warrant.
It is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Guaranteed issue within 24 hours.
Fees can be paid by credit or debit card.
Where a claim is defended, it will transfer immediately to the defen-
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dants local court for a hearing.
Fees = £5-£35 (depending on the value of the claim) cheaper than lo-
cal county court.
PCOL – Possession Claim On Line
Internet based system for simple mortgage or rent arrears claims
where there is a postcode.
Claimants can either make claims individually on the Internet or in
bulk using a dedicated interface.
Allows users to access court forms and review and check the pro-
gress of claims online.
Fees can be paid by credit or debit cards and, for registered organiza-
tions, direct debit.
Hearing dates and correct jurisdiction are allocated automatically
Guaranteed issue within 24 hours.
Guaranteed hearing date within 8 weeks of the date of issue.
It is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Users can opt for all system generated correspondence to be sent by
email - in which case they will receive instant and guaranteed com-
munication.
Fees = £50, cheaper than issuing at local court.
Source: Her Majesty’s Court Service, debts and housing branch
There are some particular features in civil procedural law in England
and Wales that enable, or at least facilitate, the use of online claim pro-
cessing:
No summons: In England and Wales, no formal summons is needed
to start a civil claim. The claimant sends his or her claim to the court,
and the court notifies the defender by mail. For the Dutch courts, a for-
mal summons is a requirement.
No obligatory court competence: The users themselves can decide
whether to use the Northampton court or not because the relative com-
petence of courts (where to go to with one’s case) is not obligatory.
No lump sum court fees: Court fees are charged for each requested
activity separately.29
It is the U.K. Government’s overriding aim to avoid cases coming to
court unless absolutely necessary. It is not the intention that provision
of online services will extend access to new users. When MCOL was
launched, the intention was that the users would be claimants in per-
son, or small businesses that do not have the volume or technology to
do bulk processing, and it seems that these are the ones that are using
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it. Research in 2006 suggested that 95 percent of those using MCOL
had issued fewer than 10 claims. Whenever a service is “opened up” by
making it available on the web, there is always a risk that this will en-
courage users who might have shied away from manual methods, thus
introducing a new market. However, this does not appear to have hap-
pened for MCOL, as the number of small claims issued has remained
fairly static since before MCOL was launched (1.4 million claims issued
in 2000, pre MCOL, and 1.4 million in 2007, 7 years after its launch),
with a few small differences along the way, which are probably more
attributable to market forces.30
With those figures, changes in user numbers may be difficult to
track because the total number of claims is so high. I would still like to
point out an effect that, according to the presentation in 2002, was
seen in the early pilot phase of MCOL. Self-employed individuals
started using MCOL on a regular basis. This group had made very little
use of the court system until then. This group was responsible for al-
most the entire growth of the labor market in England and Wales in
the first five years of the new century: the “white vanmen.” They are
self-employed, small entrepreneurs with not much more than a van
and a computer (Timms 2002).
b Example 2: The Mahnverfahren in Germany
The Mahnverfahren in Germany is another example of a procedure to
acquire an order of payment online. This procedure was introduced
successively from state to state, and is now available in all the la¨nder or
states of the German federation. This procedure produces a title, but
without a judicial procedure. Apart from the classical application in
writing, there are various ways available for filing an application for a
Mahnbescheid, the title for execution of payment.
For example, using the bar code procedure; the application is filled
out on the web site of the central title court. After data entry, it can be
printed out at home. On the last page, the data are printed in coded
form in a bar code. The application must be signed. All printed pages
are then sent to the court by ordinary mail.
Using a diskette requires specific software and an identification
number. This enables transmission of more than one application at the
same time. The applications will be processed on the day they are re-
ceived. This modality requires an authorization to debit the applicant’s
account.
Submitting a claim online requires downloading a software module
and Java Webstart, which are both available without charge through the
Internet. It also requires a card reader and a smart card with a quali-
fied digital signature. Here, filing is immediate upon transmission.
The applicant is billed online.
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In 2003, more than 90 percent of nearly 9.5 million orders for pay-
ment in Germany were processed automatically (Sˇijanski and Barber
p. 1).
c Comparing the two examples
There are some significant differences between MCOL and the Mahn-
verfahren.
The Mahnverfahren was introduced in 1982 as a paper based proce-
dure. The electronic procedure was, so to speak, put on top of it.
Money Claim On Line was developed for electronic processing.
Identification of the applicant: A new MCOL user registers with the
court and provides a credit card number for fee payments. The Mahn-
verfahren requires different modes of identification depending on the
transmission modality: an identification number or a smart card with a
qualified digital signature.
Payment: The Mahnverfahren does not use credit card payment at
all. The court fee is due upon filing. The claimant is billed for the court
fee and expenses when the order for payment is issued.31
d Example 3: A pilot in the Netherlands
In the Amsterdam local court, the largest local court in the country, a
pilot was done in data transmission in a specialized case stream. The
pilot was an initiative of an Amsterdam bailiffs’ office. The bailiffs
could transmit case data from their own databases, received from their
clients, in electronic form on a CD-ROM. The data were received in a
central location and transferred to the local court overnight. Cases were
regarded as undefended until a party announced a defense. In practice,
decisions were printed out in all cases on the assumption that the vast
majority would remain undefended, which it did. If someone appeared
at the first hearing with a defense, the decision was simply struck off,
and the cases processed as a defended case. This considerably shor-
tened both disposition and processing times for undefended cases. The
functionality tested in this pilot was never implemented widely. The
bailiffs in the Netherlands say they can supply processing information
to the courts electronically, provided an interface for supplying the data
is set up (Struiksma p. 202).
IT for the title group
In these zero-sum, low unpredictability cases, there is no dispute. Con-
sequently, there is also not much judicial dispute resolution activity in
this group. Judicial activity in individual cases is very limited.
The case volume in this group can be quite a large part of the total
caseload. In the local courts, it is a large part of the total civil caseload.
For civil courts, this group is very small compared with its share in the
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caseload in the local courts. Hence, it is probably not a priority for civil
courts. For local courts, however, it is a group worthy of attention.
The information that is available at the outset is usually sufficient
for producing the final product. The IT processing activity in this group
is mostly merging data with text to produce decisions. That activity is
supported by office automation, such as word processing and case re-
gistration databases.
The information opportunities for such zero-sum, low unpredictabil-
ity cases are in:
– Online case filing and/or data entry by court users, including data
transfer from frequent users,
– Internal processes that can process the data without the need for
human intervention.
The opportunities have been developed in different ways in some sys-
tems in Europe. The differences have to do with variations in rules,
competences and payment usage in each country. In Germany, an ex-
isting process was refitted to accommodate automated processing.
There, functionality differs for different user groups. Frequent users
are given the opportunity to supply data on a diskette or using their
identification. One- time users can download a form. In the United
Kingdom, a completely new process was devised using the possibilities
of IT and credit card payments. It involves a back office designed to
process large volumes from frequent users electronically, and a web
site with online electronic forms and a help function. In both Germany
and the United Kingdom, the development process took many years.
The development process has involved different steps.
The Mahnverfahren was piloted in one land (state), that of Bremen,
and then implemented gradually in the other states.
From the MCOL development process, which took place over many
years, we can identify the following stages: (1) receiving claims, without
completely automated processing in court; (2) processing undefended
claims without human intervention and (3) supporting defense. Each
subsequent development built on the previous one. Such phasing of
development is important, taking into account the regulatory frame-
work, local customs and the possibilities of the system. It involves
learning from experience, and mobilizing the new learning for the next
step. It is also important to observe that setting up a service like MCOL
for individual users to file their claims requires close attention to user
support. This will constitute a major shift in orientation for most court
systems. That shift, and other aspects of increasing access to courts, is
discussed in Part 4, on access to justice.
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Group 2 - Notarial role
The outcome of the cases in this group is mostly win-win and highly
predictable.
Facts
The notarial group includes dispositions in parental authority, supervi-
sion and settled employment dissolution cases in the local courts and
dispositions in family cases in the district courts.
Cases in this group do not involve a real dispute. The outcome is
highly predictable. Parties submit a proposal to the court. The propo-
sal is reviewed only marginally. As a rule, no hearing is held. This
group is the second largest group.
In this group, we find, for instance, most of the 33,00032 divorce re-
quests. More than half of these requests are filed jointly; the rest of the
applications are filed by a one party. Legal representation is required
for divorce requests. These matters can become complex in two ways:
(1) they can be contested, and (2) there is an estate to be divided. About
25,000 requests are uncontested and do not require estate division.
About 6,500 divorce requests are contested. The disposition time of di-
vorce requests is on average 113 days. The median is 46 days.
Many of the 126,000 family cases in the local courts can also be in-
cluded in this category. The local court judges appoint guardians for
minors in a number of situations. Unmarried parents can be given
joint parental authority at their request.
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Table 13 Case Categories in the Notarial Group
Group 2 Local court Civil court
Percentage of the total civil
case load
31% 25%
201 Divorce dispositions Time standard 50% within 2
months, 95% within 1 year
Average disposition time
for 2007
16 weeks
Workload standard
processing time for 2001
Judge 90 minutes
Staff 300 minutes
Workload standard
processing time for 2005
Judge 82 minutes
Staff 367 minutes
204 decisions instituting
supervision
Disposition time standard
not available
Average disposition time
for 2007
4 weeks
Workload standard
processing time for 2001
Judge 10 minutes
Staff 60 minutes
Workload standard
processing time for 2005
Judge 12 minutes
Staff 138 minutes
204 other family cases Disposition time standard
not available
Average disposition time
for 2007
22 weeks
Workload standard
processing time for 2001
Judge 90 minutes
Staff 360 minutes
Judge 99 minutes
Staff 485 minutes
299 Decisions instituting
guardianships and parental
authority
Disposition time standard
not available
Average disposition time
for 2007
4 weeks
Judge 10 minutes
Staff 60 minutes
Judge 2 minutes
Staff 56 minutes
2606 settled employment
terminations
90% within 15 days
Average disposition time
for 2007
2 weeks
Workload standard processing
time for 2005
Judge 55 minutes
Staff 190 minutes
The numbers are the case category numbers.
2005 is the most recent year for which practice-based processing time standards are available at
the time of writing in 2008.
Source: Netherlands Council for the Judiciary
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In the local court, the applications for dissolving employment contracts
on the basis of article 6:785 of the Dutch Civil Code are a significant
part of the caseload. This particular case type will be discussed in
much more detail later in this chapter. Here, a brief description will
suffice: Both parties to the contract can request the court to dissolve
the contract. The court can set a sum to be paid by either party as equi-
table compensation. The parties can agree to have a dissolution settle-
ment confirmed by the court. The disposition time of such applications
is on average 15 days. The number of settled dissolutions is very sensi-
tive to the economy; it doubled from 2001 to 2002. It has since de-
creased because of a change in social security policy: the decision is no
longer necessary to claim unemployment benefits.33 At the time of
writing, in the second half of 2008, it is too early to tell whether this
change in legislation will have an effect on the caseload or other as-
pects of the procedure.
Process and information analysis
In this group, unpredictability is low and the outcome is win-win. The
parties can achieve the best result by cooperating with each other.
Cases in this group come to court in the form of requests. The pro-
cedure for requests is less formal than that for money claims. There is
no formal summons by a bailiff. The court sends a copy of the request
to the interested party or parties. For some cases, a hearing is standard
procedure; for the majority, there is no hearing. The court product is a
decision, but not a formal verdict.
The first salient point is the low unpredictability this group has in
common with the title group. This indicates similar opportunities for
automated processing, ideally based on data entry by the parties.
The win-win aspect points to a new opportunity: guidance for the
parties to help them achieve the best result in working out the terms
of the request to the court. If the parties can file a proposed arrange-
ment that is correct the first time, that will save everyone involved time
and effort. This is best achieved if the courts can specify what informa-
tion they need, and what criteria they use to judge incoming requests.
The opportunity that presents itself for this group combines both
data entry and guidance: online forms for filing both data and sub-
stance.
Example: Employment contract dissolution in the Netherlands
This example demonstrates a number of interesting aspects of the op-
portunities for this group. It shows how an effort to increase legal con-
sistency can simplify issues and procedures, and support out-of-court
settlement. It also shows how information technology can provide sup-
port, although it is not a direct example of innovative technology use.
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It is about the process and effects of simplifying a particular procedure.
The most striking finding is that a significant number of judgment
group (group 4) cases moved to the notarial group (group 2) as a result
of this reform. The description is quite detailed because this example
so clearly illustrates some of the most relevant, important points in-
volved.
Here is, in brief summary, what it involves. Dissolving individual la-
bor contracts in case of irreconcilable differences is attributed to the lo-
cal courts. They can award compensation based on equity. The local
court judges’ association has developed guidelines for compensation
on the basis of existing equity practice. The guidelines consist of a for-
mula to determine the amount of compensation easily if there are no
unusual, special circumstances. The formula is public, available on the
Internet and free. Such a public information service can facilitate that
parties can present a complete and correct contract dissolution propo-
sal to the court, making the judicial process a routine matter.
a Background
The statistics in Box 7 provide some background on employment pro-
tection in the Netherlands34.
Box 7 Employment Protection in the Netherlands
The working population of the Netherlands is about 7.5 million –of a to-
tal population of 16 million. Between 700,000 and 1 million people
change jobs every year. About 100,000 of those changes require permis-
sion from the labor office or a court decision.
In the Dispute Resolution Delta in the Netherlands, of a total of 1,870
justiciable problems, 313 are related to loss of a job. Job loss is consid-
ered the most serious labor-related problem, rated at 3.5 of a possible 5
(Van Velthoven 2004 p. 206).
The employment protection regime in the Netherlands is, according to
OECD figures, about the OECD average. Employment protection is
much stricter in Turkey, and much more lenient in the United States.
Employment protection is thought to be good for “insiders,” those who
are securely employed. It is believed to lead to longer duration of em-
ployment. Employment duration in the Netherlands is relatively low, at
about 6.5 years, with the EU average a little over 8 years.
Employment protection is believed to be bad for “outsiders,” people
who are not securely employed. It is believed to lead to relatively high
unemployment. The unemployment rate for 2007 in the Netherlands
was 3.3 percent with the EU average of 7.9. The OECD average stan-
dardized unemployment rate was 7.1 for Europe, and 5.6 overall. The
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OECD standardized unemployment rate for the Netherlands was 3.2 in
2007, down from 4.5 in 2005.
Employment protection is also believed to be bad for labor mobility. In
the Netherlands, mobility is relatively high. Sixty percent of people ex-
pect to change jobs in the coming five years, with the EU average at 40
percent (OECD). The proportion of permanent jobs in the labor market
is nearly 80 percent. About 8 percent of jobs are flexible and 15 percent
can be considered self-employment.
Source: Symposium on labor protection at http://www.deburcht.org on
November 7, 2007.
About 90 percent of people who leave their jobs do so without recourse
to any of the employment protection instruments. Of the rest, less
than half lose their jobs with permission from the social security
authority CWI. Fewer than 6 percent come into contact with the judi-
cial procedure described here. Between 1995 and 2005, an average of
about 50,000 dissolution cases per year came to the local courts. In
2007, the total number was nearly 30,000. 26,000 were settled. These
requests make up the bulk of group 2 cases in the local courts (Van
Velthoven 2005 p. 22).
b The law
Article 7:685 of the Netherlands Civil Code says the local court judge
can dissolve an employment contract at the request of one of the par-
ties and determine an equitable compensation. Thus, the law does not
give anything much by way of criteria for setting the compensation.
This request has its own procedure laid down in the law: the procedure
is initiated by a written request from either party, but in most cases
from the employer. The resulting decision is an order. Because the legis-
lature considered the underlying situation urgent, there is no possi-
bility for appeal, except on grounds of wrongful application of the law.
Grounds for dissolution are reasons sufficient for immediate dissolu-
tion (they can be summed up as gross negligence on either part), as
well as changes in circumstances of such nature that in equity, the con-
tract should end immediately or in a short while. If the contract is ter-
minated because of changes in circumstances, the judge can determine
an amount of compensation if this appears to be equitable in light of
the circumstances of the case.
The procedure has been quite popular, at least partly because it does
not take a long time. Since the end of the 1970s, criticism has focused
mostly on the amounts of the compensation because they were quite
different from one judge to another (Van der Meer p. 7). From a legal
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point of view, the procedure is weak. Because there is no appeal, con-
sistency is not safeguarded by a review option. The professional legal
press compared the procedure, because of its inconsistent outcomes,
with a tombola.
In the 1990s, some of the local courts experimented with a common
approach, but only within their own court. This approach consisted of
a common way to calculate the amount of the compensation. The na-
tional association of local court judges took the initiative to try and cre-
ate uniformity for the entire country. Its labor law committee was
charged with this task.35 The committee surveyed all local court judges
in the Netherlands with a questionnaire asking about their approaches
to the procedure and to setting compensation. On the basis of the sur-
vey results, the committee drafted recommendations. The recommen-
dations were debated and adopted unanimously in the assembly of the
local court judges association on November 8, 1996.36 The recommen-
dations cover both the procedure and the way compensation is calcu-
lated when applicable. The feature that attracts most attention is the
so-called “local court formula,” or kantonrechtersformule.
From a legal point of view, the recommendations do not have the sta-
tus of law. That means non-observance is not a valid ground for appeal.
The recommendations and the formula are managed by the associa-
tion’s labor committee. In 2008, the committee was in the process of
amending them. After an internal evaluation, about 15 theses were put
to the vote in the association’s full assembly. Most of the votes were
unanimous. The recommendations will now be amended based on the
outcome of the vote.
Box 8 Simplified Labor Dissolution Procedure
How does the procedure work?
Procedure
A dissolution in the notarial group based on a settlement between
employer and employee is decided without a hearing. The time stan-
dard is 15 calendar days disposition time. The decision in writing is
a confirmation of the settlement, in conformity with the formula.
For an opposed judgment group dissolution, there is a concentrated
procedure: request, reply, oral hearing and decision. Its disposition
time standard is 56 calendar days. Usually, the discussion during
the hearing will focus on either party’s negligence as a cause for the
termination: the formula’s c factor explained below. The decision
needs to be sufficiently reasoned. No witnesses are allowed. There is
no possibility for appeal.
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The formula is very simple. It looks like this: (a + b) x c= x,
where a is the gross salary per month. The definition of the salary
has been streamlined and kept very simple.
b is the employee’s age and number of years of service. Both factors
weight in the end result according to how they are thought to influ-
ence the employee’s career expectations and his or her chances in
the labor market.
c is a correction factor. In studies of actual cases, factors a and b
were found to not adequately explain the variation in amounts
awarded. The extremes were mostly caused by serious negligence by
either the employer or the employee. That explains the correction
factor c, which accounts for variations according to circumstances in
the individual case
x is the resulting amount of compensation.
c Impacts
The most important intended impact was to get rid of the tombola,
and create a legal standard for the judges themselves. A foreseen but
not intended impact was to get a larger proportion of negotiated and
settled dissolutions, through improved legal unity.
The most striking impact has been that employment contract disso-
lutions, formerly settlement or judgment group cases, were mostly
settled by the parties and became largely notarial group cases.
Figure 3 shows the number of cases processed between 1996 and
2007. The baseline in this chart is 1996, the last year before the new
approach was implemented. In 1997, 24 percent of all cases settled. In
2003, the percentage of settled cases had gone up to 86. In 2007, it
was 82 percent. The absolute number of cases increased from 14,901
in 1996 to 72,961 in 2003 and back to 27,395 in 2007. A couple of cir-
cumstances were at work here:
– A downturn in the economy
– A backlog in the Work and Income Centers (Centra voor Werk en
Inkomen, CWIs), which deal with employees’ social security. The
CWIs can also sanction labor dissolution contracts. They are, in a
way, competitors of the local court judges.
A decision from the CWI or the court used to be compulsory for claim-
ing unemployment benefits. In 2007, this requirement was abolished.
Hence, demand for this type of decision is expected to decrease in the
near future.
This requirement was dropped in legislation adopted in the course
of 2007. Therefore, it does not affect the statistics shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3 Impact of Labor Contract Dissolution Standards
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Figure 4 Labor Contract Dissolution Disposition Times
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The disposition times in calendar days are between 10 and 18 days for
settled cases, and between 39 and 49 for opposed cases. The courts ad-
here to the standards that were set in 1996 quite accurately. The data
from the years before 2000 are not very accurate because registration
was inconsistent. However, it looks as if in 1996 the courts were al-
ready adhering to the standards they set themselves at the end of that
year.
Where is the IT?
The IT for the internal processes is word processing, possibly com-
bined with data merging.
Externally, the IT is mostly the Internet. Most organizations involved
in providing legal information on labor issues to the public have it on
their web sites.37 The formula is quite straightforward and can be used
by anyone seeking to find out what his or her compensation could be,
provided the correction factor is neutral. The formula is an interesting
example in this context because the legal issues involved have been
simplified to the extent that they can be largely automated. An impor-
tant point is how routine and policy development is a prerequisite for
using IT to its full advantage.
Some lessons on developing routines and policies
There are some lessons on developing routines and policies to be
learned from this example. An important lesson is the impact of judi-
cial policy: it was not developed to reduce either disposition time or the
level of quality, justice or fairness, but to create a legal framework for
the judges who had little guidance from the law to go on. The guid-
ance for parties wanting to settle was actually a by-product. Neverthe-
less, the policy as guidance for settling parties has turned out to be one
of its most important impacts. The procedure gives the parties an in-
formed choice. Where the parties value their relationship, there is a
premium on settlement. If they are unable to agree, the more elaborate
but still quite fast procedure in the judgment group will give them a
fair hearing as before.
The second lesson concerns the process of policy development. From
the report above, the steps needed for developing a routine or policy
can be identified (Box 9).
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Box 9 Steps to Develop a Policy
Steps taken in developing the process and the formula:
1. Problem identification
2. Ownership and leadership by the body involved
3. Pilots in local courts
4. Survey of judges
5. Draft recommendations
6. Consultation
7. Agreement
8. Implementation
9. Periodic evaluation
Box 9 lists the steps taken when the formula was developed and imple-
mented.
Innovation of this kind requires a professionally operating organiza-
tion. The list of steps is a clear demonstration of this lesson. Owner-
ship of both the problem and the solution, and leadership in the devel-
opment process, are crucial. The formula is managed by the local court
judges association, whose general assembly voted it into existence in
1996. As a guideline developed by a private association, it is not con-
sidered law. Non-application is not a valid ground for appeal.
From the first chapter on case delay, we have learned that simplifica-
tion can be an effective way of reducing case delay. In this example, we
see that mechanism at work. The guideline and its formula have lim-
ited the number of points that have to be addressed in case of dissolu-
tion of employment under the article 6:785 rule. Eighty-five percent of
cases are processed within 15 days of filing.
IT for the notarial group
In the notarial group, there are two main opportunities for applications
of information technology.
The first opportunity already emerged in the title group: it is in
chain automation. Let users fill in the case database, and less time con-
suming data entry work needs to be done.38 Moreover, parts of case
processing can be automated once standardized processing for them
has been developed. This will result in cases moving to the left in the
matrix.
The second opportunity is web functionality: communicating to par-
ties what information the court needs to deal with the case as quickly
and expediently as possible. In the case of employment contract disso-
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lution, the parties are guaranteed delivery of the decision in 15 calendar
days after filing, if they provide the court with all the information
needed. The Internet is a vehicle for giving the parties this informa-
tion. The possibility of online forms presents itself. This information is
one-sided; it is pushed to the users. However, the information may also
help them settle their differences. This opportunity will be discussed
in more detail in the chapter on access to information.
Group 3 – Settlement role
In the settlement group, the outcome is relatively unpredictable. The
outcome is largely win-win. There is a dispute. But if the parties coope-
rate to settle it, they may be able to produce an outcome that is benefi-
cial for both, and their relationship may be saved. The dispute need
not necessarily be resolved exactly according to the rules of the law.
Facts
How many of the present cases fall in this group is difficult to deter-
mine with great accuracy. They are not registered as such by the court
administrations. I have included all cases that leave the court without a
judicial decision into group 3. Counted this way, it is similar in size to
judgment group 4.39
Table 14 Case Categories for the Settlement Group
Group Local court Civil court
3 301
399
defended cases
withdrawn or
struck off the
record at parties’
request, both
summary and
non- summary
cases
1568,
1570-1573,
1635,
2560,
2565
399
defended cases
withdrawn, struck
off the record at
parties’ request
The numbers are the case category numbers; the numbers in italics are more detailed case
category numbers where applicable.
Source: Netherlands Council for the Judiciary.
This group comprises about 9 percent of the total civil caseload. It con-
sists of very diverse cases that are either withdrawn or struck off the re-
cord before or after a hearing. More detailed statistics for this group
are not readily available.
Processing times for settled cases are between 5 and 15 minutes of
staff time if they are withdrawn without a hearing. Obviously, if they
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are withdrawn after a hearing has taken place, they also take judicial
time. There are no figures readily available for those situations.
Process and information analysis
The Netherlands have a long tradition of settlement. We have seen it
described by Voltaire in the 18th century: The civil procedural code in-
structs judges to try settling a case before resolving it in the legal man-
ner. There is considerable experience with mediation, court annex and
otherwise. The difference between group 2 and group 3 cases is that in
group 2 the parties need court approval for their arrangement, and in
group 3 the parties are free to settle their dispute themselves.
Shapiro presents the image of dispute resolution as a triad: two par-
ties who have a dispute and a third party to help them settle it. The
triad is an imbalance, as the third party needs to take the side of one
party or the other in order to resolve the dispute. Thus, one party will
be the losing minority. In order to avoid this imbalance whenever pos-
sible, judges the world over will always attempt to reach as much con-
sensus with the parties as possible (Shapiro p. 11). Hence, there is a
strong preference for consensus over zero-sum dispute resolution.
In recent years, court practice has focused on ways of dispute resolu-
tion that are less formal than evidence production and judicial deci-
sions. We will discuss the outcomes of this process in the judgment
group. In such a practice, the gap between dispute resolution by courts
and less formal mechanisms like mediation narrows.
Internationally, various informal and formal ways of court-supported
dispute settlement are in practice. They can be found in different
places on the scale of informal to formal dispute resolution:
Conciliation is the most informal, most party-focused variety.
Mediation requires a third party, but only to facilitate the process.
Neutral case evaluation requires a third party to evaluate the dispute
on its legal merits, but leaves it to the parties what they want to do: set-
tle the case, take it to court, or abandon the venture altogether.
These less formal modalities lend themselves best to disputes be-
tween parties who value continuation of their relationship. To that end,
fostering cooperative behavior and keeping issues to a minimum are
important activities. Less informal dispute resolution mechanisms are
not always voluntary. Some systems require parties to participate in
mediation before a case is admitted in court.
There is no scientific evidence suggesting that mediation in general
is a better way of dealing with disputes than a court procedure (Asser
2003), as is sometimes claimed. Neither is there a hard and fast rule
about which disputes lend themselves to settlement or not. Eshuis ob-
serves that early intervention in the form of early hearing did not in-
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crease the settlement rate in the Dutch courts between 1994 and 2003
(Eshuis 2007 p. 212).
In The Future or Law, Richard Susskind suggests that publishing
general rules of thumb as to how things can be arranged and resolved
in general may prevent disputes from breaking out (Susskind 1998
p. xlviii). This kind of information can also guide solutions in case of
settlement.
Examples
In the Dutch system, attempts to settle a case are part of the civil pro-
cedure in court. Particularly in countries with an Anglo-Saxon legal
system, much effort goes into preventing a case from ever coming to
court. We have seen MCOL and PCOL as examples of this in group 1.
In group 3, facilitating informal dispute resolution and mediation are
also used as a way of keeping the parties out of court as much as possi-
ble.
a Example 1: Australia – Adelaide Magistrate’s Court
An example of the use of prelodgement notices comes from Australia
(Cannon 2002). The procedure described here was introduced in
1999. The Magistrate’s Court (in this example that of Adelaide) pro-
vides a form for a final notice of claim by the plaintiff to the defendant.
This notice is a final warning that proceedings against the defendant
are about to be filed at court and once that happens the court is likely
to award costs to the plaintiff. The parties have 21 days to voluntarily
negotiate a resolution without further involvement by the court. Only
after the expiration of the 21-day term is the plaintiff entitled to file the
claim in the court. The court offers mediation free of charge. Mediators
provide their services free of charge on a pro bono basis. The court also
offers the option of technical advice from an independent expert from
the court office. Technical advice can narrow the issues to be settled.
The court decided to support this new procedure with forms available
on its web site. The final notice and an Enforceable Payment Agree-
ment (EAP) can be downloaded from the court’s web site. Having the
forms available on the Internet is a great benefit to claimants who can
access it from any computer at any time. After a slow start, use of the
forms increased exponentially. Between June 1999 and September
2002, the facility was used more than 14,000 times, 5,300 of these be-
tween September 2001 and September 2002. In the first 18 months,
59 mediations took place, more than half of which ended with a settle-
ment. Research also shows that nearly 60 percent of the defendants
paid the debt owed when they received the final notice, making it a
cheap and effective means of trying to collect debt. If the plaintiff will
not negotiate and the defendant admits the claim, but cannot afford to
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pay, the defendant can serve a notice that the debt is admitted and
avoid the costs of a court claim being commenced. Later, one criticism
of the form was that it could be taken for the actual claim form. The
form was amended to describe the plaintiff as the sender and the de-
fendant as the recipient.40
b Example 2: Singapore’s e@dr negotiation
The Singapore subordinate courts offer the possibility of electronic al-
ternative dispute resolution: an amicable, cost-free avenue to initiate
negotiations with the other disputing party. There are two conditions
for starting an e@dr process:
(a) The party involved has not commenced any court proceedings
(b)The party has an email account and the email address of the other
party.
Some examples of results of the e@dr process:
A Singaporean purchaser of online goods from the United States
managed to obtain a refund of additional delivery charges deducted, as
the other party agreed that he was not aware that a certain classifica-
tion of his goods required re-direction fees.
A claim for unpaid administrative services of more than $1,000 was
settled, even though prior to e@dr there were numerous reminders
and phone calls.
A request for reprint costs of a newsletter was directed and nego-
tiated with the correct party, thereby allowing a recovery of more than
$2,000 and a waiver of late interest payment.
By using the e@dr process, a claim for refund due under a car
grooming service was resolved.
c Example 3: Online dispute resolution mechanisms outside courts
In e-commerce, new online forms of dispute solution come up where
parties can negotiate supported by a computer program. Thus, the on-
line auction site eBay has developed a settlement system called www.
SquareTrade. SquareTrade is a free-standing service offering a guaran-
tee for online purchases in general, providing insurance and claims
handling. If a problem occurs, a claim can be filed with SquareTrade.
By supporting assisted, automated negotiation, it facilitates partici-
pants’ independent resolution of the problem with the other side. Two
other major examples of automated negotiation are http://www.smart-
settle.com and www.cybersettle.com. Since 2004, the City of New York
has piloted using Cybersettle for settling claims cases filed against it.
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IT for the settlement group
The Singapore example shows support for negotiation, where parties
themselves resolve their dispute. It uses email, asynchronous commu-
nication, between the parties. The court acts as a go-between. Asyn-
chronous communication may give parties time to think. However, it
does not particularly favor cooperative behavior.
The Adelaide example shows another way of preventing cases from
coming to court. The ability to have mediation and expert advice prior
to a formal claim being lodged with the court means that an ADR pro-
cess can occur earlier than the involvement of the court in a confe-
rence/ directions hearing phase. The advantages are:
– Early intervention in the dispute
– Costs contained
– Reducing the possibility of entrenchment
– The parties still have control of the resolution.
This example uses the court’s web site and online forms. Access to the
service with online forms proves to be successful in Adelaide Magis-
trates Court. Offering free mediation and expert advice requires fund-
ing on the part of the court. In some societies, this would be consi-
dered a flaw in the market for legal services.
These examples show how, using the functionalities of email or a
web site with information and online forms, a potential dispute is
moved down, as well as to the left in the matrix. The result contains
costs and avoids a complex, lengthy procedure. These opportunities do
have a limit in that communication over distance may not be enough
to foster cooperative behavior, so face-to-face contact may still be neces-
sary to broker an agreement.
Another potential opportunity in this group is the shadow of the law
in a new shape: guidance for parties who are negotiating a settlement.
Susskind pointed this out as a powerful opportunity (Susskind 1998
p. xlviii). We have encountered it in the notarial group, with the exam-
ple of the labor cases in the Netherlands.
Group 4 – Judgment role
In the judgment group, the outcome is unpredictable. The outcome is
also zero-sum. There is a dispute. The parties are in opposition. The
case is decided on legal merit. The court decides. Events during the
process influence the outcome. To learn more about processes in this
group, we look at the ordinary, non-summary cases.
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Facts
In 2007, the local courts decided about 70,000 cases in this group,
about 10 percent of their total civil caseload. The civil sectors decided
approximately 9,370 cases in this group, about 4 percent of their total
caseload. From statistics about South Australia, we know that the ma-
gistrates’ courts there also process about 10 percent defended cases
(Cannon 2002). The work in this group is generally considered the
epitome of judicial work.
Table 15 Case Categories for the Judgment Group
Group 4 Local court Civil court
Percentage of total civil
caseload
10% 4%
1589-1593, 1686, 1691, 1692
final dispositions in defended
cases
Disposition time standard
75% within 6 months
90% within 1 year
Disposition time standard
70% within 1 year
80% within 2 years
Average disposition time
in days for 2007
16 weeks without evidence 43
weeks with evidence
60 weeks with/without
evidence
Processing time standard,
2001
Judge 170 minutes
Staff 300 minutes
Judge 660 minutes
Staff 600 minutes
Processing time standard,
2005
Judge 118 minutes
Staff 411 minutes
Judge 807 minutes
Staff 619 minutes
Including evidence, 2005 only Judge 516 minutes
Staff 605 minutes
Judge 1726 minutes
Staff 998 minutes
1631, 1727, 1728
final dispositions in defended
summary cases
90% within 3 months 90% within 3 months
Average disposition time
in days for 2007
4 weeks 6 weeks
Processing time standard,
2001
Judge 180 minutes
Staff 420 minutes
Judge 190 minutes
Staff 675 minutes
Processing time standard,
2005
Judge 122 minutes
Staff 153 minutes
Judge 122 minutes
Staff 787 minutes
2607
defended employment
terminations
Disposition time standard
90% within 3 months
Average disposition time
in days for 2007
7 weeks
Processing time standard,
2005 only
Judge 47 minutes
Staff 116 minutes
The numbers are the case category numbers; numbers in italics are more detailed case ca-
tegory numbers where applicable.
2005 is the most recent year for which practice-based processing time standards were avail-
able at the time of writing in 2008.
Source: Netherlands Council for the Judiciary.
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These cases have basically three case processing modalities in increa-
sing complexity: decisions without hearing, decisions after a hearing,
and decisions after evidence production, in civil and local courts in the
judgment group. Decisions after evidence production happen only in
non-summary cases.
No hearing: this means the case is decided on the file as produced
by the parties.
Hearing: If a hearing is held, its purpose can be to attempt a settle-
ment (in which case they become settlement group cases if the attempt
is successful), to acquire more information from the parties and/or to
examine possibilities for producing evidence of disputed points. If the
last activity leads to evidence production, the case moves to the final
stage.
Evidence: In the cases that involve producing evidence, the evidence
needed will be decisive for the outcome. Therefore, evidence produc-
tion will be ordered by the court. It can involve witness hearing, a site
visit, or an expert opinion.
Process and information analysis
In this group, both processes and substance can be complex. The out-
come is zero-sum. It is also unpredictable.
Cases in this group take up the most judicial time. Time to disposi-
tion is considerable. There is some indication that the percentage of
cases in which the different courts order evidence production varies
considerably, and that this variation is associated with the length of dis-
position time.
Reducing substantive complexity is the main activity in the processes
in this group: finding the points on which the parties are in agree-
ment, the points they disagree on, those that will be decisive for the
outcome, and how they should be dealt with procedurally. For some of
those issues, handbooks on the law and case law and jurisprudence are
consulted for clarification. Then, the judge in the case decides whether
to have a hearing with the parties, and/or to order production of evi-
dence (mostly witnesses) or some other form of verification of facts or
an expert report. Hartendorp analyzed judicial decision making in this
group. He observed court hearings in this group and notes that most
of the time of the first instance judges in judgment group cases is
spent on understanding the facts, not on applying the law (Hartendorp
p. 197). Eshuis, studying disposition times and how they are affected
by reform, observes there is a fairly strong correlation between early
hearings and reducing disposition times (Eshuis 2007 p. 212).
Judgment formation is a very complex process. Two activities can be
distinguished: understanding facts and interpreting norms. Harten-
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dorp observes there is very little empirical research into how judges
form their judgment.
Examples
As we go up the scale of complexity in civil cases, examples of IT use
in courts become more difficult to find. Some U.S. courts have intro-
duced electronic case files for difficult, complex cases involving many
parties or large amounts of information.
Experience with electronic files for complex cases in the Dutch
courts was – until recently - limited to a pilot in the criminal courts.
Obviously, this example does not involve civil law. I report on that pilot
here because its findings are relevant for processing civil cases as well.
The district courts of Amsterdam and Rotterdam have piloted the use
of digital files in criminal cases. While the Amsterdam pilot looked at
high volume routine cases, the Rotterdam team specifically tested ap-
plications for use in high complexity, large criminal case files. The Rot-
terdam pilot used a common off-the-shelf application for structuring
the information in the files. The results indicate that digital files have a
great advantage in the case of large quantities of information. Some of
the advantages mentioned by participants in the pilot:41
– Easy structuring of complex information: Information in the file
can be electronically flagged during hearing preparation using a
program indexing the text files. During the hearing, the flagged
passages are retrieved easily in the screen file.
– Increased efficiency: A hearing in a tribunal can be prepared by one
person structuring the information. This may save the other partici-
pants a lot of preparation time because they do not have to read re-
dundant or irrelevant documents.
– Flagged passages can be retrieved for inclusion in the decision. An
electronic file on the court network gives access to all concerned at
the same time. With paper files, a lot of time is lost because the ori-
ginal file is not always accessible for all the participants in the pro-
cess.
– Increased accuracy of information: Digital files can also include vi-
deo and audio recordings and still images. Examples from the pilot
mention recordings of actual wiretappings and video recordings of
arrests.
Experience with the use of electronic files in the United States con-
firms the experience recorded here.
IT for the judgment group
Judgment group cases are complex to very complex. Their outcome is
unpredictable. A case is decided by the judge or the court. This section
explored the information process and some examples of IT to support
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them. Most activity serves to reduce the complexity of the information
in the case file. It mostly deals with the facts of the case. The descrip-
tion given here is still very rudimentary. I regard it as a first attempt at
developing an approach to capture the judicial processes more ade-
quately. So far, not much is known from empirical research about the
way judges form their judgment. An approach from the perspective of
information science should also be attempted to shed more light on
this important topic. More research into the information processes in
this group is needed. More empirical research in this field will help to
increase our understanding of how judges use information. Subse-
quently, it will be possible to identify information needs and forms of
technology that can support this judicial process with more accuracy.
There is an expressed need for structuring complex information. Elec-
tronic case files are a functionality that could be helpful in this group.
They can be used to structure large quantities of information with the
help of electronic search capability. Electronic case files also open the
opportunity for multimedia evidence. So far, in Dutch court practice,
witness statements and location inspections must always be repro-
duced in writing for paper files. Witness statements are summarized
and dictated for the paper file. This inevitably reduces the complexity
and richness of the information. It is also inevitably less accurate.
Thus, information is lost.
Knowledge management systems are the other obvious functionality
for this group. Two forms of knowledge management some courts al-
ready have experience with are jurisprudence databases and decision
support systems. The most common form is case law and jurispru-
dence databases. They help judges take legally correct, consistent deci-
sions.
Case law or jurisprudence is traditionally published on paper. Nowa-
days, it is also published electronically. That has improved search possi-
bilities with full text search. Jurisprudence databases can facilitate poli-
cy formation. However, for this purpose, the collection needs to be a
representative reflection of what the “average judge” has decided. Judi-
cial decisions can fulfill this role better if they are more structured than
simple text files. If they are publicly available, they support the shadow
function of the courts: facilitating out-of-court dispute resolution.
Decision support systems help with decision making by providing
guidelines reflecting some consensus about the way in which relatively
objective criteria can be applied to apply norms that are relatively open.
The way determining the labor dissolution compensation was simpli-
fied is a striking example. Thus, decision support systems serve as the
“front end” of judicial policies. They can make deciding cases more
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consistent and more transparent. That helps to increase both access
and integrity.
Case-by-case knowledge management, where the expertise relevant
for an individual case is presented to the judges and their legal assis-
tants on the basis of case characteristics, is a further opportunity in this
group. It requires a system for determining which information is pre-
sented with which case configuration.
It remains to be seen, however, what types of knowledge manage-
ment are best suited to this group’s needs. We do not yet know very
much about the processes in the judgment group.
Conclusions for Part 3
These chapters set out to analyze IT support for reducing case delay.
Chapters 3.2 and 3.3 looked at information processing in courts using a
matrix on process outcomes. Cases were grouped based on case out-
come, in order to identify information technology needs and opportu-
nities. From these chapters, we can draw some lines on:
– The role of information management in civil justice reform
– What courts have achieved with regard to IT for case processing
– What needs can be identified
– What opportunities are in store
– What needs to be done in order to make those opportunities work
to improve the administration of justice.
Civil justice, case delay and information technology
Judicial decision making can be an extraordinarily complex process.
Many different models were developed to capture this complexity: Sha-
piro’s triangle of dispute resolution, the continuum of dispute resolu-
tion modes, Zuckerman’s triangle of time, cost and truth (Shapiro p. 2;
Zuckerman p. 48). I have developed my matrix to capture judicial roles
and court case loads. It helps to make visible how both relate to the
need for information technology.
In Shapiro’s triangle, the role of the third person helping the first two
people with their dispute goes from helper to decider, related to the de-
gree of consensus in the resolution. As the third person can achieve
the most balanced result by striving for the highest degree of consen-
sus, moving cases down in the matrix whenever possible suggests itself
in this framework. In Zuckerman’s triad, there is a trade-off between
time, cost and truth: this suggests that reducing time and/or cost will
result in less truth. I do not find the suggestion that less complexity
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means less truth totally convincing. After all, dispute resolution is lar-
gely reducing complexity. However, what does present itself from this
image is that moving cases to the left in the matrix will result in less com-
plexity and faster processing.
Case processing as information management
Looking at case processing as a process of information management
helps to see opportunities for information technology applications in
order to improve case processing. We have uncovered some actions
that will result in cases moving to the left and/or down in the matrix.
Simplification: Creating routines and standards will move cases to
the left. Thus, the number of individual decisions that need to be taken
in each case is reduced. This reduces unpredictability through redu-
cing the number of individual decisions that have to be taken in each
case. In the example of the labor contract dissolution, a majority of
cases moved from the judgment group to the notarial group. The main
activity is simplification: By standardizing the concepts of salary and
contract duration for the purpose of determining compensation more
equitably, complexity was reduced. With the formula itself publicly
available on the Web, the parties become capable of resolving most
cases on their own. Therefore, cases may even be moved out of the
court when the parties are given enough information to resolve their
dispute by settlement. Thus, policy formation encourages problem sol-
ving by the parties. If, like the Dutch peacemakers in Voltaire’s letter
in the footnote above, we think time and cost can be saved by keeping
dispute resolution away from the legal realm, and helping parties to
settle their differences is a socially desirable objective, it is useful to
find ways to move cases in the direction of the bottom half of the ma-
trix.
Early intervention: Early intervention in individual cases can have two
effects: it simplifies the case in question, which moves it to the left in
group 4; or it facilitates settlement, which moves the case toward group
3. The example of the online pre-action protocols illustrates how a com-
plex, lengthy process is avoided. A potential dispute is moved down, as
well as to the left in the matrix to such an extent that it never gets to
court.
IT for case processing: What has been achieved?
Most of the effort in implementing court IT has gone into streamlining
and routines; in other words: simplification and process control. The
lengthy treatment of group 1 underlines this point. This fits into the
general trend in IT use, which appears to support large scale control by
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manipulating large amounts of information. It is an indication that
proportionality is at work.
Not letting cases come to court is a trend. However, it is a trend that
raises questions about how time, cost and truth are being rebalanced.
Does it raise the barriers to access to justice? Are people not getting
the justice they seek and deserve? What is the level of justice if legal
protection cannot be invoked? These are questions that will be exam-
ined in Part 4.
Communication with the users, both one-way and interactive, is a
way of helping them with solving their own problems. Much of the in-
formation technology identified, in order to be successful, involves or
requires standardization of court practices or policy formation with re-
gard to judicial decision making. These activities require active work
on the part of courts and judiciaries.
Resolution of complex problems and innovative problem solving are
not supported by IT to any great extent yet. The results of this study do
not indicate that automating judicial reasoning for purposes of dispute
resolution is a perceived need.
Databases
This study has used a lot of statistics to examine court processes. Those
statistics are available where courts use database technology for their
case administration. The U.S. courts were the first to start developing
case processing standards. They have implemented technology to regis-
ter and administer cases since the 1970s. That gave them an instru-
ment to generate information and knowledge about their processes. It
also provided them with a tool to check the implementation and pro-
gress of the Trial Court Performance Standards.
To my mind, the finding of the effect of electronic case administra-
tion is one of the most interesting: our ability to know our processes
has increased enormously because databases keep the data we have fed
them for us and make them available in ways we can use. Databases
can produce correlations that we could never find otherwise. Justice
Bharuka, then chair of the Indian Judiciary’s IT Commission, told me
how he first tracked case delay in Bangalore by using a self-constructed
database.42 The jurisprudence of the European Court on Human
Rights on case delay was analyzed with a database. With the support of
databases, we can learn what we do and how and where the problems
are. After we develop and implement solutions, we can track changes
in order to ensure that our solutions are working. For the policy re-
search needed to develop routines, databases to compare and analyze
are an indispensable tool. These examples are an illustration of the po-
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tential for changing culture with regard to timeliness in disposing
court cases.
IT needs and opportunities
From the courts’ perspective, internal information needs and external
information provision are the two vectors that drive information man-
agement in cases. The matrix demonstrates how different cases require
different processing. The cases can be divided into four groups. Each
group has specific IT support needs. Those needs point to opportu-
nities for IT support to reduce case delay:
For all groups, electronic filing is an opportunity that will save proces-
sing time. Most claimants are firms that have clients in an automated
administration. Moreover, most claims are filed by either law firms or
bailiffs. They will mostly have their clients in an automated administra-
tion. If they could deliver those data to the courts, as is done in the
bulk claim center in the United Kingdom, the extra step of re-keying
the data in court can be eliminated. Procedural rules affect how this
can be achieved.
In the notarial group, an additional opportunity is in web functiona-
lity. Information on the court web site, online forms and information
for settlements can be ways of stimulating the parties to work together
to resolve their own disputes.
In the settlement group, information service on the Web to help par-
ties settle their own disputes is also a good activity. Moreover, we see
the use of communication technology, such as email or dedicated soft-
ware, to help parties settle disputes with a less predictable outcome.
In the judgment group, the foremost need is for managing complex
information. The opportunity of electronic case files presents itself
here. Electronic files open up new opportunities themselves with mul-
timedia storage of evidence and hearing recordings. The other need is
for legal information service.
Electronic filing of claims, online data entry and electronic case files
will reduce processing time, and possibly disposition time, for all cases.
Automating routines can speed up processing for the title group. Inter-
net functionality for public information and electronic forms supports
the notarial group. Likewise, public information and software support-
ing negotiations can support processing specifically for the settlement
group. Electronic files and knowledge management are the main tools
specifically for the judgment group.
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Interaction with the parties
Forms of electronic interaction between courts and their users present
themselves as an opportunity for preventing cases from coming to
court and for more expedient processing for the cases that are filed. In-
formation on the Web and forms of increasing interactivity are ex-
plored in Part 4, on access to justice.
What needs to be done?
Major shifts in the way courts and judiciaries work are required if they
choose to use the opportunities that are presented by forms of informa-
tion technology effectively. Both require changes in organization as
well as major shifts in thinking.
The first one is a shift toward generating knowledge from the court
decisions and practices for the purpose of developing routines and poli-
cies. Developing routines and policies must become a standard activ-
ity. That is a big change for an organization geared to process indivi-
dual cases. It is explored in the chapter on managing change.
The other one is a shift toward providing court users and the general
public with information. This requires both organizational and attitudi-
nal changes. Courts, in order to provide information to court users,
need to develop an attitude that does not routinely rely on intermedi-
aries like lawyers and bailiffs. The topic of communicating and inter-
acting with court users is explored in Part 4, on access to justice.
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33 Interview with Herman van der Meer, then secretary of the Association of Local
Court Judges and chair of the committee; validated interview notes in my possession.
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tection at http://www.deburcht.org on November 7, 2007. The percentages do not al-
ways add up to 100 %.
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41 Interview with the panel of judges who tested the application in March 2003.
42 Interview in New Delhi, July 2005.
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Part 4 Access to Justice
Plan for the next three chapters
The next three chapters examine ways in which information techno-
logy can support improving access to justice.
The first chapter discusses the relevance of the concept of access to
justice to the broader theme of judicial reform. It analyzes methodolo-
gical difficulties of studying access to justice. It discusses the norma-
tive framework for the issue of access to justice. It then examines the
main barriers to access to justice that have emerged from different
sources.
The second chapter examines impediments with regard to informa-
tion and knowledge. It ends with a list of information and knowledge
needs people with justiciable problems experience. Those needs should
be addressed to improve access to justice.
The third chapter takes up the conclusions from the other two chap-
ters to look at courts and how they can improve access to justice using
forms of information technology, and particularly the Internet.
Chapter 4.1 Access to Justice
Relevance and context
This section discusses how the concept of access to justice relates to
the broader discussion on judicial reform.
Access to justice has become a major theme in the broader judicial
reform agenda, as is shown by the following, fairly random, examples:
In the Western world in the 1970s, a movement started toward making
information about rights more accessible to the general public. Fun-
ding legal aid and legal representation became an area for government
policy. Donors of development assistance fund projects focusing on ac-
cess to justice in developing countries. Its place on the reform agenda
means it is relevant as a topic for study in the framework of judicial re-
form. Whether access to justice is a problem that needs to be addressed
by reform efforts, and if so, how that should be done, is a major ques-
tion. It should be answered based on empirical evidence.
In the access discourse, access is not a clearly defined concept, and
neither is justice. That makes them viable for political discourse on as-
pirations and claims. For academic exploration, for instance quantify-
ing and comparing levels and impacts, and for devising reform strate-
gies, they are not immediately practical. Until recently, the debate was
conducted without much of an evidence base. Now, however, empirical
evidence on barriers to access is beginning to build up.
Evidence
This section provides a brief overview of the evidence that is emerging.
The body of evidence for access to justice as a problem has started to
accumulate only fairly recently. There were no reliable quantitative data
about the needs, interests and experiences of those ostensibly lacking
access (Genn p. 1). This gap is beginning to be filled by research on ex-
perience in solving justiciable problems. Starting in the 1970s, a body
of knowledge on access to justice and its impediments gradually built
up. Research on people using legal services was done in the 1970s in
the United States by the ABA (Genn 1999 p. 6). A Dutch study also ex-
plored legal needs and the use of legal assistance (Schuyt 1976). In
the United Kingdom, Paths to Justice (Genn 1999) examined what
people do and think about “going to law”, that is, using the legal sys-
tem in England and Wales. The study was later repeated in Scotland
(Genn 2001). Contrary to the U.S. studies, the methodology’s object of
study is the legal problems people face, not people using legal services.
The Paths to Justice methodology was used for a study in the Nether-
lands by Van Velthoven and Ter Voert (Van Velthoven 2004). The re-
port of their study is called the “Dispute Resolution Delta 2003.” It
was published in 2004. Both Paths to Justice and the Dispute Resolu-
tion Delta started out with screening surveys of a representative sample
of the general population. Paths to Justice followed them up with inter-
views of all those individuals who reported having had a problem,
about their justiciable problems and how they responded to them. Se-
lected individuals were interviewed more in depth about their experi-
ence (Genn 1999 p. 15). The Delta conducted a second survey with
those who reported having had a problem and conducted 17 interviews
with selected individuals (Van Velthoven 2004 p. 39). Interviewees
were questioned on the barriers they perceived, the motivation for tak-
ing action, the outcome of different strategies and their experiences
and perceptions of legal proceedings, the courts, and the judiciary. The
Dutch screening survey was done through an Internet panel. The Dis-
pute Resolution Delta also provides information on the problems’ time
track and on explanations for patterns in legal aid. This research has
produced a wealth of empirical evidence that helps us understand
more about problems of access to justice and its institutions. Both stu-
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dies will be used extensively in the discussion of information aspects
of access to justice that is the main part of the second chapter.
Dilemmas
This section highlights two dilemmas that come up frequently in the
justice reform debate about access to justice.
The first dilemma is the apparent choice between institutional re-
form and access to justice: Why bother getting people access to justice
if the justice institutions are functioning poorly or not at all? To a cer-
tain degree, this is a chicken-and-egg kind of debate about what comes
first. Access to justice and functioning justice institutions are interde-
pendent; they need each other to exist. Some development programs
and donors have chosen to concentrate on access to justice programs
because institutional reform was not a viable option in the actual cir-
cumstances. This is likely to be the case in countries with more or less
dysfunctional institutions, such as the ones in Michael Johnston’s Oli-
garchs and Clans group and in the Official Moguls group (see the
chapter on corruption, Johnston p. 155 and appendix B). Faundez has
pointed out how corruption and inefficiency of ordinary state courts
have given rise to non-state justice institutions in Latin America. He ar-
gues that the shortcomings of official courts can be understood better
with a better understanding of non-state justice systems. Investigating
non-state justice systems can yield a wealth of evidence with which to
gauge the social and political needs of ordinary people, as well as their
expectations and responses to law and legal institutions (Faundez
2006 p. 136). Ordinary people and their justiciable problems are the
major focus in the next few chapters. Their experiences tell us a lot
about information and knowledge barriers to access to justice, and
about how their perception of courts helps or hinders the resolution of
problems. That is valuable understanding of how courts and judiciaries
can improve their role in the resolution of disputes. Is this apparent di-
lemma specific to developing countries, as the reference to the Oli-
garchs and Clans groups suggests? The research that is the basis for
the next chapters was done in Western Europe. As we shall see, it
shows that court improvement has a role to play in improving access
to justice in highly developed justice systems too, and not just in de-
veloping countries.
The second dilemma is the choice between diversion and access: Is
it better to keep people out-of-court by providing alternatives to court
dispute resolution, or should access to courts be improved? As with the
first theme, this is also partly a chicken-and-egg debate. The shadow
function of the law, also known as the radiating effect of courts (Galan-
ter 1983a) is an established fact: out of court problem solving and set-
PART 4 ACCESS TO JUSTICE 163
tlement are supported by courts fulfilling their role of setter and guar-
dian of the norms. Alternative dispute resolution is more effective in a
system where well functioning courts are a serious alternative. Genn
says diversion and access as reform goals logically conflict: the more
court access is enhanced, the less the public will be interested in wast-
ing time in possibly fruitless self-help remedies or alternative dispute
resolution processes (Genn 1999 p. 263). She also notes there is little
empirical evidence for either choice. We will come back to this debate
at the end of the second chapter.
Access to legal information
Legal information, be it to inform people about their rights, help them
settle their disputes, or tell them how to bring a case to court, is rele-
vant in all those situations: out-of-court settlement, diversion through
alternative dispute resolution, dispute resolution by a court. Because of
its capacity to disseminate legal information at low cost, information
technology, and particularly the Internet, is regarded as an important
means to improve access to justice. Moreover, the outcomes from the
chapters on case delay suggest that for some groups of cases, commu-
nicating with the parties and access to legal information potentially
help to lower the need for access to court (see Chapter 3.4). Access to
information also potentially reduces the opportunity for corruption (see
Chapter 5.3). These very general suggestions will be taken up and ex-
amined in more detail here.
Approach of these chapters
These chapters will attempt to answer some parts of the question how
courts and judiciaries can contribute to better access with uses of infor-
mation technology. In order to do that, this first chapter identifies bar-
riers to access to justice in general. The second chapter then goes on to
examine lack of information as a barrier. As observed before, the evi-
dence base is only beginning to build up. There is some information
on how people in a few countries deal with some of their justiciable
problems. That information will be the starting point for the third
chapter, which discusses how courts can contribute to improving ac-
cess to justice using information technology. These chapters will focus
mainly on those topics for which there is a sufficient evidence base.
These chapters will not look into:
– Information sources for judges, and those for lawyers and other le-
gal professionals. Richard Susskind developed a vision for this sort
of information in The Future of Law (Susskind 1996). The subject
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deserves a more empirically-based discussion. However, that would
take up more space than it can be given here.
– The market for legal information that is available for sale, because
the topic is too far removed from the discussion on judicial reform
and information technology support for it. This exclusion includes
most of the discussion of lawyers and other professional service
providers.
The discussion concentrates on individual litigants. It is guided not by
a general intuitive feeling or by any kind of program, but by the em-
pirical evidence that is available. The overall approach in this discus-
sion is as follows:
It starts with a discussion of the normative framework.
The next section describes the most commonly identified impedi-
ments to access to justice as well as some possible technological solu-
tions.
The second chapter examines lack of knowledge and information as
barriers to access to justice. It examines information and knowledge
needs and deficits that keep people from resolving their problems. It
uses empirical evidence on justiciable problems people face, from
Paths to Justice and the Dispute Resolution Delta.
Then, the third chapter addresses those problems in the context of
courts. It discusses forms of information technology than can be ex-
pected to support the remedies identified.
The normative framework for access to justice
International conventions guarantee access to a court: Everyone is en-
titled to a fair and public hearing by an independent tribunal - in the
determination of their civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against them.1
This right to access is generally associated with equal opportunity to
invoke protection of the law. A well functioning justice system should
afford everyone the opportunity to protest violations of their rights. By
performing this function well, it also should make the protests less ne-
cessary through its deterrent effects (Reiling 2007 p. 66). Allegedly
realizing that their actions will be sanctioned, would-be violators would
refrain from doing what the law prohibits or do what it mandates. This
is the “shadow function” of the law. Court decisions have a shadow
function of their own (Galanter 1983). This is the theory. The theory as-
sumes that information about court decisions is readily available.
In practice, many factors affect whether violations and disputes ulti-
mately end up in court or not. To be precise, we have to note a major
distinction here in the factors that influence whether cases come to
court. There are (1) barriers that prevent issues that should come to
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court from getting there, and (2) factors that make taking issues to
court unnecessary because there is some other way of resolving them.
There are also important lessons to be learned about the second group
of factors. They will emerge in the course of the discussion.
These chapters focus on the barriers. The next section presents an
overview of those factors impeding court access that have been identi-
fied in the research so far.
Impediments to access to justice
Before giving an overview of known barriers to access, this section
looks at some methodological problems with identifying barriers to ac-
cess.
In practice, the normative framework turns out to be less than solid
for our purpose here. It does not provide us with clearly defined con-
cepts that can be the object of academic study. Access to justice is not a
straightforward concept, as observed above. Consequently, diagnosing
whether it is deficient in a given context, and identifying the factors in-
volved, are equally problematic. Increases in the numbers of court
users or high and/or low litigation rates do not necessarily signify an
improvement in access to justice. It is possible that there are alterna-
tives to courts for resolving disputes. There may also simply be rela-
tively few conflicts that could be solved through legal means or by way
of court procedures. Another possibility is that the barriers to court are
high. Establishing whether there is an objective need for access to
courts is problematic. These issues are still very much in discussion,
and far from resolved. Resolving them is, in any case, beyond the scope
of this study.
I just note there are no established methodologies for:
– Comparing and quantifying levels of access within or across coun-
tries
– Developing means to assess and measure impacts, except on the
immediate beneficiaries
– Developing integrated strategies that incorporate the variety of me-
chanisms that people may use to resolve their problems.
Consequently, there is much we do not yet know where access to jus-
tice is concerned.
The discussion in this section will concentrate on those issues about
which we do know enough to examine them for the purpose of identi-
fying solutions involving information technology.
Barriers to access
The first topic to address is that of the barriers to access. There are
many approaches to this field of issues. The discussion here is con-
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fined to barriers for which there is potentially a solution in some form
of information technology as defined in Part 1. From the literature, we
derive the following major barriers to access:
Distance can be a factor impeding access to courts. In many countries,
courts are concentrated in the main urban centers or in the capital.
Furthermore, in large and/or sparsely populated countries, courts are
simply far away or far apart. Examples of the latter are Brazil and Aus-
tralia. Courts can also be out of reach when travel is difficult or costly
(Dale p. 2). Generally speaking, distance is a fairly straightforward fac-
tor to diagnose. The geographical situation of large countries like Brazil
and Australia evidently makes it difficult to cover the distance to courts
for people living outside the few urban concentrations. Factors expres-
sing the number of courts per capita can also indicate the presence of
this factor. The judicial map, showing the locations of courts in a coun-
try, can show concentration of courts in a few areas. In Brazil, there
has been an experiment with traveling courts to extend the reach of for-
mal justice to populations in distant, sparsely populated regions. In
this experiment, a boat traveled up and down parts of the Amazon ba-
sin. The experiment involved both judicial functions and civil register
functions, such as marriages (Hammergren p. 136). In Australia,
courts travel circuits to wide areas. They also experiment with forms of
videoconferencing to extend the reach of the formal court system to
outlying, partly aboriginal communities. Videoconferencing is used for
a range of pretrial and administrative purposes, as well as in hearings.
In large measure, its popularity is a product of both the enormous dis-
tances courts have to cover, particularly in the larger states, and the
consequent costs associated with travel for witnesses, lawyers and the
judiciary (Macdonald p. 652).
Language barriers are present when justice seekers use a language
that is different from the language of the courts. They can be immi-
grants or people who are not familiar with the official language when a
country uses one or more different languages for everyday use. The
right to a fair trial in the international conventions usually includes the
right to be informed of the accusation in a language one understands,
at least in criminal law. An obvious remedy is to provide for translation
of documents and interpretation of the spoken word. The most com-
mon form of interpretation is consecutive: every sentence or group of
sentences is translated after it has been spoken. A more advanced form
of interpretation is simultaneous interpretation, where what is spoken
is translated (nearly) at the same time. Presumably, this form of trans-
lation can save time in a hearing. There is dedicated technology to fa-
cilitate simultaneous interpretation with microphones and earphones.
Interpretation technology is used in all the international courts. It is
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not used on a large scale in most other courts. It involves installing
technology in existing courtrooms that may not be suited to it. This
may incur cost, while the benefit of time saved is not easy to quantify.
Physical challenges, like impaired sight and hearing and motor and
cognitive impairments, as a barrier to access are an emerging topic in
the debate on technology support in courts. On the one hand, electro-
nic information can provide improved access with text to audio. On the
other hand, electronic information is an additional challenge for people
with impaired sight or hearing. Using electronic information sets new
requirements for accessibility (Waters c.s.).
Cost, in many forms, has been identified as a factor affecting access
to courts. The most common forms of cost are legal and court fees,
and the costs of additional documents.2 In order to be complete: costs
can also involve speed, money and bribes. As observed before, cost is a
complex phenomenon. It will not be discussed further here (see Chap-
ter 1.2 for the reasons).
Lack of information and knowledge, lack of familiarity with the court
process, complexity of legal and administrative systems and lack of ac-
cess to legal information are commonly identified factors (Cotterrell p.
251, Hammergren p. 136). They are related because they all refer to the
availability of information. Potentially, information on the Internet can
provide some form of solution for these problems.
The first three factors in the list above have in common that they are
relatively straightforward and do not strike at the heart of the legal pro-
cess. For this reason, they do not merit further attention in this study.
Cost, as explained in Chapter 1.2, is outside the study’s scope.
The next chapter, therefore, will focus on access to legal information
and knowledge. Lack of information and knowledge as a barrier to ac-
cess to justice is the focus for discussion in the first few paragraphs.
The rest of the chapter will identify information needs from empirical
studies of justiciable problems and how they are handled.
Chapter 4.2 Access to Information
This chapter will examine access to legal information in more detail.
In order to find a first, tentative answer to the larger question of how
IT can support improving access to justice, it examines information
needs and defects as an impediment to access to justice. It will study
justiciable problems in order to identify related needs for information.
Once those needs have been identified, the next chapter will move on
to discuss how courts and judiciaries can play a role in enhancing ac-
cess to justice by providing information.
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In 1974, Marc Galanter pointed out the disadvantage in the legal field
of those who come to court only incidentally over those who routinely
use the courts as part of their business. His 1974 article “Why the
Haves Come Out Ahead,” challenged the idea that the principle of
equality before the law brings parties on equal footing in litigation.
One-shotters go to court perhaps once in their lifetime. Repeat players
are engaged in many similar litigations over time. Some of the advan-
tages for the repeat players in litigation are:
– Advance intelligence because of previous experience
– Ability to structure the next transaction and build a record
– Control over interaction with form contracts and security deposits
– They develop expertise and have ready access to specialists.
Repeat players are the claimants in most debt collection procedures:
banks, insurance companies, and other institutional service providers.
Administrative agencies dealing with social security and government
agencies are also repeat players. In criminal matters, the prosecution
service is the repeat player par excellence.3 These repeat players are
part of the legal information chains that also include the courts. In
terms of the information and knowledge classification laid out in Part
1, the repeat players’ advantage lies mainly in the previous experience
that enables them to process the information generated in litigation,
and act on it.
One-shotters do not have these advantages. According to Galanter
(1974), they suffer a lack of knowledge and information that makes
them come out behind. Not much was known about this apparent lack
of knowledge and information until later.
Later empirical research challenged the idea that the most common
method of dispute resolution is that disputes are resolved by courts
after they have been brought there by the parties and their lawyers.
One study by the ABA and the American Bar Foundation showed that
lawyers were used only for problems of a specific nature (Genn p. 7).
This suggests there were other problems that did not make it to legal
advice, let alone to court. An ABA study of legal needs in 1994 con-
firmed this suggestion. It found that over the course of a calendar year,
about half of the households surveyed faced one or more situations
that could have been addressed by the civil justice system, that nearly
three-quarters of those situations faced by low-income households, and
two-thirds of those situations faced by moderate income households
did not find their way into the system (Genn p. 7).4
In order to identify information needs to improve access to justice, we
need to find out which information defects are at the root of these fin-
dings. We will first look into the problems as people experience them.
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Next, we map the different ways in which people handle their justici-
able problems. This will help us learn more about their need for infor-
mation when resolving their problems.
Empirical evidence: Justiciable problems
If most disputes never come to court, what happens to them?
This section looks at the kinds of problems people face that could
potentially end up in court. It draws on the results of the surveys on
justiciable problems in England and Wales, and in the Netherlands.
Genn defined a justiciable event as a (non-trivial) matter experienced by
a respondent which raised legal issues (Genn p. 12) . This definition
excludes problems that are not recognized as legally worthy of protec-
tion.
Van Velthoven defined justiciable problem as: those situations in
which problems cause trouble or where parties strive for aims that are
irreconcilable, and combat each other with certain means, as well as
problem-charged situations in which legal aid was invoked (Van Veltho-
ven 2004 p. 44). From this definition, it is unclear to what extent legal
recognition of a problem is part of the definition. In any case, it seems
correct to assume that problems that are not legally recognized as
worthy of protection are not included in the surveys. Despite this ap-
parent gap in meaning between both definitions, the results of both
surveys are similar enough to lend themselves to careful comparison,
and to some equally careful conclusions. We first look at the screening
surveys of a representative sample of the general population for an
overview of the problems that occur.
What justiciable problems occur?
The two screening surveys provided a lot of information about the
kinds of justiciable problems people in England and Wales and the
Netherlands experience. Table 16 compiles the results of the screening
surveys, listing them by type of problem and relative share in England
and Wales (E+W) and the Netherlands (NL). Some categories were
combined to make comparison easier.
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Table 16 Incidence of Justiciable Problems
E+W Netherlands Remarks
Percentage of
respondents with
problem
40 % 67 %
Faulty goods and
services
11 % 21 %
Work related 6 % 13 %
Money problems 9 % 13 %
Possessing real estate
/owning residential
property
8 % 12 %
Renting
accommodation/
living in rented
accommodation
7 % 8 %
Relationships and
family, including
divorce
10 % 6 % 6 % relationships, 4%
family in Genn.
Health problems
caused by third
parties, including
negligent medical
treatment
10 % 4 % Genn treats negligent
medical treatment as
a separate category; I
have included it in
health problems
together to facilitate
comparison
Children under 18 3 % 2 %
Renting out real
estate
- 2 %
Sources: Genn 1999 p. 24 and Van Velthoven 2004 p. 68.
There are some noteworthy differences between the outcomes of the
two studies. Relatively more respondents report justiciable problems in
the Netherlands. More work and money related problems are reported
in the Netherlands as well. More family and relationship problems and
health problems are reported in England and Wales. The Delta, pub-
lished four years after Paths to Justice, puts forward some candidate ex-
planations for the difference in experiencing problems: greater popula-
tion density resulting in more legal problems in the Netherlands; dif-
ferent composition of the population; a different, more service-oriented
economy; and more extensive regulation. These differences and their
explanations are outside the scope of the discussion here.
With regard to the incidence of types of justiciable problems, the re-
sults in the table are quite similar:
– Most problems have to do with faulty goods and services.
– Money problems come in second place.
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– Work related problems come in third place in the Netherlands. In
England and Wales, third place is held by health related problems.
– Eighty-nine percent of the problems reported in the Netherlands
are civil justice matters; the remaining 11 percent are problems cov-
ered by administrative law (Van Velthoven 2004 p. 81).
The studies observe that income levels affect the type of problems peo-
ple experience. Higher-income people have more problems with real
estate; lower-income people have more problems with living in rented
accommodations.
Another observation in both studies is that problems do not come by
themselves: most people reported more than one problem, on average
3.7 problems per person (Van Velthoven 2004 p. 81). People who re-
ported work problems were likely to also have health and/or money
problems. Money problems correlate with problems concerning faulty
goods and services. Divorce problems correlate with problems with
children under 18, other family problems and money problems (Genn
1999, p. 31). Because problems do not come by themselves, informa-
tion services should take into account the chance of underlying pro-
blems that need to be uncovered at the first request for help. Resolving
only one problem may not take care of the entire complex. This is par-
ticularly true for courts. A particular court, legally charged with decid-
ing particular types of cases, may be able to decide the divorce, but not
the money problem or the other family problem.5
Dealing with problems
People with a justiciable problem have some choices when it comes to
taking action:
– Lumping or resolving it6
– Resolving it themselves or seeking help
– Seeking help from friends, experts, or legal aid
– Starting a procedure.
Table 17 shows the most frequent actions for each problem category.
What does Table 17 tell us about people’s choices for addressing their
justiciable problems? Accurate comparison between the results of the
two studies is difficult due to differences in the way they are presented.
Some patterns emerge from both studies:
The top lumping categories are renting out real estate and family
problems in the Netherlands and health problems in England and
Wales.
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Table 17 Which Action for Which Problem?
E+W Netherlands
Percentage of respondents
with problem
40 % 67 %
Faulty goods and services 60 % self
73 % contacting other side
36 % advice
72 % contact with other party
35 % expert advice
Work related 78 % advice
20 % to court
49 % contact with other
party,
36 % expert advice
6 % to court/tribunal
Money problems 50 % self help
41 % advice
63 % contact with other party
23 % expert advice
Possessing real estate /
owning residential property
85 % advice 52 % contact with other party
41 % expert advice
Renting accommodation/
living in rented
accommodation
49 % advice 54 % contact with other party
27 % expert advice
10 % court/tribunal
procedure
Relationships and family,
including divorce
92 % advice/legal aid 11 % lumpers
45 % advice from friends,
45 % expert advice
18 % court
Health problems caused by
third parties, including
negligent medical treatment
15 % lumpers
69 % advice
66 % expert advice
Children under 18 26 % court 63 % expert advice
Renting out real estate n.a. 14 % lumpers
45 % contact with other
party; 11% court procedure
Sources: Genn 1999 p. 105-133 and Van Velthoven 2004 p. 84.
For faulty goods and services and money problems, people mostly find
solutions themselves, mainly by contacting the other party.
A need for expert advice is shown for problems with children under
18, health problems, relationship and family problems and possessing
real estate.
Problems ending up in court or in some other formal procedure are
family problems, renting out real estate and renting accommodation
and work problems.
Problem solving differs per problem. Further research confirms that
the type of action taken is determined largely by the type of problem
(Genn p. 141, Van Velthoven 2004 p. 94).
This gives us an idea of what justiciable problems people have and
how they address them. The next question is whether the problems are
resolved, and how.
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Outcomes
Table 18 provides some statistics on the way problems have ended.
Table 18 Outcomes
Outcome E+W Netherlands
Abandonment, unresolved, no agreement
or adjudication
51% 46%
Agreement 35% 48%
Adjudication 14% 7%
Sources: Genn 1999 p. 147 and Van Velthoven 2004 p. 117, 127.
A very important finding in these studies is that about half of all mem-
bers of the public who experience non-trivial justiciable problems fail
to achieve any resolution to those problems, whether or not they seek
advice. Legal advice and active assistance increase the likelihood that a
case will end in an agreement, adjudication or court order. In the
Netherlands, the agreement group is considerably larger than in Eng-
land and Wales: nearly half as opposed to about a third of all outcomes.
In the Netherlands, agreements are reached with third party assistance
in a considerable proportion of the outcomes.
What clearly emerges is the very limited use made by the public of
formal legal proceedings to resolve justiciable problems. The propor-
tion is twice as high in England and Wales as it is in the Netherlands.
Almost all cases that end up in a formal procedure got there after ad-
vice was obtained. People are reluctant to voluntarily become involved
in legal proceedings. Involvement in legal proceedings is most com-
mon in cases concerning divorce and separation, education tribunal
matters, ownership of residential property, employment disputes, and
accidental injury.
Problem type is very important in the outcome of justiciable pro-
blems. Employment problems, neighbor problems and problems with
landlords tend to have a generally low rate of resolution. Divorce and
separation problems, money problems and consumer problems have a
higher rate of resolution. Money remedies are easier to achieve than
some change in behavior (Genn p. 176-178).
Success rate
In those cases where the problem was resolved, people’s main aim was
largely achieved, and they largely perceived the outcome as fair.
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Table 19 Aims Achieved, Perceptions and Effects
Main aim
achieved,
completely or
partly
Outcome
fair
Compliance Negative effects
on personal life
NL overall 73,2% 86% 89
E+W overall 56% 76%
NL agreement 90,2% 86% 91 Little
E+W agreement 86% 78%
NL official decision 65,8% 58% 86
E+W official decision 68% 71%
NL lumpers 52% Yes, work,
stress, sleep
problems, health
Sources: Genn 1999 p. 196, 200, Van Velthoven 2004 p. 158, 163
Agreements achieve better results than official decisions:
– The rates for aims achieved are higher.
– Perceived fairness is higher.
– Compliance is somewhat higher.
– Effects on personal and work life are less negative than for official
decisions or for lumping (Van Velthoven 2004, p. 167).
People report they are pleased with having stood up for their rights
and with having some control over their own situation.
Some of these effects may be explained by the nature of the pro-
blems that are resolved through agreement, and that of the counter-
parts:
– Most are consumer problems, and they are relatively easy to re-
solve.
– The problems are generally not as serious, making them easier to
resolve.
– Most problems are with repeat players. Repeat players deal with
problems in a more functional manner; they have more routine pro-
cedures for dealing with problems (Van Velthoven 2004 p. 153).
This may also explain to a degree why problems with repeat players
are resolved more easily than those with one-shotters.
Official decisions also achieve good results, but they cause much more
stress. The majority of people whose problem ended with an official de-
cision still report their main aim was achieved and the outcome was
fair. Compliance is still quite high. People are pleased with having
stood up for their rights. They report even more satisfaction than peo-
ple who settled their dispute with an agreement. They also report sig-
nificantly more stress, sleep and health problems than the agreement
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forgers. Their reported stress and health problem level is about the
same as that of the lumpers (Van Velthoven 2004 p. 167).
When asked about their regrets, only 18 percent report any regret.
When asked what they regret, most people mention regret about their
own behavior:
– Not having taken action earlier
– Not having had the required tenacity
– Not being assertive enough.
Some of those whose problem ended with a decision also feel they
should have found themselves a lawyer or other adviser (Van Velthoven
2004 p. 166).
Family and relationship cases are relatively costly.
Problems are still going on: 14 percent, 22 percent in official proce-
dures, 6 percent in agreement and 25 percent in lumpers.
People report they do not appeal official decisions because they ex-
perience a sense of powerlessness (Van Velthoven 2004 p. 163).
The next question regards the role of information in the choices people
make in addressing their justiciable problems. How does it play a role
in half the problems not being resolved?
Information and knowledge needs
This section identifies some information and knowledge needs and
deficits from the findings of the two studies.
When making choices about their justiciable problems, people are
presumably affected by what they know and the information they can
obtain. How does this affect whether they ignore their problem, settle
it with the other party, find advice and expert help, or take their case to
court?
Lumping the problem
The first choice people make is between lumping a problem and taking
action. How often do the lumpers cite lack of information and knowl-
edge as a reason for doing so?
In the Delta, on average 8 percent of those experiencing justiciable
problems take no action to address them. On average, 35 percent of
them give “I did not think anything could be done about it” as the
main reason for doing so. The number of people giving this reason dif-
fers greatly depending on the problem. It is the reason most cited by
lumpers for their decision. If we also include the group saying “I did
not know who could help,” the average percentage goes up to 44. In
England and Wales, only about 5 percent took no action about their jus-
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ticiable problem (Genn p. 69). Within this group, about 20 percent
said they took this course of non-action because nothing could be done
about it. Genn observes that this judgment is made without the benefit
of any kind of advice.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that nearly 4 percent (the Nether-
lands) and 1 percent (England and Wales) of those experiencing justi-
ciable problems take no action for lack of knowledge and information.
The study on the Netherlands does not identify the problem of lumping
for lack of information as a problem of access. This raises the question
why it is not considered a problem.
Seeking advice
Whether advice is sought is largely determined by problem type. Pro-
blems (a) involving issues that are relatively complex and (b) with is-
sues that are difficult to resolve by means of self-help strategies are
likely to lead to advice seeking. The highest scoring on these points are
those problems that involve a relationship: employment, family mat-
ters, and neighbor problems. Advice is sought in a very high propor-
tion of cases with divorce and separation problems. In England and
Wales, it is well over 90 percent, in NL it is 60 percent (Van Velthoven
2004 p. 93-94, Genn p. 140-142).
Factors determining the need for advice:
– The competence/resources of the party
– The importance of the problem
– The intransigence of the opponent.
A competent, resourceful party may still need advice for an important
problem or when the opponent is difficult to deal with (Genn p. 143).
What advice?
If people go looking for advice, what kind of advice are they looking
for?
Table 20 What Kind of Advice Do People Look For?
Advice on E+W Netherlands
Ways to solve the
problem
68 % 46 %
Rights and duties 47 % 45 %
Financial aspects 20 % 23 %
Legal procedures 15 % 34 %
Sources: Genn 1999 p. 95 and Van Velthoven 2004 p. 109.
First and foremost, people want advice on ways to solve their problem.
Next is information on rights and duties. In the Netherlands, the
next most important subject is information on legal procedures, a need
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that is not as prominent in England and Wales. Finally, there is a siz-
able need for information on financial aspects.
On the whole, the advice received was considered largely useful.
What people need when they go for advice is determined by the type
of problem and by their own personal competencies, such as confi-
dence, verbal skills and literacy (Genn p. 99).
Whose advice?
When people sought expert advice, their first port of call was the fol-
lowing:
In the Netherlands, they went – in order of frequency - to:
– Trade unions and specialist associations
– Lawyers
– The police
– Legal aid bureaus
– Legal assistance insurance (Van Velthoven 2004 p. 102).
In England and Wales, the most visited providers of expert advice were:
– Solicitors
– Citizens’ advice bureaus
– Local councils
– Police (Genn p. 83).
The specialist associations in the Netherlands include such organiza-
tions as home owners’ associations and consumer associations. It is in-
teresting that the police are a resource for many people.
Advice or assistance?
Sometimes advice is not enough to resolve the problem at hand and
people need active assistance. Genn reports that in many cases where
people went looking for help, they needed more positive assistance
than what was offered by the provider of advice (Genn p.103). People
had a need for active assistance and credible threats to be made.
Active help and assistance are needed most for:
– Approaching the other party (26 percent),
– Taking legal steps (17 percent)
– Approaching a different adviser (12 percent).
In the Netherlands, 11 percent of those seeking advice needed legal re-
presentation (Van Velthoven 2004 p.109).
The need for assistance is higher for problems that involve dealing
with bureaucratic and legalized bodies, like government institutions
(Van Velthoven 2004 p. 105). A possible explanation is that there is less
room for informal solutions when dealing with the government, ac-
cording to the Delta.
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What assistance?
What assistance did people actually get? Providers helped them with
the following (in order of frequency from Genn p.97):
– Contacting the other party (30 percent)
– Negotiating with the other party (24 percent)
– Helping to file complaint/petition (13 percent)
In the Netherlands, assistance with helping to contact the other party
occurred in 11 percent of all instances of assistance (Van Velthoven
2004 p. 110).
This information enables us to draw conclusions on the knowledge
needs and information barriers in the concluding paragraphs of this
chapter.
Conclusions for this Chapter
This chapter explored information needs as impediments to access to
justice. The analysis brought up some questions that need to be ad-
dressed before we can move on to a discussion on the contribution
courts can make to improving access to justice:
– Whether the identified information needs can be met using the
Internet
– Whether diversion or access to courts needs to be improved
– Whether routines help or hinder problem resolution.
These will be discussed below.
The main focus of this chapter was on the information needs of indivi-
duals when they encounter justiciable problems. Empirical evidence of
people and their justiciable problems in England and Wales and the
Netherlands points to some information needs and deficiencies.
Knowledge and information barriers to access to justice
The main aim of this chapter was to identify information defects as im-
pediments to access to justice. An important finding is that around
half of all justiciable problems are not resolved at all. Analysis of em-
pirical evidence, on individuals and their justiciable problems, pro-
duced the following findings with regard to information and know-
ledge barriers:
– Inaction in the face of a justiciable problem because of lack of infor-
mation and knowledge occurs in a small percentage of cases.
– Unavailability of advice negatively affects dispute resolution out-
comes. It lowers the resolution rate. Cases where people went to
find advice were resolved with a higher rate of success than those
of the self-helpers.
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– Inability to find advice. If people go looking for advice, the barriers
to finding it have more to do with their own competencies, such as
confidence, emotional fortitude and literacy skills, than with the
availability of the advice.7
– Incompetence in implementing the information received. Different
competence levels will affect what can be done with information
and advice. Competencies in implementing the information re-
ceived include, for example, skills such as working out what the
problem is, what result is wanted, how to find help, simple case re-
cording skills, managing correspondence, confidence and assertive-
ness, and negotiating skills (Advicenow 2005).8 Some people do
not want to be empowered by having information available. They
want assistance, or even someone to take over dealing with their
problem. People with low levels of competence in terms of educa-
tion, income, confidence, verbal skill, literacy skill, and emotional
fortitude are likely to need some help in resolving justiciable pro-
blems.
– Ignorance about legal rights exists across most social groups. Genn
notes people are not educated about their legal rights (Genn p.
102).
– People lack confidence in the legal system and the courts, and have
negative feelings about the justice system. Genn observes that peo-
ple do not want to become voluntarily involved with the courts.
They associate courts with criminal justice. People’s image of the
courts is formed by media stories about high profile criminal cases
(Genn p. 247). This issue is related to the public image of courts, as
well as to the wider role of courts as setters of norms. It will be dis-
cussed in more detail in the next chapter.
One-shotters and the access to justice crisis
Galanter’s model of repeat players and one-shotters raises the question
how one-shotters can achieve justice, while at the same time they will
never become repeat players with all the knowledge advantages that
brings.
The discovery that one-shotters are at a disadvantage when it comes
to the administration of justice has caused a major shift in thinking.
Now, it is no longer considered acceptable that parts of the population
do not actually enjoy the legal protection they are awarded by law.
From the empirical evidence discussed in this chapter, we have learned
that the availability of advice and assistance, as well as information on
resolving disputes and on rules and regulations, improves the chance
that problems will be resolved and justice achieved. Thus, the one-shot-
ters’ disadvantage is, to a degree, compensated for by information, ad-
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vice and assistance. Chapter 4.3 examines some ways in which this
compensation can work.
Use of the Internet
This section is a first exploration of the potential of the Internet as an
answer to those information needs. We have learned that levels of com-
petence are a major factor in the resolution of justiciable disputes.
They are going up as more people get a better education. That enables
them to act on information. What we do not yet know is whether peo-
ple use the Internet as a resource for resolving their justiciable pro-
blems. What about Internet competence? In the studies, we have not
found evidence whether people used the Internet to find information
to help them with resolving their justiciable problems. Both studies
were done some years ago. The data for Paths to Justice were collected
before 1999, and those for the Dispute Resolution Delta before 2003.
In both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, Internet use has in-
creased considerably since then. Between 2000 and 2008, Internet use
grew in the United Kingdom by 171 percent and in the Netherlands by
284 percent.9 The level of Internet skills has also been going up, ac-
cording to European Union statistics. In 2007, there were more people
with Internet skills overall than in 2005. In the Netherlands in 2005,
80 percent of the general population had at least one Internet skill. In
2007 the rate had gone up to 84 percent. For the United Kingdom, the
2005 figure is not available but the 2007 level was 71 percent.10 In an
online poll in August 2008, users of Advicenow, a U.K. resource for
legal information, were asked where they would go for advice when
they have a problem: 19 percent went to their mother, 5 percent went
to the local advice agency, 8 percent reported they wait for divine in-
spiration and 68 percent said they went to the Internet or a help line.11
It looks as if the Internet could be an adequate channel to provide
people with justiciable problems with information on resolving them.
Chapter 4.3 explores some examples of information and advice on legal
issues on the Internet.
Routines or bureaucracy?
A noteworthy finding is that problems with firms or organizations are
relatively easily resolved as opposed to problems with other individuals
((Van Velthoven 2004 p. 153). The reason put forward is that firms
and organizations have routine procedures for dealing with problems.
At the same time, there is the finding that people needed more assis-
tance in dealing with government institutions because these institu-
tions have bureaucratic and legalized ways of working (Van Velthoven
2004 p. 105). These two findings seem to conflict. What is the diffe-
rence between routines and bureaucracy? Is bureaucracy bad routines?
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This is an issue we should keep in mind, because it comes back in
many instances when we talk about court procedures. Developing rou-
tines is discussed extensively in the chapters on case delay. In terms of
information management, routines have to do with structured as op-
posed to form-free information exchange. In the next chapter, there is
a discussion of online forms as a way of communicating with indivi-
dual litigants. We will take up this issue in that context again.
Diversion or access, empowerment or court improvement?
The debate about the objective of legal policy has been going on for
some time. It discusses which is preferable or which should come first,
diversion, access, empowerment, or court improvement. The choices
are to:
– Enhance access to legal forums for the resolution of dispute
– Prevent problems and disputes from arising
– Equip as many members of the public as possible to solve problems
when they do arise without recourse to legal action
– Divert cases away from the courts into private dispute resolution
forums.
According to Genn, it is not an answer to say that diversion and access
should be the twin objectives of policy, because they logically conflict.
On the strength of Genn’s own empirical material and that of the Del-
ta, I would like to submit some possible lines of reasoning for a way
out of this apparent dilemma.
The first line of reasoning is based on the higher degree of satisfac-
tion people reported at having resolved their own problem and in the
stress they experience over having to go to court. The outcomes of
court cases are often uncertain.12 Consequently, there will always be a
degree of stress involved in going to court. Reducing that stress by
more realistic, positive images of the court will not take it away en-
tirely. Hence, ensuring that as few cases as possible come to court is
preferable, since it reduces uncertainty and increases satisfaction with
the outcome.
The second line of reasoning is based on the finding that resolutions
are to a large degree problem specific. Could it be that the way out of
the dilemma is also problem specific by strengthening the itinerary the
resolutions take? This would mean, for instance, that specialist organi-
zations that make it their business to provide specific information, ad-
vice and assistance should enhance their role. There is an empirical
base for this in Paths to Justice and the Dispute Resolution Delta.
Goods and services cases are largely resolved through self-help, out of
court settlement and ADR, but they still come to court. Devising ways
to help informal problem solving and diverting them to other dispute
resolution mechanisms can still keep more of them out of court. Even
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in matters for which a court decision is compulsory, like divorce, there
are ways of sorting out the disputes before the case needs to be filed.
Comparison between England and Wales and the Netherlands with
regard to dispute outcome (Table 18) shows the following: The Nether-
lands has fewer unresolved disputes, more disputes resolved by agree-
ment and the rate of resolution by adjudication is half that of England
and Wales. It looks as if there is more capacity for resolving justiciable
problems in Dutch society than there is in society in England and
Wales. Apart from the legacy of the justice system that Voltaire de-
scribed, many factors may be at work in the Netherlands to produce a
higher level of problem solving capacity. One probable factor is the le-
vel of education and the related competence levels for dealing with pro-
blems and the legal framework. The functional illiteracy rate is only
half that in the United Kingdom. Another factor may be a propensity
to settle differences by reducing the complexity through policies and
routines.
User statistics from MCOL and the labor compensation caseload in
Chapter 2.3 do not suggest that changes in procedure facilitating access
in themselves lead to higher caseloads. Changes observed in the case-
loads are attributable to market forces in both cases.
All this should not keep us from making going to court when neces-
sary less stressful. Information can help reduce people’s stress and it
improves their chances of achieving justice. The next chapter, on courts
and how they communicate with individual litigants, will take this find-
ing up again.
Information needs for resolving justiciable problems
The other aim of this chapter was to identify access-related needs for
information and knowledge. Using the way people deal with their justi-
ciable problems as a guide, we can pinpoint those needs. The evidence
tells us that the most frequently occurring justiciable problems are
those with goods and services. People will resolve simple, easy to solve
justiciable problems themselves. They are mostly resolved satisfactorily
by self-help, or with advice from specialist organizations. As the impor-
tance of the problem grows and the problem becomes more complex,
people will find more expert help. The most difficult to resolve are pro-
blems that involve a relationship. Any of the problems discussed in
this section may lead to a court procedure. However, the problems that
are the toughest to resolve are also the ones that most frequently come
to court.
When people go looking for information, they first and foremost go
looking for information on how to solve the problem. People in the
Netherlands primarily get their information from specialized organiza-
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tions, and from legal advice providers in second place. In England and
Wales, solicitors are the first port of call, followed by the Citizens’ Ad-
vice Bureaux. In both countries, the police is a significant source of in-
formation on justiciable problems. This is especially remarkable be-
cause the problems researched were not criminal justice issues.
If people require legal information, they primarily need straightforward
information about rules and regulations. Next, they look for informa-
tion about ways to settle and handle disputes once they arise. Informa-
tion about court procedures is a separate category that becomes rele-
vant only in case people need to go to court.
For taking their case to court, people need information on how to re-
solve problems, on rights and duties, and on taking a case to court.
The justiciable problems that normally come to court tend to be diffi-
cult for people themselves to resolve. They are also experienced as ser-
ious. Many of them involve long-term relationships: family, employ-
ment, neighbors. Therefore, people will tend to go looking for advice.
Some of them may need assistance. Most people seek and receive some
kind of advice before they come to court.
The next chapter on access to justice focuses on the role of courts
and judiciaries in providing information to support access to justice. It
will explore the ways in which information technology, particularly the
Internet, can support courts in performing this role. People’s compe-
tence and their confidence in the courts are important issues to be kept
in mind.
Chapter 4.3 Access to Court
This chapter examines how information technology can support the
role of the courts in providing access to justice. After examining what
information needs people have when they experience justiciable pro-
blems in the last chapter, we now look at the implications of those
findings for the courts.
Some conclusions from the previous chapter relate to the role of
courts in resolving justiciable problems:
– The most complex justiciable problems are the most difficult to re-
solve.
– On the most complex problems, people need help (information, ad-
vice, assistance, ADR) most.
– These problems are also the most likely to become court cases.
– Going to court is stressful.
– People associate courts with criminal justice.
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More specifically, this chapter examines what courts can do with infor-
mation technology to meet the information needs that one-shotters
have when it comes to resolving their justiciable problems. In order to
answer that question, this chapter analyzes:
– The cases for which one-shotters come to court
– Their related information needs
– How information technology can help to meet those needs.
The information needs are primarily individual information needs, re-
lated to the problem in the case. However, there are also more general
or collective information needs. They are related to the shadow func-
tion of the law and to the image people have of courts. The need re-
lated to the shadow function of the law is discussed first, in the section
on keeping cases out of court. The specific information need related to
the image people have of courts, and how that affects the resolution of
their justiciable problems, is discussed in a special section.
Which cases come to court?
This section analyzes which cases come to court with one-shotters as li-
tigants. To that end, we first go back to Galanter’s framework on party
configurations in litigation between one-shotters and repeat players
(those who are engaged in many similar procedures over time, repeat
players). Galanter has constructed a model in the shape of a matrix
showing the litigation configurations of repeat players and one-shot-
ters. Next, we integrate this configuration into the matrix from the case
processing chapter.
Figure 5 shows the types of cases that may come to court, by type of
claimant and defendant. Galanter theorizes about the configurations:
Quadrant I: One-shotter vs. One-shotter: Most cases in this group
are family cases.
Quadrant II: Repeat player vs. One-shotter: Repeat players use the
courts for routine processing of claims against one-shotters. The great
bulk of litigation is in this quadrant. The litigation can be characterized
as routine mass processing. Even greater numbers of cases are settled,
and settlements are shaped by possible litigation outcomes.
Quadrant III: One-shotter vs. Repeat player: Such cases come to
court only infrequently except for personal injury cases. In auto injury
claims, litigation is routinized and settlement is closely geared to possi-
ble litigation outcomes.
Quadrant IV: Repeat player vs. Repeat player: Cases between repeat
players do not generally come to court. Repeat players will try and es-
tablish mutually beneficial relationships. For any dispute resolution,
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they will rely on arbitration or other less official third parties. Finally,
the government is a repeat player (Galanter 1974 p. 14-15).
To take up the conclusions from the case processing chapters on differ-
ent groups of cases again in the context of access to justice, we go back
to the case matrix developed in the case processing chapter. Figure 6
translates Galanter’s party configurations to the case matrix from the
case processing chapters.
Figure 6 shows the most common party configurations in the case pro-
cessing matrix. The matrix classifies cases according to the level of un-
predictability of the outcome, and the level of cooperation between the
parties affecting that outcome. The win-win cases lend themselves to
forms of settlement, whereas the zero-sum cases are adjudicated more
or less predictably.
Title group claimants are mostly repeat players. They have a routine
way of handling claims, and taking cases to court is part of that rou-
tine. Most one-shotters in this group will be potential respondents who
choose not to contest the claim. They may well be helped with informa-
Figure 5 Matrix of a Taxonomy of Litigation by Strategic Configuration of Parties
  
Defendant/
claimant 
One-shotter Repeat player 
One-shotter I OS vs. OS 
Parent vs parent (custody) 
Spouse v. spouse (divorce) 
Family v. family member 
(insanity commitment) 
Family v. family (inheritance) 
Neighbor v. neighbor 
Partner v. partner 
 
II RP vs. OS 
Prosecutor v. accused 
Finance co. v. debtor 
Landlord v. tenant 
I.R.S. v. taxpayer 
Condemnor v. property owner 
 
 
Repeat 
player 
III OS vs. RP 
Welfare client v. agency 
Auto dealer v. manufacturer 
Injury victim v. insurance 
company 
Tenant v. landlord 
Bankrupt consumer v. 
creditors 
Defamed v. publisher 
 
IV RP vs. RP   
Union v. company 
Movie distributor v. censorship 
board 
Developer v. suburban municipality 
Purchaser v. supplier 
Regulatory agency v. firms of 
regulated industry 
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tion on how they can settle to keep their case out of court. One-shotters
who may have a defense will be helped with information on how to de-
fend themselves or on finding help with it. If they decide to file a de-
fense, the case moves to the judgment group or, in case of settlement,
to the settlement group. Early user statistics for Money Claim On Line
show a quick rise in individual organizations that file claims after
MCOL first went live in early 2003 (MCOL 2004). This could mean
there is a latent demand in the group of one-shotters who are potential
claimants.
The notarial group comprises what Galanter calls pseudo-litigation.
There is no real dispute between the parties. They mostly involve fa-
mily and labor matters between one-shotters. Even a large part of the
employers in the labor matters are one-shotters, individuals with small
businesses. Courts are addressed ad hoc. Parties come to court because
the law requires a judicial decision.13 In the family cases, both the ini-
tiators and the respondents are likely to be one-shotters: spouses re-
questing a divorce because they have agreed to end their marriage, fa-
mily members who request a provision for parental authority, an
authorization for forced medical treatment, an insanity declaration.
Some cases may require representation by a lawyer.
Cases involving relationships can be difficult to resolve. If there is a
real dispute between the parties, the case moves to the right in the ma-
trix, to the settlement group if it is settled during the life of the court
Figure 6 Matrix of Party Configurations
zero   –sum 
  
win-win  
unpredictable 
outcome                      
 
1 title
 
Claimants 
repeat players 
 
4 judgment 
 
 
3 settlement 
 2 notarial
 
predictable   
outcome                     
 
Claimants repeat 
players
Defendants repeat 
players or 
one-shotters
 
Claimants  + 
defendants 
one-shotters
 
Any 
configuration
Source: Chapter 3.2.  
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procedure, and to the judgment group if it ends in a judgment after ad-
versarial proceedings.
Settlement group matters can be any party configuration. They may
come to court because negotiations between the parties have stalled be-
cause of a legal point, or because of something else that was insur-
mountable for one of the parties. It could be they need help on a legal
point, after which they can settle. Court help with settlement may well
be most needed in unequal party configurations. This will prevent
these matters from becoming group 4 cases.
The judgment group’s party configurations are similar to those of
the title group, but now with a defendant. The most frequently occur-
ring configuration will be with repeat players as claimants/initiators,
and mostly one-shotters as defendants/respondents. Occasionally, de-
fendants will be repeat players. Information needs in this group will,
therefore, be diverse. One-shotters are likely to need help on how to
bring a case to court as well as on the rules and regulations regarding
their dispute.
Information needs for litigation
Next, we look at the information needs of one-shotters in the different
groups. What do we know about their need for information, and how
can courts help them to:
– Settle and stay out of court
– Bring their case to court well prepared so their case can be resolved
in the best manner possible.
Keeping cases out of court
This section looks at information needs related to resolving cases with-
out bringing them to court. The problem resolution process can be
pictured as a continuum: Self-help first, then guidance for problem re-
solution, with or without assistance, for a settlement that needs to be
ratified by the court or not. A small percentage of justiciable problems
will come to court. They come to court because the problem cannot be
resolved otherwise and it is serious enough to be taken to court. How-
ever, some problems come to court even though they could be resolved
without it, because a court decision is a legal requirement.
In the last chapter, we learned the following:
– For the kind of justiciable problems that as a rule come to court,
people always need advice.
– For those problems, they usually seek and find information.
– They need information on how to resolve problems, on rights and
duties, on taking a case to court.
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– To find information on resolving problems, they mostly go to spe-
cialized organizations in the Netherlands, and to legal aid organiza-
tions in the United Kingdom.
If guidance about court jurisprudence and policies should play a role
in resolving problems, information on the policies needs to be available
to those organizations as well as to individual information seekers. In
practice, specialist organizations, such as the consumer associations or
home owner associations communities build up their own knowledge
bases. Those repositories are sometimes made available in their publi-
cations and on their web sites. Depending on the organization’s web
site’s business model, the information may be available to the general
public in part, or as a whole. Nowadays, there are examples of specia-
lized organizations to deal with damages suffered by large groups of
one-shotters through one specific cause or event, like risky investment
products or an accident, set up around a web site.
People may also need assistance with resolving their problem. The
assistance can range from contacting the other party, to helping with a
settlement, to forms of ADR. There is potential for settling a consi-
derable number of cases that come to court. One-shotters tend to have
little experience in resolving disputes. In the chapter on court case pro-
cesses, we concluded that cooperation between the parties can produce
a win-win outcome. One-shotters may need help with resolving their
differences so they can bring a ready settlement to court. The example
of labor contract dissolution in the notarial group illustrates how that
can work. In Dutch court practice on labor contract termination, the
employer generally initiates the termination procedure by filing the re-
quest containing the agreement the parties have worked out before-
hand. These requests make up the bulk of notarial group cases in the
local courts (Van Velthoven 2005 p. 22).14 About half of the employers
initiating a procedure are individuals; the other half are legal bodies
(Van Velthoven 2005 p. 29). We do not know what proportion of those
legal bodies could be regarded as one-shotters. The policy developed by
the local courts is public information; it is known in labor unions; and
it is publicly available on the web sites of many organizations speciali-
zing in providing information and support for either employers or em-
ployees. In this win-win group, this example illustrates how informa-
tion about norms that are applied by the court can help the parties.
This discussion of notarial group cases draws a picture of a land-
scape of settling justiciable problems in different phases of their de-
velopment, aided by court jurisprudence and policies. This kind of
information rings of what Richard Susskind called the golden legal
nuggets: punchy, jargon-free practical points, rather than detailed legal
analysis (Susskind p. xlviii). Their basis may be no more than tenden-
cies in decisions by lower courts, but also established case law or juris-
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prudence. In the case of the justiciable problems for which the legal
golden nuggets are not available, generating information on general
trends is an option, possibly with technological support.
Some of the information to support out-of-court settlement can be
laid down in policies, which in turn can be contained in court decision
support systems. Court decision support systems help judges and
courts to reach decisions. Van den Hoogen, referring to the require-
ment of public, transparent administration of justice in the European
Convention on Human Rights, advocates making decision support sys-
tems public (Van den Hoogen p. 105). If they are public, they can also
guide out-of-court solutions. However, making judicial decision support
systems public may well change their character. It seems likely they
will be regarded as norms or standards (Oskamp 2008). Legal and pro-
blem solving cultures may be more geared toward informal dispute re-
solution in some countries than in others. An indication could be that
in the Netherlands, 7 percent of justiciable disputes end in an official
decision; it is more than 14 percent in England and Wales. Such a dif-
ference may signify more or less receptivity to the type of information
service discussed in this chapter.
Bringing cases to court
This section will look into ways in which information technology can
help one-shotters who need to take their case to court. There are a
number of reasons why this question is relevant.
The first one is that correct, adequate information can enhance the
procedural position of the court users, thereby giving one-shotters a
better chance of a just and fair outcome of their case.
Second, a modern government organization can be expected to in-
form the public clearly about its procedures. That holds for courts too.
The third reason needs a little more introduction. From the results
of the Delta and Paths to Justice, we know that so far, almost no one-
shotters come to court without having first received advice and/or as-
sistance. They hardly ever come by themselves. At the same time, com-
pulsory representation by a lawyer is gradually being reduced, at least
in the Dutch system. The value amount for which claims can be filed
in the local courts has been raised several times in the past ten years
(Eshuis 1999 p. 9). It now stands at E 5,000. More than 74 percent of
all civil cases were disposed in the local courts in 2007. There are
plans to raise the amount to E 25,000 in 2011. Consequently, the pro-
portion of civil cases handled in the local courts will grow. In the local
courts, representation by a lawyer is not compulsory. As a result, in
more and more cases parties can come to court, either without assis-
tance or assisted by someone other than a lawyer.15 In other areas, we
see disintermediation: intermediaries disappearing or being bypassed
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by communication on the Internet. The most striking are online
banking and the travel business: instead of physically going to their
bank for transactions, many people now manage their finances online.
They also book flights, hotel rooms and theater tickets by themselves,
bypassing travel agents. It is likely that court users will increasingly
come to expect a similar level of service too.
Therefore, it is timely and useful to explore how these developments
and expectations can be met. There is some indication of how some
court users in the Netherlands experience the present information ser-
vice provided by the courts. In 2007, a study commissioned by the
Netherlands Council for the Judiciary evaluated existing communica-
tion services and outlined improvement of information services for
court users (Mein 2008). The study examined, among other things:
– To what extent are court users provided with information about the
business and the course of things in court?
– How do they rate the information obtained, and how do their
wishes compare with the actual situation?
The study interviewed approximately 250 court users before and/or
after their hearing. The interviews were spread as much as possible
over all sectors: criminal, administrative, local court, and civil (juveniles
and estate division). Five court users were interviewed more in depth.
The team also analyzed information materials and correspondence.
They interviewed legal aid providers as well. The sample of users is
very small, so the findings are indicative only. The findings indicate
that information services for court users in the Netherlands are not
very effective.
Most users do not actively seek and find information in preparation
for their court case. There is a latent demand for information about the
procedure, but users are unable to articulate their demand for legal ad-
vice and assistance. Hence, they cannot seek and find information to
prepare for their case. If users do go looking for information actively,
lawyers are their most common source. That makes information ser-
vice a fairly random process. Users have a passive attitude, partly due
to feelings of guilt and shame. The users want to be informed by a
clearly written letter from the court. They are not interested in modern
media.
People are altogether relatively satisfied about their court experience.
This positive evaluation is caused mainly by the attitude they encounter
from the judge in court.
The information provided by the courts in letters and leaflets focuses
on the sender of the information and the sender’s needs. Legal correct-
ness and procedural functionality are the main criteria. The informa-
tion is not geared to answering questions; it does not take the recipient
of the information into account.
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Users get their information from other sources as well: lawyers, legal
kiosks, bailiffs, the prosecution. Bailiffs, legal service providers, clerks
and ushers all give information. This information is neither coherent
nor coordinated.
The study concludes that “paradigmatic change” is needed. It makes
some recommendations. The style of the information service needs to
be reconsidered. A more proactive, demand oriented and differentiated
information service deserves recommendation. This also involves a re-
consideration of the implications of the rule that courts do not give le-
gal advice. The study has not given a more detailed recommendation
with regard to this rule. I feel the rule itself should not be reconsid-
ered, but the implications need to be looked into. The implication of
the rule is now interpreted, at least by district courts, to mean that peo-
ple with a question are, as a rule, referred to a lawyer. Local court staff,
who are more used to dealing with self-representing parties, tend to be
more forthcoming with help. The study also recommends setting up a
dedicated web site for informing court users about coming to court.
They recommend it should be a new web site dedicated to practical in-
formation for court users per type of (frequently occurring) procedure.
The language level needs to be simple; the site must be easy to navi-
gate. A project is under way to implement these recommendations in a
new web site.
I would submit that the paradigm in question needs a few more
new features:
– Multi-channel information: In the letter inviting parties to court,
there should at least be a reference to information on the web site.
– Information coordination with the other sources.
– Unified and simplified court access.
The next section will explore some of the features of the change that
would be needed, by looking into experience from the United States
and the United Kingdom where information technology has been a
tool for courts for a longer period of time. This section will look first at
experiments with more advanced forms of information technology for
court access.
Online court access: First experiences
This section looks at IT functionality for providing online access to
courts. Courts in the United States have experimented with Internet
technology for helping self-representing litigants navigate their way to
and through court. The pilots, presented regularly at the bi-annual
Court Technology Conferences of the National Center for State Courts
in the United States, are a response to what has been called the access
to justice crisis: the realization that many people, particularly those
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with low income, do not get the help that would make their legal pro-
blems go away (Hough 2007). The philosophy of the access to justice
pilots is that courts, as a justice institution, should ensure decisions
are not made on defaults or lack of knowledge, that decisions are fol-
lowed because litigants understand how to comply, and people have a
right to their day in court. Information technology can provide diffe-
rent functionalities to achieve these goals.
As outlined in Chapter 2.1, courts’ external communication occurs with
very different counterparts:
– Non-users and users
– Lawyers and other regular professional court users
– Non-professional court users.
Looking at the level of the interaction, the approach below follows the
four-stage model for benchmarking e-government projects in the
European Union (EU Benchmarking p. 16):
Stage 1: Information online about public services
Stage 2: Communication/interaction: Downloading of forms
Stage 3: Communication/two-way interaction: Processing of forms
(including authentication)
Stage 4: Transaction: Case handling, decision and delivery (payment).
Below is an analysis of the ways in which those functionalities have
been mobilized to provide access to justice. The examples range from
one-sided information service to increasingly interactive forms of com-
munication:
– Web sites and information
– Forms and document assembly
– Videoconferencing
– Customer friendly e-filing
– Case management systems
– Chat models
– Records access.
Some of these functionalities are still experimental. They are discussed
in the final sections. First, the next section discusses and analyzes
functionality for providing information. This is the activity with the lar-
gest body of experience available of all the functionalities discussed
here.
Providing Information
This section looks at experience with providing information on the In-
ternet. It first lists some requirements for this type of information ser-
vice. Next, it compares some web sites providing information on di-
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vorce. The information is analyzed for web readability and effective-
ness. The section closes with some specific conclusions for court infor-
mation services.
Providing information is generally regarded as a one-sided activity.
Information is “pushed” to the recipient. This does not mean the recei-
ver of the information is irrelevant. For information to be effective, it
needs to meet four major requirements:
– The recipient can understand it.
– The recipient can act on it and will know what to do next.
– The recipient feels confident that the actions he or she undertakes
will achieve the result envisaged.
– The information must, of course, be correct. This criterion is not ex-
amined further in this context.
The general problem with any professional communication is that it
tends to presume a professional, post-graduate level of understanding.
Information for members of the general public needs to be specifically
targeted.
For legal information service on the Internet to be effective, the first
requirement means that people with limited knowledge of the law or
even limited education in general must be able to understand it. The
second requirement is that they must also be able to follow up on it.
Testing legal resources on the Internet
To examine some of the implications of these requirements, a number
of Internet resources were tested on those two requirements. The first
test is for readability. The second test checks if the information points
the reader toward what to do next, and whether the reader can, if the
steps are followed, expect the desired result. I compared web informa-
tion on divorce in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands. I chose
divorce because it is a type of court case that belongs in the notarial
group in the matrix. For this group, information service to support dis-
pute resolution by people themselves was identified as an opportunity
for using IT to improve court performance. Moreover, this choice fol-
lows up on the studies on justiciable problems in those two countries
in the previous chapter. From those studies, we know that divorce, is a
problem for which people will most likely look for advice. In order to
obtain a divorce, they will also need to go to court. In the United King-
dom, a simple divorce can be requested by the parties without a lawyer
representing them. In the Netherlands, all divorce requests need to be
filed by a lawyer. Divorce is a complex issue. It involves procedures and
rules, and it has a strong emotional component. That makes explaining
the legal situation and its implications no easy task. The sites listed be-
low were tested, first for web readability, and then for effectiveness.
The details of both tests are explained below.
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The sites tested were the instances figuring in Paths to Justice (Genn)
and the Dispute Resolution Delta (Van Velthoven 2004), their succes-
sors or their offspring, and the official web sites of the ministries of
justice and the judiciaries and courts. Screen dumps of the web pages
are collected in Appendix A. These sites, listed here in alphabetical or-
der, were tested in September 2008:
CAB: Citizens’ Advice Bureaux, the United Kingdom’s network of advice
agencies. For online advice, visitors to the CAB web site http://www.
citizensadvice.org.uk/cabdir.ihtml are referred to the site of advice-
guide.org. Once there, five clicks, through to family matters and to
ending a relationship bring the visitor to: http://www.adviceguide.org.
uk/index/family_parent/family/ending_a_marriage.htm#divorce
HMCS: Her Majesty’s Court Service: the United Kingdom’s national of-
fice for the courts. There is a link on the home page for divorce pro-
ceedings. The divorce proceeding page lists six choices. I have chosen
“I want a divorce – What do I do?” (leaflet D184):
http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/courtfinder/forms/d184.pdf
Advicenow: a cooperative web site of a number of advice providers in
the United Kingdom. On the home page, there is a quick search link
for divorce. There is a list of search results for divorce from different
sources: a guide to help with splitting up, a survival toolkit, and pages
that discuss mediation and conciliation. Clicking through on informa-
tion about divorce leads to another page with search results. Clicking
on the survival toolkit, which promises information on the divorce pro-
cess, leads to an introductory page that discusses the feelings the read-
er may have and offers help in the process. Another click brings the
reader to the page that explains how divorce law works.
http://advicenow.org.uk/advicenow-guides/family/divorce. The page ad-
dresses the mental picture people may have of divorce from the media,
and also their anxieties about being involved with courts. Advicenow is
a winner of the 2006 Plain English Web Award, for the clear language,
design and organization of the site.
Juridisch loket (Legal kiosk) is the web site for the Netherlands’ network
of legal advice providers. There is a link for family matters on the
home page. On the next page, there is a link to everything you need to
know about divorce. http://www.hetjl.nl/hetjl
Minjus is the web site of the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands. On
the home page, there is a link for the theme of family. On the family
page, there is a link for divorce and alimony. On the divorce page,
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there is a link to “you are going to divorce.” This leads to a pdf of a pa-
per leaflet.
http://bestel.postbus51.nl/content/pdf/06BR2006G015-2006523-
123436.pdf-2006523-123436.pdf
Rechtspraak.nl is the (also award-winning) web site of the Netherlands
first and second instance courts in the Netherlands.16 There is no poin-
ter to general information about getting and filing a divorce on the
home page. I have randomly selected two court web sites. The informa-
tion provided there is presented under the heading: “for lawyers.” The
text on the first one turns out to be a general text addressed to an inde-
finite audience.
http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Gerechten/Rechtbanken/Utrecht/Over+de
+rechtbank/Rechtsgebieden/Handels-+en+familierecht/Familierecht.
htm.
The other court web site presents information specifically for law-
yers.
http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Gerechten/Rechtbanken/Roermond/Voor
+juristen/Rechtsgebieden/Civielrecht+familie/Echtscheiding.htm.
Jeugdsite (Youth Site) is the dedicated space on Rechtspraak.nl to in-
form young people about the law and the courts.
http://www.rechtvoorjou.nl/#/ik_moet_naar_de_rechter/ik_word_ge-
hoord_want_mijn_ouders_gaan_scheiden
Readability
To test for readability, I used a common online web readability test (Ta-
ble 21).17 The test is an automated tool that works with conventional
readability tests. It was designed to help web designers test their pages
for readability. Copied text can be entered into a field, after which it is
processed and the results are reported right away. The tests were de-
signed for use with English. A similar test for Dutch is not readily
available. English is a more compact language than Dutch. That prob-
ably puts the Dutch language sites at a slight disadvantage in this test,
which was designed for English language text. In my experience, that
does not affect the outcome of the test for the purpose of this discus-
sion.
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a Some observations on web readability
Only two web pages meet the web readability standards on all three
tests: Advicenow and leaflet D184 of HMCS. The CAB scores come
very close to the standard. The Juridisch loket and the jeugdsite also
approximate the standards. All these pages were clearly written with a
non-legal audience in mind.
The Minjus page, judging from its content, was written for the gene-
ral public, but its scores do not come close to the web readability stan-
dards.
The first Dutch court web page was written with lawyers in mind.
As such, its scores are adequate.
The second Dutch court web page contains only general informa-
tion. Judging from its content, it is clearly not intended for lawyers.
The score for reading ease is 19, with a web readability reading ease
standard between 60 and 80. The grade level score is 15.1, against a
standard of 6 or 7. These scores show it is far too difficult for a general
audience.
Effectiveness
The second test is for effectiveness. Does the reader know what to do,
and is the reader confident that the desired result will be achieved? I
have not rated the sites for legal correctness. The aim of the test is to il-
lustrate the implications of the web information service, not to judge
the sites concerned.
Table 22 displays the results of testing two other major requirements:
the reader should, after reading the page, know what to do next. The
reader should also feel confident that the required action will produce
the desired result.
First, a brief description of the contents of each page:
The page on Advicenow does not tell the reader what to do, but there
is a menu on the page directing the reader to sections of the site that
Table 21 Divorce 1 - Readability of Web Site Information
Know what to do? Expected result?
Advicenow No Yes
HMCS what do I do leaflet D184 Yes No
Rechtspraak.nl jeugdsite No No
CAB Yes Yes
Juridisch loket Yes Yes
Minjus Yes No
Rechtspraak.nl Rechtbank – for the lawyers No No
Rechtspraak.nl Rechtbank – for the general public No n.a.
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do tell the reader what to do. The page addresses preconceptions about
courts, the law and divorce, and corrects them by explaining how
things work in reality. In this sense, it has learned from the lessons in
Paths to Justice about people facing justiciable problems: they only
know courts from TV and the media, they associate courts with crim-
inal law, they are going through a stressful process, and divorce is ex-
pensive.
The HMCS D184 pdf leaflet provides the reader with factual infor-
mation about the process. For example, how forms are exchanged be-
tween the party and the court: The initiator files form D8 (divorce peti-
tion), he or she gets form D9H (notice of issue of petition) back from
the court, and next form D10 (acknowledgement of service), and so on.
It describes the technical, formal side of filing a divorce, up to the ac-
knowledgement of service. For the next steps, the reader is referred to
another leaflet.
The Rechtspraak.nl jeugdsite, a dedicated space explaining courts
and the law to young people, explains divorce from the perspective of
the child in a marriage. It explains what happens. There is a reference
to legal aid for children on another page.
The CAB page explains that in order to get a divorce, the reader can
apply to any county court. It also explains that the court will grant a de-
cree nisi and a decree absolute that will formally end the marriage.
Juridisch Loket explains to the reader that he or she can make ar-
rangements with his or her spouse. It recommends getting the help of
a mediator. The reader can take the agreement to a lawyer who can file
the request. It also explains that the divorce will be final only after, at
the request of the lawyer, the court decision is entered in the civil regis-
ter.
Minjus is a pdf of a paper leaflet. It says the reader can file the re-
quest, by way of his or her lawyer. The reader will have the decision
sent to him or her by way of his or her lawyer.18
Table 22 Divorce 2 – What to Do?
Know what to do? Expected result?
Advicenow No Yes
HMCS what do I do leaflet D184 Yes No
Rechtspraak.nl jeugdsite No No
CAB Yes Yes
Juridisch loket Yes Yes
Minjus Yes No
Rechtspraak.nl Rechtbank – for the lawyers No No
Rechtspraak.nl Rechtbank – for the general public No n.a.
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Both the Rechtspraak.nl web pages do not tell the user what to do or
what the expected result will be.
Table 23 presents the ranking of the sites on readability and effec-
tiveness. Each site was ranked between 8 and 0 on each of the three
readability counts, 8 being the highest possible score and making 24
the highest possible total for readability. The ranking on the number of
clicks was 4 for the lowest, and 1 for the highest number of clicks. A
site also scored 4 points for an affirmative answer on each of the two
effectiveness scores. Maximum possible score was 36.
The HMCS leaflet D184 ranks best overall. The scores are quite con-
sistent on all aspects tested. The Dutch Rechtspraak.nl sites were being
overhauled at the time of writing.
Box 10 What Is a Decree Nisi?
What is a decree nisi?
I was particularly struck by the use of Latin terminology in commu-
nication with the general public on the HMCS web site. It explains
the divorce procedure. The decree nisi comes up in two instances:
Leaflet D186 explains that a decree nisi is the first of two decrees you
must have before you are finally divorced and free to re-marry.
Leaflet D187 (I have a decree nisi - what must I do next?) will tell you
how to get your final decree (called a “decree absolute”).
Nowhere does the site tell you what a decree nisi actually is. A legal
scholar, but not educated in the United Kingdom, even I had to look
it up:
The Oxford Dictionary of Law told me the following: decree nisi: A
conditional decree of divorce, nullity, or presumption of death. For
most purposes the parties to the marriage are still married until the
decree is made absolute. During the period between decree nisi and
Table 23 Total Web Site Score
Site tested Readability Clicks Ranking
readability
Ranking
effectiveness
Ranking
overall
HMCS what do I do leaflet D184 23 4 27 4 31
Advicenow 22 2 24 4 28
CAB 16 4 20 8 28
Juridisch loket 15 4 19 8 27
Rechtspraak,.nl jeugdsite 15 3 18 0 18
Minjus 9 3 12 4 16
Rechtspraak.nl Rechtbank –
for the general public 5 3 8 0 8
Rechtspraak.nl Rechtbank –
for lawyers 4 3 7 0 7
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decree absolute the Queen’s Proctor or any member of the public
may intervene to prevent the decree being made absolute and the
decree may be rescinded if obtained by fraud.
Help is also at hand in the Advicenow divorce jargon buster:
Decree nisi
For a married couple, this is the first stage of the divorce. You are
not finally divorced by this.
Decree absolute
For a married couple, this is the final stage of divorce. At this point
you stop, legally, being husband and wife.
a Some observations on effectiveness
The differences between the sites allow for some observations:
Information should be geared toward the general, most common
picture. If most divorces are non-contested, paper-based procedures
with no court hearing, this is what needs to be explained first. Lawyers’
approaches tend to be geared toward exceptions. That is a different or-
ientation that is inadequate for providing general information to the
general public.
The pdf’s examined here are electronic copies of paper leaflets. They
are practical and cheap to produce, but their usefulness is limited be-
cause they are static. They do not make much use of the capabilities of
web technology for providing targeted, custom information. They do
not, for instance, contain live links to other sources of information or
clickable menus. If another paper leaflet is referred to, it takes at least
three clicks to open it. Repurposing informational materials for use on
the Web can make communication much more effective by taking ad-
vantage of web functionality.
Advicenow starts by addressing the emotions surrounding divorce
and the preconceptions people may have about the process. The pre-
conceptions include negative images of the law and the courts. It be-
gins by correcting those preconceptions, as they may stand in the way
of effectively handling the problem at hand. This approach looks like it
was inspired by the findings in Paths to Justice. It can be expected to
help the reader become more receptive to the more factual, formal and
legal information about divorce.
If representation by a lawyer is compulsory, courts do not need to
communicate with the public directly. Therefore, they do not feel the
need to take the recipient into consideration. This affects their commu-
nication, as can be seen from the content of the Dutch Rechtspraak
page intended for the general public. The change required, referred to
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earlier, is that toward communicating directly with litigants who are
not legally trained.
Without legal representation, the process as explained by the HMCS
leaflets becomes predominantly bureaucratic. This process of standard,
routine processing resembles that of the standardized processes of re-
peat players and government agencies.
The United Kingdom, like the Netherlands, has a petition, not a
summons system. However, in the United Kingdom the court adminis-
trations themselves have to deal with sending the petition to the re-
spondent. In the Dutch system, there is a compulsory system of legal
representation in court. Comparing the U.K. and Dutch practices leads
to some conclusions about paperwork. Where representation by a lawyer
is compulsory, the lawyer also takes care of the court paperwork.
Self-representing litigants need to take care of the paperwork them-
selves. In simple uncontested cases, that may be fairly straightforward.
But as issues become more complicated, the explanations on the
HMCS web site make it look quite daunting.
Courts are usually barred from giving legal advice. Legal advice in
this context means making a judgment on facts presented, counseling
on steps to be taken and taking a measure of responsibility for the re-
sult. This is radically different from presenting one’s audience, be they
litigants or members of the general public, with facts about the steps
needed when taking a case to court, about what result can be expected,
and including links to credible resources. These activities are not
covered by the rule on legal advice.
If courts choose to provide information on facts about taking cases
to court through a web site for the entire legal system, this information
needs to be consistent for the whole of the legal system, usually the
country, in question. This means the information from one single
source needs to be correct for all courts. This has two implications: (1)
the court practices need to be the same, and (2) the information service
needs to be vested in a central agency. These far reaching implications
will be examined further later.
The preconceptions people have about courts will also be addressed
below, when we discuss their image of the courts and how that affects
them.
In summary, this section examined web site use for the purpose of pro-
viding information to individual litigants. It tested two aspects: read-
ability and adequacy of the information. The majority of the pages
tested did not meet all the readability requirements. Information was
judged adequate if it told the reader what to do, and conferred confi-
dence with regard to the required result. The majority of the web sites
also did not pass the effectiveness tests on all counts. The U.K. sites
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ranked higher on all counts. Differences in practice, like compulsory
legal representation, affect what information is required. They also af-
fect courts’ attitudes to information services. As there appears to be a
movement towards broadening the scope for self-representation, it is
prudent to be prepared for a growing need for direct access to informa-
tion. This will imply centralizing the information service as well as uni-
fying some court practices. It will also involve providing information
on more than one channel by referring to web site information in cor-
respondence with parties. Information coordination with other infor-
mation sources, such as bailiffs and legal aid organizations, will ensure
better consistency of the information provided.
A larger scope for self-representation will also result in an increasing
demand for digital access to courts. This is the topic of the next sec-
tion.
Beyond information push: developing digital access to courts
This section examines the functionality that enables digital court access
for self-representing litigants. There are many different forms of com-
munication between courts and self-representing litigants. Experience
with any of them is limited in most judiciaries. However, there is a
growing body of experience with - increasingly interactive - communi-
cation with self-representing litigants in the United States. Some of
this experience, from pilots in different parts of the United States and
presented at CTC10, is listed below. The examples can be divided into
two groups: online processing and human help. There will always be a
need for human help for people for whom information is not enough.
Therefore, there should always be some form of human help as back-
up, in case someone does not manage the tasks required indepen-
dently.
Recalling the EU benchmark for e-government projects (Chapter 2.1,
EU Benchmarking p. 16), the next section looks at interaction:
Stage 2: Communication/interaction: downloading of forms
Stage 3: Communication/two-way interaction: Processing of forms
(including authentication)
Stage 4: Transaction: Case handling, decision and delivery (payment).
Digital access and online processing
Online processing facilitates the filing of cases by self-representing liti-
gants. There are different ways of doing so, and they are being piloted
in some courts in the United States. They are discussed here in ascend-
ing order: from simple to more complex and sophisticated forms.
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Forms and document assembly
The simplest functionality is that of online forms. Forms provide a
streamlined channel of communication: the recipient of the informa-
tion, in this case the court, specifies what they need to know; the sen-
der of the information, the court user, can be sure that a completely
filled out form will produce the required outcome. It can be a court or-
der of some sort, or a decree formalizing a divorce or a decision gran-
ting a money claim. We have seen examples of the use of forms in the
uncontested divorce procedure in the United Kingdom. Including
forms on a web site can be the next step in developing digital access,
after pushing information. The simplest form of digital access can be
downloadable forms that have to be printed, filled out by hand, signed
and returned by mail or fax (stage 2). They fit into the paper-based pro-
cess most courts still have. More sophisticated types of forms can be
filled out electronically (stage 3). They may have a help function, they
can have embedded calculation functions and analytic tools, and some
can even be filed electronically. Even more developed forms provide the
function of interactive, for instance question-based, document assem-
bly. These forms can fit into electronic file processing, but they can still
be printed out and processed through a paper based process. For this
type of digital access service, full electronic processing in court is not a
necessity.
Experiments with more interactive access
Beyond forms and document assembly, there are experiments with a
few more functionalities. They also require more developed electronic
case processing systems in the courts. I list them here for complete-
ness. There is not much documented experience with them yet.
Customer friendly e-filing
Beyond forms and document assembly, this modality allows for electro-
nic filing. It replaces coming to court to fill out paper forms to file a
case. It is expected to free up court staff for other tasks.
Case management systems:
Functionality in the systems can capture data on self-represented liti-
gants, for instance from previous cases. It can connect cases, especially
in family law to avoid conflicting orders. It allows courts to provide or-
ders to litigants after the procedure.
Records access
This provides self-representing litigants, but also legal service organiza-
tions that give them advice and assistance, access to their court records.
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For people who find problems difficult to deal with on their own, hu-
man support should be available.
Providing human help
From the research on justiciable problems, we have learned that there
are always some people who need human help. In all the functional-
ities listed here, there is a human help backup function. Here are some
examples of providing such human help using technology:
Videoconferencing
In the United States , videoconferencing is used to give self-represent-
ing litigants legal counseling over distance using existing court video
networks, normally used for court hearings over distance. The existing
court video networks are used to give people access to lawyers over dis-
tance, to allow them to consult those lawyers in order to be better pre-
pared to present their case. This facility allows for multi-lingual service
and specialized forms of legal counseling.
Chat functionality
Online chat functionality can assist users to find information and re-
sources and assist users of automated forms. It ensures that users can
find and understand the information. As a backup facility, it presents
an opportunity to learn more about user needs as well.
Digital access: Some indicative conclusions
This part has explored of different forms of online access to courts that
have been tried, but not yet widely implemented . The more advanced
forms of online access are still experimental. However, for judiciaries
wanting to expand their services for self-representing litigants, it is
quite possible to provide simple forms of access without having a so-
phisticated system for receiving electronic information directly. Full e-
filing capability in courts, like electronic filing, case management and
electronic case files, is not an absolute condition for providing more di-
gital access. An important lesson from the previous chapter was that
human help should always be available in case a user cannot manage
the instruction provided independently. The examples of experimental
IT-supported human help given here are not necessarily limited to
cases that come to court. They are also useful for information and ad-
vice services.
A special information need
This section discusses a special problem with regard to people’s atti-
tudes toward courts. This problem is discussed in this chapter because
(1) it affects access to justice, and (2) it involves the communication of
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courts and judiciaries with the outside world, be it users or the general
public.
Genn reports that people’s expectations of courts are largely formed by
what they see in the media. People associate courts with criminal jus-
tice. Without personal experience, their beliefs and stereotypes have
been formed by televised representations, newspaper stories and some-
times stories from friends (Genn p. 225-232). The Dutch study on com-
municating with court users indicates that people did not prepare
themselves well because they were paralyzed by guilt and shame (Mein
p. 45). The Delta reports that the majority of people in general feel the
courts and judges do their jobs well (Van Velthoven 2004 p. 174). How-
ever, those with experience in a court have a more negative opinion
than those without any court experience (Van Velthoven 2004 p. 176).
Interestingly, Dekker observed that people who rate their court experi-
ence positively also have a higher degree of trust in the judiciary (Dek-
ker p. 95). Paths to Justice results indicate that respondents were gene-
rally positive about their experience in court (Genn 1999 p. 221-222).
The Dutch study on court users also indicates that people are positive
about their experience in court (Mein p. 45). Mostly, this is because
their expectation of the court experience is more negative than the
treatment they encounter from the judge in reality. Those who were
well prepared for what happens in court rated the experience more po-
sitively than the small number of respondents who described their
court experience as traumatic.
Paths to Justice and the Dispute Resolution Delta both signal how peo-
ple’s attitudes toward courts and the justice system are crucial for suc-
cessful problem resolution. How people feel about courts affects their
willingness to come to court, their experience when they get there, and
their perception of the outcome of their case. This finding indicates
one more information need in the context of access to justice. This
need for a fact-based realistic understanding of their processes and
roles also constitutes an important requirement for court and judiciary
information services: judiciaries and court systems, if they want to im-
prove access to justice, should ensure that their information service
helps people to have a realistic understanding of their processes. They
can also provide litigants with practical, correct and complete informa-
tion on what they can expect when they come to court, and how they
can prepare for their case. This will improve access to justice for people
who need a court decision only occasionally in their lifetime. Because
this information can enhance public trust in the judiciary, it cannot be
left to others and is the responsibility of the judiciaries themselves.
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Conclusions for Part 4
How courts and judiciaries can improve access to justice using forms
of information technology was the main question of these chapters on
access to justice. These conclusions summarize the main findings.
The first chapter identified barriers to access. It concluded that ac-
cess to legal information is an important area to be explored further,
for two reasons. The first reason is because of the role of information
in access to justice. Access to information can support fairer adminis-
tration of justice by providing information for people to act adequately
when confronted with problems with a potentially legal solution. It can
compensate, to some extent, for the disadvantage one-shotters experi-
ence in litigation, thereby increasing their chance of a fair decision.
The second reason is because the Internet provides a channel for legal
information service, but experience with it is limited in most judici-
aries.
The second chapter examined the information needs that arise when
people experience problems with a potentially legal solution. Informa-
tion needs turn out to be problem-specific. Most problems are resolved
by people themselves, sometimes with the help of information, or help
in the form of advice or assistance. The help is provided by many dif-
ferent organizations, but mostly by specialized organizations or provi-
ders of legal aid and alternative dispute resolution.
The third chapter examined the implications of those findings for
the role of courts in improving access to justice using information on
the Internet and digital access to courts. Two strains on the role of in-
formation in access to justice run through this theme: information to
keep disputes out of court, and information on taking disputes to
court.
Information to keep disputes out of court
An almost implicit understanding is that parties with information on
the “rules of thumb” of how courts deal with types of disputes will set-
tle their differences more easily and keep them out of court. This sup-
ports settlement in the shadow of the law. Most of this type of settle-
ment will be done with the support of legal or specialist organizations.
In the pre-litigation stage, information about general approaches
judges and courts have to specific types of problems can help the infor-
mal resolution of those problems. This will require that information
about the way courts deal with those types of problems becomes avail-
able. Some of the ways in which courts deal with specific issues are
laid down in policies. Moreover, judicial decision making is supported
by decision support systems reflecting policies. In order to help out-of-
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court settlement, policies and decision support systems need to be
available publicly.
This study generally supports the idea that access to justice can be
effectively improved with information services. The information ser-
vices identified here should serve the purpose of getting justice done.
They should not keep people from getting the justice they deserve by
preventing them from taking a justified concern to court.
Information on taking disputes to court
If a dispute needs to come to court, information can reduce the disad-
vantage one-shotters have in dealing with the court and with legal is-
sues. Access to information for individual, self-representing litigants
increases their chance of a just, fair decision. Litigants need informa-
tion on how to take their case to court. Such an information service re-
quires a proactive, demand-oriented attitude from courts and judi-
ciaries. Multi-channel information services, such as a letter from the
court with reference to information on the court’s or judiciary’s web
site, can meet people’s information needs. Beyond information push,
increasingly interactive forms of information technology can provide
access to court. Not all of them require full-scale implementation of
electronic case management and electronic files. In order to be effec-
tive for everyone, the information services discussed will require hu-
man help backup. There are also technologies to provide this, but they
may still not be sufficient for everyone. The information services dis-
cussed here, in order to be effective, will require a central agency for
the entire legal system.
Public trust
A final finding is the importance of public trust in the courts for access
to justice. Judiciaries can actively contribute to improved access to jus-
tice in this field by ensuring correct information about their processes.
The requirement of public trust becomes a more urgent issue where
court users complain about corruption in the judiciary and in the
courts. This issue, and how information technology can support redu-
cing corruption and improve impartiality and integrity in the courts, is
the subject of the next part of this thesis.
Notes
1 article 14 ICCPR, article 6 ECHR.
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2 With its comparison of estimated court costs (discussed in the chapter on case delay),
the DB database provides a means of getting an indication of costs for one particular
type of civil procedure.
3 Galanter remarks that the top-scoring repeat player is the alcoholic derelict. But that
was in 1974. By 2008, due to changes in culture and law enforcement, others may
have taken over this place.
4 This is commonly referred to as the Access to Justice Crisis.
5 I remember a case where a dispute between owners of parts of a building had its
root in the official document that split the ownership of the building between them.
The problem with the document could only be resolved by a public notary. We, the
court, could decide that one of the owners should cease renovation activities, but
were not allowed to deal with the problem in the document that was at the root of
the problem.
6 The words “lumping” and “lumpers” are used by Genn to denote the category of peo-
ple who remain inactive in the face of their justiciable problems.
7 In the United Kingdom, about 20 percent of the population is so poor at reading and
writing that they cannot cope with the demands of modern life. (http://www.
literacytrust.org.uk/database). In the Netherlands, the percentage of similarly low
literacy is estimated at about 10 percent (http://www.lezenenschrijven.nl/nl/
analfabetisme).
8 Advicenow.org.uk – ISB Self Help Project Final Report March 2005, on www.advice-
now.org.uk.
9 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm
10 Source: www.eurostat.eu
11 Polls Archive - Home - Advicenow
12 Even if the outcomes are not objectively uncertain, as was argued in the chapters on
case delay, they may still be perceived as uncertain by the litigants.
13 This requirement was recently abolished for termination of labor contracts. At the
time of writing, in 2008, it is too early to tell the effect this change in the law will
have. See the chapter on case delay (Chapter 3), p. 10-16.
14 There are also labor cases in group 4 (or 3). In the majority of those cases, there is
no agreement on termination, or the relationship was terminated but the final ac-
counting has developed into a dispute.
15 It will enable special interest organizations to extend their services to litigation
support.
16 A project is under way to overhaul the website.
17 http://www.addedbytes.com/readability. I have learned a lot from this site about ways
to make writing more understandable: using shorter words and breaking up sen-
tences, for instance.
18 In October 2008, the page tested turned out to have been taken off the site. It has
been replaced by a page providing a link to a downloadable pdf brochure.
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Part 5 Impartiality, Integrity and Corruption
The next three chapters examine how information technology can sup-
port reducing corruption and improving impartiality and integrity in
courts and judiciaries.
Corruption in the judiciary and in the courts is a common complaint
in many parts of the world. During my time at the World Bank, I was
told time and again that the only way to ensure a favorable judicial de-
cision is to bribe the judge. This impression is difficult to test, because
corruption is extremely difficult to verify empirically. In 33 of the 62
countries polled for TI’s Global Corruption Barometer, a majority of re-
spondents describe their judiciary/legal system as corrupt. This group
includes all countries in Africa and Latin America except South Africa
and Colombia. In the United States, the percentage of respondents de-
scribing their judiciary/legal system as corrupt is about 55, and it is 33
percent in Canada. In Asia, the percentage for India is well over 70,
and for Pakistan it is around 55. However, for Singapore, Malaysia,
Hong Kong and Thailand the percentages are lower than 25. Eight of
the ten countries with the lowest percentages are in Western Europe.
In all former communist countries, 45 percent or more people de-
scribed their judiciary/legal system as corrupt (TI 2007).
From Part 4, we have learned how important public trust in the
courts is for peaceful dispute resolution and for the administration of
justice. Part 5 examines the role of information, and consequently in-
formation technology, in engendering public trust, ensuring impartiali-
ty and integrity, and reducing corruption in courts and judiciaries.
Relevance
Corruption in the judiciary and the courts is relevant in more ways
than one. First, corruption in society is commonly believed to impede
economic growth and disproportionately affect the poor (Lambsdorff
1999 p. 5). The judiciary, part of the larger justice system, is an impor-
tant instrument in combating corruption. If corrupt practices in society
in general should be punished, they must be prosecuted, tried in court
and sanctioned. The justice sector institutions serve to prosecute and
judge such corrupt practices. In the shadow of effective prosecution
and trial, people may refrain from corrupt practices for fear of being
prosecuted themselves. Therefore, justice sector institutions are indis-
pensable in combating corruption in society. There is some empirical
evidence of a correlation between the quality of the judiciary and the
incidence of corruption in society: The 1997 World Development Report
found a significant correlation between corruption and the predictabil-
ity of the judiciary in 59 countries, while controlling for other explana-
tory variables (World Bank 1997 p. 104). Lambsdorff questions the di-
rection of the correlation (Lambsdorff 1999 p. 6). Therefore, whether
judicial independence reduces corruption, or reducing corruption in-
creases judicial impartiality, or whether they just go together is uncer-
tain. Feld and Voigt conclude that de facto (actual, practical) judicial in-
dependence1 positively influences gross domestic product (Feld p. 23).
Therefore, it is probable that well working judiciaries, low levels of cor-
ruption and economic growth go together. We do not know enough to
understand the causal relations between them. However, we do know,
in summary, that a well working judiciary is an essential institution in
reducing corruption.
The second reason why corruption in the judiciary is relevant is that
corruption in the judiciary will undermine the legal system and the
confidence people have in it. As a peaceful means of conflict resolu-
tion, judicial dispute resolution relies largely on voluntary compliance.
Where public trust in the judiciary is harmed by corruption, confidence
in the legal system and voluntary compliance with it are at risk.
The third reason is in the international conventions, discussed in
Part 1: everyone has a right to independent, impartial judges and
courts.2 In the context of this study, independence is regarded as an in-
stitutional condition to safeguard impartiality. Independence is under-
stood as a part of the framework of conditions that make impartiality
possible. For this reason, impartiality, not independence, is discussed
here as the primary norm for the judiciary in the context of the discus-
sion on corruption. If courts and judiciaries perform the task set out in
the conventions effectively, there is less incentive for corruption to col-
lect debts, protect property rights and for other private enforcement.
The role of information technology
Introducing and using information technology is often believed to re-
duce corruption in courts and judiciaries because it is expected to intro-
duce more impersonal ways of working. In most countries where I ad-
vised World Bank judicial reform projects, people told me they believed
corruption would go down after the introduction of computers. How-
ever, it was difficult for them to explain why. Possibly, they were saying
it just because they expected that would induce the World Bank to give
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them funding for computers. Another possibility is that they expect the
introduction of computers to make their problems go away without
much effort on their part. I do believe they are right in that introdu-
cing computers and IT can help reduce corruption in the courts. Mak-
ing that happen, however, will require more than just money or intro-
ducing IT. It will require targeted effort, based on understanding what
the problems are, how they can be resolved effectively and what infor-
mation technology can realistically contribute. These chapters set out
to provide some answers to those questions.
Plan for these chapters
These chapters examine corruption, in general and more particularly
in judiciaries and courts, in order to find out how IT can realistically be
expected to contribute to reducing corruption in the judiciary and the
courts. The first two chapters are dedicated to a better understanding
of the problems of corruption. Chapter 5.1 is concerned with theory.
Chapter 5.2 presents empirical material. Chapter 5.3 discusses reme-
dies and their effectiveness, and then goes on to examine the role of in-
formation and its consequences for information technology support for
reducing corruption.
For those purposes, the following areas will be covered:
Theoretical framework
Chapter 5.1 will set up a theoretical framework that can serve to exam-
ine corruption based on empirical evidence, and explore possible reme-
dies. It discusses the normative, legal framework, some definitions of
corruption from different perspectives, some of the leading theories
about causes of corruption and a comparative, cross-country approach.
Empirical evidence of corruption in courts and judiciaries
Chapter 5.2 examines empirical evidence of corruption in courts and
judiciaries. Using the theoretical framework form Chapter 5.1, it will
conduct case studies of empirical evidence on the incidence of corrup-
tion in the judiciary and the courts in Slovakia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Ni-
geria and the United States.
Possible remedies: Corruption in courts and judiciaries as an information
problem
Chapter 5.3 analyzes the information-related aspects of the findings.
The resulting insights are used to draw conclusions on ways in which
forms of IT can be used to combat corruption in courts and judiciaries.
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Chapter 5.1 Corruption - Theory
This chapter introduces theoretical approaches that will help us to un-
derstand corruption in courts and judiciaries. It discusses the norma-
tive framework for courts and judiciaries with regard to corruption,
how corruption is usually categorized, some ways in which it is de-
fined, and the most current theory about its causes.
Normative framework
This section highlights the specific normative international framework
for the topic of impartiality and corruption in courts and the judiciary.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 19483 states that every-
one is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and
obligations and of any criminal charge against him. Article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,4 by stating that
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal established by law, affirms this state-
ment, as do the regional human rights conventions. All these conven-
tions award everyone the right to impartial judges and courts. Since
the vast majority of countries are party to one or more of the conven-
tions mentioned above, the normative framework as described binds
those countries and the judiciaries and courts in them, directly or indir-
ectly.
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)5 aims
to promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption
and promote international cooperation and technical assistance in the
prevention of and fight against corruption, and promote integrity, ac-
countability and proper management of public affairs and public prop-
erty. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
has also produced an anti-bribery convention aiming to prevent inter-
national bribery and corruption.
UNODC – Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct
Conventions need implementation in order to be effective. The United
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) supports implementa-
tion of the international anti-corruption agreements with its Global
Programme against Corruption. The Programme builds capacity by
providing a knowledge base and conducting training and education.
Because a corrupt judiciary is a serious impediment to the success of
any anti-corruption strategy, the Programme also examines judicial cor-
ruption, and is seeking to identify means of addressing it. To this end,
it supports a Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity (JIG).
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The JIG, active since 2000, consists of chief justices from Africa and
Asia. Among the outputs of this group are the Bangalore Principles of
Judicial Conduct.6 The Bangalore Principles are based on principles
found in the majority of judicial codes of conduct around the world.
They intend to provide a code against which the conduct of judicial of-
ficers may be measured. They list six principles of judicial conduct: in-
dependence, impartiality, integrity, propriety, equality, and competence
and diligence, followed by guidance on the application of each princi-
ple. In the context of this chapter, only the first two principles will be
discussed because they are the two principles that are central to focus-
ing on what constitutes judicial corruption .
The first principle in the Bangalore Principles is independence.
From the text of Principle 1 and its application, it is clear that it at-
tempts to combine different understandings of independence. Inde-
pendence of courts and judges has been the subject of much, some-
times ideologically flavored, debate. For example: lawyers from country
X argue that there would be less corruption in the courts of country Y
if only those courts were more independent. Evidently, independence is
understood differently in different contexts (Carothers p. 90). Arrange-
ments guarding judicial independence are the outcome of complex po-
litical processes in a given context, and therefore they, and their under-
standing, are specific to that particular context. In itself, this does not
constitute a problem in the context of this study. If we look at what
court users object to as corruption in courts, it is unfair court processes
and decisions. In this study, independence is regarded as a condition,
an arrangement enabling impartial, fair decisions by judges and courts.
Impartiality is JIG’s Principle 2. Impartiality means performing judi-
cial duties without favor, bias or prejudice, with regard to the decision
itself but also to the process by which the decision is made. In the fa-
mous adage, justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be
done.7 Impartiality requires the existence of actual impartiality as well
as the appearance of impartiality as seen through the eyes of the rea-
sonable observer. That is why perception is important. In the section
on empirical evidence, we will see how the impartiality of court deci-
sions is perceived, how important appearance is, and what is important
about independence as a condition for impartiality.
Council of Europe – GRECO
Another modality in anti-corruption implementation is the Group of
States against Corruption (GRECO), established in 1999 by the Coun-
cil of Europe to monitor states’ compliance with the organization’s anti-
corruption standards. GRECO monitoring comprises a horizontal eva-
luation procedure evaluating all members, and leading to recommen-
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dations for reform, and a compliance procedure to assess the measures
taken to implement the recommendations. To date, GRECO has con-
ducted three evaluation rounds. GRECO has 46 members, 45 Eur-
opean states and the United States. Most GRECO reports are public.8
Definitions and categorizations of corruption
This section examines some commonly used definitions and categori-
zations.
Corruption is a term that is used in many different ways. A com-
monly accepted way of tackling this conceptual variety is to introduce a
definition. Definitions do not capture the full reality of a complex phe-
nomenon like corruption. The approach taken in this section does it
only limited justice. This treatment of the definitions attempts to limit
the scope and provide some focus to the discussion. The comparative
perspective introduced later on will paint a more nuanced picture.
Abuse of public roles for private benefit is the most commonly used
definition of corruption. A more precise and elaborate definition is: Be-
havior that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the ac-
tions of someone in a position of public authority because of private-re-
garding motives such as wealth, power or status (Mustaq Khan 1996
p. 12, quoted in Andvig, p.12).
Most definitions of corruption focus on its economic aspects, but
corruption can also consist of a social or cultural exchange. Likewise,
most definitions of corruption will focus on the state-society relation-
ship because public sector corruption is believed to be a more funda-
mental problem than private sector corruption, and because controlling
public sector corruption is considered a prerequisite for controlling pri-
vate sector corruption.
A frequently used categorization of corruption is the following (An-
dvig p. 18, Anderson 2006 p. 7):
– Administrative or bureaucratic corruption, “petty,” low level forms of
bribery in connection with the implementation of laws, rules, and
regulations.
– Political corruption, or state capture, high level corruption in the law-
making process, firms shaping and affecting formulation of laws and
regulations through private payments or other means of influence to
public officials and politicians.
When applied to judiciaries and courts, this grouping distinguishes
corruption in:
(1) Bureaucratic corruption: influencing routine implementation of
laws and regulations: case handling and everyday, common judicial
decisions in first instance courts.
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(2) Political, high level corruption: influencing judicial decisions that
are relevant on a higher level, for instance regarding election re-
sults, judicial control of the executive by the high instance court,
high profile criminal cases, or decisions shaping jurisprudence, and
influencing judicial appointments.
Forms of corruption include bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, pa-
tronage, graft, and embezzlement; they are described in the Oxford
English Dictionary as follows:
– Bribery means to dishonestly persuade [someone] to act in one’s fa-
vor by paying them or giving other inducement.
– Graft includes bribery and other corrupt measures pursued for gain
in politics or business.
– Extortion is to obtain something by force, threats, or other unfair
means.
– Nepotism is favoritism shown to relatives or friends, especially by
giving them jobs.
– Cronyism is the improper appointment of friends and associates to
positions of authority.
– Patronage means support given by a patron, as well as the power to
control appointments to office or the right to privileges.
Patronage apart, the descriptions all include an explicit morally nega-
tive qualification of the activity in question: dishonestly, corrupt, unfair,
improper, implying that the activity in question crosses the dividing
line between proper and improper behavior. Paying someone to act in
one’s favor as such is not bribery. What makes it bribery is that it is
done against the rules and standards. The standards are stricter for
public officials than they are in the private sector. Paying a member of
parliament to act on one’s behalf is improper, but paying a lobbyist to
try and influence that same parliamentarian on one’s behalf is not.9
Helping one’s relatives in itself is alright; it becomes favoritism when
it crosses the line between proper and improper help, for instance
when a job is given bypassing the usual procedures for hiring staff,
where a family member is given priority in case handling. What also
makes it improper is the purpose of private gain. Impropriety therefore
has two components: violation of a standard, and private gain.
Nepotism, cronyism and patronage influence who takes a decision,
rather than what its content is. With regard to judiciaries and courts,
the question of who takes a certain decision involves several levels of
the organization. It has to do with assigning individual cases and
groups of cases, as well as with judicial appointments. In both cases,
that can involve both administrative and political corruption. It can also
involve bodies and persons inside or outside the judiciary. And ulti-
mately, the content of the decisions is the purpose of the influence.
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That leads to the conclusion that, for the purpose of discussing cor-
ruption in courts and judiciaries, using a somewhat elaborate defini-
tion emphasizing the improper elements will sharpen our focus. Here
is the definition that suits that purpose: Corruption in courts and judici-
aries thus means an improper use of judicial power for private gain, result-
ing in decisions that are not impartial.
A legally-oriented understanding of the term corruption generally re-
lates it to the violation of a rule of a national law. This implies that
judgments over the legality of various practices will also vary with dif-
ferent national legislation (Andvig p. 66). This is also valid in a wider
sense. What is considered proper or improper depends on the context.
Consequently, a solely legal understanding of corruption is insufficient
for the purpose of finding ways to combat it, in judiciaries or else-
where. However, where the international conventions say judges and
courts have to be fair and impartial, that should provide something of
a normative framework for the discussion as to what is proper and im-
proper for courts and judiciaries.
Some theories about causes of corruption
This section examines some of the leading academic approaches to
causes of corruption in order to gain insight into ways of limiting cor-
ruption in courts and judiciaries. The leading academic approaches to
corruption and its causes are mostly American. I chose them for inclu-
sion here because they are helpful for my analysis, which targets orga-
nizational aspects of the issues courts and judiciaries face.
The first approach focuses on power and checks on that power. It
identifies three factors:
– The exclusive power of the decision-maker
– His or her discretion
– The lack of accountability for abuses of this power and discretion.
Framed in a formula, the relationships between the factors look like
this:
Corruption = monopoly + discretion – accountability (Klitgaard 1988 p.
75). Applied to judges and courts, Klitgaard’s formula means that
judges would be far more likely to be corruptible and corrupted if they
have:
(1) A monopoly over legal dispute resolution, for example where there
are no viable alternatives such as arbitration or mediation
(2) Broad discretion, for example, where they are independent from re-
view
(3) Limited accountability, for example, in non-oral processes, non-pub-
lic venues, non-continuous trials, non-participatory dispute resolu-
tion, or unpublished decisions.
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Judges and courts ultimately do have a monopoly over sanctioning
state force in dispute resolution. Referring to the second factor, judges
seldom have very broad discretion; their discretion is generally limited
by the provisions of the law.10 Judicial decisions are often subject to ap-
peal or review. Finally, where processes are dealt with in public and de-
cisions are published, abuse of judicial power can be expected to be
limited. When applied to the judiciary, each factor entails risks. It also
suggests arrangements to mitigate those risks. Higher levels of mono-
poly can be offset with reduced discretion, or more accountability, or
both.
The focus on power explains the conditions under which that power
may be abused. It does not explain why people actually do abuse their
power, in general or in the judicial processes.
The second approach focuses on motivations and incentives for peo-
ple to actually abuse power. Corrupt behavior, in this analysis, is
mainly determined by:
– The level of available benefits
– The riskiness of corrupt deals
– The relative bargaining power of the briber and the bribee (Rose-
Ackerman 1999 p. 225).
These basic factors can be applied to judges and courts. Low salaries,
poor working conditions and scarce resources can all be obvious incen-
tives for judges and court staff to take bribes for the benefits they en-
tail. They may abuse their power especially where the risk of detection
is low, or where detection does not lead to sanctions. Here, indepen-
dence can be a risk factor in itself: where the only mechanism for disci-
pline is internal because judges themselves judge accusations of abuse
of judicial power, the risk of prosecution and sanction can be relatively
low. Another factor affecting the level of risk is the effectiveness of the
organization. If information on the workings of the organization is not
available or opaque, that will facilitate corrupt behavior because it lowers
the risk of detection.
The relative bargaining power of the judge or court staff member
and competing litigants is mainly determined by the degree of finan-
cial need, resources, and competition. These factors all affect the level
of corrupt practices. The relative bargaining power of the judge or
court staff member will be affected by the existence of a monopoly, the
degree of discretion and the level of accountability.
This approach examines motivations; it does not focus primarily on
the conditions that give rise to these incentives. Both approaches look
at the behavior of individuals; they do not primarily study differences
in the level of economic or political development of a national system
that may explain variations in corruption.
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If corruption should be limited by increasing the riskiness of corrupt
deals and raising accountability, the most obvious remedy that may
come to mind is that of strong repressive measures. These can take the
form of anti-corruption campaigns and prosecution. Many of those
campaigns have not led to a sustainable reduction of corruption.
So far, we have implicitly assumed corruption is the same phenom-
enon all over the world. The next section examines a comparative ap-
proach that may provide some explanation for the failure of those cam-
paigns.
A comparative approach: Syndromes of corruption
The first thing that is striking in the comparative perspective is that
there is apparently less corruption in richer, more developed countries.
The World Bank’s World Governance Indicators have shown a clear
correlation between the level of economic development and corruption:
corruption tends to be lower in richer countries. Likewise, judges with
higher salaries are less corrupt. Almost half, 46 percent, of the varia-
tion in judicial corruption is “explained” by the variables per capita in-
come and openness of the economy, although the openness of the
economy is not significant (Voigt in TI GCR 2007 p. 298). Higher ju-
dicial salaries and lower levels of corruption are strongly correlated.
However, raising judges’ salaries as an isolated measure does not sig-
nificantly affect the level of corruption The significant factor here is
not the level of the individual judge’s salary; it is the overall level of de-
velopment.
The third approach in this section on theory relates levels of develop-
ment and levels of perceived corruption. It compares patterns of cor-
ruption across countries and identifies cross-country patterns of cor-
ruption (Johnston 2005). The level of development and the level of per-
ceived corruption were the main factors used to group countries into
syndromes of corruption. Ninety-eight countries were sorted into four
corresponding groupings by applying widely used indicators of partici-
pation and institutions (Appendix B). The main indicators used are the
World Bank’s World Governance Indicators, the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme’s Human Development Index and Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index, valid for 2001. They are
all publicly available.11
The syndromes are about systemic corruption, not individual cases
of corrupt behavior. The approach identified four syndromes of corrup-
tion, reflecting frequently encountered combinations of stronger or
weaker political participation and stronger or weaker institutions:
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The Influence Markets syndrome has fully developed, functioning de-
mocratic institutions, but it is weak on the participation side. Voter
turnout is low, and party financing is a critical issue. Corruption has
been checked by legalizing the political role of wealth, yet policies favor
moneyed interests. Those policies may well be seen as the result of un-
fair or corrupt influence International firms participate in corrupt prac-
tices in developing countries, where strong public institutions make in-
fluence well worth buying or renting, and strong economic institutions
(such as banks, currencies) make these societies safe havens for cor-
rupt takings amassed elsewhere.
In the Elite Cartels syndrome, top figures collude behind a fac¸ade of
political competition and colonize both the state apparatus and sections
of the economy. Elections are fraudulent, indecisive, or uncompetitive.
Institutions are moderately weak. Political and economic opportunities
are often expanding at least somewhat, however, making the elite cartel
a way of staving off potential competitors in both spheres.
In the Oligarchs and Clans syndrome state, political and social insti-
tutions are very weak and ineffective, and participation is risky. Politi-
cally and economically ambitious elites are insecure. They build bases
of personal support from which they exploit both the state and the
economy. Corruption of this type is unpredictable and a powerful
source of injustice. Courts, the police and the bureaucracy are hijacked
as well.
In the Official Moguls syndrome, there is official impunity. Institu-
tions are very weak, popular participation in government is feeble and
orchestrated from above, and corrupt leaders and their personal favo-
rites exploit society and the economy, including aid and investment,
rather than developing it.
This approach provides a nuanced understanding of the various forms
of corruption and the interaction of public sector institutions with the
surrounding societies. The syndromes approach includes all countries,
not just developing countries. It suggests starting points for reform in
societies at all different stages of development. Consequently, it is rele-
vant for identifying remedies for corruption. Tailoring reform to the
particular syndrome will increase its chance of success. For instance,
reform requiring strong political resolve will be difficult to carry out
where institutions are very weak. The potential consequences of this
approach for reform will be examined more closely in Chapter 5.3, on
remedies. First, in Chapter 5.2, country cases of corruption in the
judiciary will be introduced to provide some understanding of the
phenomena.
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Conclusions for this chapter
This chapter set the theoretical framework for studying corruption in
courts and judiciaries. Corruption in the context of judiciaries and
courts means behavior by judges or court staff that is improper be-
cause - for private gain - it deviates from the rules of conduct derived
from the provisions in the international conventions concerning judi-
cial impartiality. It can be facilitated by arrangements that go with inde-
pendence, for example internal disciplinary mechanisms that lower the
risk of detection or sanction. Weak institutional development also facili-
tates corruption in courts and judiciaries. Low pay and lack of re-
sources can raise the benefits of corruption. Corruption is likely where
judges have the following:
– A monopoly on decision, therefore no competition
– Wide discretion, for instance when there is no or limited possibility
of review or appeal
– Low accountability, because there is no public scrutiny or the risk of
detection or sanction of corrupt behavior is low.
A low detection risk points to institutional weakness. The level and
form of institutional weakness are important determinants for corrup-
tion. The actual level and form the corruption takes in a given situation
are related to the level of development and they depend on the applic-
able corruption syndrome. Both the level and form of institutional
weakness determine where the starting points for reform are. This fra-
mework provides some focus for an examination of the incidence of
corruption, in general and in judiciaries and courts, in the next section.
It will help us to gain some understanding of the starting points for re-
form to reduce corruption in courts and judiciaries in countries in dif-
ferent syndromes. This will provide a foundation for identifying how,
in each case, forms of information technology can support reducing
court corruption.
Chapter 5.2 Court Corruption - Empirical Evidence
This chapter examines the incidence of corruption in judiciaries and
courts, and the forms it takes in real life in different contexts. The
chapter starts by discussing methodological issues with empirical evi-
dence of corruption. Next, it analyzes those issues with regard to evi-
dence of corruption in courts and judiciaries.
The chapter then examines well-documented examples of both ad-
ministrative and high level corruption in countries from all the differ-
ent corruption syndromes. Empirical evidence of corruption will come
from different sources. Some of the evidence comes from surveys;
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most of it is derived from case studies. The case studies serve as illus-
trations. This empirical information, about the incidence of corruption
and the actual forms it takes, is given a fairly lengthy treatment. The
reason for this is that the information is of particular importance for
those members of the audience with a Western, developed country
background. It has been my experience that understanding what that
corruption actually looks like is problematic because their experience
with systemic public sector corruption is limited.
Finally, the chapter offers some conclusions on causes of judicial
and court corruption, and some tentative indications of remedies.
Methodological issues
This section discusses some methodological issues related to empirical
research into judicial and court corruption. It discusses the strengths
and weaknesses of survey methodologies and of various indicators that
affect the research.
Empirical evidence of corruption in general, and of corruption in
courts and judiciaries in particular, is scarce. This is especially true for
case studies. As a consequence, a relatively large part of the empirical
evidence comes from surveys. However, what we can learn from sur-
veys has its limits.
We need to distinguish surveys reporting on experience with corrup-
tion, and surveys on corruption perception. Both types entail their own
risks. Actual experience may not always be truthfully reported. Respon-
dents may be reluctant to admit having paid a bribe. Justice officials
may be reluctant to report corruption in their own profession or peer
group due to a sense of loyalty to the group. The perception of corrupt
practices in the justice system may be caused by actual corrupt prac-
tices but also by delays or incompetence from other causes. It can also
be caused by a general feeling that all public servants are corrupt. Per-
ception of judicial and court corruption in the general public tends to
be higher than perception of corruption by court users, those who have
actual court experience (TI GCR 2007 p. 14). Perception of corruption
may also go up when governments actually begin to tackle corruption,
and the subject gets more attention in the press. A case in point is the
Czech Republic; its score in the Transparency International Corruption
Perception Index went down from 3.9 to 3.7 between 2001 and 2002,
as the Czech Republic prepared to join the European Union (TI CPI
2001 and 2002).
Hence, both experience and perception surveys need to be treated
with care, particularly in the context of diagnosing problems. However,
they can serve to provide a sense of the incidence of corruption, thus
helping to identify directions for further enquiry and examination. For
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diagnostic purposes, they need to be supplemented with information
from more qualitative studies, and case studies in particular.
A worldwide view of corruption in courts
As a first step in examining the empirical evidence of corruption in
courts and judiciaries, Transparency International’s Global Corruption
Barometer provides a worldwide impression. It surveys the form and
extent of corruption from the view of people around the world. The
most recent Barometer is from 2006. There is interesting information
about corruption in courts: worldwide, 29 percent of all respondents
believe the courts are corrupt. Twenty-four percent agree with the pro-
position that, in order to be sure that a court passes a fair judgment,
you need to bribe someone. Of that 24 percent, 51 percent believe you
have to bribe a judge. Of those respondents who had used the legal sys-
tem and the courts in the previous 12 months, 11.5 percent report they
or a member of their family have paid a bribe (TI GCR 2007 p.11).
Thus, while 24 percent believe bribes are a necessity, only 11.5 percent
of court users report they actually paid a bribe.
Syndromes of corruption
This section also takes a world view of corruption, but with more de-
tail. Table 24 illustrates the comparative approach of corruption syn-
dromes from the theoretical framework. Here, the methodology is ap-
plied to compare a number of countries based on their level of develop-
ment and corruption, grouping them into syndromes. Their rankings
in the major indexes discussed in Chapter 1.3 are included as well.
Table 24 shows the rankings and scores from the various sources. For
each country, its corruption syndrome grouping is in column 1. The
country name is in the second column. Column 3 gives the 2008
Transparency International Corruption perception index score out of a
possible maximum of 10; column 4, the Human Development Index,
out of a possible maximum score of 1.0 (2005 is the most recent index
available); column 5: the 2008 ranking in the TI CPI with 1 being the
score for the lowest corruption perception; column 6, the Doing Busi-
ness Database time in calendar days for contract enforcement from the
first step up until and including enforcement; column 7, the time in
calendar days for only trial and judgment; and column 8, the World-
wide Governance Indicators percentile ranking scores for Rule of Law.
The countries were selected because they figure in this study, and/or
because their ranking is illustrative of the syndromes approach. The
table gives a general sense of worldwide trends in levels of development,
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governance effectiveness, levels of corruption and the quality of judicial
systems. On the whole, a high level human development ranking
(column 4) goes together with a low level of corruption (TP CPI,
columns 3 and 5). Johnston’s syndrome ranking was based on figures
for 2001. With the 2008 figures, some of the results would probably
have come out differently.
Generally, a high score on rule of law also comes with a high level of
development, but these results are less directly correlated. That also
holds for the two DB scores on the number of days needed to process
a contract enforcement claim. Clearly, for a realistic assessment, a
more in-depth, qualitative study is necessary. Such an approach is pre-
sented in the next section.
The Judicial Integrity Group’s indicators
The Judicial Integrity Group, supported by UNODC, has drawn up a
list of indicators derived from empirical studies on judicial and court
corruption (UNODC 2001). The JIG commissioned a number of as-
sessments of the status quo of the justice sector in Indonesia, Nigeria,
Table 24 Corruption and Rule of Law in Selected Countries
1 group
by
syndrome
2 country 3 TI
CPI
2008
4 HDI
2005
5 TI
CPI 08
rank
6 DB
time in
days 2007
7 DB trial
and
judgment
8 WGI
RoL 06
1 New Zealand 9.3 0.943 2 216 152 97.6
1 Singapore 9.2 0.922 4 120 88 95.2
1 Netherlands 8.9 0.953 7 514 442 93.8
1 United Kingdom 7.7 0.946 16 404 313 93.3
1 Costa Rica 5.1 0.846 47 877 547 64.8
2 Belgium 7.3 0.946 18 505 400 91
2 South Korea 5.6 0.921 40 230 90 72.9
2 Slovakia 5.0 0.863 52 565 365 61.4
2 Paraguay 2.4 0.755 138 591 466 18.1
3 Sri Lanka 3.2 0.743 92 1318 1000 54.3
3 Romania 3.8 0.813 70 537 365 50.5
3 Bulgaria 3.6 0.824 72 564 334 50
3 Nepal 2.7 0.534 121 735 365 29
3 Nicaragua 2.5 0.710 134 540 331 25.7
4 Macedonia 3.6 0.801 72 385 280 43.8
4 Georgia 3.9 0.754 67 285 100 32.9
4 Egypt 2.8 0.708 115 1010 720 53.8
4 Morocco 3.5 0.646 80 615 365 53.3
4 Benin 3.1 0.437 96 720 375 36.7
4 Kenya 2.1 0.521 147 465 365 15.7
4 Nigeria 2.7 0.470 121 457 273 8.1
4 Gambia 1.9 0.502 158 434 302 47.6
Sources: TI CPI, HDI, DB, World Bank 2008a, WGI.
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South Africa, and Sri Lanka. The assessment methodologies include
desk reviews, surveys and focus groups. All stakeholders were inter-
viewed about - among other things - their experiences and perceptions
of corruption in the judiciary and the courts.
In its 2001 publication on Strengthening Judicial Integrity Against
Corruption, the JIG has listed 16 indicators for corruption. These indi-
cators are not indicators in the sense described above. They are facts or
circumstances that may indicate the presence of corruption in a judi-
cial system. This is their list (UNODC 2001 p. 6):
Indicators of corruption, as perceived by the public, include:
– Delay in the execution of court orders
– Unjustifiable issuance of summons and granting of bails
– Prisoners not being brought to court
– Lack of public access to records of court proceedings
– Disappearance of files
– Unusual variations in sentencing
– Delays in delivery of judgments
– High acquittal rates
– Conflict of interest
– Prejudices for or against a party, witness or lawyer (individually or
as member of a particular group)
– Prolonged service in a particular judicial station
– High rates of decisions in favor of the executive
– Appointments perceived as resulting from political patronage
– Preferential or hostile treatment by the executive or legislature
– Frequent socializing with particular members of the legal profes-
sion, executive or legislature (with litigants or potential litigants)
– Post-retirement placements.
The JIG indicators do not differentiate between symptoms, such as in-
consistent decisions and prejudices, and facilitating circumstances, like
lack of access to records of court proceedings and prolonged service in
a particular judicial station. They use criteria such as “unusual” varia-
tions in sentencing and “high” acquittal rates. To be useful, those criter-
ia should be elaborated in the specific context, less relative and also
less subjective. Even a concept such as delay needs some standard to
establish whether a decision is overdue, in the sense that it should have
been delivered but has not been.
In order to be useful for the analysis of both incidence of corruption
and potential remedies in a judiciary, court or court system, these in-
dicators need to be divided into meaningful groups. I have categorized
them as follows.
a Deficiencies in the execution of court work
– Delays in the execution of court orders
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– Delays in delivery of judgments
– Disappearance of files
Delays are, as explained in Chapter 3.1, understood to be “things that
should have been done within a certain time frame, but have not been”:
overdue judgment, execution that has been put off. In that sense, there
is a normative component to delays. Therefore, in order to decide
whether there is a delay, it is necessary to have a standard against
which to gauge it.12 Besides, delays are different from backlogs. A back-
log is “something that has not been done yet.” With regard to the dis-
appearance of files, the JIG report gives the example of files that were
made to disappear only to reappear after a payment. These indicators
will mostly point to administrative corruption in courts.
b Inequalities in the administration of justice
– Unjustifiable issuance of summons and granting of bail
– Unusual variations in sentencing
– High acquittal rates
– High rates of decisions in favor of the executive
– Prejudices for or against a party, witness or lawyer - individually or
as a member of a particular group.
These indicators are all about outcomes of the judicial process. There
may also be some indicators that have to do with entry points, such as
leave for appeal. Inequalities, just like inefficiencies, need to be mea-
sured against a standard. Case file analysis is the most frequently used
methodology to establish whether these inequalities have in fact oc-
curred. In this methodology, concrete case files are sampled or ran-
domly drawn. They are examined by legal experts who are sufficiently
familiar with jurisprudence in the given legal system. Inequalities may
point to either administrative or political corruption, or both. The in-
equalities may have been caused by factors other than corruption, like
ignorance of the standards due to lack of education and training.
c Status and career of judges
– Conflict of interest
– Appointments perceived as resulting from political patronage
– Preferential or hostile treatment by the executive or legislature
– Frequent socializing with particular members of the legal profes-
sion, executive or legislature (with litigants or potential litigants)
– Prolonged service in a particular judicial station
– Postretirement placements.
The presence of any of the first three factors in this list may point to
deficiencies in judicial career management. The deficiencies can be
either the cause or a symptom of political corruption. Where political
patronage is systemic, for instance in group 3 or 4 syndrome countries,
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it is likely that patronage prevails over the norm of impartiality. In or-
der to underpin impartial judicial decisions, judicial career manage-
ment should be governed by the need for independence. Frequent so-
cializing and prolonged service may be risk factors for either adminis-
trative or political corruption. Especially in this group, it becomes clear
that differentiation according to the country is needed in order to draw
valid and useful conclusions. Prolonged service in a particular judicial
station, for example, would not in itself be regarded as an indicator of,
or a facilitating circumstance for, judicial corruption in most influence
market (syndrome 1) countries. Moreover, other factors need to be ta-
ken into account to explain why there is corruption in some systems,
and less corruption in others. Indicators in this category will need to
be addressed in countries where corruption is perceived as a problem.
d Other things to look for
The last group comprises some other circumstances that may indicate
corrupt practices, notably prisoners not being brought to court and lack
of public access to records of court proceedings.
Prisoners not being brought to court may, but does not necessarily,
point to corruption in the judiciary or the courts. It can also be due to
other factors, such as either political or administrative corruption in
the prosecution or the police. It may show up in statistics about the
length of pre-trial detention, but it will most probably have to be exam-
ined in the local context. Lack of public access to records of court pro-
ceedings indicates low accountability, a factor we already encountered
in the theoretical framework.
Each of the JIG indicators may be a manifestation of the possibility of
corruption in a judiciary or a court. That makes them useful for diag-
nostic purposes, but they are not, in themselves, a solid basis for a plan
for introducing remedies. They do not tell us why the corruption is
there; they can be proxies for causes of corruption, but they are not in
themselves causes as discussed in the theoretical framework. In order
to diagnose judicial and court corruption, we need to know, for each
country context:
– Whether judicial and court corruption is perceived as a problem
– Its manifestations
– The causes and incentives .
This diagnosis is the basis for analyzing the possible viable remedies .
For identifying opportunities for using IT as a remedy, we also need to
establish what the information aspects related to the corruption are –
both in general terms and in each specific case. The next section exam-
ines some examples, using the approach described here.
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Administrative corruption – bribe paying surveys
This section examines examples of bribe paying in the context of ad-
ministrative corruption. Our main source for the first part of this dis-
cussion is a World Bank experience survey of bribe paying by busi-
nesses in the Eastern European and Central Asian region. The reason
for choosing this source is that the survey in question provides such a
well-detailed picture of corruption experience. Part of the survey asks
businesses whether they have paid bribes to courts. The 2006 survey
notes that, on the whole, firms report that both bribe paying and state
capture have gone down in most countries in Eastern Europe. How-
ever, in contrast to taxes and customs services, judicial systems have
not reduced corruption. Businesses report having paid more bribes to
courts (Anderson 2006 p. 54).
The case of Slovakia
Slovakia’s TI CPI score for 2008 is 5.0; for 2001, it was 3.7. It joined
the European Union in 2004. It is an elite cartels (syndrome 2) coun-
try. For courts and judiciaries, this could mean that judges are part-
ners in elite networks, using their powers to aid cartel partners and
sharing the corrupt proceeds.
The World Bank conducted a special study of corruption in Slovakia,
published in 2002 (Anderson 2002). It provides an example of how, in
many ways, identifying the problem of corruption is easier than identi-
fying both its causes and incentives and its remedies. In Slovakia, cor-
ruption in the educational system is centered mostly around universi-
ties. There is also a widespread perception that one cannot gain admit-
tance to law or medical schools without paying bribes. Both the justice
system and the health sector are reported to have widespread corrup-
tion. Possibly, students who have bought their way into university edu-
cation carry those practices with them when they enter the legal and
medical professions.
The study also reports how the courts were identified by the three
sample groups - households, enterprises and public officials - as slow
and largely corrupt:
– “Slowness of courts” was selected by 80 percent of enterprises as
one of the three most serious obstacles of all the obstacles that en-
terprises face in their business development.
– Seventy-five percent of enterprises indicated “low executability of
justice”13 to be a major problem. Among enterprises that had been
involved in a recent court case, nearly 19 percent indicated that they
had encountered bribery.
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– The average bribe was more than 25,000 SKK, and the median was
more than 11,000 SKK, more than any of the other 20 governmen-
tal bodies covered by the enterprise survey.14
– Courts received a dismal quality rating, among the worst in the sur-
vey. Only one in nine enterprises that were involved in court cases
gave favorable ratings for quality.
Of the 13 percent of households that were involved in court trials, 25
percent gave something “special” to a court employee, judge, or attor-
ney. The rate was highest among those who were the accusing parties
in civil trials, such as divorces, property disputes, etc. Thirty-two per-
cent made such unofficial payments.
Thirty-five percent of enterprises evaluated their experiences with
the courts as unfair or biased, and 30 percent felt is was corrupt. Less
than 17 percent felt the process was fast and without unnecessary de-
lays.
Between 2002 and 2005, the frequency of bribery in the courts went
down from approximately 12 percent to approximately 5 percent of
firms indicating that bribes related to courts are frequent (Anderson
2006 p. 55). The Slovak Republic introduced merit-based selection of
judges and strengthened the capacity to prosecute cases of judicial cor-
ruption. Court case disposition time, as reported in Time in Days for
the Doing Business court case, decreased from 655 to 565 days.
The case of Bulgaria
Bulgaria, an Eastern European country formerly in the Soviet bloc,
joined the European Union in 2007. Bulgaria’s TI CPI score for 2008
was 3.6; for 2001 it was 3.9. Bulgaria is an oligarchs and clans (syn-
drome 3) country. This can mean that judges are part of competing oli-
garchs’ personal followings, in effect “retained” to perform legal ser-
vices (issuing writs, filing/dismissing charges, etc.) from the bench. In
1999, the World Bank’s Bulgaria justice sector assessment examined
the courts and the national governance structure for the judiciary. The
assessment includes a description of some of the circumstances that fa-
cilitate corruption.
“The lack of sufficient national record-keeping and administrative
follow-up also contributes to corruption. The Supreme Judicial Council
does not have staff to handle either statistical information or adminis-
trative supervision, and the MOJ does not collect data which would per-
mit reviews of job performance or actions/delays in specific cases, nor
does it have supervisory authority over the judicial branch. The presid-
ing judges of the courts systems have a variety of administrative duties,
as well as their own caseload, and also have no administrative staff to
support a thorough review of the caseloads of the other judges. Nor is
there any modern docketing system for case files. The result is a lack
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of systemic administrative support of supervision of the judicial
branch. One consequence of this situation is that judges, prosecutors
and investigators who decide to resolve cases corruptly can do so with
the high probability that their actions well be neither reviewed nor
questioned. According to strong anecdotal information, this kind of
corruption is more common than the resolution of cases on the basis
of the facts and applicable law.” (World Bank 1999, p. 13)
Between 2002 and 2005, the frequency of bribery in the courts in
Bulgaria stayed almost constant at a level of approximately 18 percent
of firms indicating that bribes related to courts are frequent (Anderson
2006 p. 55). The case disposition time as reported in Doing Business
did not change.
The case of Georgia
Georgia’s TI CPI score for 2008 was 3.9. Its earliest measured score
was 2.4 for 2002. Based on the 2002 score, Georgia would most
probably be an official moguls (syndrome 4) country.15 This could
mean that judges are personal clients of top regime figures, performing
political as well as legal functions at the behest of a dictator or ruling
circle.
Since the Rose Revolution in November 2003, under the leadership
of President Michael Saakashvili, Georgia has gone through rapid
changes. The 2008 scores indicate it could now also be an oligarchs
and clans (syndrome 3) country, discussed above. During my World
Bank mission to Georgia in 2004, I interviewed a number of leaders
in the judiciary at the time.16 Some of them have since left the judi-
ciary, voluntarily or otherwise.
During one of my court visits, case handling was explained to me.
This is what I understood of how case handling worked, at least at the
time of my visit:
A case is filed, which means someone brings one or more docu-
ments to the court building. The file is taken by the clerk. The clerk
gives the file a case jacket. The file in its jacket is then passed to the
judge, who keeps it in his or her cabinet throughout the life of the
case. The judge then needs to determine the court fee. This should be
done by estimating the work the court will have with this case, judging
from the nature of the dispute and the content of the file. There is no
established fee structure. No one but the judge handles the case file.
The judge writes a notice to the filing party asking for the estimated
court fee.
When asked what the most important short-term issue in the Geor-
gia judiciary is, the majority of my counterparts mentioned eliminating
corruption in the judiciary. There is no reliable estimate of the extent
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of corruption in the judiciary. The following circumstances were put
forward as facilitating corruption:
– Judges do not know what to do with the cases for lack of training
– Lack of (professional) court management
– Lack of consistent management of resources
– Low salaries
– Integrity is, so far, not a criteria for the selection of judges
– Many rayon (small, sub-district) courts consist of only one judge.
In 2005, in a World Bank survey, firms report that both administrative
corruption and political corruption in the form of state capture have
fallen markedly and that corruption is far less of a problem for busi-
ness. Bribery in the courts has decreased from about 15 percent to
about 10 percent of firms indicating that bribes related to courts are
frequent (Anderson 2006 p. 55). Georgia has – as one of the first coun-
tries in the region - introduced entry examinations for judges. It has
also restructured the internal judicial discipline mechanism by includ-
ing outside stakeholders on the panel. The single judge courts in dis-
tant mountain areas were integrated into larger courts in regional cen-
ters.
The case of Nigeria
Nigeria’s TI CPI score for 2008 was 2.7. Its 2001 score was 1.0. Niger-
ia is an official moguls (syndrome 4) country. This could mean the
judges, as personal clients of top regime figures, perform political as
well as legal functions at the behest of a dictator or ruling circle.
In Nigeria, the JIG study confirmed the strong relation between de-
lays and bribe paying in courts. Court users reported how the payment
of bribes occurred in connection with applications for bail, institution
of proceedings, issuing of summons to the defendant, interrogatories,
delivery of judgments and obtaining certified copies of proceedings.
People who had to return to court several times for the same case were
the ones who were asked to pay bribes more frequently. Delays are a
compelling incentive for court users to accelerate the procedure by pay-
ing bribes. Delays are often in fact an implicit request for a bribe in ex-
change for an unanticipated service. Procedural complexity may also fa-
cilitate corruption. This also suggests that the likelihood of incidence
of corruption relates directly to the overall duration of the case (UN-
ODC 2006 p. 140).
The case of Benin
Benin’s TI CPI score for 2008 was 3.1. Its earliest recorded score was
2.9 for 2004. Benin is also a group 4 syndrome country. Here, too,
judges may be personal clients of top regime figures, performing politi-
cal as well as legal functions at the behest of the ruler.
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Benin’s justice sector was diagnosed in 1999-2000 as part of the
process toward a justice reform program supported by the World Bank.
The report calculated that in 2008, there would be no judges left in Be-
nin unless the conditions were drastically improved. All the old judges
would have retired, and no new judges were forthcoming because of
the low status and pay of the profession. One example of the low level
corruption this may induce is illustrated by a case I encountered
during my visit in 2004. Some judges had tampered with the checks
they had received to reimburse their travel costs, by adding one or
more zeros to the number on the checks. The official in charge of
bookkeeping had received part of the proceeds. While I was in Benin,
some of the judges were serving jail sentences. The judges were slated
to be dismissed after having served their sentences.17
The case of the Netherlands
The Netherlands’ TI CPI score for 2008 was 8.9. Its score for 2001
was 8.8. It is an influence markets (syndrome 1) country. Generally
speaking, syndrome 1 countries have fully developed, functioning de-
mocratic institutions, but the systems are weak on the participation
side. Voter turnout is low, and party financing is a critical issue. Cor-
ruption has been checked by legalizing the political role of wealth. Poli-
cies favor moneyed interests; those policies may well be seen as the re-
sult of unfair or corrupt influence. For the courts and judiciaries, this
may generally mean that judges are bribed or practice extortion in con-
nection with specific cases. The Netherlands ranked third in TI’s Bribe
Payers’ index for 2008 with a score of 8.7 out of 10 (TI BPI 2008). I
have not found sufficiently documented cases of administrative corrup-
tion in the courts of the Netherlands. The user satisfaction surveys
(Prisma) show that people were not pleased with the disposition times
and the waiting times in their cases, but there is no indication that
they were displeased because of unequal treatment. Another source of
information in this context could be reporting on complaints to the
court. However, there is no public record of complaints to courts
boards or how they were handled. From my own memory, I recall a
case where courtroom ushers were bribed by lawyers to let defendants
go first in a criminal court in Groningen in the 1980s. The case was
prosecuted and tried, and the defendants were convicted.
Conclusions about administrative corruption: corruption as a problem of
information
The Nigeria case illustrates how procedural complexity and longer
duration create opportunities for bribery. The extreme weakness of the
institution means there is little risk of detection. In Georgia, candidate
causes offered by stakeholders in the judiciary included lack of training
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and education, deficient court management and very small courts. The
Georgia case handling story shows there was no case administration to
speak of in this example: no administration, no clear, unambiguous
procedure for setting court fees. The judge in the case had a monopoly
as the only case handler, wide discretion with regard to the court fee,
and a very low risk of detection of a possible unfair decision. Georgia,
with its improved TI CPI score, also shows that measures to address
corruption can have an effect.
Institutional weakness, consisting of a lack of systemic administra-
tive support for supervision of the judicial branch, is described vividly
in the Bulgaria assessment. In Slovakia, the most significant factors
are the quality of internal administration, information flow, and the ex-
istence of meritocracy. Such deficiencies, occurring with more or less
severity depending on the level of development of the country in ques-
tion, show up as opportunities for unchecked administrative corrup-
tion. This is a starting point for thinking about information, and access
to information, as a remedy against corruption. Unfair decisions and
procedures will be more difficult to carry out when:
– Information flows within the organization are clear
– Decisions are public
– Internal administration is done on the basis of clear, unambiguous
predefined procedures
– Careers are managed on the basis of competence and merit.
Clear procedures and public accountability will limit the scope of dis-
cretion. All improvements to information flow will raise the risk of de-
tection as well as accountability.
High level political corruption: Influencing decisions and appointments
High level corruption is generally understood as influencing decisions
in the law-making process, such as firms shaping and affecting the for-
mulation of laws and regulations through private payments to public
officials and politicians. What is called high level corruption would, for
the courts and the judiciary, mean influencing two things: (1) judicial
decisions, and (2) judicial appointments. The judicial decisions in this
group are usually the decisions of higher courts with political impact,
such as decisions about the legality and correctness of election results,
decisions regarding the legality of executive action, or high profile
criminal cases involving the powerful. It is very difficult to find exam-
ples of judicial decisions that are not impartial because they were influ-
enced. It is even more difficult to document them properly.
The appointment of judges can be a politically sensitive process.
Generally speaking, legislation regulating judicial appointments is
done in a way that safeguards the judiciary’s independence, if followed.
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In Germany, for example, judges in the ordinary courts are - mostly -
appointed by parliamentary committees after a post-academic training
program. In other systems, judges are appointed by the head of state
on the recommendation of another state body. Some countries distin-
guish lower and higher level judicial appointments. In these countries,
lower level, first instance judges are appointed by a body within the ju-
diciary, for instance, a judicial service commission. Members of the Su-
preme Court or the appellate courts are appointed by the head of state
after a recommendation by one or more other state bodies. The involve-
ment of different state powers is intended to ensure the judiciary’s in-
dependence. Both the internal and high level appointments run the
risk of being influenced by patronage systems where these are strong
and where institutional weakness is such that no countervailing poli-
cies are strong enough to curb it.
The case of Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka’s TI CPI score for 2008 was 3.2. Its TI CPI score for 2001
was 3.2. Sri Lanka is an oligarchs and clans (syndrome 3) country. This
could mean that judges are part of competing oligarchs’ personal fol-
lowings, and in effect “retained” to perform legal services (issuing
writs, filing/dismissing charges, etc.) from the bench.
In Sri Lanka, there was great public dissatisfaction with the integrity
of the judiciary following the last appointment of a president of the Su-
preme Court of Sri Lanka. The President of Sri Lanka appointed him
as chief justice in 1999 from the position of attorney general. This was
a breach of the usual convention of appointing the most senior judge
on the supreme court to the chief justice position. The most senior
judge at the time was well regarded internationally and noted for deli-
vering judgments that went against executive and legislative abuse of
power. He was bypassed - allegedly for those judgments - by the Presi-
dent of Sri Lanka (TI GCR 2007 p. 275-278). Under the Constitution,
the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) exercises the powers of appoint-
ment, promotion, dismissal and disciplinary control of the judges of
the lower courts. However, there are no disclosed criteria. The Interna-
tional Bar Association Report of 2001 gives examples of instances
where original court judges were arbitrarily disciplined and even dis-
missed by the JSC headed by this chief justice. The IBA Report con-
cluded that the perception of a lack of independence of the judiciary
was in danger of becoming widespread and that it was extremely harm-
ful to ordinary citizens’ respect for the rule of law. It was “concerned
that not only is there a perception that the judiciary is not independent,
there may indeed be some basis in fact for the existence of such a view-
point in relation to a minority of the judiciary” (IBA 2001 p. 33). There
were also serious concerns expressed about the discipline, retirement,
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appointment, transfer and promotion of judges under the auspices of
the Judicial Services Commission (IBA 2001 p. 38). In his April 2003
report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the Independence of the Judiciary wrote that he
“continues to be concerned over the allegations of misconduct on the
part of the Chief Justice Sarath Silva, the latest being the proceedings
filed against him and the Judicial Service Commission in the Supreme
Court by two district judges [in 2003].”18 In 2006, the other two mem-
bers of the JSC besides the chief justice resigned for “reasons of con-
science” (IBA 2006).
On the presumption that all judges are somehow equal, the principle
of seniority is a very common criterion for selecting presiding judges.
This is particularly true when managerial capabilities are not consid-
ered a key competence for the presiding judge. Potentially, bypassing
the seniority criterion is a way of invading the judiciary with a patron-
age network. Lower court judges are appointed by the Sri Lanka JSC.
There are no disclosed criteria for the careers of judges in the lower
courts. The absence of those criteria is an institutional weakness that
leaves room for developing a patronage network. This example also
shows the importance of external agencies, in this case the Interna-
tional Bar Association and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Indepen-
dence of the Judiciary, for observing what goes on in a country and de-
bating it publicly.
The case of Texas
The TI CPI score for the United States for 2008 was 7.3. The TI CPI
score for the United States for 2001 was 7.6. The United States, of
which Texas is a part, is an influence markets (syndrome 1) country.
Generally speaking, syndrome 1 countries have fully developed, func-
tioning democratic institutions, but the systems are weak on the parti-
cipation side. Voter turnout is low, and party financing is a critical is-
sue. Corruption has been checked by legalizing the political role of
wealth. Policies favor moneyed interests; those policies may well be
seen as the result of unfair or corrupt influence. For the courts and ju-
diciaries, this may mean that judges are bribed or practice extortion in
connection with specific cases.
In the United States, judges in state courts are mostly elected. In
most states, the elections are non-partisan. In Texas and seven other
states, judges are elected in party elections. Once elected, they are al-
lowed to contribute to others’ election funds. Parties with cases pend-
ing in court are allowed to contribute to the election or re-election
funds of the judges concerned. In 2003, former Chief Justice of Texas
Tom Phillips said: “Our partisan, high-dollar judicial selection system
has diminished public confidence in our courts, damaged our reputa-
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tion throughout the country and around the world, and discouraged
able lawyers from pursuing a judicial career."19 This example shows
how partisan elections may endanger judicial impartiality. From discus-
sions with many judicial colleagues and other lawyers in the United
States, I understand that partisan elections of judges are widely consid-
ered a serious flaw in the system.
The case of Nepal
The TI CPI score for Nepal for 2008 was 2.7. The TI CPI score for Ne-
pal for 2004 (earliest score available) was 2.8. Nepal has recently gone
through major constitutional changes, after years of unrest. Nepal is
an oligarchs and clans (syndrome 3) country. Nepal has a number of
specialized tribunals, some of which have been set up to circumvent al-
leged corruption in the ordinary courts. During my mission in 2004,
the following case became headline news: A British citizen was ar-
rested in Kathmandu’s Tribhuvan Airport with heroin in his luggage
and in one of his shoes. He admitted having the drug in his posses-
sion. The special court for drug cases convicted him to 17 years in pris-
on and a hefty fine. The case was heard on appeal by the appeal in-
stance for the special court. This appeal court is a panel of two mem-
bers of the Supreme Court. The panel acquitted the defendant. The
reasons that made it into the public press were twofold. Apparently,
the police report was unclear as to whether the heroin was in his right
or his left shoe. He also had allegedly not had the service of an inter-
preter while being questioned by the police. The press voiced the suspi-
cion of corruption, saying that no member of the organized drugs ma-
fia had so far remained in custody. The Bar Association studied the de-
cision. Its conclusion was that the decision was completely against
established jurisprudence. The Bar and the Attorney General de-
manded an investigation by the Judicial Council. The two judges went
on leave. A three-member panel reported to the Council, or at least to
the Chief Justice. The official procedure for dismissal of Supreme
Court judges is that they have to be impeached before Parliament,
which can depose them with a two-thirds majority. At the time, there
was no Parliament. One judge resigned after having been advised to do
so. The other judge decided to resist the advice to resign20.
This case, about influencing a high level judicial decision, is an ex-
ample of the role of public scrutiny and external pressure. The institu-
tional weakness of an absent parliament to decide whether to dismiss
the judges in this case created a problematic situation.
The case of the Netherlands
For the sake of completeness, here are the data on the Netherlands
from the previous section again: The Netherlands’ TI CPI score for
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2008 was 8.9. Its score for 2001 was 8.8. It is an influence markets
(syndrome 1) country. Generally speaking, syndrome 1 countries have
fully developed, functioning democratic institutions, but the systems
are weak on the participation side. Voter turnout is low, and party fi-
nancing is a critical issue. Corruption has been checked by legalizing
the political role of wealth. Policies favor moneyed interests; those poli-
cies may well be seen as the result of unfair or corrupt influence. For
the courts and judiciaries, this may generally mean that judges are
bribed or practice extortion in connection with specific cases. A public
source on misconduct by judges is the annual report of the procurator
general. The procurator general is in charge of requesting the dismis-
sal of judges, for misconduct or other reasons. In the published annual
reports, I have found two investigations regarding judicial impartiality
(Hoge Raad p. 142-143). Both are ex officio investigations into reports
raising doubts about a judge’s impartiality. In the first case, a party to a
case and her lawyer accused a judge of lack of impartiality because of
ties in the past between him and the director of the other party; among
other things, the judge was said to have bought a piece of land below
market value from this director. Investigation showed this had not been
the case, nor were there other grounds for conflict of interest or partial-
ity. The other case concerned a statement made by a judge in a news-
paper interview; the subject matter of this case is completely outside
the scope of this study. Complaints, generally, should be made to the
court where the alleged impartiality has taken place. Until now, report-
ing on those complaints is not public. However, there is a public regis-
ter showing each judge’s official activities outside court on the Internet.
Provided an interested party knows the name of the judge in his or her
case, the data on this judge’s activities are publicly available.21
Institutional weakness in high level judicial corruption
Obviously, in high level judicial corruption public scrutiny is impor-
tant. Without it, I would not have been able to report these cases.
The Nepal example shows the institutional weakness of not having
Parliament in place to deal with the dismissal of Supreme Court jus-
tices. The partisan elections in Texas do not reflect syndrome 1, but
rather syndrome 2: elite cartels with party allegiance as a factor imped-
ing impartiality. The Sri Lanka example illustrates the patronage net-
works syndrome eloquently: no publicly disclosed career management
for judges, leaving them at the discretion of the leadership of the judi-
ciary. The case of the Netherlands illustrates how a fully developed in-
stitution displays little sign of high level corruption. Unfortunately, this
may also be caused by the lack of accountability, since reporting is lar-
gely not public.
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Conclusions for this chapter
The quality of internal administration, procedural complexity, and ca-
reer management based on merit and the actions of external watchdog
agencies such as the press, the private bar, and civil society groups are
factors influencing the incidence of corruption.
The illustrations and the research discussed above strongly suggest
that the underlying cause of corruption is mainly institutional weak-
ness. The weaknesses uncovered include absence of clear information
flows and poor internal administration. They result in poor accounta-
bility and low risk of detection. Poor or absent career management
goes together with clientelism and political intervention in appoint-
ments and promotions.
With regard to the role of information, some observations can be
made:
– Internal administration is mostly a matter of information about on-
going work. More transparent internal administration increases de-
tection risk.
– Excessive procedural complexity is related to sub-optimal internal
administration. Simplification of procedures will reduce the num-
ber of opportunities for bribe-taking.
– A career based on merit presupposes that the knowledge and infor-
mation required are available. This means that knowledge and in-
formation on standards, as well as training and education, need to
be available.
– The actions of external watchdog agencies, and public accountability
more in general, are evidently mostly about information.22 In-
creased transparency will enhance public scrutiny and thereby pres-
sure for, ultimately, more impartial judicial decision making.
That makes information an important tool against corruption in courts
and judiciaries. Consequently, technology that deals with information
can be an instrument against corruption as well. This can be techno-
logy providing information about internal processes and technology
supporting communication with external parties. Searching for poten-
tial remedies that can be supported by information technology in order
to combat corruption and improve impartial decision making is, there-
fore, the next step.
As observed before, the level of corruption and the form it takes are
influenced by the level and form of institutional weakness, which
strongly correlates with the level of development of the country in
question. This last observation needs to be taken into account when
identifying starting points for reform that point to effective remedies.
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Chapter 5.3 Court Corruption - Remedies
This chapter examines ways in which IT can support reducing corrup-
tion in judiciaries and courts. Building on the theoretical insights from
the first chapter on corruption and the findings from the empirical
chapter, it focuses on potential remedies. Therefore, it first identifies
information aspects of the problem of corruption. It then goes on to
identify starting points for remedies. The syndromes approach sug-
gests options for reform in each syndrome. Although those suggestions
do not apply specifically to judiciaries or courts, they offer some guid-
ance for remedies that will be examined later. The chapter ends by
drawing conclusions about some of the ways to use IT for corruption
reduction in courts and judiciaries.
Distinguishing clearly between identifying the problem of corruption
in the judiciary and identifying its source, solutions or remedies is of
the essence in the process of figuring out how corruption can be re-
duced. For each country or system, a thorough diagnosis is needed to
gain insights into the proximate and underlying causes (Reiling 2007,
throughout). This diagnosis can serve as a basis to identify starting
points for remedies. The scope of this study, into ways in which IT can
support reducing corruption in courts and judiciaries, is more limited.
However, there are some general observations about remedies to be
made from the empirical evidence above, in combination with the theo-
retical insights in the first sections of this chapter.
Remedies for judicial and court corruption
This section looks at remedies in relation to the level of corruption and
development in different countries, and in their judicial systems.
If corruption is wrong, the first remedy that may come to mind in a
legal setting is that corrupt behavior should be punished. Repression,
sanctioning corrupt behavior after it has happened by means of prose-
cution and/or by firing the perpetrator from his or her job, is one type
of remedy. It has a value in that it sets a norm; it expresses that corrup-
tion is wrong. However, repression does not address the causes of cor-
ruption. In the case of judicial corruption, prosecution faces particular
difficulties because the perpetrators would have to be judged by their
colleagues. Preventing corruption before it can happen is another pos-
sible remedy. From the above, we know that corruption is caused by a
poorly functioning system. The Nigeria example shows how adminis-
trative corruption is facilitated by delays, complex procedures and a
high incidence of court appearances. The weaker the court manage-
ment, the more this corruption can go unchecked. Improvements to
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the system may reduce opportunities for corruption and thereby pre-
vent corruption from occurring. If, as in the Slovakia example, students
have to bribe their way into a legal university education, the culture of
corruption in education is easily perpetuated in the court system. Un-
derstanding those fundamental factors is needed for an effective re-
form program. Here, we will try and understand how a poorly func-
tioning system can be made to function better in order to prevent cor-
ruption from happening.
This conclusion is confirmed by the theoretical approaches to the
causes discussed above. The power-oriented analysis suggests balan-
cing discretion and monopoly with relatively high transparency and
accountability. Monopoly can be reduced by introducing checks and
balances like appeal and review. Discretion can be reduced, for instance,
by forms of policy. Increasing accountability with public hearings, pub-
lic decisions and reporting on performance also constitute forms of in-
stitutional improvement. The incentives approach suggests lowering
available benefits, raising the risk of detection and influencing the rela-
tive bargaining power of the parties. This last point again confirms the
suggestions from the power approach: reducing bargaining power can
be done by reducing either a monopoly or discretion. When procedures
are improved and transparency increased, the risk of detection will be
higher too.
Institutions can be more, or less, dysfunctional. This is what we
learn from the syndromes approach: official mogul countries have
practically no functioning institutions; in influence market countries
institutions are fully functional.23 Hence, the best place to start our
search for remedies to the dysfunctionality underlying corruption is
within the framework of the syndromes of corruption. This approach
does justice to the fact that, due to the different levels of institutional
functionality, countries have different starting points for reform. For re-
form in each syndrome, there are some suggestions for the role of the
judiciary function in reforming society. Those suggestions are strategic
in nature, quite general and not very detailed. For example, for syn-
drome 3, credible criminal law enforcement is suggested as a general
starting point. This will most probably involve improving the effective-
ness of criminal courts and their internal administration too, but the
syndromes study does not go into that level of detail. This study, how-
ever, is looking for remedies at that level as well.
Here is how we will address this question: Judiciaries in each syn-
drome have different levels of functionality and, consequently, starting
points as well. In this sense, they are the same as other institutions. In
order to find remedies for corruption in the judiciary, the more general
recommendations for institutional change and reform in each syn-
drome will be taken up. They will then be extrapolated for their mea-
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ning for the judiciary as an institution by analogy. For reform in each
syndrome, there are specific risks, things to avoid and things to put off
until later. This discussion is relevant for the judiciary too. It should
produce some criteria to select and prioritize the remedies that may
work in each specific syndrome.
The next section will draw up inventories of possible starting points,
risks and opportunities for reform in the judiciary for each particular
syndrome. Such an inventory can serve as a first step toward a reform
program. However, it cannot be stressed enough that a reform program
for a specific country or system needs to be tailored to the circum-
stances found in that particular country.
After having done all that, we will come back to the role of informa-
tion in the remedies identified.
Corruption in syndromes
The purpose of this section is to identify starting points for reform to
reduce corruption. It will discuss, for each syndrome, the characteris-
tics of the political system in general and the role of the judiciary in it.
The possible starting points for reform in each syndrome will be iden-
tified in order to find the remedies that can be effective. In each case,
we will also examine risks and opportunities for that syndrome. By
analogy, we will identify possible starting points, risks and opportu-
nities for reform in the judiciary in each of those syndromes in ques-
tion. Finally, we will look at the role of information in the remedies
identified. That will help us uncover opportunities for introducing and
implementing forms of information technology.
a Influence markets syndrome (1)
In this syndrome, institutions are fully functional and independent.
The system suffers from declining political trust and popular dissatis-
faction with political choices. Outright corruption in society in general
is rare in this group. There is likely to be popular distrust of institu-
tions. This distrust can take the form of perception of corruption.
The system has strong, independent professional judiciaries. The ju-
diciaries are capable of running their own business.24 Corruption in
the judiciary is incidental. Popular distrust in institutions includes the
judiciaries. This distrust can take the form of perception of corruption.
In the United States, more than 50 percent of the respondents in the
Global Corruption Barometer survey included in the Gallup Voice of
the People survey for 2006 described their judiciary/legal system as
corrupt (TI GCR 2007 p.13). In the Netherlands, the percentage was
25. In the United Kingdom, it was almost 40 percent (TI GCR 2007
p.13). Consequently, it is useful to discuss it here. Professional organi-
zations have risks of their own. Partly, this is the problem of the ivory
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tower: a strong professional orientation in the courts and the judiciary
may weaken the orientation toward the needs of court users. It may
mean a lack of awareness of the needs of the court users. Professional
norms may override societal needs. There is evidence that this is the
perception of considerable parts of the public. In the United Kingdom,
the public believes that the courts are important, but also that the
courts serve the interests of the wealthy and that the judiciary is remote
and out of touch (Genn p. 246). In the United States, perceptions that
courts are too costly, too slow, unfair in the treatment of racial and eth-
nic minorities, out of touch with the public, and negatively influenced
by political considerations are widely held (Rottman 2000 p. 1). Ap-
proximately 80 percent of the respondents in the 1999 National Survey
on How the Public Views the State Courts indicate that they agree that
“judges’ decisions are influenced by political considerations” and
“elected judges are influenced by having to raise campaign funds”
(Rottman 1999 p. 28). Dispute resolution in court may not resolve the
disputes at all. Genn’s study on what people do and think about going
to the law in the United Kingdom reports that of those whose problem
was resolved on the basis of a court or ombudsman’s decision, about
one in three said that they had not achieved their main objective (Genn
p. 199). In a similar study in the Netherlands, of the respondents who
opted for agreement, 90 percent indicated that they had achieved their
objective compared with 66 percent of the respondents who went to
court (Van Velthoven 2004 p. 199).
The professional orientation may also involve a strong orientation to-
ward the lawyers, the Bar, and/or the prosecutors. The JIG mentions
the public perception of frequent socializing between lawyers and
judges as an indicator of perceived corruption. In the United Kingdom,
judicial appointments were limited to barristers and they were opened
up for solicitors only recently. In the Netherlands, a web site of a dis-
contented group has a list of lawyers and judges – under the name of
Jurikaste, which translates as lawyer’s caste – and their affiliations, in
order to demonstrate how “partiality, prejudgment, conflict of interest
and corruption spoil our legal system” thus explicitly displaying their
disbelief in judicial independence.25 More seriously, there was a com-
plaint against the Netherlands to the U.N. Human Rights Committee
concerning a possible conflict of interest of members of the Supreme
Court. The complaint was dismissed, but the Committee expressed
“some doubts about the propriety of a system that allows judges to sit
on a supervisory board established by a business association”26 (Lang-
broek 2007 p. 124-125). In addition, there was an informal alert to the
Netherlands from the Council of Europe’s office on efficiency of justice
(CEPEJ) regarding the availability of data on disciplinary proceedings
in the Netherlands judiciary. Those data are not public, and therefore
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they were not reported to the Council of Europe. Hence, there is no
way of knowing whether complaints against judges were filed, and
how complaints, if any, were dealt with.
To deal with such objections, and also to avoid any semblance of par-
tiality, well enforced ethics and conflict of interest rules that are trans-
parently enforced are a necessity. More generally, in order to improve
public trust, the judiciary will need to become more transparent. It will
need to develop its presence in the public debate. Public reporting
about the enforcement of ethics as well as about the way the courts are
run, using court and judiciary web sites, can be an effective remedy
against public distrust. Public reporting is more than a communication
issue; it is also an incentive for the organization to comply with the
norms. Another remedy for public distrust is to publish court decisions
and make them available without charge on the Internet, since that will
provide a measure of control for the public to check decisions for parti-
ality and corrupt decision making. Judicial decisions can be expected to
be of better quality when they are published.
The starting point for the reform of judiciaries and courts in this
syndrome is lack of public trust.
In terms of information, the main focus of the remedies discovered
in this syndrome is that of transparent external communication, and
communication of proper, correct practices at that. The obvious vehicle
for doing this is the Internet.
b Elite cartels syndrome (2)
This syndrome has a closed, collusive, politicized economy with moder-
ately weak institutions, sometimes colonized by political parties. For
this syndrome, Johnston suggests underlining the value of an indepen-
dent judiciary, free press and long-term efforts to shore up administra-
tive autonomy and professionalism. Improved public management and
enhanced transparency, functional independence through enhanced,
transparent funding, and stronger civil society must be sustained by a
wide range of incentives for a long time; emerging civil society groups
will be better sustained by advocating their own interests. Pantouflage,
that is, elite employment transitions back and forth between the public
and private sectors, must be controlled as well as lobbying. There need
to be checks on conflicts of interest. The interpenetration of political
processes, the economy, elite networks and bureaucracy must be dis-
couraged. An example of the kind of problem some systems in this
group have to contend with is the following. Under the former socialist
regimes in Eastern Europe, the judiciary function was not very well de-
veloped. The judicial function was part and parcel of the centralized
party organization. Directives from the Central Committee were more
important than the facts in the case, the legal provisions governing
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them, and a fair interpretation of both. Judges had low status and their
role can be characterized as administrative, rather than judicial.
Creating a strong, independent judiciary can be a strategic objective.
A striking instance of what an independent judiciary can achieve is the
example of the mani pulite (clean hands) judges in Italy, who in effect
“decimated an entire political class and their networks of corruption”
(Johnston p. 98-100). The Italian judiciary was given strong and
strictly regulated independence after WWII. This has effectively insu-
lated the judges from the corrupt networks that affected politics. An-
other example from Italy is that of a 1999 decision of the Corte di Cas-
sazione, the civil division. This decision changed jurisprudence on lia-
bility for damages to private parties by illegitimate acts of the public
administration.27 Before the decision, administrative judges could only
void decisions by the public administration, but there was no legal re-
course for compensation of damages caused by such acts. The Corte di
Cassazione decision extended liability for damages to acts of the ad-
ministration. Di Vita, who brought up this decision, maintains that “re-
garding the corruption phenomenon as a whole, using the indicators
of Transparency International, we may affirm that corruption has de-
clined in Italy starting from 2000.” Whether this is a direct conse-
quence of the decision needs more research, Di Vita remarks (Di Vita
2006). The TI CPI scores for Italy have gone from 4.7 in 1999 to 5.5
in 2001, 5.2 in 2007, and 4.8 in 2008. It seems reasonable to assume
that damage claims addressed to the administration will raise the risk
of detection for civil servants who abuse their power. This discussion
of Italy shows that an independent judiciary can be an important factor
in raising the level of institutional integrity in another government in-
stitution.
Creating such judicial independence will, in general, involve raising
the level of professionalism of the judiciary and of the courts: well de-
veloped conflict of interest rules that are transparently enforced, high
levels of bureaucratic professionalism, a corresponding level of pay and
of status. Case assignment procedures can be an important issue in
improving bureaucratic performance. Output-based budgeting, where
funding is based on results, also increases a judiciary’s independence.
Information-intensive measures, such as output-based budgeting, re-
quire that basic bureaucracy is in place. Information on output, and on
the workings and performance of the organization, is needed before
funding can be allocated based on output, and the risks this entails can
be controlled. Then, information systems can be a basis for more trans-
parent funding in order to increase functional independence. Func-
tional independence is an aspect of how constitutional independence
works in practice, with budgeting and accountability based on service
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delivery. Moreover, a funding system that rewards expedient case hand-
ling, and thereby reduced processing time, will also help to reduce op-
portunities for administrative corruption. Similar to the first syndrome,
public trust and transparency can be enhanced with communication
over the Internet about the ethics system, case assignment methodolo-
gies, reporting on enforcement of the ethics codes and other aspects of
the courts’ systems for effective dispute resolution and administering
justice.
c Oligarchs and clans syndrome (3)
In the countries in this syndrome, institutions are very weak and parti-
cipation is risky. Consequently, there is much insecurity and injustice.
Liberalization may make things worse by adding to insecurity. Other
activities that increase insecurity may prove counterproductive. For-
mally, constitutions declare the courts independent, but the reality is
not that straightforward. The judiciary is itself part of the network of
personal relations. That makes any attempt at increasing independence
a hazardous exercise. The Sri Lanka appointment example illustrates
how independence can be hazardous, and also how the network of per-
sonal relations may work. In Romania, the independence of the judi-
ciary was introduced very soon after the fall of the Ceausescu regime
in 1989. A code of ethics was introduced only in 2001. Without a cor-
responding level of accountability, independence became an instru-
ment of judges’ own oligarchies and clans (TI GCR p 269). A specific
risk in this group is that anti-corruption initiatives may become weap-
ons for rival oligarchs, so that tackling corruption head-on would wor-
sen the rivalry and insecurity (Kaufmann 2005 p. 88). The courts may
well be instruments in, or party to, such rivalry. There are some reme-
dies that can be effective in this syndrome. Instead of confronting cor-
ruption directly in the crime prevention mode, reducing its most threa-
tening forms indirectly by easing insecurity can be an effective way of
dealing with it. Professionalizing the courts may help to reduce inse-
curity and promote credible law enforcement. Effective criminal law
enforcement is a very important way of increasing basic security. Insti-
tution building and improvements in public management are urgent
needs but lack political backing. Basic improvements in the judiciary
and law enforcement are top priorities. More effective markets, courts
and guarantees of property rights can discourage raids on other oli-
garchs’ holdings. Thus, the recommendation is to build a framework
of institutions by political means. The dynamics of oligarchs and clans
are rooted in history, in long-standing family networks. Outside influ-
ence and assistance can be crucial. Judicious conditionality and re-
wards for progress can be development strategies, Michael Johnston
observes.
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The courts most probably share the fate of other public sector insti-
tutions in this syndrome. They can be expected to be very weak institu-
tionally. Hence, in this group professionalizing the courts involves re-
viewing court processes, setting up basic administrative and case hand-
ling frameworks where they do not yet exist, and training and
education. Reviews of court processes should examine whether simpli-
fying procedures and speeding them up are viable. This will reduce the
number of opportunities for corruption both in terms of steps and in
terms of time.
Introducing computers and basic office automation can be a starting
point for basic steps in professionalization. In themselves, these ac-
tions will not reduce processing times. That is why the procedures will
need to be reviewed in order to uncover opportunities for simplifica-
tion. Simple electronic case management systems can be set up. Intro-
ducing sound systems in courtrooms is another simple measure to im-
prove transparency and thereby induce more professional behavior.28
Making current legislation available online will help to reduce the un-
certainty about what the law says, for those within the courts as well as
for the general public and those seeking justice. The same holds for
publishing court decisions. There is quite a bit of catalytic effect to be
had in this group. This will be discussed in greater detail, in the con-
text of both access to justice and case handling, in the respective chap-
ters.
d Official moguls syndrome (4)
Official moguls are the people in power or their prote´ge´s who plunder
an economy with impunity. In countries with this syndrome, the insti-
tutions are extremely weak. Corruption is a symptom of problems so
fundamental that specific reforms will accomplish little. Because the
institutions are so frail, there is practically no potential for improve-
ment. Nor is there much chance that any change wrought can be sus-
tained over the longer term. However, the implications of unchallenged
power depend on the agendas of those who hold it, as demonstrated by
the example of Singapore’s successful anti-corruption and development
agendas. Since 1959, the Government of Singapore has consistently
worked to develop the economy and combat corruption. It is now in
the influencing markets syndrome group.29 Singapore ranks first in
the Doing Business overall ranking for 2007 (DB). Its TI CPI score for
2008 was 9.2 (TI CPI 2008). Hong Kong has also combated corrup-
tion since the 1970s (Klitgaard p.100). Its TI CPI score for 2008 was
8.1. Giving groups in society a small measure of autonomy through
more secure property rights and micro-credit, enhanced communica-
tions and press freedom is a step forward. Building a stronger and
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more active civil society will be a gradual process requiring basic politi-
cal change. Civil society groups will be more sustainable if they are ani-
mated by self-interest, rather than by international development agen-
das. External pressures and resources will be critical. The Internet is
an effective resource for supporting self-interest groups from outside.
Transparency International has national chapters in most countries,
and so does Amnesty International. Most national Transparency Inter-
national chapters have their own web sites.30 A factor of influence here
will be the computer literacy of the nation in question.
The observation about institutional weakness applies to the institu-
tions of countries in this group generally. It also applies to judiciaries
and courts. This means that, in the syndrome 4 group of countries,
there is not much opportunity for reform within the judicial institu-
tion. In Egypt, large amounts of aid have been poured into the courts
for case management systems for a long time. Still, the so-called “fa-
mily guilds” are actively protected by the Supreme Judicial Council. Fa-
mily influence and gratuities are significant elements in the assign-
ment process. The Ministry of Justice and the Judges Clubs are institu-
tional mechanisms for accessing scarce government resources –
apartments in Cairo, villas, automobile loans, free medical care in Eur-
ope or America for a judge or a judge’s family member (Blackton,
Egypt Country Report for USAID, p. 6-8, unpublished, quoted in Car-
others, p. 120). It goes without saying that each country and its justice
system and courts need to be assessed individually for opportunities,
keeping in mind the restrictions inherent in the syndrome. Self-inter-
est groups (Bar associations, business and professional groups) may be
able to develop an atmosphere in which the judiciary is held more ac-
countable for its role in administering justice. An example is the asso-
ciations of women lawyers in Africa. The Zimbabwe Association of Wo-
men Lawyers set up mobile legal aid clinics around Harare in 2001. It
also offers training for women on how to represent themselves in
court.31
Sanctioning money laundering, as a measure against corruption
from abroad, will ultimately require prosecution. Therefore, court inter-
vention will be needed at some point. This may prove to be proble-
matic in this group if the courts are very weak institutions. There is
some confirmation of this observation in assessments of anti-money-
laundering frameworks in group 4 countries. For Mauritania, for exam-
ple, a World Bank assessment of the AML framework finds the courts
wanting, and recommends training, education, funding and the setting
up of procedures (World Bank 2005a).
There is growing interest in the role of non-state bodies in dispute
resolution, particularly in this group. This possibly comes from the no-
tion that non-state dispute resolution can provide competition for the
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state courts, or maybe also because this is where most people have
their disputes resolved. Non-state institutions are outside the scope of
this study. The results of ongoing research into non-state dispute reso-
lution may provide us with more insight, but it is uncertain whether
the results will produce clear ways forward with regard to reducing cor-
ruption in courts and judiciaries.
Another observation that needs to be made at this point is that there
does not seem to be much opportunity for introducing IT in courts. If
the institutions are largely non-functional, introducing technology is
problematic. It is difficult to envisage introducing technology into an
organization without processes to build on or an infrastructure to keep
the technology working.
e Conclusions: Building judicial institutions from the bottom up
The corruption syndromes approach is helpful in uncovering effective
starting points for remedies. The approach provides a nuanced under-
standing of the forces at work in each syndrome, the risks and oppor-
tunities, and possible starting points for reform. Therefore, it is for
those starting points that we use it in this context. The starting point
for judicial reform to reduce corruption is, as the case may be, impro-
ving public trust, institutional independence, basic administrative pro-
cesses or external pressure.
Reform to reduce corruption in judiciaries and courts needs to start
by building basic administrative structures and then building on this
foundation. When we look for the information aspect of this develop-
ment process, case registration and access to information are the two
themes that emerge. The way cases are handled can be improved in all
the syndromes. What needs to be done first depends on the starting
point: Where there is none, basic case administration will have to be
set up. This constitutes an opportunity for creating procedures and
management systems that will provide increased transparency, and
thereby discourage corruption. Existing systems for case handling can
be examined for ways to simplify to reduce opportunities for corrup-
tion. With regard to access to information, nowadays the Internet is a
relevant presence everywhere. Hence, the general public will increa-
singly come to expect transparency from public institutions, including
courts and judiciaries. Courts and judiciaries in all syndrome groups
have web sites. They also all have a need for improving public trust,
though some more than others.
Comparing systems and their forms of corruption has led - tenta-
tively - to some elements for an incremental model for opportunities to
reduce corruption. In the next step, this study explores which remedies
have proven to be successful in reducing corruption in courts and judi-
ciaries.
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Which remedies have proven to be effective?
There is a consensus that remedies are more effective when they can
be combined and work together. No single remedy will be successful in
isolation. The experience in Latin America has been that court systems
that worked on their court processes were also more successful in com-
bating corruption (TI GCR 2007 p. 144-5, Hammergren p. 282).
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the following quantitative
comparison: simultaneous changes in a number of judicial institutions
promise to have a more significant effect than isolated measures. The
question of when judges are likely to be corrupt is examined with a
quantitative, comparative approach, based on 63 countries, by Stephan
Voigt (TI GCR 2007, p. 296-301). Which factors are most strongly cor-
related with the level of corruption in the judiciary? This is another ap-
proach that can help in selecting possible remedies. If changes in a fac-
tor do not influence the level of corruption, that factor may not be the
first thing to focus on when looking for effective remedies. For in-
stance, the income of judges and prosecutors is found to be highly –
negatively -correlated with corruption: the higher the salary, the lower
the judicial corruption. However, raising the salary as an isolated mea-
sure has only minimal influence on the incidence of corruption. Judges
with higher salaries are not necessarily less corrupt because of it (TI
GCR 2007, p. 296-301). According to the same source, there is a clear
association between procedural formalism and the time needed to get
a court decision, and judicial corruption. Three other factors were
found to be insignificant: the obligation to publish court decisions, the
level of checks and balances and the existence of anti-corruption com-
missions. Finally, the absence of a monopoly to prosecute leads to less
corruption.32 Increasing remuneration together with reducing proce-
dural formalism, and reducing the time needed to arrive at judicial de-
cisions are the relevant lines of action if corruption in a judiciary or a
court should be reduced, according to these findings.
From what we already know, reducing incentives by improving pro-
cesses and increasing accountability by deliberately working on raising
public trust can be done in most syndromes, but from different start-
ing points. An issue like low pay will have to be dealt with in order to
make the other improvements work, but only in conjunction with other
measures. Raising salaries as an isolated measure will do little or noth-
ing to reduce judicial corruption (Klitgaard p. 77). In developing reme-
dies, it will also be important to identify sources of support and resis-
tance as a means of selecting entry points. This is why administrative
corruption is sometimes easiest to attack first because it largely bene-
fits low-level players who have relatively little bargaining power. As we
have seen from the discussion on syndromes, institutional indepen-
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dence is a starting point in syndrome 2 countries. Increasing judicial
independence in syndrome 4 or 3 countries can be counterproductive
because it has the potential to create moguls or oligarchs who will start
clans, empires and patronage systems of their own (Carothers p. 121).
In moguls syndrome countries, the institutions are so weak that there
is practically no potential for institutional improvement from inside
the institutions, and not much chance that those changes will last.
That is why the discussion of institutional improvement starts with the
oligarchs and clans syndrome.
a Steps to improve case handling
In oligarchs and clans syndrome (3) country, the starting point is the
weakness of the basic administrative structures. Therefore, addressing
that weakness can help to reduce opportunities for administrative cor-
ruption. Reform starts with setting up a basic case handling system.
The introduction of a basic automated case handling system can be an
opportunity to review case handling procedures to reduce the opportu-
nity for bribery:
– Remove unnecessary formalities and steps – and thus also reduce
case processing time
– Divide responsibilities to reduce monopoly
– Reduce discretion by developing standard routines, like tariffs for
court fees.
These are all activities that can be supported with an electronic case re-
gistration system. JIG refers to the experience in Karnataka, India as
an example of what can be achieved. The Karnataka experience is de-
scribed by Justice G.C. Bharuka, now chair of the India judiciary IT
committee. He recounts how backlogs were reduced with the use of a
database on cases: in some pilot courts, the backlog was reduced by 90
percent in three years (Bharuka p. 138-9). The information on case
handling from an automated case management system will support
what can be done, and it will also track changes in case handling. It
can also help to detect unusual case handling that may indicate corrup-
tion (Klitgaard p. 82). What exactly needs to be done will depend also
on whether there is no case management system at all, or whether a
paper based case management system is already in place. Computeri-
zation of court files is another recommendation by the JIG (UNODC
2001 p. 10). It is expected to “reduce immensely the workload of the
single judge and speed up the administration of justice but also helps
to reduce the reality of appearance of court files being lost, and then re-
quiring fees for retrieving them.” The most minimal version of compu-
terization of files is probably to set up a database of case files to track
where they are. More sophisticated versions include bar-coding the files
when they move, or even imaging them and storing the images in a
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database. The most comprehensive way of computerizing case files is
to have fully electronic files on the court’s file server. Worldwide, very
few courts used only fully electronic case files at the time of writing
this chapter in the last part of 2008. Using electronic files requires a
high level of sophistication of the organization. As long as files can be
made to disappear for a fee without detection, and maybe even reap-
pear for another one, the court and case management in question is so
ineffective that using electronic court files is not a realistic option.
Introducing basic office technology is a good way of training staff in
the new way of working. The next step can be a simple, straightforward
case registration and management system. Developing a case manage-
ment system will require some expertise with computerized processes,
so some experience with office technology will be a necessity. Electro-
nic court management is a requirement for more professional ways of
working. It may be expected to reduce opportunities for the embezzle-
ment of court goods. However, that is not the topic of this study.
Using information systems to distribute legal resources, texts and
jurisprudence will help to make judges and court staff understand
what a correct legal judicial decision is. If those decisions, or at least
more of them, are published, there is a chance that the possibility of
public scrutiny will raise the quality of the decisions themselves, and
their written record as well.
The starting point for elite cartels syndrome (2) countries is mainly
insufficient institutional independence. Information management
should be high on the agenda here: improving management and en-
hancing transparency, increasing functional independence through en-
hanced, transparent funding, and communicating with a stronger civil
society. This will mean raising the level of professionalism of the judi-
ciary and of the courts: well developed conflict of interest rules, and
greater bureaucratic professionalism, pay, and status.
Who gets to decide which case, and who gets to decide that, can be
an important source of concern for corruption. This concern is impor-
tant for both the first instance and the appeal courts. It has become
most apparent in elite cartels and influence markets syndrome coun-
tries. This concern is present in the other syndromes as well, but it can
be more difficult to address in a situation where basic case manage-
ment processes are weak or absent. For syndromes 1 and 2, a transpar-
ent and publicly known system for assigning cases, publicly known on
the court Internet site, can be an effective means of addressing concern
about collusion. Introducing an impartial, equitable, credible case as-
signment system can be undertaken on its own, but it should most cer-
tainly be part of any automated case management system. Professiona-
lizing internal processes is discussed in more detail in Part 3 on inter-
nal case processing.
250 TECHNOLOGY FOR JUSTICE
b Increasing access to information
The starting point for syndrome 1 countries in this context is primarily
the lack of public trust. A remedy for this distrust could be to increase
accountability to offset the monopoly and discretion awarded indepen-
dent judiciaries in this syndrome. Increasing accountability by repor-
ting about the way the judiciary in question safeguards its integrity can
also enhance public trust:
– Transparent procedures and merit based systems for judicial ap-
pointments and careers, appointment, and promotion. Merit based
recruitment and career management presuppose that knowledge,
education and training are available.
– Methodologies for judicial case handling
– The ethics framework, codes of conduct and their enforcement
– Asset declaration: The Judicial Integrity Group advocates that all ju-
dicial officers should be required to declare their assets, and those
of their parents, spouse, children and other close relatives.
Accountability can also be increased by publishing court decisions, or
publishing more court decisions than before. Publishing court deci-
sions also has different modalities: publishing the leading decisions of
higher courts will help judges in lower courts understand the jurispru-
dence of the land. Publishing all court decisions on the Internet in or-
der to increase transparency has not been achieved anywhere, as far as
can be established. The debate about publishing decisions on unde-
fended money claims and other decisions that are uninteresting from a
jurisprudential point of view has not been resolved. We do know that
public access to courts for the public and the media usually leads to
better judicial performance. Likewise, public access to judicial decisions
improves their quality. If decisions are published on an Internet site,
the information will need to be more correct than when it stays out of
the public eye (Blume p. 328).
The increasing penetration of the Internet will mean that the public
will become accustomed to information being available. Hence, there
will be increasing pressure for information, as listed above.
Implementing information technology
From this discussion, the strategic importance of information, access
to it and how it is used becomes evident. Information is a crucial tool
in reducing corruption in judiciaries and courts. That means there is
also potential in introducing information technology. Both case hand-
ling and access to information can be improved and developed. Intro-
ducing and implementing information technology brings new issues
and questions.
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Introducing computers is a popular measure. Everybody wants com-
puters. They are sometimes regarded as a status symbol. In patronage
systems, they are used as rewards. The “top people” all get computers;
this can even be a strategy to involve them in the improvement pro-
jects. In Nepal, I observed how IT was distributed very unevenly over
the tiers of the court system. According to the data on 2003/4 in the
Nepal judiciary’s strategic plan, two of the 75 District Courts had 1
computer, none had a fax or a photocopy machine. Four of the 16 Ap-
peal Courts had 1 computer each, all Appeal Courts had a photocopy
machine and three had a fax. In the Supreme Court, there are 56 com-
puters, 5 photocopy machines and 4 faxes (World Bank 2005b p. 30).
The experience is that the computers are sometimes left unused. This
is, or has been, one of the major difficulties of organizations imple-
menting forms of IT: the leadership, for lack of experience, could not
envisage its potential. Technology, in the context of these chapters, is
primarily regarded as something with functionality that can support re-
medies against corruption. The mere introduction of computers and
modern office technology already presents an occasion for improving
basic bureaucracy. The experience is that the introduction of modern
information technology has almost autonomous effects on an organiza-
tion. Some changes need to be made in decision making, in relation-
ships, in the types of disputes to be decided in court (see Chapter 2.1).
Other changes occur almost unnoticed, for example more disciplined
behavior with regard to documents and information. Moreover, because
routines have to be changed and new ones invented, the way things
are done in an organization is subjected to review. This is the catalytic
function of information technology (Reiling 2006 p. 190): technology
and its introduction affect the way people work together, governance,
and the way budgets are managed. Introducing office technology, word
processing, and databases for case management all require new skills
that were not needed before. They also require new forms of support.
After computers have been introduced, there will have to be a frame-
work for managing and maintaining the hardware and for replacing it
when it becomes obsolete or out of date. Experience has shown that, in
an organization where no one else understands much of what they do,
the people in charge of managing the information systems can become
disproportionately powerful. They have a virtual monopoly on an es-
sential resource, and if their discretion goes relatively unchecked, they
may be likely to make use of that opportunity. The chair of the India
judiciary IT committee told me his biggest problem was IT people who
think they are in charge.33 This creates an imbalance in the governance
structure of courts and judiciaries. In the context of the corruption dis-
cussion in this chapter, it is prudent to point to this effect because it
may present an opportunity for corruption in its own right. This new
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powerhouse, a new source of privileges and services, may become a
new vehicle for corrupt practices, unless the risks are managed care-
fully by a proper governance structure.
Conclusions for Part 5
These chapters examined reducing corruption and improving the im-
partiality and integrity of courts and judiciaries with the support of in-
formation technology. Understanding what can be done has involved a
long journey. The journey went from exploring existing theoretical
and empirical knowledge about corruption and possible remedies to
the role of information in those remedies.
If corruption in judiciaries and courts is to be combated effectively,
accurate diagnostics are a prerequisite. Diagnostics are the first step in
corruption reduction, in order to identify the problems and locate pos-
sible remedies. General comparative and theoretical insights help us to
understand what to look for. Comparative and general insights on
causes and possible remedies will have to be fitted to the specific situa-
tions. In each country, proper diagnostics should also identify the cor-
ruption syndrome that can serve as the starting point, the possible stake-
holders and the level of ownership for judicial reform. The reform
strategy needs to fit the syndrome that is applicable in the given con-
text. Applied in the wrong syndrome, presumed remedies can turn
into instruments of corruption.
Improving information handling in a broad sense can be the pur-
pose of reform programs. The way information is handled is of strate-
gic importance in the reduction of corruption. Developing basic bu-
reaucracy is the first possible step. The findings suggest the institu-
tions in question must be able to absorb and sustain change. This
means it is not a viable remedy for existing institutions in syndrome 4
countries.
This improvement also involves access to information and know-
ledge: training, education and some measure of self-regulation and
self-discipline. Targeted training, in how to deal with cases and dis-
putes as well as in ethics, can be the starting point, even in situations
where this is the only starting point available. That makes it a possible
point of departure in syndrome 4 countries.
Introducing basic office technology can support the basic processes
needed to process cases in an orderly, transparent manner. This is
usually a good starting point for syndrome 3 countries. Case registra-
tion systems can support more automated, improved case handling.
They provide a tool to reduce case disposition times. Reducing both
processing time and the number of steps needed to reach a judicial de-
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cision will reduce the opportunity for bribery. Case registration sys-
tems, if properly set up and used, will also increase the risk of detec-
tion and thereby reduce incentives for bribe taking and for manipulat-
ing files and cases. As a tool for reporting, they can support increasing
institutional independence, which is of particular importance for syn-
drome 2 countries.
Network technology can support increasing public trust by providing
an effective means of communication between courts and their users
and the general public. This is a primary point of attention for syn-
drome 1 countries. It can help make the arrangements supporting im-
partiality and independence visible.
Judicial and court integrity can be supported with information tech-
nology, provided it is implemented with these guidelines in mind.
Notes
1 There is a discussion on the concepts of de iure and de facto independence in Chap-
ter 1.2.
2 For a legally oriented body like a judiciary, a legal norm is usually a more compelling
reason for action than a fairly weak and hardly conclusive statistical correlation.
3 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of December 10, 1948.
4 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966. The
Convention entered into force on March 23, 1976.
5 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 58/4 of October 31, 2003. The Convention
entered into force on December 14, 2005.
6 The Bangalore Draft Code of Judicial Conduct 2001 adopted by the Judicial Group
on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, as revised at the Round Table meeting of Chief
Justices, held at the Peace Palace, the Hague, November 25-26, 2002. It was sub-
mitted to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights at its 59th session in
2003. It is available on line at https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/
cicp10.pdf.
7 Rex v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy ([1924] 1 KB 256, [1923] All ER 233) In a
landmark and far-reaching judgment, Chief Justice Lord Hewart CJ said justice should
not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.
8 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/about_en.asp
9 Thanks to Michael Johnston for this example.
10 In common-law systems, discretion is considered to be broader than in civil-law sys-
tems.
11 These indexes are discussed in Chapter 1.3.
12 See the discussion of standards for case disposition in the chapter on case delay.
13 Low executability probably means that court decisions are difficult to enforce, which
means the parties to a dispute do not get their dues.
14 On January 1, 2002, 1 Slovak Koruna = 0.02341 Euro; 1 Euro (EUR) = 42.71630
Slovak Koruna (SKK). The exchange rate was calculated by Oanda, http://www.oan-
da.com/convert/classic?free=1.
15 Georgia is not listed in Johnston’s list of syndromes in the Appendix. Based on his
methodology, my estimation was that it is most probably a group 4 or group 3 syn-
drome country. Johnston confirmed my estimation in an email.
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16 See the report on that visit in Part 1.
17 Information from a Ministry of Justice official who dealt with the case from the Min-
istry’s side. Notes from the conversation are in my possession.
18 E/CN.4/2003/65/Add.125, February 2003.
19 The Washington Post quoted Phillips in a story about the Tom DeLay case. It is an il-
lustration of some of the effects of this system of electing judges. Representative
Tom DeLay (Republican-Texas), majority leader in the House of Representatives of
the United States, had to step down when he was accused of money laundering and
conspiracy with illegal election funds, by prosecutor Ronald Early [D]. With the pro-
ceeds, the Republicans achieved a majority in the Texas House of Representatives.
This majority changed the boundaries of the electoral districts. In the next elections,
even more Republicans were elected to the House.
Judge Bob Perkins [D] was not impartial enough, according to DeLay’s defense team.
He had donated more than $5,000 to Democratic election campaigns. Perkins re-
fused to leave but was taken off the case. Judge B.B. Schraub [R] had to appoint an-
other judge. Prosecutor Earle [D] recused Schraub because he had contributed to the
election campaign of governor Rick Perry [R]. Perry was closely associated with De-
Lay’s contested election campaign.
Judge Schraub [R] then left the decision to the president of the Texas Supreme Court,
Wallace B. Jefferson [R]. Political activists in Texas then complained about Jefferson’s
close ties with circles around DeLay [R]. In 2004, Jefferson had been appointed by
Perry. He was supported by Texans for a Republican Majority. This group is also a de-
fendant in the DeLay case. Judge Jefferson quietly appointed Pat Priest [D], a retired
judge who had donated only $150 each to three Democratic candidates for the Texas
House. The defense was expected to ask for a transfer of the case from Austin [D] to
another location in Texas [R].
20 Compiled from the Kathmandu Post and the Himalayan Times of July 2004.
21 http://namenlijst.rechtspraak.nl/Default.aspx
22 As Daniel Kauffmann, one of the authors of the World Governance Indicators, em-
phasizes in the context of corruption: “Sunshine is the best disinfectant.”
23 In order to do Johnston justice: he stresses that his model is not a developmental
model in the sense that countries and their institutions necessarily have to transform
from a group 4 into a group 3, then group 2 and finally a group 1 country.
24 It is good to keep in mind that, in spite of all efforts to comply with the European
Union’s acquis communautaire, quite a few EU member countries are not in this
group. Belgium, Greece, Italy and Spain were in the elite cartels group (group 2) in
2001, the year of Johnston’s measurements. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
and the Slovak Republic, countries which joined the EU in 2004, were in the elite
cartels group as well. Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007. They were in
the oligarchs and clans group (group 3) in 2001, and probably still are. Johnston did
not classify all EU members, so it is impossible to give a complete breakdown of EU
member countries. Appendix 2 has the breakdown as done by Johnston.
25 www.sdnl.nl
26 Human Rights Committee, Eighty-fourth session, July 12-19, 2005, Communication
No. 1185/2003.
27 Corte di Cassazione, Sezioni Unite – Sent. N. 500/99.
28 It is quite another matter to get the courts to use them. During my visit to some of
the Sri Lanka courts, the World Bank-funded sound system was very much in evi-
dence, but it was turned on only after my request to do so.
29 Singapore, by any standard except economics, is a very small country. That makes it
very difficult to replicate the experience there because it will require substantial scaling
up. The same holds for very large countries, like the United States, where experi-
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ences may have to be scaled down. Moreover, as Johnston also remarks, Singapore’s
leaders have yet to yield to open and competitive politics.
30 For example: http://www.tinepal.org/ (TI Nepal), http://www.transparency.org/
contact_us/organisations/transparency_international_nigeria (TI Nigeria).
31 Information from ZWLA’s web site www.zwla.co.zw. ZWLA was off-line following
the political crisis in late 2008.
32 Allocating the competence to initiate prosecution to other actors, such as the police,
victims, NGOs and the like, should increase the amount of prosecution and reduce
the expected gains from corruption.
33 Conversation with Justice G.C. Bharuka in New Delhi, July 2005, notes in my posses-
sion.
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Part 6 Conclusions
Part 6 concludes this study. It sums up what IT can do to support judi-
cial reform. Chapter 6.1 summarizes the findings of Parts 3, 4 and 5 of
this study on the role of IT in judicial reform. Chapter 6.2 explores
some directions for new research.
Chapter 6.1 Technology for Justice: How Does Information
Technology Affect Delay, Access and Corruption?
The main goal of this study was to generate new knowledge about the
ways in which information technology can support judicial reform.
The underlying problem this study attempts to help resolve is the lack
of understanding of the role of IT in court processes. This understan-
ding is critical for successful reform. Judiciaries, if they are to improve
their performance with information technology, need to understand
how this technology works in their processes and in their interactions.
This study has added some new understanding.
This chapter summarizes the findings. The organizing principle for
this chapter is primarily the technology’s functionalities: functional,
networking and enterprise technologies, and how they relate to judicial
reform. This summary of the findings focuses on the roles of those
functionalities in resolving the problems users complain about most:
delay, access, and corruption. These findings are followed by a discus-
sion highlighting (1) the changes the technologies have already brought
to courts and judiciaries in each of those areas, and (2) the develop-
ments that can be expected, and some changes this entails for the ad-
ministration of justice.
Methodology
This study investigated IT impacts on the three most frequent com-
plaints about courts and judiciaries: case delay, lack of access and judi-
cial and court corruption. Hence, it studied three areas of court reform:
– Internal case processing (Part 3)
– Interaction with court users (Part 4)
– Guarding integrity (Part 5).
In order to learn more about the ways in which information technology
can support reform in those areas, the following approach was chosen.
The main activities in this study were to analyze, for each area:
(1) Knowledge about the problem and possible remedies
(2) The role of information
(3) Roles for information technology in resolving the problem.
The sources used in this study are publicly available. The sources are
extremely varied, and their use as illustrations was justified specifically
in each case. The material used for the analyses includes comparative
indexes, empirical studies, and practical examples and illustrations of
the use of IT in practice in courts. These examples did not serve to test
a hypothesis or to prove that IT supports judicial reform, and they can-
not simply be transposed into a different context. However, they do
serve to share experience.
1 Functional technology for timeliness and integrity
Functional technologies, office automation and database technology,
are the most pervasive information technologies in courts in Europe
and the United States (Chapter 2.1). They have increased timeliness
and integrity mainly by increasing accuracy and experimentation capa-
city.
Office automation is used mostly for document production. It has in-
creased accuracy through the use of standard texts and merges with
case registration systems.
Database technology has supported more timely case processing.
Used for electronic case registration, it has provided insight into pro-
cesses, influenced culture and supported developing standards. Courts’
ability to know their processes has increased greatly.
Looking back, we can say that most courts have used their IT to sup-
port their paper processes.
Timeliness
Office automation has supported document production, a classic activity
for courts. Changes in the way those documents are produced were de-
veloped gradually, as the possibilities of the text production systems
were tried out. Examples are the re-use of frequently used phrases, and
repositories of standard texts, which have raised accuracy and consis-
tency. Thus, new processes were developed gradually by the users
themselves. Experimenting with word processing is relatively easy, be-
cause the processing systems do not prescribe processes very strictly
(Chapter 2.1). The increased accuracy reduced processing time.
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Case registration systems replaced paper dockets. Their introduction has
impacted the timeliness of case processing by opening the way for
using the information contained in the systems in new ways.
In my view, the most remarkable impact of these systems was the de-
velopment of case disposition time standards (Chapter 3.1). The data-
base technology in case registration systems has enabled the generation
of knowledge about processes: how they work, and what is needed to
figure out how to reduce backlogs and improve processes to speed them
up. After remedies are implemented, changes can be tracked in order
to ensure they are working. And as a concrete example, tracking case
processing with a database in Bangalore, India reduced case backlog by
90 percent. This study, particularly Part 3, uses caseload statistics to
analyze court processes. Those statistics are available where courts have
started using database technology for their case administration.
Case matrix
Using court statistics, I originally developed the case matrix to capture
the role of information in case processing, judicial roles and court case-
loads (Chapters 3.2 and 3.3). It underlines the need to distinguish case
types. It is a useful tool for different purposes. In this study, it was
used for:
– Showing the distribution of caseloads in different categories (Chap-
ters 3.2 and 3.3)
– Identifying potential areas for different kinds of electronic proces-
sing and other forms of IT support (Chapter 3.3)
– Displaying party configurations with regard to differing information
needs for increasing access to justice (Chapter 4.3).
For the purpose of understanding the role of information in court case
processes, the level of predictability of the outcome of certain case
types and their party configuration are distinguishing factors. Using
the matrix, court cases can be sorted according to the level of predict-
ability and the party configuration of zero-sum (one party wins) and
win-win (both parties gain) outcomes. The resulting categories reflect
judicial roles as well as case characteristics and processes.
In Figure 7, the percentages in the matrix reflect the group’s share
in the overall caseload.
For the Dutch civil jurisdiction, the matrix demonstrates how each
group merits its own approach.
– In the majority of the cases (groups 1 and 2) processed in the Dutch
civil jurisdiction in the first instance, there is no dispute resolution
because there are few disputes there. Titles are provided for unde-
fended claims (role 1, title role), and arrangements in family and si-
milar situations are marginally tested (role 2, notarial role). In such
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cases, there is no dispute. Consequently, the information available
when the case is first filed is sufficient to finalize the case and pro-
duce a decision. Therefore, processing those cases is relatively sim-
ple. That makes these groups the first candidates for automating
parts of processes. Routines and standards will need to be devel-
oped in order to automate sub-processes. The result may be that
fewer individual decisions need to be taken in each case. This will
make cases move to the left in the matrix, potentially reducing proces-
sing time.
– Almost half of all the cases are most probably resolved with a settle-
ment (groups 2 and 3). Cases in the notarial and settlement groups
are largely resolved by the parties themselves. Providing the parties
with information to help settlement will move cases down in the ma-
trix, enhancing self-help. By reducing the number of disputed
points, the processing time will also be reduced.
– Fewer than 20 percent of all cases (groups 3 and 4) need more in-
formation during the court procedure in order to bring a resolution
of the dispute closer. This makes the information handling process
more complex.
– Only 8 percent, a small fraction of the total caseload, constitutes a
dispute that is concluded with a judicial decision (group 4). Judicial
dispute resolution, most often mentioned by the different stake-
holders, is not the most prevalent court activity from the point of
Figure 7 Matrix of Different Judicial Roles and Caseloads in the Dutch Courts
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view of the total caseload. However, it is the role taking up most of
the judges’ time. The judges’ information in this group is primarily
for support with managing large amounts of information in indivi-
dual case files.
Case processing
This study found no previous academic research suggesting that IT in
courts has led to more expedient disposition times.1 The case studies
in Chapter 3.3 showed how courts still distribute and process case files
mainly in paper form. Networking technologies have led to changes,
but not to fundamentally new ways of working. Courts’ internal pro-
cesses and their interactions with the parties have, so far, not changed
fundamentally under the influence of IT. Most of the effort of imple-
menting court IT has gone into caseload management through simpli-
fication and process control. This observation fits with the general
trend in IT use: supporting large-scale control by manipulating large
amounts of information.
Communication with the users is still mostly one-sided. Resolution
of complex problems and innovative problem solving are not supported
by IT to any great extent yet. There is no indication that automating ju-
dicial reasoning for the purposes of dispute resolution is a perceived
need.
The results of the Netherlands civil justice case study produced some
conclusions regarding the impacts of IT support. The first group of
conclusions is about direct reduction of case delay. The second group
deals with less direct effects on case processing and on reducing cor-
ruption. The third group applies to access to justice, with the more ab-
stract role of courts as setters of norms and with engendering public
trust.
Reducing case delay
The case processing matrix suggests some opportunities for electronic
information processing to reduce case delay (Chapter 3.3).
For all groups, electronic filing of claims, online data entry and elec-
tronic case files reduce the amount of activities court staff need to per-
form when processing cases. Automating routines and e-filing will di-
rectly affect processing time.
Automating routines goes together with simplification. Simplifica-
tion was found to be an effective remedy for case delay. Simplification
means reducing the number of individual procedural and substantive
decisions that need to be taken in each case. It will move cases to the
left in the matrix.
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Internet functionality for public information and electronic forms
are support for the notarial group. Here, better preparation of party
documents can reduce processing time in court.
Public information can help the parties settle more of their dispute,
thus reducing the number of issues to be resolved in court and moving
cases down in the matrix, which will affect both the notarial and the
settlement group cases. Software supporting negotiations can support
processing specifically for the settlement group.
Electronic files and software supporting knowledge management are
the main tools specifically for case processing in the judgment group.
They can help to manage large quantities of information.
Culture and standards to reduce case delay
Culture was found to be an important factor in efforts to reduce pro-
cessing time. Implementing a case registration system in court, and
making information about processes transparent, can also affect court
culture with regard to case processing.
Besides tracking whether cases are disposed in a timely manner, case
registration systems can serve to affect the expectations and assump-
tions of actors in the administration of justice process by providing fac-
tual information (Chapters 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). Comparing case processing
across courts and even systems can shed new light on those assump-
tions. The findings indicate that courts in about a third of all countries
worldwide dispose ordinary civil cases within the ABA Trial Court Per-
formance Standards time standard, and courts in about two-thirds of
all countries dispose those cases within the ECHR jurisprudential stan-
dard for case delay in ordinary civil cases. Results like these provide a
basis for discussion about what constitutes a reasonable disposition
time, and can be a starting point for developing standards.
Judiciaries, as independent institutions, should be able to set stan-
dards for themselves. Such self-imposed standards do not interfere
with judicial independence. Standards can be developed based on infor-
mation from various sources: actual practice, like the American Bar As-
sociation Trial Court Performance Standards, cross-country comparison
and jurisprudence on timely case processing, for example that of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (Chapter 3.1). Standards
will help as orientation points for timely case disposal. Where goals for
improved disposal times have been set, the systems can help to track
whether those goals are being met. Case registration systems’ tracking
role is essential in judicial reform.
Reducing corruption
Case registration systems improve tools for process control, and thus
support ensuring integrity and reducing corruption. Institutional weak-
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ness was found to be an important factor in the level of corruption in
institutions, including courts (Chapter 5.1). This weakness occurs more
often in countries where economic development is low. It manifests it-
self in insufficient or even absent process control. Effective process
control reduces discretion and increases the risk of detection.
Implementing a case registration system can be an opportunity for
developing basic bureaucracy, introducing process control process con-
trol, where this does not yet exist (Chapter 5.3). Introducing basic office
technology can support the basic processes needed to process cases in
an orderly, transparent manner.
More transparent and more expedient case processing can impact
the level of administrative corruption in courts in the following ways:
– Increasing the risk of detection and thereby reducing incentives for
bribe taking for manipulating files and cases (Chapter 5.1)
– Reducing processing and disposition time, the number of steps
needed to reach a judicial decision, and setting time standards, thus
reducing opportunities as well as incentives for bribery (Chapters
5.1, 5.2 and 3.3).
Here, two of the problem areas in judicial reform are related: long dis-
position times and procedural complexity create opportunities for bri-
bery. Reducing case delay thus also impacts the level of administrative
corruption.
2 Networking technology for access and integrity
Networking technology enables users to communicate with each other
electronically. Court staff, including judges, use email, but largely for
informal communications only (Chapter 2.1). Internal networking en-
ables smart merges by combining case registration data with document
production. These possibilities were mostly developed by “bricoleurs”
within the courts.
The advent of the Internet was a major change. It presents courts and
judiciaries with a channel for information and communication for ex-
ternal communication purposes. Information service on the Internet
provides access to information for litigants and the general public.
Access to legal information is an important factor in resolving pro-
blems (Chapter 4.1). It helps people to resolve their difficulties out of
court (Chapter 3.2 and 4.2). Correct information about court proce-
dures increases one-shotters’ (occasional litigants) chance of a just out-
come to their case (Chapter 4.3). It can improve integrity by providing
transparency, thereby reducing discretion, in court procedures (Chapter
5.1).
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The case load matrix (Chapter 3.2) suggests that the parties, provided
with information on trends in judicial decisions, can settle their differ-
ences out of court more often, and adequately prepare their cases for
court if necessary (Chapters 3.2 and 3.3). This suggestion points to two
distinct roles of courts: the role of courts in deciding individual cases
and their role as general setters of norms, also known as their shadow
function.
Part 4 of the study is an exploration of the potential of the Internet
as a channel for communication by courts. The Internet, probably the
most widely used source of information in the world, can be used for
providing information and for communicating with others. Internet
functionality is constantly evolving. Courts and judiciaries are increas-
ingly present on the Internet. The available evidence gives only a first
indication of the extent to which the Internet has been adopted by judi-
ciaries and courts.
Justiciable problems and information needs
How people resolve justiciable problems, serious problems with a po-
tentially legal solution, is examined in Chapter 4.2. This problem-sol-
ving happens on a continuum, empirical study shows. The majority of
problems are resolved by people themselves, sometimes with some ad-
vice or assistance. Problems in long-term relationships are relatively
difficult to resolve. Hence, they also come to court more often. Pro-
blems come to court mostly through advice or assistance agencies.
Resolution success depends on:
– The nature of the problem
– Availability of adequate information, advice and assistance
– Competence in finding and acting on information.
People who come to court only occasionally, or one-shotters, have speci-
fic information needs. The case matrix shows where those needs can
arise.
In Figure 8, the case matrix shows the party configurations of cases
coming to court (Chapter 4.3). The matrix provides some indications of
the information needs of the parties who come to court only inciden-
tally (one-shotters), as opposed to repeat players. The matrix suggests:
– In title provision cases, defendants who do not act against a claim
may need information on possible defenses.
– In the notarial group, both parties have a need for information on
how to arrange a settlement to be submitted to court.
– In the settlement group, there is a need for guidance on settling
disputes.
– In the judgment group, information needs can vary considerably.
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Thus, providing information on a web site can serve to (1) help settle-
ment and keep cases out of court, or (2) help with information on how
to bring them into court.
Information for keeping disputes out of court
When people have a serious problem, and they look for information,
their first and foremost need is for information on how to solve the
problem (Chapter 4.2). The legal information they need is primarily
straightforward information about rules and regulations. Next, they
look for information about ways to settle and handle disputes. Their
main sources are specialized organizations and legal advice providers.
Judiciaries and courts, in their general shadow-of-the-law role, can
help keep disputes out of court by providing information about the
general approaches judges and courts have for specific types of pro-
blems (Chapter 4.3). Settling these disputes is generally done with the
support of legal or specialist organizations. Information about those
general approaches will need to become publicly available. Increasingly,
judicial decision making is supported by policies and decision support
systems that reflect policies. Policies and decision support systems, if
they are available publicly, can help keep disputes out of court by sup-
porting settlement.
The legal policy dilemma, whether keeping cases out of court or im-
proving court case resolution should be a goal of policy, finds some an-
Figure 8 Matrix of Party Configurations
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swers here (Chapters 4.2 and 4.3). Going to court should be a last re-
sort. People generally are more satisfied at having resolved their own
problem than they are at having a court resolve it. Hence, helping
them to resolve problems out of court is preferable. Devising problem-
specific ways to help informal problem solving and diverting them to
other dispute resolution mechanisms may keep still more of them out
of court. Even when a court decision is compulsory, like divorce, some
parts of the dispute can be sorted out by the parties in advance with
the necessary guidance.
However, making going to court when necessary less stressful is still
a valuable goal in itself. Information on going to court can help reduce
people’s stress and improve their chances of achieving justice if they
have to go to court (Chapter 4.3).
Information for taking disputes to court
Information technology, notably the Internet as a provider of informa-
tion, can also perform a role in compensating for the information dis-
advantage for occasional litigants. Information service on the Internet
can support courts’ role of ensuring fair process. Providing incidental
court users with adequate information can help them to achieve better
justice.
The justiciable problems that normally come to court tend to be ser-
ious and difficult to resolve. Most people who come to court have
sought and received some kind of advice beforehand. Access to infor-
mation increases litigants’ chances of a just, fair court decision (Chap-
ter 4.1). For taking their case to court, litigants need information on
how to resolve problems, on rights and duties, and on taking a case to
court. One-shotters, those who use the courts only occasionally, have a
knowledge and information disadvantage compared with those who
routinely use the courts. If a dispute needs to come to court, informa-
tion can reduce the disadvantage one-shotters have in dealing court
and with legal issues. In order to better appreciate the Internet’s poten-
tial as a source of such information, case studies were done on finding
and using relevant information.
Finding and using information
The case studies in Chapter 4.3 looked at government and advisory
web sites in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands for information
on getting a divorce. They tested two aspects: the readability and ade-
quacy of the information. Does the web page tell the reader what to do,
and can the reader be confident that the desired result will be
achieved? The majority of the web sites did not pass the effectiveness
tests on all counts. Some of the information on the sites presented is
not adequate because the texts are too difficult for the audience and/or
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they do not provide sufficiently practical information. As there appears
to be a movement toward broadening the scope for self-representation,
it is prudent to be prepared for a growing need for direct access to in-
formation. Some points of attention:
– Effective information service requires understanding recipients’ pro-
blems, their information needs and their competences in acting on
information (Chapter 4.2). Inability to act on information inhibiting
people’s participation in court processes may result in problems re-
maining unresolved. Consequently, people with low levels of com-
petence are likely to need some help in resolving justiciable pro-
blems, so there always needs to be backup human help (Chapter
4.3).
– Differences in practice, like compulsory legal representation, affect
what information is required. They also affect courts’ attitudes to in-
formation services. Instead of relying routinely on lawyers and bai-
liffs, they may need to become more proactive. Information coordi-
nation with other information sources, like bailiffs and legal aid or-
ganizations, will ensure better consistency of the information
provided.
– To be effective, information should be offered on more than one
channel by referring to web site information in correspondence
with the parties.
There has also been a shift towards generating routines and policies or
guidelines for judicial decision making. This type of information can
serve as a general guideline for resolving disputes as well. In order to
safeguard the quality of the information, it is necessary that it is gene-
rated and disseminated by the courts themselves. Collecting knowledge
from court decisions and practices for the purpose of developing rou-
tines and policies constitutes a major change and a new activity for an
organization geared to processing individual cases.
Providing information on the web will also give rise to new require-
ments for the court governance: central management will be needed to
make the information service effective and to help unify some court
practices. A centralized information service requires changes in deci-
sion rights, making individual courts lose some of their autonomy.
This may well constitute a major change for some court systems.
Public trust and transparency
The Internet also provides judiciaries and courts with a means to com-
municate with the general public. This form of communication sup-
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ports both the role of courts as setters of norms as well as the courts’
public image.
The level of confidence people have in the legal system affects
whether they feel inclined to use the courts (Chapter 4.3). The issue of
public trust becomes even more urgent where users complain about
corruption in the judiciary (Chapter 5.1).
At this point, the issues of access and corruption are interrelated. By
publishing decisions, information about their processes and informa-
tion people need for coming to court and preparing a case, judiciaries
can actively contribute to improving access to justice and reducing cor-
ruption. Judiciaries have a certain monopoly on deciding disputes.
Controlling corruption involves balancing that monopoly with account-
ability (Chapter 5.1). Publishing decisions and information about pro-
cesses, and providing court users with information about bringing
cases to court are tools for reducing discretion, and support impartial
processing and decision making.
3 Work flow management and two-way communication
The technologies in this group include work flow management and
two-way communication. Implementation of these technologies in
courts is largely still experimental. Therefore, this section mainly looks
toward the future, but with a few examples pointing the way.
Two-way interaction moves beyond one-sided information “push” (e-
government, stage 1) and processing downloadable forms on paper
(stage 2). It includes advanced stages of Internet interactivity (Chapter
2.1). For digital access to courts, stage 3 involves electronically receiving
and processing electronic forms. This stage has not been reached by
many courts yet. Beyond this step, there is stage 4, full electronic trans-
actions: case handling, decision and delivery. These two stages logically
belong in the group with the work flow management systems needed
to process the electronic information received.
Digital court access
Two-way communication comes in different forms. Digital court ac-
cess, in the sense of two-way communication, e-filing and full electro-
nic case processing, is still rare. Demand for digital court access will in-
crease as there is more demand for self-representation (Chapter 4.3).
Digital access is not necessarily full online dispute resolution. For ju-
diciaries wanting to expand their services for self-representing litigants,
it is quite possible to provide simple forms of access without having a
sophisticated system for receiving electronic information directly. Digi-
tal access can be increased in stages. It can be developed in small steps,
following the advice on IT development in Chapter 2.2. The first step
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is one-sided information service, discussed extensively in Part 4. The
second step is to provide downloadable forms that can be sent back to
the court in paper form (Chapter 4.3). The third step, not taken by
many courts just yet, is to offer two-way interaction consisting of sub-
mitting forms electronically. The step to come next would be that of a
full transaction: case handling, decision and delivery.
The steps beyond submission of paper forms are no longer just net-
working technology as defined in Chapter 2.1. They logically belong in
the group with work flow management technology because they re-
quire internal electronic case handling processes.
What are the enterprise technology functionalities going to bring?
When posing this question, it is good to keep in mind that, over time,
online transactions (stage 4) will become the norm. The public will
come to expect electronic services from all government organizations.
Judiciaries will need to gear their strategies to moving in the direction
of stage 4 IT. Internally, the stage 4 IT will, with work flow manage-
ment, primarily bring improved process control. Processes can be rede-
signed and standardized much more easily, and reports on events and
activities are much more readily available. Potentially, this improves le-
gal consistency. It can also facilitate balancing caseloads and transparen-
cy on case disposition.
Looking at these impacts in terms of the court user complaints, what
will be their benefit? Possibly, delays will be reduced with improved
process control and incoming electronic information. Improved pro-
cess control may also reduce incentives for corruption. More digital ac-
cess to courts may well constitute improved access to justice.
However, this does not mean that all cases can be covered exclusively
and fully through an electronic exchange of information, in documents
or otherwise. Video communication is far from a regular process in
most judiciaries, even the more advanced ones. Early intervention, a
proven way to reduce complexity in cases, in most cases still implies
face-to-face contact.
What do the enterprise technology functionalities require?
Enterprise technologies affect court work processes more profoundly
than either functional or network technologies. At the present state of
court IT, work flow functionality appears to be a threshold for judici-
aries (Chapters 2.1 and 2.2).
Major shifts in the way courts and judiciaries usually work are re-
quired if they choose to use this functionality. Full electronic proces-
sing requires complete control over the process of receiving and proces-
sing information online. Developing full online proceedings, where ef-
fort is centered on translating all the complexity of the paper based
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procedures into the electronic ones, has been “fraught with difficulty
and delays. Never-ending piloting and mounting costs seem to charac-
terize this approach” (Chapter 2.1). In Chapter 2.2., there is some ex-
perience on ways to avoid this quagmire.
The first requirement is a strategy that lays out the approach, in-
formed by the understanding of how information about court pro-
cesses and information in individual cases both drive court processes.
The overall goal of the strategy should be to safeguard, and where ne-
cessary increase, chances of just, fair judicial decisions. It should at
least address the following issues:
– How the court organization will be involved, based on the under-
standing that IT development and implementation is a process that
involves the court organization, how information plays a role in it,
and IT expertise.
– The development approach to manage the risks of complexity. The
approach should advocate incremental development: starting with
either a simple process or a piloting approach, and move forward in
small steps, re-using experience from the previous steps. It should
also cover simplifying existing processes. The case matrix (Chapter
3.2) can be a helpful tool to identify processes and starting points
for simplification, for example the title group with predictable out-
comes for simplicity and a large enough proportion of the total
caseload to justify an investment.
– The required degree of work process standardization and how to de-
termine it. Total work process standardization may be suitable for
hierarchical, bureaucratic processes. It may also be suitable for
cases with predictable outcomes, like the ones in groups 1 and 2 of
the matrix (Chapter 3.3). Ultimately, the judicial court processes in
groups 3 and 4 need to be open-ended because the outcomes can
go different ways. Hence, total process control may well be undesir-
able. Different processes may have different needs for process con-
trol.
– An acceptable level of effort and resources. The conventional wis-
dom is that automating 80 percent of a process can be done at 20
percent of the cost. Here, keeping development simple involves
using common, proven technology. The strategy should specify
what level should be enough.
– How other court systems’ experience will be tapped. Courts and
court systems that have already introduced more advanced forms of
technology have experience to share.
– Organizational requirements. Much of the information technology
identified, in order to be successful, involves or requires standardi-
zation of court practices or policy formation with regard to judicial
decision making. These activities require active, coordinated work
270 TECHNOLOGY FOR JUSTICE
on the part of courts and judiciaries. These changes also need in-
creased coordination and more centralized management over the
individual courts, in order to work well. Therefore, the strategy
should include any new organizational requirements. Centralization
can concentrate expertise, but it will also bring changes in decision
rights. Individual courts may experience this development as a loss
of autonomy.
4 What has changed?
Looking back, we can say that most courts have used IT to support
their paper processes. Using technology for radical innovation in courts
is rare. The technological revolution happens mainly incrementally.
Both MCOL and Austria’s ERV started small, and have expanded their
functionality to other processes and other user groups step by step.
This section looks back. Has IT support improved the way courts
and judiciaries administer justice by improving timeliness, access and
fairness as in consistency and integrity? This question can be answered
in the affirmative.
Timeliness. Disposition time for ordinary civil cases in the Dutch courts
went from 608 days in 1996 to 420 days in 2007. This change was
brought about by all kinds of interventions: small claims courts’ com-
petence was raised to include larger claims, there is more early inter-
vention, and targeted backlog reduction. Those interventions were mo-
tivated by information from the case registration systems. There has
been development toward standards for disposition times, made possi-
ble by the data from the case registration systems. When the informa-
tion from those data is used with the intention to affect culture and
practice, better timeliness is ensured. In short: those who want to, can
do it.
Access. On the Internet, legal information institutes like Austlii and Bai-
lii, Dutch Rechtspraak.nl and the European Court of Human Rights’
HUDOC database make decisions available free of charge. Public juris-
prudence databases have impacted the justice discourse considerably. It
has made reporting more accurate, it has increased transparency in de-
cisions, and it has enhanced the courts’ shadow function. Reporting in
the press has become much more accurate now that decisions can be
quoted directly from the source. The courts’ shadow function, guarding
and affirming norms, has expanded as a consequence. Court decisions,
when they need to face this public scrutiny, need to become more
transparent. An example is the Promis project in the Netherlands.
Court decisions had been written mainly for lawyers and the higher
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courts; they now need to be understandable for a broader audience.
Public information service on going to court is increasing. This means
more than providing laws and case law. To be acted on, laws and juris-
prudence require context and experience. Court information service re-
quires centralized services to ensure consistency of information.
Consistency. Public scrutiny has also engendered increasing criticism of
court decisions. The criticism focuses partly on equal justice, or consis-
tent administration of justice. For judges, jurisprudence databases are
very important because they can help prevent inconsistent decisions.
Word processing functionalities also have possibilities for increasing
consistency, such as standard texts and intelligent merges. There is in-
creased use of guidelines, something that is considered to be very im-
portant by the courts. I think that under the influence of the availability
of so much information, developing guidelines for consistent decisions
has become a more accepted activity. It is still too early to tell whether
consistency itself has increased.
Integrity. Evidently, public scrutiny is a factor affecting the judiciary’s
integrity. The Internet as a medium for communicating to the public is
used by judiciaries to explain how they protect and promote their own
integrity. Reporting on the way complaints were handled, publishing
the ethics code, asset declarations and the judges’ outside activities can
all help to increase public trust. This means that courts will have to live
up to their own standards, and public scrutiny will ensure that they do.
Governance. In many European judiciaries, the governance structure
has been changed radically in the past ten years where judiciaries were
given governance bodies separate from the Ministries of Justice. The
task of these new bodies largely is to administer courts more centrally,
particularly with regard to budgeting. I believe these changes were also
initiated as a consequence of two developments:
– Increased need for centralized structures to manage the IT
– Increased public scrutiny of the judiciary, bringing higher political
risks for ministers of justice.
5 How is IT changing the administration of justice?
This section looks forward. It attempts to chart some of the develop-
ments that can be expected based on what we now know about IT and
judicial reform. It looks at the way developments in IT will change the
way information is used in the processes involved in administering jus-
tice and how this will change the way justice is administered. This will
also indicate some directions for further research.
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As observed at the beginning of this study, the discourse about IT
tends to be optimistic and not well founded in empirics. Claims that
IT will improve things are taken as a certainty, and not as mere claims.
The discussion below attempts to look forward without such specula-
tive rhetoric. Therefore, readers who have become accustomed to the
usual upbeat tone of the IT debate may be a little disappointed by the
limited scope of the discussion.
Standardization
Online transactions will eventually become the norm in government
services. An early example of online transactions is the United King-
dom’s Money Claim On Line (MCOL, Chapter 3.3). Online transac-
tions, together with public information on court decisions on the Inter-
net, will be a catalyst for more standardized, predictable outcomes.
They will move disputes with predictable outcomes away from the
courts. This trend is already discernible.
Online transactions require increasing process control. This process
control will be developed incrementally. The development process will
also be a catalyst for more standardized, predictable outcomes. In-
creased process control goes together with a tendency towards standar-
dization.
Public availability of information on the Internet will strengthen this
tendency toward standardization. It reinforces the demand for consis-
tency. In the Dutch judiciary, tendencies are discernible confirming
that judges are ready to meet this demand with guidelines for fre-
quently occurring case situations. This trend toward standardization is
inspired by increased transparency and concomitant public scrutiny as
well. Consistency and predictability are considered very important.
Public debate in judicial decisions is increasingly met with the develop-
ment of guidelines. There will be more and more guidelines for judi-
cial decisions in specific categories, limiting judicial discretion. Reason-
ing in decisions increasingly serves to justify deviation from the guide-
lines.
As the guidelines for certain case categories become clear, disputes
will lose their unpredictability. A predictable next step might be that a
court decision will be eliminated from the process. This has already
happened in many European jurisdictions with regard to traffic of-
fenses. Traffic offenses are sanctioned by the administration and those
decisions are reviewed by a court at the request of the sanctioned party.
It has also happened in some countries, where the civil administration
handles divorces not involving under age children. In this model,
courts will only review decisions by the administration or by other deci-
sion making bodies. The judicial role in administrative, criminal and
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civil justice will increasingly be to review other bodies’ decisions at the
request of an interested party.
Disintermediation
Online transactions may also reduce the role of intermediaries. In
some fields, they have already virtually disappeared. This phenomenon
is known as disintermediation. This trend is strengthened by changes
in the legal field. The legal profession, the Bar, is increasingly losing
its monopoly on representing parties in court. Legal aid for court repre-
sentation is being increasingly restricted.
In conventional thinking, subsidized legal aid and access to justice
are easily associated because of the cost aspect of legal advice and assis-
tance. In this view, the impediment to justice is the high cost of legal
advice and assistance. In this perspective, increasing access to justice is
largely understood as intervening in the market for legal assistance by
subsidizing legal aid. As more people turn to the Internet for informa-
tion on resolving justiciable problems, publicly funded web informa-
tion services like Citizens’ Advice Bureaus or Legal Kiosks may increase
access to justice by offering information, advice and assistance free of
charge. Such agencies should be part of a government’s access to jus-
tice strategy. Such services, provided they are effective, will extend ac-
cess to justice to larger groups of the population. Effectiveness requires
a judicious combination of legal and experience information. They will
also require human backup in case of need, since there will always still
be people who need assistance.
Disintermediation also means courts will have to deal more directly
with non-professional court users. Courts providing their own informa-
tion on their own web sites on how to bring in cases eliminate, to a
certain extent, the need for specialized expertise in this respect. Digital
court access can streamline interaction with self-representing court
users. However, assistance in human form will still be necessary for
some types of cases and for people who cannot do without assistance.
This means the need for staff providing this type of support in court
will increase.
Integrity and independence
Will all this public information harm the independence of courts?
Schmidt has argued that information, in the hands of the executive,
could be a threat to judicial independence (Schmidt p. 460). The line
of reasoning is that the executive, holding the purse strings, can then
determine what judges do, and what they should be doing. Conse-
quently, judiciaries and individual judges will be rendered less free to
hand down impartial decisions. Transparency, in this view, allows more
control over the judiciary. I have found no empirical evidence that this
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is the case. This study has learned how increased scrutiny offsets the
risks of judicial monopoly and increased transparency limits discretion,
and thereby prevents opportunities for corruption. Public information
about the way the courts are run, by reporting, based on court case sta-
tistics, is a way to offset the judicial monopoly by accounting for the
way public resources are used. Moreover, a process whereby the budget
is awarded by parliament based on plans and reports justified by statis-
tics is more transparent and less of a threat to the judiciary’s institu-
tional independence than a process without such a factual basis.
Hence, such transparency supports judicial independence.
Knowledge sharing
This study’s approach has obscured the view on some very important
impacts of IT: those on sharing knowledge and information among
professionals such as judges and lawyers. I consider this unfortunate
because knowledge sharing in a very broad sense is critical for the
quality of administering justice. From the Dutch user surveys, we
know court users value judicial expertise highly. In the Netherlands ju-
diciary, the extent to which knowledge is acquired, shared and kept up
to date is part of the quality measuring framework. Judiciaries should
be knowledge-based professional organizations.
The way networking technologies are used in this knowledge sharing
will be a useful field for study. It will help us to understand how IT sys-
tems may support developing judicial expertise, from email, to blog-
ging, to developing expert guidance systems.
What is in it for developing countries?
Does this study hold a specific message for developing countries? Yes
and no. On the one hand, the IT developments are now the same the
world over: office automation and the Internet are global influences.
What is also the same is judiciaries’ inexperience with implementing
IT for their processes. The mechanisms described in this study, how
information works to reduce delay (Part 3), increase access (Part 4) and
reduce corruption (Part 5), are the same everywhere. On the other
hand, differences in levels of development relate to the political context
and have consequences for institutional functioning and available re-
sources (Chapter 5.3). They need to be assessed carefully to determine
starting points for judicial reform, and how to use IT to support them.
However, this advice for context specific programming applies every-
where.
What does it all mean for judiciaries?
Ultimately, the core business of courts everywhere is in deciding mat-
ters where no one knows the right outcome in advance. This involves
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unpredictability and a certain degree of discretion. There is no reason
to assume the use of IT will change it. Both tendencies toward simplifi-
cation will have for an effect that cases that still need to come to court
will be more complicated in nature. There will be relatively more cases
that are the core of judicial business.
The increase in public information service means judiciaries have an
opportunity to exercise their shadow function more actively. It will also
bring more public criticism. Increased exposure and transparency in
individual court cases may well increase the need for courtroom tech-
nology.
In view of all these changes, judiciaries will need to adjust their
structures and develop more expertise in order to leverage IT for im-
proving the administration of justice.
Chapter 6.2 New Research
This is the last chapter of the study. It suggests some topics for further
research. After the summary of what we know from this study in the
previous chapter, this final chapter proposes some areas where more
research might deepen and broaden this study’s findings.
Some topics had to be excluded from the study’s scope for practical
reasons. For the same practical reasons, the scope of treatment of each
of the three issues, delay, access and corruption, had to be limited as
well. Each of them deserves much more study. Other subjects emerged
as noteworthy in the course of the study. Knowledge about IT support
for judicial reform would benefit from studying the fields of learning
from experience with court IT, and the role of information in judicial
integrity and in judicial processes. In all instances, empirical study and
the development of conceptual frameworks should go together.
For each topic, there is a brief expose´ on the problem and how new
research can contribute to its resolution.
1 Learning from experience
Judiciaries can learn from each other when it comes to using IT. For
some, moving to increased digital access presents problems, both stra-
tegic and more practical ones. Learning from other judiciaries and
from other organizations’ experience will help to build understanding
on how IT can improve judiciary performance. This learning would re-
quire organizational frameworks for information exchange, such as wi-
kis, web sites, publications, conferences and platforms. In order to fa-
cilitate this learning, two subjects urgently need more study: a concep-
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tual framework for court IT, and implementation and experimentation
experience.
A meaningful conceptual framework
Learning would also benefit from a conceptual framework for court IT.
This framework should serve the purpose of diagnostics and also for
comparing of implementation levels and systems.
What information on IT in courts is available? There are collections
of country reports by IRSIG (Fabri 2001 and 2003) and there is the
CEPEJ database. There are ad hoc reports from other judiciaries on the
state of IT. The IRSIG reports offer a lot of interesting information, but
comparing the information and putting it into a wider context is diffi-
cult. The CEPEJ reports’ main weakness is that the IT functionality re-
ported by the COE member countries is not very clear. This makes ca-
tegorization difficult. The frameworks used so far have not been ade-
quate.
A conceptual framework should support understanding by facili-
tating categorization that is capable of enabling statements of cause
and effect. Research, building on Chapter 2.1 and on the other findings
of this study, to build a conceptual framework can reduce this weak-
ness; it will also help to draw lessons from experience as discussed in
the next research proposal.
Experimentation and domestication, implementation experience
The experience is that IT applications become fully useful only after
considerable experimentation by users. Here is where the real effects
of IT on the quality of judicial performance become visible.
This study found that implementation is an underestimated issue.
Implementation can be problematic, for lack of understanding how ju-
diciaries and courts actually work or because of underestimating the
implementation requirements. Lack of experience can be an underlying
cause of both. Empirical and comparative research on implementation
could help to fill this information gap, and avoid pitfalls. Mapping the
experimentation that courts are doing in their daily practice would be
an important source of information for the courts and IT leadership
that should inform their IT policies.
The results of such research will help in improving judicial perfor-
mance with a better understanding of the workings of IT in judicial
processes.
2 The roles of information in judicial integrity
Empirical research into corruption in judiciaries is extremely scarce.
The findings in this study have produced some insights, but they cover
PART 6 CONCLUSIONS 277
only a small part of what is relevant. From the findings on judicial
and court corruption in this study, it seems that a more elaborate con-
ceptual framework could aid more targeted empirical research. This
empirical research, in turn, would inform a more accurate conceptual
framework, including a repertoire of remedies.
3 The role of information in judicial processes
How information works in judicial processes was one of the themes of
this study. Empirical study into those processes is extremely scarce.
This study’s scope was largely limited to relatively simple civil proce-
dures. The same approach could be applied to the other fields of law in
order to identify the needs for IT in those fields. Moreover, more com-
plex civil procedures should be studied to uncover their information
needs.
Information processes in criminal law
The topic of information in the criminal justice sector was eliminated
from this study because it deserved more attention than I could have
given it. It needs much more study. The consensus is that an effective
criminal justice information chain improves security in society. The
criminal law chain has its own dynamic when it comes to information.
Hence, it also has its own IT issues. Information primarily comes to
the courts from one source: the prosecution, who get their information
from the police. Increasingly, information in police investigations is
electronic: surveillance camera and wire tapping recordings, and mo-
bile phone records. In the Dutch file-based civil law system, the courts
get descriptions of the content of this information on paper, or in a
word processing format. However, developments are moving in the di-
rection of much more immediate fact-finding in hearings under the in-
fluence of ECHR jurisprudence. There are issues of quality of informa-
tion, and of reliable evidence decisions. There is the question of equal
access to information for all the parties. Consistent sanctioning is also
an issue.
All these problems make IT in this chain an important issue. Experi-
ence with developing IT systems for the criminal justice chain is di-
verse. The Ontario project and the HBS project are examples of early
failure (Chapter 2.2). In the Netherlands, the development of a new
system for both the prosecution and the judiciary has already taken
more than five years. Empirical study of such development experiences
is a necessity. Experience with courtroom technologies becomes more
relevant. For more consistency in sanctioning, database technology
could support generating information on sanctioning trends discussed
below.
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Information processes in administrative law
Information in the administrative law chain had to be excluded from
this study because administrative law is not my field of expertise. It
generally has one-shotters as the initiators and repeat players on the re-
sponding side. It is a very diverse field. Institutional arrangements dif-
fer from one legal system to the next. In contrast to the criminal justice
chain, there are multiple repeat players. The repeat players will mostly
have internal electronic work processes and files. They will also have
policies. There is room for keeping cases out of court here too if the re-
peat players take court decisions into account in their policies.
Research into these processes can help in the understanding how in-
formation technology can help to improve judicial performance.
How to generate trends in judicial decisions
Trends in judicial decision making will become more prominent. The
Internet opens up new possibilities for the judiciary’s shadow function.
In keeping cases out of court, and in preparing for one’s case in court,
there is a need for information on how judges generally approach is-
sues. Increased demand for judicial consistency also requires informa-
tion on trends. We see policy formation on the rise in alimony, labor
compensation, and criminal sanctioning. For policy formation, too, i-
deally information on trends is needed. Information on trends is fun-
damentally different from traditional jurisprudence or case law. It is a
quantitative aggregation of the largest possible number of cases of a
certain type. How to generate this from all those thousands of deci-
sions is an interesting technological challenge.
Information on trends can help the general public and justice see-
kers and those advising and assisting them in making choices that are
more informed. They can help judiciaries and individual judges form
policies, thereby increasing consistency in their decisions.
Information in complex civil justice processes
If judiciaries want to make better use of IT for their core processes in
group 4, complex civil cases, more study of those processes is needed.
The mass compensation claims in banking cases present themselves as
an interesting case for study. The lawyers representing the clients in
those cases are using technology to manage the large numbers of
cases. A study into how the courts dealing with those cases have come
to use information technology to manage the case flow and the infor-
mation in each case should provide some answers regarding the de-
velopment of electronic case processing toward full online dispute reso-
lution.
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Note
1 The only apparent exception is the article by Buscaglia and Ulen, which in fact only
found faster processing time in the decision writing phase when word processing
was used.
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